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The  principal  focus  of  this  research  is  a  comprehensive  defence  of  the  theory 
of  strict  finitism  as  a  foundation  for  mathematics.  I  have  three  broad  aims  in  the 
thesis;  firstly,  to  offer  as  complete  and  developed  account  of  the  theory  of  strict 
finitism  as  it  has  been  described  and  discussed  in  the  literature.  I  detail  the 
commitments  and  claims  of  the  theory,  and  discuss  the  best  ways  in  which  to  present 
the  theory.  Secondly,  I  consider  the  main  objections  to  strict  finitism,  in  particular  a 
number  of  claims  that  have  been  made  to  the  effect  that  strict  finitism  is,  as  it  stands, 
incoherent.  Many  of  these  claims  I  reject,  but  one,  which  focuses  on  the  problematic 
notion  of  vagueness  to  which  the  strict  finitist  seems  committed,  I  suggest,  calls  for 
some  revision  or  further  development  of  the  strict  finitist's  position.  The  third  part  of 
this  thesis  is  therefore  concerned  with  such  development,  and  I  discuss  various 
options  for  strict  finitism,  ranging  from  the  development  of  a  trivalent  semantic,  to  a 
rejection  of  the  commitment  to  vagueness  in  the  first  instance. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
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The  aim  of  this  research  is  to  provide  a  proper  account  of  strict  finitism  as  a 
foundation  for  mathematics,  and  to  provide  a  robust  defence  of  the  theory  against 
numerous  objections  which  have  been  thought  to  deflate  the  theory  as  a  serious  or 
tenable  position.  I  shall  also  aim  to  present  a  model  of  strict  finitism  which,  while  it 
differs  from  the  traditional  account,  will,  I  suggest,  solve  many  of  the  problems 
associated  with  such  an  account. 
An  outline  of  the  project 
Strict  finitism  has  been  discussed  variously  in  the  literature  surrounding  the 
philosophy  of  mathematics,  but  proponents  of  the  theory  are  rare.  For  this  reason, 
perhaps,  there  is  no  reliable,  general  account  of  the  theory,  and  I  hope  to  go  some  way 
towards  offering  such  in  the  opening  chapters  of  this  thesis.  In  particular,  the  notion  of 
surveyability,  which  seems  central  to  the  strict  finitist's  account,  is  used  in  a  variety  of 
contexts  to  mean  anything  from  'is  possible  to  physically  reproduce'  to  'is  recognised 
and  understood  in  the  mind  of  the  surveyor'.  I  shall  try  to  offer  an  account  of 
surveyability  which  clearly  marks  the  bounds  of  the  criterion. 
There  are  also  many  objections  to  the  theory  to  be  found  in  the  literature,  and  a 
large  focus  of  this  thesis  will  be  to  address  these  issues.  Not  least,  there  have  been 
several  attempts  to  show  that  the  theory  is  internally  inconsistent,  and  I  shall  argue 
that  no  such  thing  is  established. 
Lastly,  after  a  thorough  consideration  of  the  various  options  for  the 
formulation  of  a  strict  finitary  model,  including  a  detailed  examination  of  the 
plausibility  of  a  trivalent  semantics,  I  shall  offer  a  form  of  finitism  that  I  have  labelled 
'Fanatical  Finitism',  because,  if  anything,  it  takes  the  fundamental  ideas  of  strict 
finitism  more  seriously  than  a  traditional  account,  which  I  contend  proves  robust  to 
the  various  remaining  obstacles  for  the  position  as  a  whole.  Fanatical  finitism  is,  I 
4 suggest,  the  preferred  model  for  the  strict  finitist  -  and  one  worthy  of  further  study 
both  in  itself  and  for  the  potential  consequences  its  failure  might  have  on  the  finitist 
programme  as  a  whole. 
On  the  subject  of  numbers 
Although  I  shall  offer  some  qualification  in  the  opening  chapter  as  to  why  I 
shall  find  it  convenient  to  focus  on  the  objects  of  mathematics  -  in  particular  on 
numbers  themselves  -  rather  than  on  the  statements  or  proofs  which  must  also 
ultimately  be  the  concern  of  the  philosopher  advancing  a  coherent  theory  for  the 
foundation  of  mathematics,  I  would  also  like  to  be  clear  from  the  start  about  the 
central  concern  of  this  work.  Firstly,  I  should  reiterate  that  numbers  are  of  paramount 
importance  and  interest  to  me  -  my  suspicion  of  the  infinite,  which  will  become 
apparent,  is  a  suspicion  that  it  is  not  a  genuine  number  at  all.  Furthermore,  in  general 
the  objects of  study  will  be  the  natural  numbers;  again,  this  is  largely  for  the  sake  of 
simplicity,  and  to  ensure  that  the  examples  are  intuitively  accessible  in  what  is,  after 
all,  for  many  people  a  very  counter-intuitive  model  for  the  foundation  of  mathematics. 
However,  where  appropriate,  I  shall  also  include  some  discussion  of  the  other  species 
of  number  (in  relation  to  finitism),  and  will  try  to  offer  enough  remarks  to  indicate 
how  what  I  suggest  may  be  successfully  applied  in  a  wider  context. 
I  would  also  like  to  make  some  preliminary  remarks  about  what  I  take  the  term 
number  to  apply  to,  in  an  ordinary  sense.  (I  do  not  mean  here  how  far  I  think  the  term 
'number'  may  be  usefully  applied  'up  the  number  line',  as  it  were;  this  will  be  the 
subject  of  a  good  deal  of  the  work  that  follows.  By  'ordinary'  sense,  I  mean  I  should 
like  to  explain  what  I  understand  by  the  term  '2  is  a  number',  where  2  is  perfectly 
acceptable  as  a  number,  finitistically  speaking). 
There  is  an  apparent  confusion  between  numbers  and  their  physical 
representations,  the  symbols  (or  string  of  symbols)  used  to  represent  the  numbers;  and 
I  have  been  surprised  to  learn  that  many  philosophers  think  the  distinction  is  not  an 
important  one.  It  seems  to  me  that  numbers  are  distinct  from  numerals  in  a  very 
important  sense.  A  numeral  may  be  canvassed  and  not  understood,  and  indeed  this  is 
5 precisely  the  case  for  all  children  before  they  come  to  understand  that  a  particular 
representation  standsfor  a  particular  number.  A  number,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a 
concept  that  one  has  a  possession  of,  irrespective  of  the  presence  of  a  representation 
of  it.  Indeed,  it  is  plausible  that  a  child  might  know  some  of  the  very  early  numbers  in 
a  relational  context  (e.  g.  'there  are  two  apples  over  there')  without  knowing  or 
recognising  which  particular  numeral  represents  that  number.  Moreover,  we  needn't 
think  that  understanding  of  a  particular  notation  (including  its  component  symbols)  is 
an  understanding  of  every  number  in  that  notation  -  in  fact,  I  think  quite  the  opposite. 
When  children  learn  to  count,  they  may  at  first  learn  simply  the  sequence  of  words 
cone' 
, 
'two',  'three',  and  so  on.  But  soon,  if  not  before,  they  will  understand  that  these 
words  refer  to  numbers,  which  they  understand,  and  understand  in  the  sense  that  they 
recognise  that  the  number  'three'  (for  example)  corresponds  to  a  collection  of  three 
things.  We  do  not  teach  numbers  purely  by  the  introduction  of  symbols,  but  by 
explaining  that  the  number  is  exemplified  in  this  or  that  particular  case,  and  then  that 
such  a  number  is  represented  by  this  or  that  symbol.  Two  very  young  children  might 
both  mechanically  be  able  to  count  to  ten,  but  while  one  will  recognise  a  collection  of 
ten  objects  as  exemplifying  the  number,  the  other  may  have  no  understanding  of  the 
concept  and  hence  no  ability  to  use  the  number  appropriately.  And  this  seems  to  hold 
true  if  they  are  both  taught  to  write  the  symbol  '10'  for  'ten'. 
I  maintain  then  that  understanding  of  a  number  is  more  than  simple 
recognition  of  the  numeral.  Children  usually  learn  the  symbol  for  one  hundred  before 
they  have  sorted  out  all  the  numbers  below  it,  and  indeed  when  a  child  who  has  only 
really grasped  the  concepts  of  the  first  few  numbers  is  asked  how  big  numbers  get, 
one  hundred  is  a  good  candidate,  or  one  thousand  perhaps,  or  even  a  million.  But  no 
genuine  understanding  accompanies  the  assertion,  even  though,  as  I  assert,  a  genuine 
understanding  does  accompany  the  numbers  with  which  the  child  can  already  operate, 
and  apply,  like  'two',  or  'five'.  And  this  is  not  because  they  will  recognise  or  can 
write  down  the  symbols  '2'  and  '5'  but  not  '100'  since  in  many  cases  they  will  be 
able  to  do  both. 
On  the  subject  of  numerals,  I  should  also  qualify  my  use  of  this  term 
throughout  my  thesis.  I  have  tried  to  be  careful  to  say  number  when  I  mean  a  number 
in  the  sense  outlined  above,  and  numeral  when  I  mean  a  representation  of  a  number,  a 
physical  inscription;  but  I  have  not  been  so  careful  to  distinguish  between  single-digit 
6 numerals  (the  symbols  0-9  in  Arabic  notation)  and  complex  numerals  (representations 
made  up  of  a  string  or  arrangement  of  single-digit  numerals).  The  reason  for  this  is 
that  I  think  it  is  an  important  part  of  our  recognition  of  numerals  that  we  connect  them 
to  number  concepts  -  and  hence  it  is  an  important  part  of  the  way  in  which  we 
understand  complex  numerals  that they  are  comprised  of  'simple'  (single-digit) 
numerals.  So  while  I  might  speak  of  the  numeral  '100',  1  might  also  suggest  that  the 
representation  contain  three  numerals,  since  I  take  the  meaning  of  numeral  to  mean 
simply  a  representation  of  a  number. 
The  Motivation  behind  a  Strict  Finitary  account 
Strict  finitism,  as  I  shall  describe  in  Chapter  two,  is  fundamentally  committed 
to  an  anti-realist  position  with  respect  to  mathematics.  That  is  to  say  that  the  numbers, 
statements  and  proofs  of  mathematics  are  mind-dependent.  Indeed,  it  is  a 
constructivist  theory  -  it  stems  from  the  idea  that  mathematics  is  constructed  by  the 
mathematician,  and  hence  numbers  (for  example)  are  only  'real'  if  they  are 
constructible.  This  is  a  key  motivation  behind  strict  finitism  -  those  committed  to  a 
realism  about  mathematics,  a  Platonist  ontology  regarding  number,  are  unlikely  to 
find  the  theory  attractive.  I  personally  find  the  constructivist  account  intuitively 
plausible  -  from  the  moment  we  begin  to  learn  about  numbers,  we  begin  to  construct 
them;  the  very  first  mathematical  procedures  that  we  learn  are  constructivist  in  nature: 
simple  addition,  for  example  -  the  notion  that  2+2  makes  4. 
Strict  finitism  is  perhaps  a  natural  extension  of  constructivist  ideas.  It  takes  its 
motivation  in  part  from  an  objection  that  intuitionism,  which  is  also  a  constructivist 
philosophy,  does  not  take  the  tenets  of  constructivisin  seriously  enough.  It  is,  as  I 
shall  show  in  Chapter  eleven,  possible  to  insist  that  even  Strict  Finitism  is  not  the 
natural  'rest-point'  for  constructivist  constraints,  but  for  the  time  being  let  us  just 
point  out  that  Strict  Finitisin  involves  a  strengthening  of  the  constructivist  constraint 
in  what  is,  to  the  strict  finitist,  a  perfectly  natural  direction:  it  requires  that  the  relevant 
construction  is actually  possible,  given  the  actual  constraints  of  human  minds.  If  one 
takes  the  intuitionistic  requirement  that  numbers  must  be  potentially  constructible  in 
7 order  to  be  admissible,  it  is  hard  to  resist  the  thought  that  potential  construction  is 
only  barely  constructivist.  Since  the  constructivist  requirement  is  essentially  that 
numbers  must  be  constructible  in  minds,  it  seems  odd  to  allow  that  nonetheless  minds 
may  (potentially  at  least)  be  as  powerful  as  required  in  order  to  effect  virtually  any 
construction,  short  of  the  unconstructible  (such  as  the  infinite).  Strict  finitism 
maintains  that  if  constructivism  is  going  to  be  a  plausible  constraint,  it  must  be  based 
on  the  actual  powers  of  construction  of  actual  minds. 
This,  then,  I  take  to  be  the  starting  point  for  this  work.  I  shall  look  at  various 
forms  of  finitism,  including  intuitionism,  on  the  understanding  that  all  a  commitment 
to  finitism  involves  is  commitment  to  a  rejection  of  the  infinite  in  mathematics,  but 
my  principle  interest  in  such  investigation  is  in  distinguishing  strict  finitism  properly 
from  these  other  forms,  and  I  shall  assume  from  the  outset  that  there  are  good 
(cons  truc  tivi  st)  reasons  for  pursuing  finitism  'further'  than  in  the  case  of  intuitionism. 
I  would  like  to  close  this  introduction  by  simply  mentioning  that  I  think  there  is  scope 
for  a  finitism  of  a  more  general  kind,  to  which  a  finitist  (particularly  of  the  strict  or 
fanatical  variety)  understanding  of  mathematics  will  be  invaluable,  and  to  which  I 
hope  this  research  will  also  be  indirectly  useful.  Modem  physics  supports  the  notions 
that  both  space  and  time  are  finite,  at  least  in  extension,  and  recent  work  suggests  that 
it  is  not  implausible  to  assert  that  they  are  finitely  divisible  also.  There  are  a  great 
many  paradoxes  of  the  infinite  which  I  think  themselves  warrant  an  investigation  into 
the  plausibility  of  a  'global'  finitism,  and  a  rejection  of  the  problematic  notion  of 
infinity  at  both  the  physical  and  mathematical  levels.  Towards  that  endeavour,  a 
vindication  of  a  strict  finitary  foundation  for  mathematics,  a  task  I  hope  is  at  least 
begun  in  this  volume,  would  be  a  good  place  to  start. 
8 40  PART  ONE. 
A  FISTFUL  OF 
NUMBERS 
A  definition  and 
explanation  of  the 
0 
philosophy  of 
Strict  Fi*ni*ti*sm CHAPTER  L  AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  FINITISM  IN  MATHEMATICS 
The  finitist  program,  conceived  as  broadly  as  possible,  can  be  described  as  having 
a  single  goal  -  the  rejection  of  our  ordinary  concept  of  infinity,  and  the  successful 
interpretation  of  a  coherent  conceptual  schema  that  operates  without  it.  Whatever  the 
prospects  may  be  for  a  successful  attempt  at  the  'physical  level'  -  in  terms  of  the 
extension  and  division  of  matter,  space  and  time  -  it  is  clear  that  a  complete  rejection  of 
the  infinite  will  involve  extensive  revision  of  the  way  in  which  we  commonly  think  about 
mathematics.  Mathematicians  (and  physicists)  certainly  operate  with  a  notion  of  infinity, 
and  in  a  seemingly  unproblematic  manner.  What  are  we  to  say  about  such  practice?  Are 
we  to  reject  mathematics  altogether  because  of  its  adherence  to  such  notions?  Surely  such 
a  conclusion  would  be  unnecessarily  drastic.  In  fact,  some  philosophers  have  tried  to 
support  afinitary  foundation  for  mathematics  -  that  is,  a  basis  for  mathematical  practice 
that  legitimizes  that  practice  up  to  a  point;  and  it  is  upon  these  theories  that  I  wish  to 
focus  my  attention.  Clearly  mathematical  practice  that  involves  use  of  the  infinite  -  be  it 
infinite  quantities,  limits,  or  operations  -  will  have  to  be  viewed  with  the  utmost 
suspicion  during  such  analysis;  even  if  such  theories  may  still  be  pressed  to  provide  some 
account  of  precisely  what  is  going  on  with  practices  involving  recourse  to  infinite 
quantities,  limits,  etc.  Equally,  the  claim  that  the  infinite  remains  useful  in  scientific  and 
mathematical  endeavour  perhaps  deserves  further  examination. 
I  shall  not  here  attempt  to  provide  extensive  responses  on  either  of  these  counts 
however,  as  it  is  the  intention  of  this  study  to  focus  upon  a  single  kind  of  finitism,  namely 
strictfinitism,  and  explore  the  limits  of  this  theory  -  often  in  contrast  to  other  concepts  of 
finitism,  or  even  to  broader  theories  about  numbers  as  mind-dependent  entities.  The 
worries  expressed  immediately  above  are  not,  I  suggest,  problems  peculiar  to  strict 
finitism,  but  to  most  theories  of  this  sort,  as  I  shall  describe  in  more  detail  shortly.  As  to 
the  precise  distinction  between  strict  finitism  and  the  more  general  finitism  I  will  also 
discuss,  the  principle  aim  of  this  chapter  will  be  to  describe  the  distinction  in  detail.  But 
let  us  begin  with  a  clear  statement  of  difference,  so  that  the  intent  may  be  followed  in  the 
upcoming  discussion.  Finitism,  in  the  broadest  sense,  amounts  to  a  rejection  of  actual  or 
10 completed  infinite.  That  is  to  say,  a  finitist  will  not  allow  talk  of  completed  infinite  sets, 
or  of  transfinite  mathematics  (operations  involving  the  actual  infinite  as  a  relative  or 
comparable  quantity).  Finitism  may  perhaps  be  best  characterised  by  a  denial  of  the 
actual,  but  not  necessarily  the  potential  infinite,  following  the  Aristotelian  distinction. 
Strict  finitism,  on  the  other  hand,  denies  that  there  are  any  (potential  or  actual)  infinite 
collections/sequences. 
In  this  opening  chapter,  then,  I  shall  begin  with  a  proper  account  of  the  distinction 
between  strict  and  'classical'  finitism.  I  shall  offer  a  preliminary  account  of  what  is 
known  as  constructivism,  and  describe  how  both  the  strict  and  classical  finitist  interpret 
the  notion  of  constructibility.  Lastly,  I  shall  offer  some  initial  definitions,  not  least  of 
which  is  a  description  of  the  extent  to  which  the  term  'strict  finitism'  should  be  properly 
applied  to  existing  theories. 
On  the  'objects'of  discussion 
Before  I  develop  a  proper  account  of  these  positions,  it  is  prudent  to  establish 
precisely  the  issues  of  debate,  and  the  focus  of  my  own  discussions.  Consideration  of 
mathematical  practice  can  focus  on  different  aspects  of  that  practice,  for  example  on  the 
objects  of  study,  on  the  practices,  rules  or  conventions  in  use,  and  so  on.  I  shall  proceed 
with  an  investigation  largely  focused  on  mathematical  objects  -  that  is  to  say  the 
numbers,  sets,  points,  etc.  -  with  which  a  mathematician  operates.  Moreover,  what  I  am 
most  interested  in  is  an  account  of  the  ontology  of  number  -  what  it  is  for  a  number  to 
count  as  a  number.  The  corresponding  claim  of  any  kind  of  finitism  is  of  course  that 
infinity  can  have  no  such  status  -  there  can  be  no  infinite  magnitudes,  no  legitimate 
numbers  of  infinite  (or  indeed  multiply  infinite)  size. 
Although  number  is  certainly  a  central  concern  of  finitism,  the  notion  of  proof  has 
also  been  traditionally  discussed.  Finitists  have  suggested  that  only  proofs  of  finite 
lengths,  and  involving  only  finite  operations,  should  be  accepted  as  legitimate.  While  I 
shall  devote  some  time  to  discussion  of  proofs,  I  shall  stay  largely  focused  upon  the 
II debate  concerning  numbers.  My  justification  for  doing  so  is,  I  suggest,  that  in  general, 
what  goes  for  numbers,  i.  e.  the  requirements  imposed  upon  that  which  is  to  count  as  a 
legitimate  number,  will  go  afortiori  for  (what  is  to  count  as)  legitimate  proofs  -  since  in 
the  latter  case,  we  are  talking  of  either  proofs  with  a  certain  number  of  steps,  or  else  with 
a  certain  complexity,  which  in  most  cases  will  itself  depend  upon  the  size  of  numbers 
used  in  the  proof. 
As  a  result,  much  of  my  discussion  will  focus  on  questions  about  number  -  and 
the  central  claim  of  any  kind  of  finitism  with  regard  to  numbers  is  that  there  are  only 
finite  numbers.  Infinity  is  not  a  genuine  (legitimate)  mathematical  object,  and  should  not 
be  given  'number-status',  nor  talked  about  as  if  it  has  such  status.  Now,  what  precisely  is 
meant  by  'there  are  only  finitely  many  numbers'  depends  upon  the  species  of  finitism 
under  consideration.  There  seems  to  be  a  broad  usage  of  the  term  in  some  of  the 
literature,  not  all  of  which  will  be  useful  here.  Another  way  to  describe  the  distinction  I 
have  already  offered  (between  finitism  and  strict  finitism),  which  emphasises  the  focus 
upon  numbers  which  I  wish  to  adopt,  is  that  strict  finitism  asserts  not  only  that  there  are 
only  finite  numbers,  but  also  that  there  are  only  finitely  many  of  them.  The  distinction 
may  seem  an  odd  one  at  first  glance,  but  'less-strict'  finitists,  such  as  the  school  of 
intuitionism,  are  happy  with  potentially  infinite  collections  -  that  is,  there  is  nofinite  end, 
as  such,  to  the  numbers  on  such  accounts,  but  the  numbers,  such  as  they  are,  still  never 
exceed  finite  values.  Before  I  get  too  deeply  into  such  questions,  however,  let  me  first 
establish  what  I  take  the  philosophy  of  finitism  to  be,  and  furthermore  how  we  are  to 
precisely  distinguish  strict  finitism. 
Clearing  ambiguity  -  the  uses  of  the  term  finitism' 
Let  us  begin,  then,  with  an  examination  of  what  has  been  broadly  termed 
'Finitism'.  As  I  have  suggested,  it  is  important  to  differentiate  between  finitism  in  a  broad 
sense,  and  the  theory  of  strict  finitism,  but  it  is  not  immediately  obvious  what  theories  are 
to  fall  underneath  the  umbrella  of  finitism.  Mary  Tiles,  for  example,  in  The  Philosophy  of 
12 Set  Theory,  describes  only  two  distinct  forms  of  finitism.  The  first  of  these  is  strict 
finitism,  and  the  theory  of  strict  finitism  as  it  is  traditionally  advanced  is  outlined  (if  not 
exactly  advocated)  in  the  literature  by  (at  least)  Michael  Dummett,  Crispin  Wright,  and 
Paul  Bernays,  and  defended  perhaps  in  part  by  Wittgenstein  and  certainly  by  Aleksander 
Yesenin-Volpin.  Strict  finitism  occasionally  bears  other  names  -  ultra-finitism,  for 
example,  and  sometimes  even  ultra-intuitionism. 
The  second  form  of  finitism  Tiles  has  called  'classical'  finitism,  and  although  she 
identifies  neither  philosophers  nor  specific  schools  of  thought  in  her  description,  by  her 
accompanying  discussion  it  is  clear  that  she  has  in  mind  at  least  the  school  of 
intuitionism,  and  perhaps  also  Hilbert's  finitism. 
The  distinction  between  strict  and  classical  is  assuredly  that  I  outlined  in  the 
previous  section  -  where  classical  finitism  asserts  that  there  are  only  finite  numbers,  strict 
finitism  insists  that  there  are  only  finitely-many  finite  numbers.  Strict  finitism  then  is 
generally  regarded  as  a  more  thorough-going  version  of  'classical'  finitism.  The  view  that 
classical  finitism  encompasses  intuitionism  and  that  strict  finitism  involves  a 
strengthening  of  that  thesis  is  supported  by  Robin  Gandy,  who  writes: 
"I  prefer  this  term  [ultra-finitism]  to  Esenin  Volpin's  'ultra-intuitionism' 
and  Dummett's  'strict  finitism'.  "' 
From  this  it  is  clear  that  Gandy  assumes  the  terms  are  synonymous  with  one 
another,  and  hence  intuitionism  is  equivalent  to,  or  at  least  encompassed  by,  what  Tiles 
describes  as  (classical)  finitism.  In  fact  the  term  'finitism'  is  often  used  in  the  literature  to 
describe  a  commitment  to  there  being  only  finite  numbers;  and  as  such  the  distinction  that 
Tiles  has  in  mind  is  sometimes  reduced  to  a  distinction  between  'finitism'  and  'strict 
finitism'.  This  is  presumably  due  to  Hilbert's  finitist  program,  which  he  simply  calls 
finitism,  but  which  has  more  in  common  (ontologically)  with  the  intuitionists  than  with 
1  Gandy,  Logic  Colloquium  '80,  in  a  footnote  on  p.  145 
13 the  strict  finitists.  Such  a  distinction  is  often  confused,  however;  Joan  Moschovakis 
wntes: 
"intuitionism  differs 
... 
from  finitism  by  allowing  (constructive)  reasoning 
about  infinite  collections"' 
But  here  Moschovakis  clearly  has  in  mind  some  form  of  strict  finitism  when  she 
employs  the  simpler  term  'finitism',  since  there  is  nothing  in  Tiles'  discussion  of 
'classical'  finitism  that  precludes  reasoning  about  infinite  collections,  at  least  to  the 
extent  that  such  collections  are  only  potentially  infinite;  a  constraint  which  at  any  rate  is 
certainly  adhered  to  by  the  intuitionists. 
As  a  final  note  on  this  point,  the  idea  that  Hilbert's  finitism  should  also  be 
included  under  the  broad  heading  of  'classical'  finitism  is  supported  by  Jean-Paul  Van 
Bendegem: 
"The  additional  qualification  [of  the  label  strict  finitism]  serves  to  make 
the  distinction  with  Hilbert's  finitism  which,  roughly  speaking,  can  be 
seen  as  a  form  of  finitism  on  the  meta-level"' 
Here,  Van  Bendegem  suggests  that  the  distinction  between  strict  finitism  and 
classical  finitism  is  between  strict  finitism  (which,  to  further  complicate  matters,  he  refers 
to  often  -  as  in  this  quote  -  simply  as  finitism;  the  distinction  here  is  trivial)  and  David 
Hilbert's  finitism.  Although  Van  Bendegem  does  not  mention  the  intuitionists,  it  is  clear 
that  the  two  philosophies  (intuitionism  and  Hilbert's  finitism)  share  at  least  the  pertinent 
features  ascribed  to  'classical'  finitism  As  a  result,  I  shall  find  it  convenient  in  the 
discussions  that  follow  to  distinguish  between  strict  finitism  and  intititionism,  or  between 
strict  finitism  and  classical  finitism  whenever  the  debate  has  wider  application';  and  the 
2  Moschovakis,  'Intuitionistic  Logic',  Stanford  Online  encyclopaedia 
3  Van  Bendegem,  Tinitism  in  Geometry',  Stanford  Online  encyclopaedia 
4  But  in  much  of  what  follows  I  shall  really  consider  only  intuitionism  as  the  'classical'  counterpart  to  strict 
14 broader  term  'finitism'  I  shall  take  to  apply  to  any  theory  which  takes  as  a  central  theme 
the  rejection  of  the  infinite  as  legitimate  practice. 
SO,  now  that  the  terminology  of  the  debate  is  clearer,  I  would  like  to  turn  my 
attention  to  describing  precisely  the  pertinent  features  I  mention  above,  and  indeed  to  the 
features  in  general  belonging  to  both  the  strict  and  'classical'  finitist  theses.  Moreover,  I 
shall  begin  to  illustrate  the  resulting  commitments  of  each. 
Strictfinitism  vs.  intutionism:  the  differences  and  similarities 
The  central  feature  of  such  theories,  which  is  shared  by  all  (past  and)  present 
finitist  positions,  is  commitment  to  a  view  of  mathematics  called  constructivism.  Van 
Bendegem  describes  this: 
"Finitism  is  one  of  the  foundational  views  of  mathematics  that  is  listed 
under  the  broader  heading  of  constructivism.  It  shares  with  the  many 
forms  of  constructivism  the  fundamental  view  that  mathematical  objects 
and  concepts  have  to  be  accessible  to  the  mathematician  in  terms  of 
constructions  that  can  be  executed  and  performed.  The  various  forms  are 
distinguished  from  one  another  as  to  how  'execution'  or  'performance'  is 
to  be  understood.  "' 
finitisni,  as  the  parallels  and  points  of  difference  are  perhaps  easier  to  distinguish.  Since  the  thesis  is 
intended  as  a  thorough  investigation  of  strict  finitism,  the  subtler  divisions  between  forms  of  classical 
finitism,  that  is  those  competing  theories  that  take  as  ftindamental  only  that  the  numbers  will  never  exceed 
finite  values,  need  not  concern  us  greatly.  Intuitionism  is,  at  any  rate,  the  more  contemporary  theory,  and  the 
existing  literature,  when  considering  the  distinctions,  makes  much  more  use  of  the  intuitionist  position. 
5  Ibid.  In  fact,  here,  Van  Bendegem  is  again  speaking  of  strict  finitism  when  he  says  simply  'finitism'  -  this 
is  due  to  the  aforementioned  tendency  in  the  literature  to  distinguish  between  strict  finitism  and 
intuitionism,  rather  than  strict  and  'classical'  finitism  as  Tiles  does.  Intuitionism  is  one  of  the  better-known 
constructivist  theories,  and  I  am  sure  it  is  precisely  the  difference  in  approach  between  strict  finitism  and 
intuitionism  that  Van  Bendegem  has  in  mind  when  he  describes  a  difference  between  the  'various  forrns'  of 
constructivism. 
15 The  important  requirement  imposed  by  constructivism  is  then  that  any  operation 
or  object  in  mathematics  is  constructible  by  (and  in)  the  mind.  Expressed  in  such  terms,  it 
is  not  hard  to  understand  why  a  constructivist  is  committed  to  the  idea  that  mathematical 
objects  are  mind-dependent  entities.  Douglas  Bridges  describes  this  generally 
constructivist  position  in  relation  to  intuitionism: 
"In  Brouwer's  philosophy,  known  as  intuitionism,  mathematics  is  a  free 
creation  of  the  human  mind,  and  a  [mathematical]  object  exists  if  and  only 
if  it  can  be  (mentally)  constructed.  "' 
In  the  next  chapter  I  shall  return  to  the  idea  of  mind-dependent  objects  in 
mathematics,  as  the  idea  is  central  to  the  traditional  strict  finitist  thesis. 
I  would  like  to  turn  now  to  what  I  shall  call  the  finitist  internal  debate,  and, 
following  Van  Bendegem  above,  distinguish  strict  and  'classical'  finitism  from  one 
another  by  looking  at  the  different  ways  in  which  each  interprets  the  constructivist 
constraint.  As  we  have  seen,  both  positions  are  committed  to  the  idea  that  mathematical 
objects  are  mind-dependent  mental  constructions.  Furthermore,  both  place  limits  on  the 
scale  over  which  these  mathematical  objects  range  -a  scale  that,  (in  accordance  with  the 
original  binding  premise  of  finitism  that  I  have  acknowledged),  does  not  extend  over 
infinite  quantities/totalities.  Where  they  differ  is  over  the  definition,  and  size,  of  this 
scale. 
The  limit  is  imposed  in  the  following  way.  Both  theories  make  the  intuitively- 
appealing  (and  constructivism-friendly)  claim  that  there  is  some  limit  to  what  can  be 
constructed  by  a  mind;  as  a  consequence  of  this,  and  the  accompanying  assumption  that 
mathematical  objects  are  mind-dependent  entities  in  the  first  place,  it  follows  that  there 
are  limits  to  the  mathematical  objects  that  can  be  constructed,  and  hence  limits  to  the 
6  Bridges,  'Constructive  Mathematics',  Stanford  Online  encyclopaedia 
16 mathematical  objects.  For  classical  finitism,  the  limit  is  a  potential  one,  or  a  limit  of 
possibility,  whereas  for  strict  finitism,  the  limit  is  an  actual  one. 
Classical  finitism,  such  as  the  intuitionism  first  espoused  by  Brouwer,  holds  that 
only  those  mathematical  objects  and  proofs  that  can  in  principle  be  constructed,  (or  in 
principle  recognised,  perhaps),  by  a  mind,  are  to  be  counted  among  the  'real'  matter  of 
mathematics.  The  notion  of  'in  principle'  is  not  an  unproblematic  one,  but  it  does  seem, 
intuitively  at  least,  to  capture  much  of  mathematical  practice  within  its  compass.  The 
intent  of  the  thesis  is  relatively  clear.  If  a  machine  can  construct  or  deal  with  a  proof  or  a 
number,  then  so,  in  principle  at  least,  could  a  sufficiently  advanced  human  mind.  Again, 
if  advanced  notation  affords  us  intellectual  tools  that  we  would  not  otherwise  possess  and 
with  which  we  are  able  to  construct  greater  and  greater  numbers  and  proofs,  we  might 
imagine  that  with  sufficient  intellect,  such  operations  would  be  possible  without  the 
'artificial'  contribution  of  the  notation.  Infinite  quantities,  sequences,  etc.,  can  never  be 
constructed  (even  potentially),  and  hence,  according  to  the  intuitionists  (and  indeed 
finitists  in  general),  do  not  belong  to  the  domain  of  mathematics. 
The  idea  is  that  as  long  as  we  can  imagine  a  construction  occurring,  even  if  we 
cannot  actually  perform  it  ourselves,  we  can  accept  it.  Intuitionism  is  not  therefore  limited 
by  human  mortality,  or  the  constraints  of  human  minds,  etc.  As  long  as  we  can  imagine 
performing  the  construction  if  we  lived  significantly  longer,  or  our  brain  power  was 
significantly  improved,  the  construction  is  admissible  -  it  is  only  in  the  cases  where  the 
construction  is  in  principle  impossible,  such  as  those  constructions  of  infinite  length 
where  the  construction  cannot  in  principle  be  completed,  that  we  should  reject  the 
purported  number  or  proof  altogether.  The  number  (in  exponential  notation)  1010"'  is 
clearly  beyond  my  actual  powers  of  construction  -  if  I  tried  to  count  to  it  from  1,  for 
example,  my  life  would  end  before  I  completed  the  construction.  Moreover,  long  before 
that,  I  would  probably  'lose  count',  and  become  confused  by  the  operation.  However,  for 
the  intuitionists,  1010ý0  is  a  legitimate  construction  (and  hence  a  legitimate  number)  -I  can 
imagine  that  if  my  life  were  sufficiently  long,  my  powers  of  attention  sufficiently 
advanced,  I  just  would  eventually  count  to  101010.  The  sense  of  'imagine'  here  is 
17 n'k  preSUMaDlysimilar  to  the  example  where  I  can  imagine  when  I  watch  a  child  who  is 
learning  to  count  (to,  say,  5),  that  when  their  ability  and  power  of  attention  has 
sufficiently  improved,  they  just  will  be  able  to  count  to  200. 
Strict  finitism  picks  up  the  problematic  notion  of  'in  principle'  possibility,  and 
discards  it,  insisting  instead  that  the  only  constructions  that  are  to  count  in  the  relevant 
way  are  those  that  may  be  in  practice  constructed.  Again,  this  is  not  an  unproblematic 
notion,  and  indeed  the  focus  of  criticism  for  strict  finitism  centres  around  the  idea  of  in 
practice  possibility;  but  again,  the  idea  has  an  intuitive  attraction.  The  point,  raised  by  the 
strict  finitist,  is  that  we  can  have  no  clear  definition  of  what  it  is  for  something  to  be  in 
principle  possible,  as  the  intuitionist  requires.  We  do,  however,  have  a  clear  idea  of  what 
it  is  for  something  to  be  in  practice  possible,  and  although  we  may  doubt  the  sharpness  of 
the  definition,  our  understanding  of  the  notion  is  at  least  apparent.  Strict  finitism  insists 
that  while  the  intuitionists  are  correct  to  assert  that  there  are  no  constructions  that  are  not 
in  principle  performable,  they  are  wrong  to  'stop'  at  in  principle  possibility.  Rather,  what 
is  required  is  that  I  am  actually  able  to  construct  the  number  or proof  in  practice,  for  it  to 
count  as  legitimate  mathematics. 
Note  that  there  are  a  number  of  ways  we  can  interpret  'construct'  in  this  context  - 
we  might  simply  require  that  one  is  able  to  reproduce,  or  write  down,  a  number  for  it  to 
count  as  having  been  constructed.  Indeed,  some  of  the  literature  focuses  on  predicates 
such  as  'inscribable  in  Arabic  notation'  as  the  strict  finitist  requirement  for  number-hood. 
However,  most  serious  strict  finitist  theories  will  impose  a  further  limit,  to  avoid 
complications  arising  from,  say,  different  notations.  1010'0  is  perfectly  (in  practice) 
inscribable  in  exponential  notation,  but  probably  not  in  Arabic  notation,  and  certainly  not 
in  stroke  notation.  Usually,  strict  finitism  requires  that  one  can  reliably  construct  a 
number,  which  implies  an  intuitive  understanding  of  the  number.  In  this  case,  the  above 
example  of  10  10'0  is  presumably  not  a  legitimate  number,  since  I  cannot  reliably  construct 
it.  (Again,  depending  upon  what  we  say  about  notations  -I  cannot  reliably  construct  it  in 
Arabic  notation).  Much  more  remains  to  be  said  on  this  matter,  and  I  shall  indeed  do  so  in 
18 due  course  -  the  issue  of  different  notations  will  receive  extensive  treatment  in  chapter 
four. 
Strict  finitism,  unlike  intuitionism,  places  a  strict  limit  on  the  size  of  a  number; 
moreover,  it  defines  that  limit  in  very  human  terms,  according  to  the  intellectual  abilities 
of  human  minds.  This  requirement  is  often  called  surveyability  -a  number  is  surveyable 
if  and  only  if  the  mathematician  can  reliably  construct  it  in  practice.  The  strength  of 
reliability  here  is  also  a  matter  for  some  debate,  and  I  shall  return  to  the  question  shortly  - 
but  in  general,  as  I  outlined  above,  the  strict  finitist  will  require  not  only  that  the  number 
may  be  physically  constructed  (i.  e.  written  down  in  a  human  lifetime),  but  also  somehow 
understood  by  the  mathematician.  A  number  in  Arabic  notation  that  has  658  numerals  in 
it  is  presumably  not  surveyable,  since  even  though  somebody  could  relatively  easily  write 
one  down,  it  is  unlikely  that  anyone  could  have  any  real  grasp  of  its  magnitude  (or,  say, 
divide  it  by  3  and  be  certain  they  were  without  error). 
Now,  since  the  strict  finitist  requires  that  only  the  putative  numbers  which  are  to 
count  as  legitimate  numbers  are  those  which  are  surveyable,  strict  finitism  is 
consequently  committed  to  an  upper  limit  on  the  actual  size  offinite  numbers,  something 
the  intuitionist  need  not  agree  to.  Furthermore,  for  the  strict  finitist,  the  scale  of  thefinite 
numbers  (and  thus  all  numbers,  from  her  point  of  view)  will  be  much  smaller  than  that 
adopted  by  the  intuitionists,  or  moreover  by  traditional  mathematics. 
One  might  understand  the  distinction  between  the  two  theories  in  the  way  I 
described  in  the  opening  of  this  chapter.  Intuitionism  ('classical'  finitism)  holds  the  view 
that  there  are  only  finite  numbers  -  strict  finitism  maintains  the  stronger  view  that  there 
are  onlyfinitely  many  finite  numbers.  That  is  also  to  say  that  the  intuitionist  holds  that  the 
numbers  are  open  ended,  whereas  the  strict  finitist  thinks  that  they  are  closed.  For  the 
intuitionist,  there  is  a  potential  infinity  of  finite  numbers  -  but  this,  of  course,  does  not 
imply  an  actual  infinity.  It's  just  that  we  won't  ever  run  out.  The  strict  finitist  on  the  other 
hand,  denies  that  there  is  (or  can  be)  a  potential  infinite. 
19 Constructivism  then  is  a  branch  of  anti-realism'  that  holds  that  not  only  are 
numbers  mind-dependent,  but  that  they  are  properly  constructed  within  the  mind.  In  this 
way,  the  finitist  asserts  that  only  those  numbers  (or  indeed  proofs)  which  it  is  possible  to 
construct  in  the  mind  are  to  count  as  proper  mathematical  practice.  Of  course, 
construction  must  be  construed  in  the  relevant  sense  -  it  is  not  enough  for  you  to  think  of 
the  words  'one  million'  to  have  constructed  the  number;  instead,  the  finitist  will  require 
that  you  could  construct  it  from  first  principles,  e.  g.  by  counting.  (Although  this  is  by  no 
means  the  only  sense  of  construction  at  work.  I  shall  also  develop  this  theme  considerably 
in  Chapter  three). 
It  is  now  quite  a  small  step  to  see  how  the  finitist  rejects  the  infinite  -  since 
numbers  are  those  mathematical  abstract  objects  which  may  be  constructed  in  the  mind, 
and  infinite  constructions  are  impossible,  no  numbers  will  be  of  infinite  magnitude.  The 
same  holds,  under  a  constructivist  account,  for  all  the  objects  and  statements  of  ordinary 
mathematics,  and  hence  the  constructivist  finitist  rejects  all  infinitistic  elements  of 
mathematics. 
Strict  Fin  itism 
This,  then,  is  the  fundamental  idea  of  strict  finitism:  numbers  are  mind-dependent 
objects  that  must  be  surveyably  constructible  in  practice  if  they  are  to  count  among  the 
legitimate  objects  of  mathematics. 
The  surveyability  requirement  may  seem  intuitively  attractive,  at  least  to  those 
with  anti-realist  feelings  about  mathematics.  If  numbers  are  constructions  within  the 
mind,  surely  there  can  be  no  numbers  that  cannot,  in  practice,  be  intelligibly  constructed 
7  Anti-realism  about  mathematics  is  broadly  the  view  that  mathematics  (the  objects,  practices,  or  truth 
values  of  statements  within  mathematics)  is  mind-dependent.  The  next  chapter  will  focus  on  the  relationship 
between  anti-realism  and  constructivisn-i,  and  on  a  proper  examination  of  what  it  is  to  be  an  anti-realist 
about  mathematics. 
20 (in,  or  by,  the  mind)?  It  would  seem  odd  to  suggest  that  we  might  construct  o.  ects  in  our 
mind  which  we  did  not  fully  understand  -  how  then  are  we  responsible  for  their  creation, 
moreover  for  their  ontology?  Surveyability  is  a  complex  requirement,  however,  and  one 
that  deserves  considerable  attention.  For  now,  let  me  close  this  chapter  with  a  summary  of 
Strict  Finitism,  and  a  brief  look  at  the  problems  I  shall  be  focusing  on. 
The  tenets  of  strict  finitism  may  be  summarised  as  follows: 
i)  It  is  a  constructivist  theory.  Numbers  are  mind-dependent  constructs,  and  in  this 
sense,  strict  finitism  is  an  anti-realist  thesis. 
ii)  Accordingly,  the  only  'numbers'  (as  traditionally  conceived)  we  are  to  take  as 
legitimate  mathematical  practice  are  those  which  may  be  constructed. 
iii)  Further  to  the  intuitionist  constraints  (that  numbers  must  be  constructible  in 
principle),  the  strict  finitist  requires  that  numbers  must  be  constructible  in 
practice. 
iv)  Therefore,  while  the  intuitionists  will  allow  all  finite  numbers  (as  classically 
understood),  since  any  finite  number  is  in  principle  constructible,  the  strict 
finitist  will  only  admit  a  proportion  of  the  finite  numbers  as  classically 
understood.  ' 
v)  This  leads  to  the  (often  problematic)  notion  of  a  'cap',  or  limit  to  the  numbers. 
What  exactly  determines  this  limit  depends  upon  the  precise  formulation  of 
'possible  to  construct  in  practice'  -  on  the  simplest  reading,  strict  finitism  may 
be  seen  as  asserting  that  a  number  is  constructible  in  practice  if  and  only  if  it  can 
be  written  down  in  a  suitable  notation,  e.  g.  'inscribable  in  Arabic  notation'. 
However,  more  sophisticated  formulations  will  advance  a  'surveyability' 
requirement  of  some  kind,  of  which  inscribability  is  the  weakest  requirement. 
8  Naturally,  the  strict  finitist  will  not  argue  that  she  does  not  allow  all  finite  numbers,  or  that  she  denies  the 
existence  of  any  finite  numbers  -  but  by  the  description  'all  finite  numbers'  she  will  not  mean  the  same  as 
the  platonist;  and  the  platonist  may  think  that  she  denies  the  existence  of  a  great  many.  But  for  the  strict 
finitist,  the  extension  of  the  term  'finite  number'  is  defined  by  the  actual  possibility  of  construction,  and 
hence  the  set  of  finite  numbers  it  is  actually  possible  to  construct  will  constitute  all  the  finite  numbers. 
21 Typically,  surveyability  will  require  some  measure  of  intuitive  grasp  of  the 
number  constructed. 
In  the  following  three  chapters,  I  shall  focus  on  a  proper  explanation  of  the 
commitments  and  claims  of  strict  finitism,  as  briefly  outlined  here.  However,  for  all  that  I 
shall  say  here,  it  must  be  admitted  that  strict  finitism  is  not  a  popular  theory  in  the  search 
for  a  foundation  of  mathematics.  There  are  a  number  of  objections  frequently  raised,  and 
in  the  later  chapters  of  this  thesis  I  shall  attempt  to  meet  the  charges  on  behalf  of  strict 
finitism.  The  claim  that  strict  finitism  is  committed  to  a  vague  totality  of  numbers,  and 
that  such  totalities  are  intrinsically  incoherent,  is  the  most  prominent  charge  laid  against 
the  theory  -  and  I  will  consider  the  major  contributors  to  this  debate  carefully.  There  are 
one  or  two  other  objections  in  the  literature,  which  I  shall  also  examine,  but  I  shall  not 
elsewhere  address  what  is  perhaps  the  most  obvious  initial  objection;  so  I  shall  spare  a 
few  words  to  discuss  it  here. 
The  charge  is  that  of  simple  implausibility;  this  is  the  intuitive  objection  that  strict 
finitism  leads  to  an  implausible  notion  of  a  cap  on  the  numbers  -a  limit,  somewhere  on 
what  we  think  of  as  the  ordinary  number  line,  below  which  we  are  supposed  to  accept  that 
the  numbers  are  legitimate,  and  above  which  they  are  not.  I  do  not  think  this  is  as 
problematic  as  it  first  appears,  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  it  only  seems  problematic  from  the 
standpoint  of  aplatonistic  conception  of  number,  and  only  if  we  forget  that  the  strict 
finitist  criterion  for  admissibility  is  based  on  a  mind-dependent  conception  of  numbers, 
and  a  constructivist  one  at  that.  It  does  not  seem  odd  to  us,  by  comparison,  that  emotions 
can  only  last  for  a  finite  amount  of  time,  dependent  upon  the  constraints  of  the  mind. 
Mourners  get  over  their  grief  in  time,  broken  hearts  mend.  The  suggestion  of  a  cap  on 
emotion  duration  is  not  implausible,  because  we  already  think  of  emotions  as  mind- 
dependent  entities.  Why  then,  if  numbers  were  accepted  as  mind-dependent  entities, 
should  constraints  or  limits  on  their  properties  seem  intuitively  implausible?  Simply,  I 
91  shall  explain  the  Platonist  position  in  more  detail  next  chapter  -  briefly,  it  is  a  theory  that  takes  an 
opposite  stance  to  that  of  anti-realism,  to  the  extent  that  numbers  are  mind-  independent  objects;  objects  in 
the  world  in  some  sense.  It  is  also  called  realism  about  mathematics,  and  is  the  traditional  position  on 
ontology,  at  least,  both  in  the  philosophy  of  mathematics  and  in  the  practices  of  mathematicians  themselves. 
22 think,  because  we  traditionally  think  about  numbers  as  mind-independent  entities,  without 
proper  qualification.  It  is  no  small  coincidence  that  mathematical  practice  operates  as  if 
numbers  are  mind-independent  numbers,  without  asking  for  proper  justification.  Hence, 
we  learn  to  think  about  numbers  as  individual,  mind-independent  entities  as  we  learn 
about  mathematics  -  and  such  thinking  becomes  entrenched  in  our  intuitive  responses. 
A  second  reason  that  the  cap  on  the  number  line  may  seem  implausible  is  that  we 
tend  to  think  about  the  number  line  in  relatively  small  finite  terms  -  the  suggestion  that 
there  is  a  cap  seems  absurd  because  we  intuitively  place  the  cap  somewhere,  arbitrarily 
certainly,  but  where  we  can  still  conceive  of  legitimate  numbers  above.  But  the  strict 
finitist  will  not  insist  that  the  limit  lies  where  we  may  obviously  conceive  of  numbers 
above  and  below,  like  50,  or  9999.  Instead,  the  strict  finitist  suggests  that  the  cap  lies 
precisely  where  our  ordinary  intuitive  grasp  of  numbers  runs  out  -  where  we  can  no 
longer  clearly  think  about  numbers  beyond. 
Difficulties  of  the  Dialectic 
A  related  issue  arises  for  strict  finitism,  in  that  this  traditional  conception  of 
numbers  as  a  mind-independent,  completed  totality,  leads  to  certain  semantic  assumptions 
regarding  the  members  of  that  totality  -  assumptions  which  the  finitist  will  wish  to  resist. 
It  is,  for  example,  convenient  in  the  discussion  to  speak  of  'numbers'  below  the  cap,  and 
'numbers'  above,  since  traditionally  all  of  these  entities  are  numbers.  Strictly  speaking 
(no  pun  intended),  the  finitist  ought  to  speak  only  of  'putative  constructions'  above  the 
cap,  and  numbers  below.  When,  in  the  examples  given  earlier,  I  spoke  of  the  'number' 
1010", 
,I  ought  more  cautiously  to  speak  of  a  putative  number  construction,  or  some  such, 
at  least  until  it's  status  is  assured  on  the  relevant  (in  this  case,  strict-)  finitist  grounds. 
As  a  result,  the  strict  finitist  is  often  faced  with  the  unpromising  task  of  rejecting 
some  4numbers'  as  being  numbers,  which  to  many  may  seem  absurd;  but  all  this  really 
highlights  is  that  the  anti-realist,  constructivist  position  has  not  enjoyed  traditional 
23 success  -  and  not  that  it  is,  in  itself,  necessarily  implausible.  Certainly,  finitism  will 
require  not  only  a  revision  to  mathematical  practice",  but  also  to  the  semantics,  since 
what  we  call  numbers  will  not  always  be  numbers  on  a  (strict)  finitary  account. 
There  remains  a  question  as  to  what  the  strict  finitist  will  say  about  those 
traditionally  conceived  'numbers'  which  lie  without  the  proper  boundaries  of  number  on 
a  strict  finitary  model.  There  are  perhaps  two  obvious  options  here  -  firstly,  to  maintain 
that  nothing  is  referred  to  in  such  cases,  such  that  any  talk  of  these  entities  is  meaningless; 
secondly,  perhaps  more  plausibly,  that  reference  to  such  entities  involves  the  use  of  empty 
terms".  This  latter  response  is  to  commit  the  strict  finitist  to  some  form  of  fictionalism 
with  respect  to  mathematical  entities  that  are  not  encompassed  by  the  proper  definition  of 
number,  so  that,  for  example,  '10  to  the  power  of  10  to  the  power  of  10'  will  be  an  empty 
term,  and  the  entity  to  which  it  refers  a  fictional  entity  at  best. 
The  semantic  problem  remains  a  difficult  one  for  anyone  attempting  to  outline  the 
strict  finitist  program  within  the  traditional  paradigm.  I  shall,  therefore,  in  what  follows, 
try  to  be  precise,  and  speak  of  'putative  constructions',  or perhaps  'putative  numbers',  for 
cases  which  have  not  been  admitted  as  legitimate  numbers;  but  sometimes,  if  only 
heuristically,  it  will  be  convenient  to  speak  of  'numbers'  in  a  looser  sense.  I  have 
experimented  with  various  conventions,  such  as  using  a  capital  N  for  Numbers  in  the 
strict  finitist  sense,  and  lower-case  n  for  numbers  in  the  traditional  sense,  but  the  result  is 
I  fear  more  confusing  and  not  less;  it  is  I  hope  sufficient  to  remind  the  reader  that  in 
sometimes  speaking  generally  of  'numbers',  (above  the  cap,  for  example),  I  in  no  way 
intend  to  commit  the  strict  finitist  to  there  being  putative  constructions  with  genuine 
number  status  above  the  cap,  since  this  would  be  simply  and  obviously  contradictory. 
10  Indeed,  it  should  be  observed  that  some  fon-ns  of  finitism  will  be  very  revisionist  with  regard  to 
mathematical  practice,  while  other  forms  will  be  less  so.  Nonetheless,  it  is  clear  that  any  form  of  fmitism 
which  is  serious  about  the  ontological  commitment  (to  a  finite  set  of  numbers)  will  result  in  a  revision  of  the 
mathematicians  proper  domain.  Traditionally,  I  suspect,  the  less  revisionist  the  particular  finitist  position, 
the  more  plausible  it  has  been  seen  to  be. 
"  Although  this  is  not  to  say,  as  in  the  previous  case,  that  such  terms  are  meaningless,  per  se;  just  that  there 
is  no  'real'  entity  to  which  the  term  refers. 
24 CHAPTER  11:  ANTI-REALISM  AND  CONSTRUCTIVISM 
In  the  previous  chapter,  I  suggested  that  constructivism  is  a  branch  of  anti- 
realism,  and  that  the  (strict)  finitist  will  be  committed  to  both.  I  would  like,  in  the  first 
part  of  this  chapter,  to  explore  the  relationship  between  the  two,  and  outline  the  extent  of 
that  commitment.  I  shall  describe  the  debate  between  the  anti-realist  and  defenders  of  the 
opposing  position  of  realism  about  mathematics,  so  that  the  commitments  of  strict 
finitism  to  anti-realism  may  be  made  explicit.  I  will  examine  the  difference  between 
being  an  anti-realist  (or  realist)  about  the  objects  of  mathematics,  and  being  an  anti-realist 
about  the  truth  of  mathematical  statements.  I  consider  the  various  possible  combinations 
of  these  views,  and  demonstrate  that  a  (constructivist)  strict  finitist  that  is  committed  to 
an  anti-realism  in  one  sense  must  be  committed  to  an  anti-realism  in  the  other. 
In  the  second  part  of  this  chapter,  I  shall  turn  my  attention  to  the  work  of 
Wittgenstein,  and  discuss  the  idea  that  he  attempted  to  develop  a  non-revisionary  form  of 
strict  finitism;  since  it  seems  as  though  any  thoroughgoing  constructivism  (as  a  narrower 
form  of  anti-realism)  is  likely  to  be  drastically  revisionary.  Here  I  shall  also  introduce  the 
notion  of  surveyability,  and  distinguish  between  what  I  call  the  'weak'  and  'strong' 
claims  of  strict  finitism.  The  'weak'  claim  at  least  is  supported  by  Wittgenstein,  the 
strong'  claim  is  that  more  usually  advanced  by  the  strict  finitist  as  an  (assuredly 
revisionist)  theory  on  the  foundation  of  mathematics. 
Part  I-  The  realism/anti-realism  debates 
As  I  hinted  at  earlier,  finitism,  in  its  various  forms,  seems  to  be  committed  to 
some  form  of  anti-realism  with  respect  to  the  operations  and  subject  matter  of 
mathematics.  But  just  what  does  this  commitment  amount  to?  Moreover,  what  is  it  for 
any  philosophical  theory  regarding  the  foundations  of  mathematics  to  be  committed  to  a 
realist  or  anti-realist  position?  Stewart  Shapiro,  in  Thinking  about  Mathematics,  describes 
two  approaches  toward  a  realist/anti-realist  distinction  with  respect  to  a  general 
foundation  of  mathematics  -  one  motivated  by  a  consideration  of  the  nature  of  the  objects 
25 of  mathematical  study  (numbers,  points,  lines,  planes,  etc.  ),  and  the  other  arising  from  a 
shift  in  focus  from  the  objects  to  the  objectivity  of  mathematical  statements  and  their  truth 
values;  a  shift  attributed  (by  Shapiro  and  Dummett  at  least)  to  the  influence  of  Georg 
Kreisel. 
The  Ontological  issue 
The  first  of  these  realist/anti-realist  debates  is  a  question  of  ontology.  Realism  in 
ontology  with  respect  to  the  objects  of  mathematical  study  describes  a  commitment  to 
what  is  often  called  platonism  in  mathematics.  The  idea  behind  realism  in  ontology  is  that 
mathematical  objects  are  mind-independent;  which  is  to  say  that  they  exist  independently 
-  over  and  above,  as  it  were  -  the  efforts  of  mathematicians.  The  alternative  view,  anti- 
realism  in  ontology,  has  more  in  common  with  the  idealist  schools  of  philosophy,  and 
takes  mathematical  objects  as  solely  mind-dependent  entities.  As  Shapiro  points  out, 
there  is  at  least  one  serious  worry  for  each  position;  in  fact,  the  nature  of  the  debate  sets 
these  problems  against  one  another,  so  that  in  adopting  either  realism  or  anti-realism  one 
opens  oneself  to  the  challenge  of  the  other.  This  situation  is  described  by  Paul  Benacerraf 
in  'Mathematical  Truth'  (1973),  and  the  problem  has  been  subsequently  described  as 
Benacerraf  s  dilemma.  The  point  of  this  dilemma,  in  the  current  context,  may  be  taken  to 
be  as  follows.  If  we  are  realists  about  mathematics,  we  are  committed  to  an  external 
'domain'  of  mathematical  objects,  which  is  furthermore  usually  taken  to  be  eternal, 
acausal  and  independent  of  space-time.  If  this  is  the  case,  there  is  an  explanatory  gap  to 
be  bridged  regarding  how  we  come  to  know  anything  about,  or  interact  with,  this  external 
domain. 
On  the  other  horn,  if  we  are  anti-realists,  while  we  may  easily  explain  away  this 
problem,  since  the  subject  matter  of  mathematics  is  mind-dependent  and  therefore  mental 
interaction  with  it  is  unproblematic,  we  are  left  with  the  seemingly  (similarly  intractable) 
problem  that  the  account  of  what  it  is  for  mathematical  statements  to  be  true  will  now  not 
be  consistent  with  our  account  of  truth  for  statements  in  ordinary  language.  That  is,  on  a 
platonist  (realist)  account,  a  statement  such  as  "7  is  bigger  than  4"  has  the  same  'logico- 
26 grammatical'  form  as  a  statement  like  "Jupiter  is  bigger  than  Mars",  since  'Jupiter'  and 
7  are  both  mind-independent  objects.  But,  as  Benacerraf  contends,  any  theory  that 
manages  to  offer  an  account  that  answers  the  epistemological  worry  (including,  in  the 
present  context,  anti-realism),  is  incapable  of  issuing  in: 
4C  a  homogeneous  semantical  theory  in  which  the  semantics  for  the  statements  of 
mathematics  parallel  the  semantics  for  the  rest  of  the  language"' 
Essentially,  for  Benacerraf,  there  is  a  tension  between  the  epistemological 
problem  of  explaining  how  we  come  to  know  any  mathematical  propositions,  and  the 
semantic  problem  of  offering  an  account  of  the  truth  conditions  of  mathematical 
statements  which  treats  them  in  essentially  the  same  way  as  other  statements  of  ordinary 
language.  A  theory  (like  realism)  which  is  able  to  account  for  the  semantic  issue  seems 
incapable  of  solving  the  epistemological  concern',  while  theories  (like  anti-realism) 
which  address  the  epistemological  worry  are  unable  to  offer  a  unifon-n  semantics  that 
covers  both  mathematical  statements  and  ordinary  (or  at  the  very  least  scientific) 
statements. 
There  are  no  easy  answers,  then;  but  it  seems  as  though  any  foundation  for 
mathematics  must  face  one  or  other  of  the  horns  of  this  dilemma  at  some  point  along  the 
line.  My  intent  here  is  simply  to  establish  that  any  enquiry  into  ontology  must  face  an 
explanatory  gap,  and  that  it  will  present  no  special  problem  for  finitism;  also,  perhaps,  to 
reinforce  the  idea  that  I  introduced  in  the  last  chapter  that  we  should  not  simply  accept 
the  traditional  Platonist  account  because  it  is  the  more  familiar  -  commitment  to  a  realism 
in  ontology  is  not  without  problems  of  its  own. 
1  Benacerraf,  'Mathematical  Truth',  p.  661 
2  Although,  it  is  perhaps  only  fair  to  say  that  there  has  been  more  effort  to  resolve  the  dilemma  on  the 
realist's  behalf  than  on  the  anti-realists.  One  approach  to  the  dilemma  from  the  realist's  position  is  to 
suggest  that  numbers  are  mind-independent  physical  objects.  Such  a  solution,  if  convincing,  would  avoid 
the  dilemma,  since  physical  objects  are  eminently  'knowable',  and  the  epistemological  worry  is  rnitigated. 
27 The  issue  of  Objectivity 
The  second  realist/anti-realist  distinction  addressed  by  Shapiro  arises  from  a 
debate  regarding  the  truth  of  mathematical  statements,  and  turns  on  the  question  of 
whether  mathematical  statements  are  objectively  true  or  false.  Realism  in  truth  value 
describes  a  commitment  to  the  idea  that  all  mathematical  statements  are  independently 
and  objectively  true  or  false.  This  position  allows  for  the  possibility  that  there  are 
unknowable  truths  in  mathematics,  since  there  may  be  mathematical  statements  which  are 
not  (even  in  principle)  within  our  epistemic  reach  to  determine  conclusively,  but 
conversely  it  rules  out  the  possibility  that  there  are  indeterminately  true  or  false 
statements,  since  even  such  statements  will  necessarily  be  either  true  or  false.  On  the 
other  hand,  anti-realism  in  truth  value  is  a  position  that  maintains  that  there  are  no 
objective  truths  or  falsehoods  in  mathematics,  which  in  turn  entails  that  there  are  no  in 
principle  unknowable  truths.  Anti-realism  in  truth  value  allows  for  the  possibility  of 
indeterminate  statements,  but  note  that  for  many  anti-realists  in  truth  value  (Dummett,  for 
example),  this  does  not  amount  to  a  claim  that  there  exist  certain  statements  with 
indeterminate  truth  values.  Instead,  the  countenancing  of  this  possibility  amounts  to  no 
more  than  a  refusal  to  assert  that  there  are  not  -  that  is,  a  refusal  to  assert  that  every 
statement  is  determinately  either  true  or  false.  The  re  ection  is  precisely  that  of  the  law  of 
excluded  middle:  that  every  statement  is  necessarily  either  true  or  false.  But  the  rejection 
of  the  law  of  excluded  middle  does  not  entail  the  existence  of  statements  which  are 
themselves  actually  neither  true  nor  false. 
The  commitments  offinitism 
Traditionally  then,  finitism  as  a  school  of  thought  -  although  divided  on  some 
central  concerns  as  we  have  seen  -  is  generally  committed  to  at  least  an  anti-realism  in 
ontology.  As  Shapiro  points  out,  a  commitment  to  an  anti-realism  in  ontology  at  least 
suggests,  if  not  exactly  requires,  commitment  to  an  anti-realism  in  truth  value.  Perhaps 
this  is  a  little  quick  (and  indeed  Shapiro  qualifies  the  statement  with  reference  to 
28 positions  that  attempt  to  reconcile  either  form  of  realism  with  a  corresponding  anti- 
realism  regarding  the  other),  but  it  seems  as  though  for  finitism  in  general,  commitment 
to  an  anti-realism  in  ontology  goes  hand  in  hand  with  anti-realism  in  truth  value. 
We  shall  see  why  this  must  be  the  case  presently.  In  fact,  many  finitists  take  the 
ontological  assumption  (of  the  mind-dependence  of  mathematical  objects)  as 
fundamental.  Brouwer  states  the  case  most  clearly  for  the  intuitionists: 
"Mathematics  rigorously  treated  from  this  point  of  view,  including 
deducing  theorems  exclusively  by  means  of  introspective  construction,  is 
called  intuitionistic  mathematics.  In  many  respects  it  deviates  from 
classical  mathematics.  In  the  first  place  because  classical  mathematics 
uses  logic  to  generate  theorems,  believes  in  the  existence  of  unknown 
truths,  and  in  particular  applies  the  principle  of  the  excluded  third 
expressing  that  every  mathematical  assertion  ...  either  is  a  truth  or  cannot 
be  a  truth.  In  the  second  place  because  classical  mathematics  confines 
itself  to  predeterminate  infinite  sequences  for  which  from  the  beginning 
the  nth  element  is  fixed  for  each  n.  )53 
We  can  pick  out  of  this  a  commitment  to  both  anti-realism  in  ontology,  from  the 
last  sentence,  and  anti-realism  in  truth  value,  from  the  third.  The  commitment  to 
constructivism  is  fundamental  for  the  finitist  -  'introspective  construction'  determines  the 
limits  of  mathematical  practice.  Since  such  construction  will  never  lead  us  to  construct 
completed  infinities,  ("predetermined  infinite  sequences",  in  Brouwer's  words),  such 
sequences  are  inadmissible  on  a  finitist  account.  Constructivism  is  incompatible  with  a 
realism in  ontology  because  this  realism  seems  inescapably  to  imply  a  completed  infinity 
of  (objective,  mind-independent)  numbers.  That  is  to  say,  if  one  allows  that  the  realm  of 
mathematical  discourse  contains  reference  to  mind-independent  objects,  then  it  is  hard  to 
escape  the  conclusion  that,  independent  of  our  recognising  each  object,  the  entirety  of 
objects  is  already  and  objectively  available  for  discussion.  (Rather  like  when  one  refers  to 
Brouwer,  "Consciousness,  philosophy  and  mathematics"  p.  90 
29 the  children  in  a  school  -  one  is  not  referring  to  the  children  one  knows  in  a  school,  or 
has  epistemic  access  to,  but  rather  to  the  predetennined  totality  of  children  in  the  school, 
regardless  of  whether  we  even  know  how  many  children  there  are.  ) 
Furthermore,  perhaps  centrally  for  the  finitists,  there  is  a  problem  regarding  how 
the  size  of  any  objective  collection  (whether  finite  or  infinite)'  could  be  detennined  or 
even  constrained  by  the  subjective  limits  of  the  mind.  Since  finitism  draws  its  motivation 
from  a  claim  about  what  is  constructible  in  the  mind,  it  would  seem  very  odd  to  insist  that 
such  criteria  could  have  any  influence  at  all  on  a  domain  of  mind-in  dependent  objects.  It 
should  also  be  observed  that  a  variety  of  similar  worries  accompany  such  an  idea; 
finitism,  particularly  strict  finitism,  faces  the  problem  of  vagueness  when  delineating  a 
limit  of  constructibility  -  and  while  we  may  be  perhaps  uncomfortable  about  this  notion 
with  regard  to  mind-dependent  entities  and  their  properties,  we  are  likely  to  find  even  less 
plausible  the  idea  that  there  exists  an  inherent  vagueness  in  a  collection  of  mind- 
independent  objects.  ' 
Distinguishing  the  issues  -  compatibility 
Now  let  us  return  to  the  claim  I  made  at  the  outset  of  the  previous  section,  that  for 
finitism  in  general,  commitment  to  an  anti-realism  in  ontology  goes  hand  in  hand  with 
anti-realism  in  truth  value.  To  see  why,  let  us  consider  the  compatibility  of  these  varieties 
of  realism  and  anti-realism.  Is  it  really  possible  to  hold  anti-realism  in  ontology 
consistently  with  realism  in  truth  value?  Or  realism  in  ontology  with  a  corresponding 
anti-realism  in  truth  value?  And  what  are  the  consequences  for  finitist  positions?  To 
answer  such  questions,  we  must  first  look  at  the  motivation  behind  such  assertions. 
4  By  'objective  collection',  I  simply  mean  a  collection  which  exists  'in  the  world',  and  independent  of  mind 
-  any  collection  about  which  we  shall  be  realists  in  ontology.  'Stones  on  the  beach',  for  example,  or 
'people  in  the  room'. 
5  It  should  be  acknowledged,  however,  that  there  are  those  who  posit  mind-independent  worldly  vagueness 
-  that  is,  they  maintain  that  vagueness  is  a  property  of  things  in  the  world.  In  fact,  Michael  Tye,  who's 
position  on  vagueness  we  shall  look  at  in  detail  in  Chapter  10,  suggests  something  along  these  lines  -  he 
asserts  there  are  vague  objects,  like  mountains;  which  are  clearly  mind-  independent. 
30 One  might  attempt  to  motivate,  on  behalf  of  the  platonists,  a  realism  in  ontology 
without  a  corresponding  commitment  to  a  position  on  the  truth  value  distinction.  To  be 
fair  to  the  platonists,  this  is  not  their  usual  route  to  such  a  position;  most  of  them  are 
thoroughgoing  realists  in  truth  value  as  well.  But  the  question  as  to  the  plausibility  of 
such  a  position  remains  an  interesting  one.  One  such  position  suggests  that  the  objects  of 
mathematical  discourse  need  not  exist  prior  to  our  speaking  about  them,  in  that  there  need 
not  be  a  domain  of  objectively  true  or  false  mathematical  statements  prior  to  our 
discovery  or  assertion  of  them.  However,  in  our  assertion  of  statements  involving 
mathematical  objects,  such  objects  come  about,  or  perhaps  more  correctly  become 
relevant.  This  is  then  to  say  very  little  about  realism  or  anti-realism  in  truth  value,  but 
asserts  something  approaching  the  platonist  realism  in  ontology. 
As  a  result,  it  seems  as  though  -  at  least  in  principle  -  one  can  follow  a  consistent 
route  through  anti-realism  in  truth  value  to  realism  in  ontology.  But  is  this  really  the 
case?  The  position  suggested  here  implies  a  much  weaker  ontology  than  that  suggested 
by  the  platonists  in  (as  is  usual)  adhering  to  a  realism  in  ontology.  In  the  sense  that  the 
objects  of  study  are  mind-independent,  the  suggestion  is in  accordance  with  the  doctrine. 
But  the  mind-independent  objects  as  so  defined  seem  to  lack  a  certain  permanence  and 
reality  which  the  platonists  would  presumably  like  to  hold  onto.  For  the  platonist,  a 
realism  in  ontology  usually  entails  a  commitment  to  a  collection  of  mind-independent 
objects  which  is  not  subject  to  change,  with  determinate  properties  (even  perhaps  pre- 
determined  properties),  and  the  corresponding  realism  in  truth  value  that  statements  about 
them  are  going  to  derive  meaning  from.  A  common  understanding  of  the  commitment  of 
the  platonists  is  one  in  which  the  truth  (and  hence  the  meaning)  of  mathematical 
statements  for  the  platonists  consists  in  reference  to  distinct  (and  pre-determined) 
properties  of  the  objects  referred  to. 
So,  is  it  really  plausible  to  suggest  that  one  may  be  a  platonist  with  respect  to 
ontology  (that  is,  to  hold  a  realism  in  ontology)  whilst  remaining  agnostic  with  respect  to 
truth  value  (or  indeed  committed  to  an  anti-realism  in  truth  value)?  If  we  are  charitable  to 
such  a  position,  we  may  say  that  the  debate  is  still  up  in  the  air.  Certainly,  as  Shapiro 
describes,  there  are  philosophers  working  on  a  theory  of  mathematics  that  supports 
31 realism  in  ontology  with  anti-realism  in  truth  value.  Such  philosophies  however,  and  to 
bring  the  discussion  back  into  the  context  of  this  research,  are  unlikely  to  be  finitary.  Any 
finitist  position  -  to  the  extent  that  such  a  philosophy  turns  upon  a  claim  of 
constructibility  within  the  mind  -  that  attempts  to  support  a  realism  in  ontology  is  quickly 
going  to  come  up  against  the  intractable  problems  outlined  previously.  Moreover, 
although  there  have  been  attempts  to  entertain  the  possibility,  it  is  often  more  as  an 
exercise  to  demonstrate  the  independence  of  the  position  adopted  by  the  anti-realist  in 
truth  value  from  any  question  of  ontology,  and  not  as  a  serious  attempt  to  advance  a 
finitist  mathematics  on  inter-compatible  grounds  between  anti-realism  in  truth  value  and 
realism  in  ontology. 
What  is  of  greater  significance  to  the  current  debate  is  the  question  over  whether 
or  not  an  anti-realism  in  ontology,  (as  a  general  and  often  fundamental  commitment  of 
finitism),  is  compatible  with  a  realism  in  truth  value.  We  have  seen  that  the  finitist  will, 
in  making  a  claim  about  the  constructive  powers  of  the  mind,  wish  to  adhere  to  an  anti- 
realism  in  ontology;  which  is  to  say  that  the  objects  of  mathematics  are  mind-dependent 
entities.  From  such  a  position  then,  is  it  possible  to  move  to  a  realism  in  truth  value?  It 
seems  to  me  that  such  a  move  would  require  that  the  mind-dependent  objects  of  study 
contain  "hidden"  and  objective  properties.  The  only  way  that  mind-dependent  objects 
could  give  rise  to  objective  truth-values  would  be  for  them  to  possess  certain  properties 
over  and  above  those  that  the  creating  mind  assigns  to  them  -  properties  that  they  cannot 
fail  to  possess,  or  else  properties  that  they  were  destined  to  have  upon  creation,  such  that 
later  statements  about  them  were  always  to  come  out  determinately  and  objectively  true 
or  false.  But  then  our  notion  of  a  mind-dependent  object  is  in  crisis  -  how  may  such 
independent  properties  come  into  being,  independently  (as  it  were)  of  their  creator?  As 
long  as  such  objects  are  mind-dependent  in  the  ordinary  sense,  their  properties  remain 
knowable  and  indeed  assignable  by  the  mind  in  which  they  are  created.  We  can  further 
see  this  point  by  revisiting  an  earlier  extrapolation,  in  that  realism  in  truth  value  allows 
for  the  possibility  of  unknowable  truths.  Here  again,  surely  no  unknowable  truths  are 
possible  regarding  mind-dependent  objects?  (Note  that  the  requirement  is  not  that  the 
truth  be  unknown,  but  that  it  is unknowable.  There  would  need  to  exist,  under  such  an 
32 interpretation,  something  in  the  nature  of  the  object,  itself  a  mind-dependent  entity,  that  is 
unknowable  to  the  mind  in  which  it  is  created.  It  is  hard  to  see  how  such  an  interpretation 
could  be  coherently  advanced.  ) 
It  becomes  clear  that  for  the  finitist,  there  is  no  common  ground  to  be  had 
between  a  realism  in  truth  value  and  an  anti-realism  in  ontology.  The  two  views  cannot 
be  held  consistently  together.  There  is  no  alternate  route  to  the  position  by  taking  a 
realism  in  truth  value  as  fundamental,  and  moving  to  an  anti-realism  in  ontology;  for  in 
such  a  case,  in  virtue  of  what  precisely  could  statements  about  these  mind-dependent 
objects  be  objectively  (and  pre-determinately)  true?  Not  by  reference  to  the  objects 
themselves,  since  that  would  require  the  objects  to  have  existed  prior  to  construction, 
which  is  contrary  to  the  central  thesis  of  the  anti-realist  in  ontology. 
In  fact  the  case  is  stronger  still,  in  that  it  begins  to  look  as  though  one  cannot  hold 
realism  in  truth  value  consistently  with  anti-realism  in  ontology  given  any  philosophical 
position  on  the  foundations  of  mathematics,  at  least  in  accordance  with  the  definitions 
laid  out  here.  Shapiro,  in  his  aforementioned  qualification,  outlines  a  programme  by 
Charles  Chihara  and  Geoffrey  Hellman  which  aims  to  combine  a  thoroughgoing  anti- 
realism  in  ontology  with  a  realism  in  truth  value.  But  here  the  notion  of  anti-realism  in 
ontology  differs  importantly  from  the  one  with  which  we  are  presently  operating  - 
Chihara  and  Hellman  are  operating  with  a  kind  of  nominalism,  which  asserts  that 
mathematical  objects  do  not  exist  at  all.  The  notion  of  anti-realism  in  ontology  that  we 
are  dealing  with,  (and  importantly  that  finitism  is  generally  committed  to),  is  that  of  the 
objects  of  mathematics  as  mind-dependent  entities.  They  exist,  certainly,  but  as  mind- 
dependent  constructs,  and  not  independent  of  the  mind  of  the  constructors.  To  this 
extent,  the  programme  of  Chihara  and  Hellman,  whose  interpretation  is  different,  is 
largely  irrelevant  to  the  present  debate. 
Our  interim  conclusion  is  thus  that  an  anti-realism  in  ontology,  most  often 
adopted  as  fundamental  by  finitists  for  reasons  we  have  explored,  must  also  commit  the 
finitist  to  an  anti-realism  in  truth  value.  While  there  may  still  be  a  debate  for  the 
33 platonists  about  the  compatibility  of  anti-realism  in  truth  value  with  realism  in  ontology, 
the  finitist  remains  a  thoroughgoing  anti-realist  with  regard  to  mathematical  practice. 
Part  11  -  Constructivism  and  Anti-Realism 
We  have  seen  that  anti-realism  in  truth  value  follows  from  anti-realism  in 
ontology  for  the  finitist.  It  will  be  convenient  therefore  to  talk  simply  of  a  commitment  to 
anti-realism,  by  which  I  mean  to  imply  a  commitment  to  both.  It  is  now  of  interest  to 
determine  the  relationship  between  Anti-realism  and  Constructivism.  It  seems,  as  I  have 
suggested,  that  constructivism  is  a  branch  of  anti-realism,  and  commitment  to 
constructivism  necessarily  involves  commitment  to  an  anti-realism  (in  ontology  and 
about  truth  value).  However,  I  have  also  intimated  that  the  strict  finitist's  constructivist 
requirement  may  be  described  in  terms  of  surveyability,  and  hence  it  ought  to  be  the  case 
that  commitment  to  surveyability  entails  a  commitment  to  anti-realism.  Moreover,  all 
such  theories  are  going  to  be  revisionist  about  mathematics  -  that  is,  they  are  going  to 
reject  some  amount  of  traditionally  accepted  mathematical  practice  (and  'numbers'). 
However,  there  is  one  notable  exception  in  the  literature  that  suggests  further 
investigation  is  required:  that  of  Wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein'S  non-revisionary  strictfinitism? 
Let  me  begin  with  the  assertion,  which  I  shall  fully  explore  next  chapter,  that 
constructivism  entails  a  limit  of  some  kind.  The  limit  is  imprecise  -  indeed,  it  is  perhaps 
hard  to  establish  that  any  such  limit  exists  for  intuitionism;  as,  in  one  sense,  we  may 
always  'help  ourselves'  to  more  numbers;  construction  in  principle  is  perhaps  limited 
only  in  one  sense.  However,  as  far  as  strict  finitism  is  concerned,  it  is  easier  to  see  that 
construction  in  practice  is  limited.  Even  seen  simply  as  a  physical  limit  to  the  size  of 
inscriptions,  say,  or  a  temporal  limit  on  the  life  and  inscribing-  speed  of  any  inscriber,  it 
should  be  plain  that  there  are  (still  finite)  'outer-reaches'.  Furthermore,  it  is  clear  that 
34 commitment  to  a  limit  of  constructibility  (or  surveyability)  when  combined  with  an  anti- 
realism  in  ontology  leads  (for  the  strict  finitist  at  least)  to  a  finite  cap  on  the  numbers  that 
there  are.  Numbers  are  mind-dependent  objects,  the  mind-dependent  objects  must  be 
constructed,  and  there  is  therefore  a  limit  to  the  numbers  which  may  be  constructed  in 
practice.  I  shall  return  to  this  in  detail  shortly,  but  for  now  let  me simply  call  this  the 
'strong'  finitist  claim.  ' 
Wittgenstein,  however,  appears  not  to  be  committed  to  an  anti-realism  in 
ontology,  and  yet  his  programme  has  been  called  strict  finitistic;  indeed,  I  shall,  in  the 
next  chapter,  use  Wittgenstein's  formulation  of  'surveyability'  as  a  foundation  for 
establishing  precisely  what  is  intended  by  the  criterion.  But  how  can  this  be?  The  answer 
is  simply  that  although  Wittgenstein  is  indeed  offering  surveyability  requirements  which 
will  be  of  tremendous  use  to  the  constructivist,  Wittgenstein  himself  is  making  no 
commitment  to  constructivism  -  instead,  he  is  making  what  I  shall  call  the  'weak'  finitist 
claim.  Let  me  proceed  with  an  examination  of  Wittgenstein's  commitments. 
It  seems  primajacie  strange  that  Wittgenstein  should  be  supporting  a  strict  finitist 
thesis,  given  that  strict  finitism  is  one  of  the  most  revisionary  positions  on  the 
foundations  of  mathematics.  This  seems  to  directly  contrast  with  Wittgenstein's  explicit 
desire  to  maintain  a  non-revisionary  approach.  For  Wittgenstein,  it  is  not  the  role  of 
philosophy  to  set  out  the  parameters  of  mathematical  practice,  but  instead  to  interpret  and 
describe  such  practice  in  an  informative  way.  However,  Crispin  Wright,  in  Wittgenstein 
on  the  Foundations  ofMathematics  describes  in  detail  grounds  upon  which  Wittgenstein 
might  be  interpreted  as  advancing  the  idea  of  surveyability  without  the  corresponding 
strict  finitist  commitment  to  ontology.  Obviously,  if  this  can  be  shown  conclusively, 
Wittgenstein  may  avoid  the  revisionist  charge.  Wright  summarises  this  at  the  end  of  a 
chapter  on  surveyability: 
61  am  deliberately  distinguishing  this  from  the  strict  finitist  claim,  although  I  shall  make  some  remarks  in 
the  next  chapter  on  classical  finitism  and  the  imposition  of  limits,  after  which  it  should  be  evident  why  it 
may  be  more  correct  to  formulate  in  these  terms  the  'strong'  strict  finitist  claim,  and  subsequently  (as  will 
become  apparent)  the  'weak'  strict  finitist  claim. 
35 "the  stress  on  surveyability  may  be  viewed  as  issuing  not  from  a 
background  anti-realism  of  strict  finitist  type  but  from  rejection  of  the 
objectivity  of  internal  relations  ... 
Nowhere  does  Wittgenstein  envisage 
that  his  idea  might  have  a  bearing  on  what  deserves  acceptance  as  sound 
mathematics.  "' 
Now,  the  issue  regarding  whether  Wittgenstein  escapes  the  revisionist  charge, 
while  a  difficult  question,  need  not  really  concern  us  here.  Without  diving  into  the 
complexities  of  Wright's  extensive  discussion  on  Wittgenstein's  possible  non-revisionary 
formulation',  it  is  sufficient  to  note  that  if  this  interpretation  of  Wittgenstein's 
surveyability  requirements  is  coherent,  then  it  seems  as  though  it  is  at  least  possible  to 
assert  the  limit  of  mental  construction  with  regard  to  mathematical  objects/statements 
without  assuming  a  commitment  to  anti-realism  in  ontology.  ' 
The  important  assertion  is  that  Wittgenstem  may  be  construed  as  making  a  weaker 
claim  than  that  of  the  usual  strict  finitist  thesis,  to  the  extent  that  he  is  not  necessarily 
concerning  himself  with  the  ontological  debate  (nor  with  the  debate  about  the  objectivity 
of  mathematical  statements).  Instead,  he  can  be  understood  as  making  the  claim  that  there 
is  simply  a  limit  to  what  the  mind  is  capable  of  dealing  with,  mathematically  speaking. 
Let  us  call  this  then  the  'weak'  finitist  claim:  notice  that  it  is  similar  to  the  original 
7  Wright,  Wittgenstein  on  the  Foundations  o  Mathematics,  p.  139  f 
8  This  is  one  of  the  larger  projects  undertaken  by  Wright  throughout  the  course  of  Wittgenstein  on  the 
Foundations  of  Mathematics.  The  idea  turns  upon  Wittgenstein's  rule-following  criteria  and  his 
understanding  of  the  nature  of  'proof;  as  may  be  indicated  by  the  phrase  'rejection  of  the  objectivity  of 
internal  relations',  it  is  another  question  to  ask  whether  Wittgenstein  is  committed  to  an  anti-realism  in  truth 
value.  This  may  have  considerable  bearing  on  the  type  of  debate  outlined  above,  as  when  Durnmett  asserts 
the  possibility  of  an  anti-realism  in  truth  value  with  either  position  on  ontology.  To  some  extent, 
Wittgenstein  might  be  read  as  attempting  the  same  thing. 
9  There  are  other  ways  to  interpret  Wittgenstein  of  course.  Durnmett  writes:  "Wittgenstein's  main  reason 
for  denying  the  objectivity  of  mathematical  truth  is  his  denial  of  the  objectivity  of  proof  in  mathematics,  his 
idea  that  a  proof  does  not  compel  acceptance;  and  what  fits  this  conception  is  obviously  the  picture  of  our 
constructing  mathematics  as  we  go  along.  "  ('Wittgenstein's  Philosophy  of  Mathematics')This  last  sentence 
implies  that  Wittgenstein  is  committed  to  an  anti-realism  in  ontology.  For  our  purposes,  it  is  not  so 
important  to  decide  what  Wittgenstein  actually  meant,  but  rather  if  a  certain  way  of  interpreting  him  is 
coherent.  It  is  my  belief  that  the  approach  by  Wright  alluded  to  here  will  coherently  lead  us  to  the 
conclusion  that  a  claim  about  constructibility  need  not  (and  does  not)  entail  a  conirnitment  to  anti-realism 
in  ontology. 
36 intuitive  (and  still  broadly  constructivist)  claim  of  the  finitists,  who  then  advance  the  idea 
to  tell  us  something  about  the  ontology  (and  indeed  objectivity)  of  mathematics.  What  is 
lacking  from  Wittgenstein  is  any  commitment  to  anti-realism  in  his  constructivism  -  he 
can  be  seen  as  making  a  claim  about  numbers  (or  proofs)  such  that  they  can  be 
constructed,  (and  not  that  they  must);  but  moreover,  (and  this  is  the  intent  and  limit  of  his 
constructivism)  the  only  ones  which  are  going  to  be  fully  intelligible  to  us  are  those  that 
actually  can  be  constructed. 
Wittgenstein's  assertion  is  thus  that  we  should  only  allow  surveyable  proofs  as 
'fully-intelligible'  -  but  this  is  more  from  the  perspective  of  our  own  reliability  to 
understand  than  it  is  to  say  anything  about  the  intrinsic  reliability  of  mathematical 
practice.  Where  we  cannot  construct  (or  'survey'),  we  must  be  cautious  in  our  dealing 
with  mathematics  -  any  unconstructible  proofs  cannot  count  as  genuine  proofs,  since  it  is 
something  about  a  proof  as  such  that  requires  we  are  not  mistaken  in  it.  Where  we  cannot 
be  certain  we  are  not  mistaken,  we  should  refrain  from  holding  that  any  mathematical 
(proof-pattern'  is  a  proof  -  since  it  is  not  as  reliable  as  that.  But  note  that  this  is  not  to  say 
that  the  proof  is  not  right;  just  that  we  should  be  wary  of  asserting  its  correctness.  He 
writes: 
"Finitism  and  behaviourism  are  quite  similar  trends.  Both  say,  but  surely,  all  we 
have  here  is....  Both  deny  the  existence  of  something,  both  with  a  view  to  escaping 
from  a  confusion. 
What  I  am  doing  is,  not  to  show  that  calculations  are  wrong,  but  to  subject  the 
interest  of  calculations  to  a  test.  I  test  e.  g.  the  justification  for  still  using  the  word  ... 
here.  Or  really,  I  keep  on  urging  such  an  investigation.  I  shew  that  there  is  such  an 
investigation  and  what  there  is  to  investigate  there.  Thus  I  must  say,  not:  "We  must  not 
express  ourselves  like  this",  or  "That  is  absurd",  or  "That  is  uninteresting",  but:  "Test  the 
justification  of  this  expression  in  this  way".  You  cannot  survey  the  justification  of  an 
expression  unless  you  survey  its  employment;  which  you  cannot  do  by  looking  at  some 
facet  of  its  employment,  say  a  picture  attaching  to  it.  "  (Witt.  App.  11,18) 
37 As  Wright  concludes  on  the  matter,  Wittgenstein's  notion  of  constructibility, 
described  as  surveyability,  is  not  in  itseýf  revisionary.  As  Wright  describes: 
"...  the  stress  on  surveyability  ... 
is  not  obviously  of  itse4f  revisionary;  where, 
after  all,  in  classical  mathematics  does  anyone  ever  have  recourse  to  an  unsurveyable 
proof?  Nowhere  does  Wittgenstein  envisage  that  his  idea  might  have  a  bearing  on  what 
deserves  acceptance  as  sound  mathematics.  He  talks  of  an  intention  to  alter  not  the 
practice  of  mathematics  but  our  conception  of  the  significance  of  certain  mathematical 
results.  "10 
Understood  in  these  terrns,  the  weak  finitist  claim  seems,  as  I  have  said, 
somewhat  intuitively  appealing.  Certainly,  there  are  mathematical  operations  which  lie 
beyond  the  scope  of  the  human  mind  to  perform.  (Even  perhaps  potentially  -  the  classical 
finitist  will  presumably  want  at  least  those  calculations  involving  infinite  steps  to  fall  into 
this  category).  The  problem,  and  the  crux  of  the  present  debate,  is  that  such  a  claim, 
construed  in  these  weak  terms,  says  nothing  about  the  ontology  of  mathematical  objects 
(or  even  the  objectivity  of  mathematical  statements).  It  is  simply  an  epistemological 
claim,  concerned  with  the  limitations  of  the  human  mind.  It  is  therefore  a  claim  perfectly 
consistent  with  any  position  on  the  realist/anti-realist  divide  with  regard  to  mathematics. 
The  'weak'and  'strong'finitist  claims 
Now  it  can  be  seen  that  the  weak  (constructivist)  claim  of  (stnct)  finitism  can  be 
accepted  by  all,  and  in  particular,  may  be  coherently  admitted  by  those  who  wish  to  retain 
a  realism  in  ontology  with  respect  to  the  objects  of  mathematics;  furthermore,  it  is  a  claim 
entirely  consistent  with  a  mind-independent  domain  of  a  collected  infinity  of  numbers. 
The  limit  simply  indicates  where,  in  dealing  with  this  domain,  our  intellectual  faculties 
fail  us.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  additional  (strict  finitist)  conclusion  that  there  is  a 
limit  to  the  domain  of  numbers  only  follows  from  the  additional  assumption  of  an  anti- 
10  Wright,  Wittgenstein  on  the  Foundations  ofMathematics,  pp.  139-40 
38 realism  in  ontology.  Hence,  the  strong  finitist  claim  -  that  there  is  a  cap  on  the  numbers 
(or  even  a  potential  limit  to  constructible  numbers  on  some  'classical'  finitist  account)  - 
may  be  rejected  simply  by  adhering  to  a  realism  in  ontology,  in  which  case  the  force  of 
the  finitist  thesis  is  lost.  It  is  not  sufficient  to  advance  finitism  simply  on  the  weak  finitist 
claim,  which  may  seem  intuitively  plausible  -  as  we  have  seen,  Wittgenstein  also 
advances  the  weak  claim,  while  resisting  commitment  to  either  side  of  the  realist/anti- 
realist  debate.  As  the  finitist  usually  takes  anti-realism  in  ontology  as  fundamental,  he 
will  have  to  find  independent  grounds  upon  which  to  persuade  the  platonist  that  the 
objects  of  mathematics  are  mind-dependent  in  order  to  even  advance  the  strong  claim  that 
there  is  a  cap  or  limit  on  the  numbers.  I  do  not  mean  to  present  this  as  a  serious  worry  - 
given  Benacerraf  s  dilemma,  I  might  also  suggest  that  the  Platonist  must  find 
independent  grounds  to  convince  the  anti-realist  of  the  mind-independence  of  numbers;  1 
simply  wish  to  be  clear  about  the  importance  of  the  constructivist  element  in  strict 
finitism.  The  constructivist  claim,  construed  in  the  way  that  Wittgenstein  has  done,  is  not 
a  'knock-down'  for  realist  theories  in  the  foundation  of  mathematics,  even  if  it  is  found 
acceptable.  The  strong  claim,  on  the  other  hand,  assumes  an  anti-realism  in  ontology,  and 
cannot  be  seen  to  put  pressure  on  the  realist  case.  What  I  shall  be  concerned  with,  in  the 
chapters  that  follow,  is  whether  the  strong  claim  of  (strict)  finitism  is  a  coherent  one;  in 
an  attempt  to  demonstrate  that  strict  finitism  is  still  a  viable  position  in  the  foundations  of 
mathematics. 
Before  I  leave  the  weak  claim  behind,  however,  I  would  like  to  make  precise  the 
distinction,  as  it  may  prove  useful  in  the  debates  to  follow.  The  discussion  above  can  be 
summed  up  in  the  following  way.  The  weak  finitist  claim",  that  there  is  a  limit  to  the 
numbers  that  may  be  constructed  by  the  human  mind,  is  compatible  with  either  a  realism 
or  an  anti-realism  in  ontology  with  respect  to  the  numbers.  The  precise  distinction,  at 
least  with  respect  to  number,  may  perhaps  best  be  illustrated  by  the  diagrams  that  follow. 
11  At  any  rate,  the  weak  finitist  claim  with  respect  to  number.  Again,  I  wish  to  outline  the  point  for 
numbers,  which  are,  as  I  have  said,  fundamental  to  issues  of  surveyability,  and  anyway  the  model  is  more 
intuitive  than  that  for  proofs  or  mathematical  statements.  However,  as  before,  I  assume  that  this  illustrative 
summary  could  be  applied  equally  to  proofs  and  statements  of  mathematics  -  where,  on  the  diagrams  that 
will  follow,  magnitude  on  the  number  line  is  replaced  with  complexity  of  proof  (or  statement). 
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When  combined  with  an  anti-realism  in  ontology,  the  thesis  becomes  the  strong 
finitist  claim,  that  there  is  a  limit  to  the  numbers,  since  all  numbers  are  anyway  mind- 
dependent  objects,  and  hence  must  be  constructed  (or  at  least  constructible)  by  the  human 
mind  if  they  are  to  exist.  The  internal  debate  of  the  finitists  now  rears  up,  as  to  what  is 
meant  by  constructible  in  this  sense  -  whether  the  numbers  must  be  constructible  'in 
practice'  or  'in  principle',  and  precisely  what  is  to  be  understood  by  those  terms. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  have  seen  that  the  weak  finitist  claim  is  perfectly 
compatible  with  a  realism  in  ontology;  in  which  case,  the  strong  finitist  claim  loses  some 
of  its  force.  Numbers  below  the  limit  of  constructibility  are  those  with  which  the  human 
mind  may  interact  sensibly,  and  those  above  are  simply  those  which  it  cannot.  Note  again 
that  there  is  still  room  for  the  internal  finitist  debate  here  -  the  question  of  actual  or 
potential  'interaction'  here  will  set  the  limit  of  constructibility  lower  or  higher  on  the 
number  line.  The  strict  finitist  claim,  interpreted  weakly,  will  tell  us  what  the  mind  can 
currently,  or  actually,  deal  with,  while  the  classical  finitist  claim,  interpreted  weakly,  will 
tell  us  (if  it  tells  us  anything  at  all)  what  the  mind  may  come  to  deal  with.  I  mentioned 
earlier  that  I  think  intuitionism  might  be  best  understood  as  itself  placing  a  cap  on  the 
numbers,  albeit  in  a  different  sense  to  that  of  the  strict  finitists.  Although  I  shall  elaborate 
on  this  in  more  detail  in  the  next  chapter,  I  think  that  the  weak  finitist  claim  may 
highlight  the  issue  somewhat:  I  suggest  that  it  follows  that  if  a  strand  of  classical  finitism 
40 (intuitionism,  for  example)  does  not  place  some  limits  on  the  potential  capabilities  of  the 
mind,  then  the  weak  claim,  for  that  particular  strand,  will  say  nothing  at  all. 
As  a  final  note  in  this  section,  I  have  shown  the  limit  of  constructibility  on  the 
above  diagrams  as  a  wavy  line,  and  not  as  a  sharp  boundary;  the  reason  behind  this  is  that 
whichever  side  of  the  ontological  debate  you  fall  on  (and  indeed  the  internal  finitist 
debate  regarding  constructibility),  there  remains  the  very  serious  problem  of  vagueness 
regarding  the  'placement'  of  the  limit  itself.  Vagueness  is  a  topic  worthy  of  extensive 
treatment,  and  will  receive  considerable  attention  in  later  chapters;  I  shall  stop  here 
simply  with  an  acknowledgement  of  the  problem.  As  with  all  vague  predicates  and 
properties,  the  fact  that  the  sharpness  of  the  boundary  is  not  obvious  does  not  of  course 
entail  the  conclusion  that  there  is  no  boundary  at  all  -  clearly,  at  least  from  the  point  of 
view  of  strict  finitism,  there  are  numbers  which  we  can  sensibly  and  intelligibly 
construct,  and  'numbers'  which  we  cannot. 
41 CHAPTER  III:  RELIABLE  CONSTRUCTION  AND'SURVEYABILITY' 
I  would  like  to  turn  now  to  a  discussion  of  constructibility,  and  the  narrower,  strict 
finitist  requirement  of  surveyability.  I  have  outlined  already  that  finitism  in  general  is 
committed  to  the  claim  that  there  is  some  limit  as  to  what  can  be  constructed  by  a  mind  - 
and  I  have  further  acknowledged  that  the  description  of  this  limit  differs  according  to 
which  particular  brand  of  finitism  is  being  advocated.  For  the  strict  finitist,  this  limit  is  a 
very  real  one,  based  on  what  it  is  in  practice  possible  for  the  mind  to  construct.  For  the 
classical  finitist,  the  intuitionist,  this  limit  is  perhaps  best  viewed  as  a  potential  one,  since 
the  requirement  is  rather  what  may  in  principle  be  constructed  by  the  mind.  Infinite 
quantities,  or  proofs  requiring  infinite  steps,  cannot  be  constructed  even  in  principle,  and 
so  remain  outside  the  scope  of  mental  construction. 
Despite  the  different  qualification,  the  two  requirements  share  certain  important 
features.  Both  are  required  to  give  an  account  of  what  it  is  for  a  mind  to  construct  an 
object  or  statement,  whether  that  construction  is  an  in  practice  or  in  principle  one. 
In  this  chapter  I  shall  attempt  to  do  precisely  that:  after  some  initial  rejections,  I 
shall  turn  again  to  Wittgenstein,  who  offers  a  useful  account  of  surveyability  as  a 
description  of  the  constructive  requirement  forproofs;  an  account  which  I  go  on  to  adapt 
for  an  account  of  the  surveyability  of  numbers. 
Interpreting  Constructibility  'Countability'&  'Inscribability' 
So  what  are  we  to  say  about  such  construction?  Let  us  start  at  the  very  beginning 
-  the  numbers  1,2,  and  3  are  constructible  numbers.  The  number  I  we  may  take  as  base', 
and  perhaps  we  are  entitled  to  do  the  same  for  2  and  3,  on  the  grounds  that  their 
construction  (mentally,  as  it  were)  seems  no  more  complicated.  If  I  wish  to  construct  such 
On  many  conceptual  schema,  of  course,  the  number  zero  is  taken  as  base.  There  is  no  significant  problem 
in  taking  zero  as  base  here  -  however,  on  some  strict  finitary  formulations,  it  is  unclear  whether  zero  should 
have  number  status  at  all.  As  such,  and  for  the  sake  of  consistency  only,  in  my  example  here  I  shall  take 
instead  the  unit  singleton  'I'  as  the  base. 
42 basic  numbers,  it  seems  as  if  I  simply  do  so,  with  no  further  calculation  or  effort. 
Alternatively,  we  might  suggest  that  2  and  3  are  'constructible'  from  1-  but  the  sense  of 
construct  here  is  slightly  different  from  the  standard  interpretation.  To  see  why,  let  us 
consider  this  as  a  'first  guess'  -  let  us  take  the  notion  of  'countability'  as  our  requirement 
for  constructibility.  The  constraint  seems  to  capture  something  of  the  intent  of 
constructibility,  certainly  -  it  looks  intuitively  as  if  we  may  construct  numbers  by  simply 
repeating  the  process  of  adding  one;  repeated  application  of  the  successor  operation.  For 
example,  it  seems  I  can  construct  the  number'5'by  simply  adding  one  four  times  to  the 
initial  number'l'.  Is  this  the  case  for  all  numbers?  Countability  in  practice  will  certainly 
be  capped,  as  it  is  suggested  constructibility  is  -  the  finite  nature  of  my  lifetime,  or  my 
powers  of  concentration,  will  both  constrain  the  numbers  I  can  count  to.  And  there  is  a 
clear  sense  of  construction  at  work  -  just  like  laying  bricks,  I  make  bigger  numbers  the 
more  times  I  add  one. 
Well,  there  are  perhaps  two  problems  with  this  notion  as  an  interpretation  of 
constructibility.  Firstly,  it  is  not  clear  that  counting  is  'reliable'  construction;  perhaps  if  I 
mechanically  count,  with  say  an  abacus,  or  a  calculator,  there  may  come  a  point, 
admittedly  after  some  considerable  time,  at  which  I  have  no  real  idea  of  the  number  that  I 
am  presently  counting  -  that  is,  no  idea  of  the  magnitude  besides  'very  large',  or  has  a 
certain  number  of  numerals,  and  no  ability  to  perform  any  other  operations  upon  the 
number  in  question.  If  I  were  to  write  it  down,  it  might  look  to  me  just  a  stream  of 
numerals,  and  not  a  coherent  number. 
Secondly,  and  very  differently,  one  might  object  that  countability  will  not  go  far 
enough.  There  may  be  numbers,  in  advanced  notation,  say,  that  may  not  be  counted,  at 
least  in  practice.  Such  numbers  might  still  be  admissible  within  the  constructivist 
framework  -  10  1011,  is  presumably  not  countable,  at  least  in  practice.  But  it  may  still  be  an 
interesting  question  to  ask  whether  it  is  a  constructible  number  -  to  some  extent,  I  have 
just  constructed  it. 
This  suggestion  might  lead  us  to  an  alternative  interpretation  of  constructibility, 
and  one  not  uncommon  in  the  literature;  the  idea  of  'inscribability'.  The  suggestion  here  is 
that,  rather  than  our  being  able  to  count  a  number,  we  must  instead  be  able  to  physically 
43 reproduce  it  (e.  g.  write  it  down).  Michael  Durnmett,  for  example,  suggests  that  the  strict 
finitist's  criteria  of  constructibility  is  such  that  they  are  committed  to  predicates  like  'is 
possible  in  practice  to  write  down  in  Arabic  notation'  for  any  acceptable  number.  Once 
again,  this  notion  captures  at  least  some  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  constructibility; 
a  number  is  constructed  (rather  more  physically,  in  this  case)  from  numerals  in  a  given 
notation.  These  numbers  too,  will  (in  practice)  be  limited;  the  constraints  again  of  human 
lifetime  and  attentive  powers,  and  even  if  we  could  suitably  expand  such  constraints, 
presumably  also  the  physical  limitations  of  space-time,  will  all  serve  to  restrict  the  extent 
to  which  such  construction  is  possible  in  practice. 
But  again,  we  may  begin  to  see  similar  objections  rising  as  to  the  previous 
interpretation.  Firstly,  the  problem  of  notation  becomes  explicit  -  Dummett's  predicate 
stipulates  a  precise  notation.  But  this  will  lead  to  odd  answers  to  the  question  'Is  such- 
and-such  a  number  constructible?  ';  like  'it  depends  in  which  notation  it  is  written'.  Again, 
the  number  1010'0  is  certainly  inscribable  in  exponential  notation;  but  is  it  inscribable  in 
Arabic?  Probably  not,  at  least  not  in  practice.  Secondly,  and  perhaps  even  more  forcefully 
in  this  case,  it  looks  as  though  I  could  inscribe  a  'number'  (or  at  least  a  long  string  of 
numerals)  without  any  idea  what  number  I  was  inscribing.  If  I  randomly  scribble  down 
numerals  on  a  very  large  piece  of  paper  for  an  hour  or  so,  or  even  for  10  minutes,  I  will 
most  likely  have  very  little  idea  of  even  the  magnitude  of  my  inscribed  number.  Perhaps, 
if  I  spend  sufficient  time  on  the  task,  it  will  become  practically  impossible  for  me  to 
recognise  the  magnitude  or  other  qualities  of  my'number'-  does  this  now  look  like  a 
mind-dependent  construction?  The  problem  seems  to  be  that  inscribability  places  too 
weak  a  constraint  upon  numbers,  at  least  for  the  strict  finitist. 
It  seems  clear  then  that  neither  countability  nor  inscribability  will  be  sufficient  for 
strict  finitism,  at  least;  indeed  neither  counting  nor  inscribing  is  either  necessary  or 
sufficient  for  constructibility  in  this  sense.  With  regard  to  intuitionism,  the  case  is  less 
clear.  I  think  it  is  correct  to  suggest  that  the  numbers  that  may  potentially  be  counted-to, 
or  potentially  inscribed  in  any  given  notation,  will  amount  to  the  same  numbers  which  are 
potentially  constructible  on  such  an  account;  but  to  suggest  that  they  are  equivalent  terms 
would  be  too  quick.  It  is  likely  that  such  an  account  will  allow  for  other  methods  of 
44 construction,  to  the  extent  that  neither  countability  nor  inscribability  is  a  necessary 
operation  for  construction,  within  intuitionistic  constructivism. 
As  far  as  we  are  concerned  in  the  present  debate,  there  are  two  important  ideas 
coming  out  of  the  discussion  so  far  -  one  is  the  notion  of  'intuitive  connection'  with  a 
number,  or  'recognisability',  and  the  second  is  the  problem  of  different  notations.  The 
latter  is  a  considerable  problem,  particularly  for  strict  finitism,  and  I  shall  return  to  it  in 
the  next  chapter.  The  first,  however  is  an  issue  regarding  the  difference  between  the  strict 
finitist  and  the  intuitionist.  The  intuitionist  will  not  require  that  numbers  are  intuitively 
recognisable,  just  that  they  could  be;  say,  to  a  sufficiently  advanced  intellect.  So  the  fact 
that  I  may not  recognise  or  be  able  to  work  with  a  number  does  not  mean  that  it  is  not 
possible  for  it  to  be  recognised  or  operated  with,  in  principle.  For  the  strict  finitist, 
however,  the  same  fact  is  of  paramount  importance.  Unless  I  can  recognise  it,  a  putative 
'number'  should  not  be  admitted  into  my  mathematical  ontology  -  it  is  simply  a 
collection  of  numerals,  which  themselves  of  course  represent  allowable  numbers. 
Furthermore,  we  may  also  understand  simpler  relations  of  numerals,  such  as  of  the 
numbers  (and  numerals)  one  and  two  in  the  number  twelve,  which  may  fool  us  into 
thinking  that  an  extremely  long  stream  of  numerals  is  still  (a  representation  of)  a 
legitimate  number  -  but  for  the  strict  finitist,  this  recognisability,  this  intuitive 
connection,  plays  a  central  role.  The  term  I  shall  use  for  this  from  here  on  is  the  standard 
term  in  the  literature  -  'surveyability'  -  and  it  is  to  a  precise  definition  of  surveyability 
that  I  shall  turn  my  attention  to  next. 
Wittgenstein'S  surveyability  requirements 
The  idea  of  surveyability  is  a  complex  one,  and  it  has  met  with  much  criticism.  I 
will  of  course  devote  some  attention  to  such  criticism  later  in  this  thesis,  but  for  now,  I 
wish  only  to  establish  precisely  what  the  term  is  intended  to  imply.  I  think  that  some  of 
the  more  basic  objections  to  the  criteria  rest  upon  a  mistaken  understanding  of  what 
surveyability  suggests,  and  so  I  hope,  by  a  thorough  explanation,  to  dispel  some  of  these 
45 lesser  worries.  In  fact,  a  useful  exposition  of  the  ideas  behind  surveyability  is  first 
provided  by  Ludwig  Wittgenstein,  in  his  Remarks  on  the  Foundations  ofMathematics. 
Wittgenstein,  as  I  have  already  suggested,  is  not  necessarily  committed  to  a 
constructivism  regarding  the  ontology  of  mathematics;  nor,  as  a  consequence,  is 
Wittgenstein  what  has  been  traditionally  called  a  strict  finitist.  Instead,  as  I  demonstrated 
in  the  previous  chapter,  he  may  be  read  as  making  the  'weak'  finitist  claim  only. 
Nevertheless,  the  criteria  which  he  employs  in  establishing  this  claim  may  be  picked  up 
by  the  strict  finitist,  and  combined  with  the  constructivist  strand  of  anti-realism  in  order 
to  establish  the  strong  claim  of  strict  finitism.  Let  us  start,  then,  with  an  examination  of 
Wittgenstein's  account  -  remember  that  where  it  differs  from  strict  finitism  is  simply  in 
scope;  Wittgenstein  suggests  that  his  criteria  will  tell  us  what  mathematical  objects, 
statements,  and  proofs  are  to  count  as  'fully  intelligible',  and  says  little  about  the  rest  of 
mathematics  -  the  strict  finitist,  on  the  other  hand,  suggests  that  all  of  legitimate 
mathematics  must  possess  full  intelligibility,  since  nothing  can  lie  without  on  a 
constructivist  account. 
Wittgenstein  offers  criteria  for  'surveyability';  the  idea,  in  line  with  strict  finitist 
tenets,  is  that  more  than  the  simple  possibility  of  construction  (as  in  the  considered  cases 
of  counting  or  inscribing)  is  required  for  objects,  statements,  and  (in  particular,  for 
Wittgenstein)  proofs  to  count  -  it  is  also  important  that  we  can  make  sense  of  the 
construction  in  the  relevant  way.  He  writes: 
""Proof  must  be  surveyable":  this  aims  at  drawing  our  attention  to  the 
difference  between  the  concepts  of  'repeating  a  proof  and  'repeating  an 
experiment'.  To  repeat  a  proof  means,  not  to  reproduce  the  conditions 
under  which  a  particular  result  was  once  obtained,  but  to  repeat  every  step 
and  the  result.  And  although  this  shews  that  proof  is  something  that  must 
be  capable  of  being  reproduced  in  toto  automatically,  still  every  such 
reproduction  must  contain  the  force  of  proof,  which  compels  acceptance 
of  the  result.  "' 
2  Wittgenstein,  Remarks  on  the  Foundations  of  Mathematics,  11-55 
46 From  this  we  may  note  commitment  to  the  idea  of  reproducibility  -a  proof  (and, 
if  we  are  entitled  at  this  stage  to  transpose  these  ideas  onto  the  strict  finitist  claim  about 
numbers,  a  number)  must  first  be  reproducible.  This  focus  of  reproduction  for 
Wittgenstein  is  in  writing,  or  re-writing,  and  encapsulates  the  idea  of  inscribability  above 
-  as  Wittgenstein  writes: 
"It  must  be  possible  to  write  down  exactly  [a]  proof  again.  "' 
But  this  is  not  sufficient  -  Wittgenstein  also  suggests  that  the  'force  of  the  proof 
must  be  conveyed.  A  proof  is  therefore  unsurveyable  if  we  cannot  see  why  it  'compels 
acceptance  of  the  result'.  So  far  then,  we  seem  to  have  two  constraints  for  the 
surveyability  of  proofs. 
Crispin  Wright  suggests,  however,  that  Wittgenstein's  criteria  contain  a  third 
requirement.  Wright  has  written  extensively  on  the  topic  of  Wittgenstein's  mathematics, 
and  his  exegesis  on  the  subject  of  surveyability  is instructive'.  Wright  makes  a  distinction 
between  understanding  each  individual  step  of  the  proof  (as,  for  example,  following  from 
a  previous  step)  and  recognising  the  proof  as  a  coherent  whole: 
"Arguably,  then,  three  notions  of  surveyability  are  in  play  in 
Wittgenstein's  discussion 
... 
[which]  seem  to  run  in  an  ascending  order  of 
strength.  If  a  structure  of  inferences  is  too  complex  or  lengthy  even  to  be 
physically  reproduced,  then  naturally  there  can  be  no  convincing  check  of 
every  step  in  it;  and  if  a  physically  reproducible  structure  is  nevertheless 
too  lengthy  to  be  checked  as  a  chain  of  inferences,  then  obviously  it 
cannot  serve  as  a  paradigm  of  how  a  certain  result  cannot  but  be  achieved 
by  correctly  following  through  a  certain  process.  "' 
3  Wittgenstein,  Remarks  on  the  Foundations  of  Mathematics,  11-  1 
4  See  Crispin  Wright,  Wittgenstein  on  the  Foundations  ofMathematics.  Of  particular  interest  to  the  present 
discussion  is  chapter  VII  entitled  'Surveyability'. 
5  Wright,  Wittgenstein  on  the  Foundations  ofMathematics,  p.  122 
47 If  Wright  is  correct,  then  surveyability  consists  of  firstly,  the  ability  to  'reproduce' 
a  proof  (i.  e.  to  physically  write  it  down),  secondly,  the  ability  to  follow  each  step  of  the 
proof,  and  check  that  it  does  not  go  wrong  at  some  point  in  reasoning  or  mathematical 
calculation,  and  thirdly,  to  reach  intuitive  understanding  of  why  the  proof  must  come  out 
as  it  does,  and  thus  assert  that  the  proof  will  always  produce  this  result  if  correctly  carried 
out.  As  Wittgenstein  himself  puts  it: 
"The  proof  (the  pattern  of  the  proof)  shews  us  the  result  of  a  procedure 
(the  construction);  and  we  are  convinced  that  a  procedure  regulated  in  this 
way  always  leads  to  this  configuration.  116 
Furthermore,  the  requirement  that  we  understand,  or recognise  the  correctness  of 
the  proof  is  such  that  we  cannot  be  in  error,  or  else  we  have  not  surveyed  the  proof  : 
"That  is  to  say,  e.  g.:  we  must  be  able  to  be  certain,  it  must  hold  as 
certain  for  us,  that  we  have  not  [for  example]  overlooked  a  sign  in  the 
course  of  the  proof.  That  no  demon  can  have  deceived  us  by  making  a 
sign  disappear  without  our  noticing,  or  by  adding  one,  etc. 
One  might  say:  When  it  can  be  said:  'Even  if  a  demon  had  deceived  us, 
still  everything  would  be  all  right',  then  the  prank  he  wanted  to  play  on  us 
has  simply  failed  of  its  purpose.  "' 
It  is  this  strongest  of  the  three  requirements  (since  in  achieving  it,  we  have 
presumably  fulfilled  the  first  two)  which  is  of  particular  interest  to  us.  The  first  is  the 
simple  (constructivist)  finite  requirement  -a  proof  must  consist  of  a  finite  number  of 
steps,  which  may  thus  be  written  down.  The  second  is  (arguably)  required  in  achieving 
the  third  -  we  will  have  performed  a  check  of  the  reasoning  in  order  to  accept  the 
outcome.  What  is  suggested  by  the  third  requirement  is  that  we  achieve  intuitive 
understanding  of  the  proof.  To  put  it  plainly,  and  to  expand  upon  the  terminology 
6  Wittgenstein,  Remarks  on  the  Foundations  ofMathematics,  11-22 
7  Wittgenstein,  Remarks  on  the  Foundations  of  Mathematics,  11-21 
48 employed  by  Wittgenstein  in  light  of  Wright's  analysis  -  we  see  not  only  what  it  is 
(requirement  1),  but  first  how  (requirement  2)  and  then  why  it  is  (requirement  3). 
From  proofs  to  numbers 
I  should  also  take  the  opportunity  to  qualify,  following  on  from  the  discussion 
here,  my  earlier  claim  about  the  reducibility  of  problems  regarding  the  surveyability  of 
proofs  to  those  of  the  surveyability  of  numbers.  Since  I  am  employing  Wittgenstein's 
criteria  of  surveyability  to  numbers,  and  not  to  proofs,  as  he  does,  I  need  to  establish  to 
what  extent  Wittgenstein's  criteria  can  be  transposed.  There  is  a  distinction,  clearly, 
between  numbers  and  proofs  -  and  my  earlier  claim  was  that  whatever  criteria  constrains 
the  acceptance  of  legitimate  proofs  on  an  account  of  surveyability  would  afortiori 
constrain  the  acceptance  of  legitimate  numbers,  because  a  proof  that  contained  anywhere 
within  it  a  number  that  was  too  big  (or  complex)  to  be  surveyed,  would  of  course  make 
the  whole  proof  unsurveyable.  But  as  Wittgenstein's  discussion  develops,  it  is  also  clear 
that  his  criteria  for  the  surveyability  of  proofs,  as  presented  here,  seems  a  little  ill-fitting 
when  applied  to  numbers.  It  seems  odd  to  say,  for  example,  that  a  number  must  convey 
the  force  of  itself,  and  compel  acceptance  of  its  result. 
It  is  clear,  then,  that  we  must  to  some  extent  re-interpret  Wittgenstein's  criteria 
with  respect  to  numbers,  since  he  does  not  discuss  the  ontology  of  numbers  in  relation  to 
the  criteria  of  surveyability;  he  is  not  after  all,  as  we  have  seen,  a  constructivist  of  the 
revisionist  variety.  So,  we  must  note  instead  the  intent  of  the  surveyability  requirement, 
which  I  think  is  sufficiently  similar  in  both  cases.  What  Wittgenstein  requires  of  proofs  is 
that  they  are  understandable  -  and  understandable  in  the  sense  that  once  we  understand 
them,  as  proofs,  we  know  them;  we  cannot  be  mistaken  about  them.  What  the  strict 
finitist  requires,  analogously,  of  numbers,  is  that  they  too  are  understandable  -  in  the 
sense  that  we  recognise  a  string,  or  arrangement'  of  numerals  as  a  number,  and  we  grasp 
8  In  decimal  notation,  numbers  are  represented  by  a  chain,  or  string  of  numerals.  By  the  additional 
qualification  of  an  'arrangement'  of  numerals,  I  wish  to  include  advanced  notations,  such  as  exponential 
notation,  as  well. 
49 certain  inherent  mathematical  properties,  such  as  relative  magnitude,  perhaps,  as  a  part  of 
that  understanding.  We  reach  what  I  shall  call  'intuitive  intelligibility';  that  is  to  say  that 
we  recognise  not  only  that  it  is  a  thing  upon  which  we  can  operate,  (say  divide  by  three), 
but  we  recognise  what  it  is  that  we  are  operating  on.  I  shall  return  to  the  notion  of 
intuitive  intelligibility  presently,  but  for  now  I  hope  this  brief  explanation  serves  as  an 
introduction  to  the  way  in  which  I  believe  the  strongest  requirement  for  surveyability 
(both  for  Wittgenstein  and  the  strict  finitist)  may  best  be  understood. 
Another  objection,  before  I  leave  the  topic,  to  the  translation  of  the  criteria  from 
proofs  to  numbers  might  be  that  it  seems  hard  to  apply  the  three-stage  criteria  to  numbers 
-  particular  as  the  second  requirement  seems  to  cover  the  relations  between  steps  of  a 
proof,  and  it  is  not  immediately  obvious  what  the  'steps'  of  a  number  might  be. 
There  are  a  number  of  responses  to  this  query.  The  first  is  perhaps  to  suggest  that 
while  the  second  requirement  plays  a  crucial  role  in  the  identification  of  proofs,  it  is  to 
some  extent,  even  for  proofs,  subsumed  into  the  third  requirement.  For  numbers  then,  it 
might  be  a  trivial  operation,  entirely  subsumed  into  the  third  requirement.  This  is  to 
suggest  that  while  the  further  distinction,  drawn  by  Wright,  is  plausible  in  the  criteria  for 
the  surveying  of  proofs,  no  such  further  distinction  is  possible  in  the  case  of  numbers. 
The  number  has  one  step  -  therefore  to  understand  and  recognise  each  step  is  to 
understand  and  recognise  the  whole. 
An  alternative  proposal  is  to  suggest  that  we  must  take  'steps'  in  a  proof  to 
resemble  'steps'  in  the  formation  of  a  number  -  we  might  maintain,  for  example,  that  each 
numeral  in  the  number  is  a  step  -  and  that  we  must  understand,  in  order  to  ultimately 
recognise  the  whole  number,  each  numeral  in  its  relation  to  the  next;  as  units,  as  tens  of 
units,  as  tens  of  (tens  of  units),  and  so  on.  Perhaps  this  proposal  is  to  be  preferred,  as  it 
seems  to  preserve  the  most  of  the  original  criteria  (for  proofs). 
A  third  possibility  here  of  course  would  be  simply  to  reject  Wright's  classification 
of  the  surveyability  criteria  into  three  distinct  stages;  we  saw  at  the  outset  that  on  a 
superficial  reading  of  Wittgenstein,  at  least,  we  may  initially  draw  out  only  two.  The 
translation  into  surveyability  for  numbers  is  much  simpler  on  such  an  account  -  the  first 
requirement  is  simply  that  the  number,  like  the  proof,  is  capable  of  being  accurately 
50 reproduced;  and  the  second  is  the  'intuitive  intelligibility'  requirement  for  either,  which  I 
shall  return  to  shortly.  I  see  this  as  an  unpromising  alternative,  however,  as  Wright 
provides  considerable  evidence,  at  least,  to  suggest  that  Wittgenstein  was  operating  with 
more  than  just  the  two  separable  notions. 
So  what  is  it  for  a  number  to  be  surveyable?  Obviously  it  must  be  possible  to 
write  the  number  down.  However,  there  are  various  issues  to  consider  regarding  such 
possibility,  particularly  from  a  strict  finitist  position.  Firstly,  there  are  many  different 
notations  used  for  number,  and  if  we  advance  as  a  requirement  the  strict  finitist  idea  that 
it  must  be  possible  to  actually  write  (the  numeral  for)  a  number  down,  then  it  is  clear  that 
larger  numbers  will  be  possible  in  Arabic  notation  than  in  stroke  notation.  Similarly, 
much  larger  numbers  will  be  possible  in  exponential  notation  than  in  Arabic,  and  so  on. 
So  clearly,  Wittgenstein's  first  requirement  is  not  sufficient  to  define  the  surveyability  of 
numbers  and  place  a  limit  of  constructibility  on  the  numbers  independent  of  the  notation 
used. 
Wittgenstein's  second  requirement  seems  easily  fulfilled  in  the  case  of  numbers  - 
we  may  check  that  the  number  desired  has  been  correctly  represented  (again,  with 
notational  issues  at  play,  this  may  not  be  simply  trivial  -  checking  that  the  number'73' 
has  been  correctly  represented  in  stroke  notation  would  presumably  not  simply  be  a 
matter  of  observation).  But  lastly,  the  third  requirement  is  that  we  have  an  intuitive  grasp 
of  the  number  being  represented.  And  here  we  may  reach  an  agreeable  form  of 
isomorphism  between  notational  models.  For  a  number  to  count  as  intuitively  surveyable, 
we  must  possess  an  intuitive  understanding  of  the  number  and  its  properties.  That  is  to 
say,  that  we  must  possess  a  certain  direct  connection  with  the  number,  not  definable 
simply  in  terms  of  other  smaller  numbers  (as  in  the  case,  presumably,  of  even  relatively 
simple  exponentiation).  The  precise  boundaries  of  such  a  requirement  are  precisely  those 
debated  by  finitists  and  their  detractors  alike,  and  have  yet  to  be  properly  established.  We 
can  hopefully  see,  however,  the  role  that  Wittgenstein's  intuitive  intelligibility 
requirement  plays  in  the  description  of  the  (strict)  finitist  thesis.  Regardless  of  the 
notation  used  to  represent  the  number,  the  corresponding  'number-concept'  must  be 
directly  intelligible  to  us. 
51 Classicalfinitism  revisited 
As  a  slightly  tangential  but  related  point,  we  may  take  this  notion,  as  a  broadly 
strict  finitist  one,  and  assert  that  the  classical  finitist,  the  intuitionist,  must  be  committed 
to  a  similar  notion  of  constructibility.  Of  course,  the  position  will  differ  to  the  extent  that 
it  will  not  place  a  'real'  limit  on  the  construction  of  finite  numbers,  since  potentially  any 
finite  number  may  be  constructed.  But  with  respect  to  what  it  is  for  something  to  be 
constructible  (in  either  sense),  the  finitists  may  perhaps  reach  a  degree  of  consensus.  A 
mathematical  object  is  constructible  if  it  is  finitely  accessible  to  the  mind;  that  is,  its 
construction  consists  in  a  finite  mental  operation  which  results  in  the  possession  of  an 
intelligible  concept  -  and  so  a  mathematical  object  is  constructible  if  it  is  possible  (either 
in  principal  or  in  practice)  to  perform  a  mental  operation  which  will  result  in  the 
possession  of  the  appropriate  concept,  where,  as  far  as  Wittgenstein  (and  the  strict 
finitists  in  this  case)  are  concerned,  full  possession  of  the  concept  involves  a  sense  of  the 
object  being  recognisedfor  what  it  IS,  in  accordance  with  Wittgenstein's  third 
requirement.  The  important  difference  here  is  that,  for  Wittgenstein  as  for  the  strict 
finitists,  the  intelligibility  requirement  is  afurther  constraint  (that  is,  further  to  the  first 
and  second  requirement)  -  the  only  possible  constructions  are  those  for  which  we  are  in 
practice  capable  of  obtaining  a  full  possession  of  the  relevant  concept  by  some 
i recognitionalfeat';  whereas  for  the  classical  finitists,  full  possession  of  a  concept 
requires  only  that  we  be  in  principle  capable  of  carrying  out  the  requisite  constructive 
activity;  which  will  of  course  be  true  of  any  candidates  which  satisfy  the  first  two 
requirements. 
So.  it  seems,  the  idea  of  constructibility  contains  -  for  either  type  of  finitist  -  an 
idea  of  intuitive  intelligibility.  The  classical  finitist  may  I  think  concede  this  without 
abandoning  any  ground;  the  point  (to  re-iterate)  is  simply  for  them  that  anything  finitely 
performable  is  in  principle  intuitively  intelligible.  Again,  as  I  have  already  intimated,  it  is 
presumably  the  case  that,  as  the  classical  finitist  is  committed  to  the  view  that  numbers 
are  mind-dependent,  it  would  be  odd  for  them  not  to  nod  assent  to  this  suggestion;  in 
52 order  to  arrive  at  the  construction  of  a  mind-dependent  entity,  there  must  come  with  it  an 
accompanying  (at  least  in  principle  possibility  oj)  intuitive  intelligibility;  an 
understanding  in  the  mind. 
One  remaining  important  issue'  regarding  the  limit  of  constructibility  needs  to  be 
re-examined  before  we  continue.  As  I  have  already  mentioned,  the  limit  imposed  by  a 
strict  finitist  philosophy  will  impose  a  very  real  limit  on  the  natural  numbers.  Clearly, 
even  given  just  the  weakest  of  Wittgenstein's  requirements,  there  will  be  finite  natural 
numbers  that  we  are  unable  to  write  down,  due  to  limitations  of  space,  or  time,  or 
entropy".  In  particular,  humans  are  finite  entities,  and  have  a  comparatively  short 
lifetime,  and  maximum  rate  of  operation.  Hence,  the  largest  number  I  may  feasibly  write 
down  in  my  lifetime  will  still  be  a  relatively  small  finite  number,  by  traditional  standards. 
Obviously,  Wittgenstein's  other  requirements  will  bring  this  limit  down  much  further, 
eliminating  concerns  about  my  lifetime,  since  it  will  presumably  not  take  me  long  to 
'reproduce'  a  number  (in  any  notation)  that  out  steps  the  boundaries  of  full  surveyability. 
As  a  result,  for  the  strict  finitist,  there  is  a  limit  on  the  numbers,  a  'cap'  beyond  which 
meaningful  construction  is  not  possible. 
For  the  classical  finitist  however,  the  situation  is  more  complicated.  If  we  are  just 
considering  the  finite  numbers,  it  seems  as  though,  given  the  classical  finitist 
requirements,  no  finite  number  will  be  un-constructible,  or  un-surveyable  (unintelligible) 
in  the  potential  sense.  If  we  consider  all  numbers,  the  classical  finitist  is  going  to  insist 
upon  a  limit,  but  since  it  is  not  usual  to  think  of  infinite  numbers  as  simply  extending  the 
finite  number  line,  it  may  be  difficult  to  find  an  intuitive  model  for  this.  As  I  have  said,  I 
9  For  the  sake  of  completeness,  I  should  perhaps  also  note  here  a  further  concern  about  my  discussion  in 
this  section  that  might  arise  following  the  analysis  in  the  previous  chapter,  regarding  Durnmett's  views  on 
object  vs.  objectivity  -  it  might  be  objected  that  my  treatment  here  is  ontological,  ignoring  the  importance 
of  Durnmett's  remarks  on  objectivity,  and  classes  of  disputed  statements  in  place  of  mathematical  objects. 
However,  presumably  we  could  construe  the  constructibility  requirement  as  something  like  the  limit  of 
intelligibility  for  mathematical  statements  (of  a  certain  length  or  complexity).  This  suggestion  is,  I  think, 
implicit  in  my  treatment  here. 
'0  Gandy  provides  a  discussion  of  the  issues  involved  here  with  respect  to  the  finitude  of  time  and  space, 
and  mentions  the  suggestion  of  F.  J.  Dyson,  that  in  a  particular  model  of  the  universe,  thermodynamical 
considerations  might  be  avoided;  I  shall  not  reproduce  the  discussion  here.  It  is  sufficient  for  our  purposes 
to  note  that  some  finitude  of  humanity,  or  space-time,  will  impose  certain  limits  on  what  is  effectively 
achievable. 
53 think  it  is  best  to  perceive  the  intuitionistic  (classical  finitist)  limit  as  a  potential  limit, 
but,  I  assert,  a  limit  nonetheless.  For  my  purposes,  the  remainder  of  my  work,  focusing 
largely  as  it  does  upon  the  claims  of  and  issues  surrounding  strict  finitism,  shall  adopt  a 
strong  (strict  finitist)  notion  of  the  limit  of  constructibility;  I  shall  leave  it  to  the  reader  to 
decide  with  regard  to  classical  finitism  whether  the  limit  applies  analogously.  I  will 
however,  reiterate  the  conclusion  reached  in  the  previous  chapter,  that  if  the  strict 
finitist's  limit  of  constructibility  can  be  construed  as  making  only  a  claim  about  what  the 
mind  can  intelligibly  deal  with  (the  'weak'  claim),  then  unless  one  assumes  that  classical 
finitism  places  an  analogous  (albeit  higher)  limit  on  the  numbers  (perhaps  in  the  sense 
that  the  mind  is  only  ever  going  to  be  potentially  so  good),  then  it  seems  as  though 
classical  finitism  may  be  construed  as  saying  nothing  at  all  -  since  in  the  presented  case, 
classical  finitism  could  be  construed  as  making  a  claim  about  what  the  mind  can 
intelligibly  deal  with,  and  yet  asserting  that  the  mind  could  come  to  know  (understand, 
and  hence  intelligibly  deal  with)  anything. 
Intuitive  Intelligibility 
I  have  already  given  a  brief  account  of  what  I  mean  by  the  term  'intuitive 
intelligibility'  for  numbers.  It  is  time  now  for  a  proper  examination  of  the  concept,  and  an 
attempt  to  answer  some  of  the  worries  that  might  arise  regarding  such  a  concept.  To 
recap:  a  (putative)  number  is  surveyable,  only  if,  (in  line  with  Wittgenstein's  strongest 
requirement  for  the  surveyability  of  proofs),  that  number  is  intuitively  intelligible.  We 
should  admit  it  as  a  legitimate  object  of  mathematics  on  a  strict  finitist  account,  only  if 
we  recognise  it  as  a  number,  and  not  merely  as  a  string  or  arrangement  of  numerals  that 
'looks'  like  other,  already  allowed  and  recognised,  numbers.  Recognising  it  as  a  number  is 
not  an  entirely  unproblematic  notion  in  itself,  not  least  of  all  because  of  the  inherent 
problems  of  different  notations.  But  here  let  us  say  that  recognition  of  a  number  involves 
(at  the  least)  a  grasp  of  comparative  magnitude  -  when  presented  with  another  such 
number,  in  any  notation,  we  would  readily  be  able  to  identify  the  larger  of  the  two. 
The  idea  of  intuitive  intelligibility  might  also  be  seen  to  imply  that  a  number  be 
54 applicable  without  calculation  -  the  idea  here  being  that  if  I  have  to  think  about  a 
mathematical  operation  involving  the  suggested  intuitively  intelligible  number,  then  if  I 
have  to  perform  additional  calculations,  involving  smaller  number-concepts,  then  the 
number  can  hardly  be  genuinely  intuitively  intelligible.  Well,  this  would  be  one  line  to 
take,  but  it  appears  unnecessarily  restrictive  -  something  like  'fierce  finitism',  perhaps.  If 
we  are  to  allow  only  those  numbers  which  are  intuitively  intelligible  in  this  sense,  we  will 
be  forced  to  reject  all  but  perhaps  the  basic  unit  numerals  -  and  perhaps  not  even  all  of 
them. 
In  fact  this  line  of  thought  is  not  entirely  without  support  -  it  receives  some 
empirical  backing  from  the  observation  that  we  can  only  recognise  groups  of  objects,  say, 
in  very  small  numbers  -  between  five  and  seven  for  most  people.  With  larger  groups,  we 
recognise  them  in  terms  of  multiple  collections  of  smaller  groups.  If  one  thinks  about  the 
sides  of  dice,  one  probably  has  a  direct  representation  of  all  the  numbers  in  terms  of  the 
arrangement  of  dots.  If  one  thinks  of  even  a  slightly  larger  collection  -  say,  the  cards  in  a 
suit  from  I  to  10,  one  probably  recognises  the  collection  of  symbols  on  the  eight,  nine, 
and  ten  cards  as  two  collections  of  five  or  less  symbols.  The  eight  card  presents  itself  to 
me  as  two  collections  of  four  symbols,  for  example.  There  is  a  very  real  sense  here  in 
which  we  are  operating  with  less  than  ten'numbers',  in  order  to  intuitively  deal  with 
larger  ones. 
Well,  while  on  the  one  hand  a  strict  finitism  based  upon  this  kind  of  account  of 
intuitive  intelligibility  might  be  nice  and  simple",  it  seems  unlikely  that  anyone  will  take 
it  seriously  as  a  strict  finitary  foundation  for  mathematics.  It  is  only  barely  constructivist 
in  nature,  and  it  is  so  drastically  revisionist  that  it  seems  to  call  for  the  rejection  of 
mathematics  in  its  near  entirety.  Rather,  let  us  attempt  to  move  away  from  such  a  limiting 
definition  of  'intuitive  intelligibility',  and  try  to  provide  an  account  more  in  keeping  with 
the  intentions  of  the  strict  finitist  claim. 
11  Although  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  even  this  formulation  does  not  avoid  comniftment  to  vague 
totalities.  Even  if  we  may  say  that  the  limit  of  surveyability  in  this  sense  is  for  most  people  between  five 
and  seven,  is  the  limit  five,  is  it  six,  or  is  it  seven?  There  seems  no  good  answer  to  such  a  question  -  for 
similar  reasons  that  there  can  be  no  universal  answer  in  the  more  general  case;  as  we  shall  see  in  a 
forthcoming  chapter. 
55 I  have  suggested  that  there  are  certain  inherent  mathematical  qualities  that  are  to 
be  gasped,  if  a  number  is  to  count  as  intuitively  intelligible.  To  require  that  we  gasp  all 
of  a  number's  mathematical  qualities  at  any  given  point  would  seem  to  be  at  least  as 
restrictive  as  the  requirement  dismissed  above.  What  then  are  the  qualities  that  we  must 
grasp? 
It  seems  as  though  a  natural  demarcation  might  be  that  of  'Intuitive  operation'.  By 
this  I  mean  simply  that  by  mere  acquaintance  with  a  number,  we  are  aware  of  the 
applicability  of  certain  mathematical  operations  with  respect  to  the  number  in  question  - 
is  it  divisible  by  three,  for  example.  Now  it  seems  that  for  relatively  small  numbers,  like  3 
or  27,1  am  intuitively  aware  of  the  possibility  of  division  by  three,  and  indeed  of  the 
result  of  that  operation,  without  calculation.  (1  in  the  first  case,  9  in  the  second).  Whereas 
for  unsurveyable  numbers,  the  mere  observation  is  impossible,  and  calculation  is 
required.  However,  this  notion  is  problematic  on  at  least  three  counts. 
Firstly,  the  suggestion  that  certain  operations  should  allow  us  to  determine  the 
surveyability  of  numbers  seems  to  make  the  selection  rather  arbitrary,  as  it  will  surely 
depend  upon  the  precise  operation  involved.  While  division  by  three  may  not  be  obvious 
for  many  cases,  divisibility  by  10  is  easy  to  determine,  simply  by  examining  the  last  digit 
in  any  decimal  number.  This  holds  for  numbers  that  the  strict  finitist  would  ordinarily 
want  to  reject  as  unsurveyable,  since  only  the  last  digit  must  be  inspected.  Moreover, 
numbers  in  advanced  notations  may  even  become  surveyable  on  this  account  when  their 
decimal  counterparts  are  not.  I  know,  for  example,  that  910'.  is  divisible  by  9,  even  though 
I  could  not  recognise  the  same  property  if  presented  with  a  decimal  equivalent.  " 
Secondly,  conversely,  such  a  criterion  seems  too  restrictive  for  some  cases.  I  have 
no  intuitive  awareness  of  the  divisibility-by-three  of  the  number  46458,  for  example. 
Dismissing  numbers  in  the  thousands  or  tens  of  thousands  is  applying  the  finitist  standard 
again  too  rigorously  to  be  an  accurate  reflection  of  the  strict  finitist  claim. 
And  thirdly,  perhaps  fatally,  it  seems  impossible  to  give  an  account  of  when  such 
12  The  success  of  such  a  constraint  is  also,  as  should  be  obvious  here,  heavily  dependent  upon  the  notation 
used.  Division  by  10  is  easy  to  check  for  decimal  numbers,  but  not  for,  say,  hexadecimal.  Although  there  is 
a  good  deal  more  to  be  said  regarding  the  problems  of  notation  for  the  strict  finitist  account,  it  would  be 
preferable  to  find  an  account  of  surveyability  that  provided  consistent  results  across  (and  independent  of) 
notations. 
56 intuitive  operations  themselves  become  non-intuitive.  Although  division  by  three  may  be 
an  intuitive  operation,  it  is  presumably  not  the  case  that  division  by  n  will  always  be  an 
intuitive  operation.  Since  we  might  only  provide  a  definition  of  intuitive  operations  in 
relation  to  the  numbers  involved,  such  a  criteria  for  intuitive  intelligibility,  and  hence 
surveyability,  looks  to  entail  vicious  circularity. 
Instead  then,  let  us  focus  on  what  appears  to  be  the  primary  'recognisable'  quality 
of  intuitively  intelligible  numbers,  and  leave  open  the  question  as  to  whether  there  are 
attendant  properties  that  are  conveyed  at  the  same  time.  The  key  issue  is  one  of 
magnitude.  I  have  already  suggested  that  a  grasp  of  a  number  involves  a  grasp  of  its 
magnitude;  and  indeed  this  seems  to  be  the  crucial  difference  between  recognising  a 
number,  and  recognising  a  string  (or  arrangement)  of  numerals. 
The  first  and  most  obvious  objection  to  such  a  suggestion  is  that,  while  a  grasp  of 
magnitude  may  be  appropriate  for  the  scale  of  integers,  it  does  not  seem  appropriate 
when  applied  to  the  real  numbers.  Part  of  a  strict  finitist's  aim  is  to  reject  a  good  deal  of 
the  traditionally  accepted  real  numbers  -  certainly  the  irrationals,  but  also  presumably  a 
fair  amount  of  finite  but  'unsurveyable'  real  numbers  -  that  is,  numbers  with  too  many 
decimal  places  to  be  surveyable.  I  shall  discuss  the  issue  of  complexity  versus  size  in  the 
next  chapter,  but  the  objection  here  turns  upon  the  plausible  assertion  that  one  may  have  a 
very  good  grasp  of  the  magnitude  of  (for  example)  pi  -  after  all,  it's  just  a  little  more  than 
3.  Furthermore,  3  is perfectly  surveyable,  and  so  is  4;  hence  surely  pi  is  a  surveyable 
size? 
To  make  such  an  objection  is  just  to  miss  the  intent  of  the  criterion.  When  I 
suggest  that  what  is  required  by  intuitive  intelligibility  is  'grasp  of  magnitude',  I  mean  that 
one  must  have  a  clear  grasp  of  magnitude,  and  not  simply  an  idea  of  scope,  or  range.  One 
must  recognise  the  number  as  itself",  and  identify  it  by  its  precise  magnitude.  It  is  that 
number  precisely  and  no  other  -  and  what  sets  it  apart  from  any  other,  what  prevents 
confusion  once  the  number  is  recognised,  is  its  magnitude.  Once  one  has  a  clear  grasp  of 
13  This  is  not  a  vacuous  requirement  -  compare  this  with  Wittgenstein's  requirement  for  proofs:  "On  the  one 
hand  we  must  be  able  to  reproduce  the  proof  ...  and  on  the  other  hand  this  reproduction  must  once  more  be 
proof  of  the  result  ...  every  such  reproduction  must  contain  the  force  of  proof'.  (11-55) 
57 a  number's  magnitude,  one  may  take  any  other  number  (at  least,  any  other  number  of 
which  it  can  be  said  that  one  has  a  grasp  of  magnitude)  and  immediately  identify  which 
has  the  greater  and  which  the  smaller magnitude. 
Note  that  on  this  account,  it  does  not  matter  which  notation  conveys  the 
magnitude  of  the  number  to  the  surveyor  -  that  the  magnitude  is  conveyed  is  sufficient. 
To  that  extent,  the  limit  of  surveyability  is  not  here  dependent  upon  notation. 
Notation  still  remains  a  challenging  problem  in  a  wider  context,  however,  and  so  I 
shall  turn  my  attention  next  to  the  special  problems  raised  by  notation  for  any  strict 
finitary  account. 
58 CHAPTER  IV:  COMPLEXITY  AND  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  NOTATION 
In  order  to  provide  a  thorough  account  of  strict  finitism,  to  give  as  full  a 
Picture  as  possible  of  the  shape  of  the  theory,  it  becomes  necessary  to  address  some 
recurring  worries  in  the  discussion  of  the  previous  chapters.  So  far,  we  have  identified 
the  central  tenets,  and  established  a  robust  account  of  the  notion  of  surveyability.  One 
problem  remains  largely  unanswered,  however  -  and  that  is  the  question  over  how 
surveyability  is  related  to  the  notation  employed.  Does  more  sophisticated  notation 
lead  to  an  increase  in  surveyability?  Is  surveyability,  after  all,  dependent  upon 
notation?  The  central  concern  here  therefore,  along  with  some  related  issues,  will  be 
the  problem  of  differing  notation.  The  problem  should  already  be  clear,  and  is 
essentially  as  follows;  numbers  that  are  unsurveyable  in  Arabic  notation  may  seem 
perfectly  surveyable  (in  some  sense  at  least)  in  exponential  notation.  Nor  is  the 
problem  especially  restricted  to  cases  involving  exponential  notation  -  the  problem 
arises  for  any  two  notations.  Equally,  for  example,  numbers  that  are  unsurveyable  in 
stroke  notation  may  seem  surveyable  in  Arabic  notation.  Now,  clearly,  any  strict 
finitary  account  -  at  least  one  that  is  serious  about  surveyability  -  will  have  to  provide 
an  adequate  account  of  the  discrepancy.  I  have  skirted  this  issue  more  than  once 
already  in  previous  chapters,  so  I  shall  turn  next  to  serious  consideration  of  the 
difficulties  it  presents. 
It  seems  to  me  that  two  strategies  initially  present  themselves  to  the  strict 
finitist  in  order  to  deal  with  the  apparent  problem.  Firstly,  one  might  stick  rigidly  to 
the  criteria  outlined  in  the  previous  chapter,  and  require  an  intuitive  grasp  of  numbers, 
independent  of  the  notation  used  to  represent  them.  This  may  seem  a  natural  proposal 
following  the  remarks  I  have  already  made  regarding  the  criteria  for  surveyability,  but 
there  is  at  least  one  other  interesting  alternative  for  the  strict  finitist,  alluded  to  in  the 
literature.  The  strategy  here  is  to  simply  embrace  the  distinction  between  differing 
notations,  and  allow  various  limits  on  the  surveyability  of  numbers,  dependent  upon 
notation.  This  second  option  may  not  seem  immediately  reconcilable  with  the 
surveyability  criteria  as  presented  earlier,  and  on  first  inspection  seems  to  require  the 
rejection  of  the  constraint  of  intuitive  intelligibility.  Since  this  second  option  seems 
the  one  most  at  odds  with  the  current  analysis,  let  us  start  by  examining  it  in  order  to 
59 establish  whether  or  not  it  can  be  coherently  advanced  independently  of  the  criteria  of 
intuitive  intelligibility.  If  so,  we  might  suggest  an  alternative  formulation  of  the 
criteria  of  surveyability,  such  that  complexity  of  notation  plays  the  pivotal  role  in 
determining  whether  or  not  the  number  represented  is  surveyable. 
Complexity  over  Magnitude 
The  central  idea  of  such  a  proposal,  then,  is  that,  rather  than  the  number  itseýf 
being  somehow  intrinsically  surveyable  or  unsurveyable,  it  is  instead  the  expression 
that  represents  it  which  is  open  to  determination.  Let  us  suggest  that  when  an 
arrangement  of  numerals,  in  any  notation,  is  too  complex  (for  example,  the  sheer 
number  of  numerals  present  makes  the  arrangement  unwieldy,  or  else  the  complexity 
of  the  notation  prevents  us  from  seeing  what  is  being  represented  for  some  large 
numbers),  then  the  number  represented  by  the  arrangement  is  unsurveyable.  As  a 
result,  the  number  2456  is  surveyable  in  Arabic  notation,  but  (presumably)  not  in 
stroke  notation.  Equally,  on  such  an  account,  the  number  1010'0  is  surveyable  in 
Exponential  notation,  but  not  in  Arabic  (and  certainly  not  in  stroke-)  notation.  '  Note 
that  as  I  have  remarked,  such  an  account  will  not  accommodate  the  third  requirement 
for  surveyability  (recall  that the  third  requirement  is  that  the  surveyor  is  capable  of 
some  intuitive  grasp  of  the  number  as  a  number);  principally  because  the  number 
itself  has  less  importance  -  the  representation  of  the  number  is  what  counts.  As  a 
result,  as  long  as  we  have  a  suitable  notation  (in  practice)  to  surveyably  represent  a 
number,  (i.  e.  one  in  which  the  notation  is  not  too  complex  to  be  surveyed),  that 
number  is  admissible  as  a  legitimate  mathematical  object. 
Why,  then,  should  such  an  option  be  attractive  to  the  strict  finitist?  The  idea  of 
complexity  certainly  seems  to  play  a  role  in  our  capacity  to  survey.  The  suggestion 
that  15  is harder  to  survey  than  4,  say,  and  that  386  is  harder  than  41,  seems  to  be  true, 
and  not  just  coincidentally.  The  more  numerals  involved,  the  longer  it  takes  us  to  take 
in  (or  even  just  observe)  the  arrangement,  and  surely  this  simple  fact  must  be  a  factor 
'  The  question  as  to  whether  or  not  10""'  is  a  (surveyable)  number  is  an  old  and  much-debated  one  in 
the  literature  -I  use  it  here  as  a  paradigm  example  of  exponential  notation,  which  would  not  be 
surveyable  in  Arabic  notation.  To  the  question  of  whether  or  not  it  is  surveyable,  as  a  number  (and 
hence,  on  a  strict  finitary  account,  admits  of  number-status  at  all),  I  shall  offer  at  least  a  tentative 
response  by  the  end  of  this  chapter. 
60 in  any  criteria  of  surveyability.  Furthermore,  it  looks  as  though  some  notations  are 
invented  precisely  to  make  larger  numbers  easier  to  deal  with,  intuitively  -  the  number 
in  exponential  notation  62  6  appears  less  unwieldy  than  the  decimal  equivalent 
56800235584,  for  example. 
Indeed,  if  we  try  to  remember  this  number  to  reproduce  it  later  on,  we  will  likely 
remember  it  as  62  6,  or  else,  if  we  have  only  the  decimal  notation,  as  a  series  of  smaller 
numbers,  just  as  most  of  us  remember  telephone  numbers,  rather  than  remembering  it 
as  the  decimal  number  fifty-six-thousand-eight-hundred-million,  two-hundred-and- 
thirty-five  -thousand,  five-hundred,  and  eighty-four.  Moreover,  the  same  point  holds 
true  of  different  numbers  like  9  18  and  56563344556788,  even  though  in  this  case  the 
number  represented  in  the  first  instance  has  far  greater  magnitude. 
Michael  Dummett  offers  an  interesting  comment  on  the  subject  of  notation, 
which  seems  to  entail  a  commitment  (on  behalf  of  strict  finitism)  of  the  kind 
expressed  here.  He  is  considering  the  case  of  Arabic  numerals  contrasted  with 
numbers  written  in  exponential  notation,  and  writes: 
"On  the  other  hand,  [the  totality  of  Arabic  numerals  supplemented  by 
the  symbols  for  exponentiation]  does  not  have  the  property,  which  [the 
totality  of  Arabic  numerals]  shares  with  the  totality  of  natural  numbers 
as  traditionally  conceived,  that,  for  any  number  n,  there  are  n  numbers 
less  than  it:  for,  plainly,  the  totality  does  not  contain  as  many  as  1010'0 
num  ers. 
2 
Durnmett's  claim  is  that  if  we  allow  surveyability  in  Arabic-supplemented-by- 
exponentiation-notation,  such  that  1010'0  is  surveyable,  there  are  clearly  not  as  many  as 
101010  surveyable  numbers  less  than  it.  The  idea  here  is  that  as  more  and  more  complex 
exponential  notation  is  introduced,  an  increasing  number  of  natural  numbers 
(represewable  but  not  necessarily  surveyable  in  Arabic  notation)  are  'missed  out',  or 
skipped  over.  Dummett  continues: 
2  Durnmett,  'Wang's  Paradox',  p.  303 
61 "Since  a  totality  determined  by  a  notation  of  the  second  [Arabic  supplemented 
by  exponentiation]  kind  will  still  not  be  closed  under  all  effective  arithmetical 
operations  definable  over  it,  it  possesses  no  great  advantage  over  a  totality  of  the  first 
[determined  by  a  notation  comprising  only  Arabic]  kind,  and,  for  most  purposes  it  is 
better  to  take  the  natural  numbers  as  forming  some  totality  of  this  first  kind.  ,3 
Durnmett's  observations  suggest  that  since  the  complexity  of  exponential 
notation  does  not  increase  uniformly  with  the  magnitude  of  the  number  represented, 
the  discovery  that  a  representation  (in  exponential  notation)  is  surveyable  will  not 
entail  that  all  the  numbers  (integers)  below  that  number  are  surveyable.  Therefore, 
unlike  in  decimal  (or  stroke  notation),  where  there  is  unifonn  progression  of 
complexity  with  respect  to  magnitude,  the  size  of  the  set  of  numbers  that  are 
surveyably  representable  in  any  given  notation  is  arguably  the  same  (or  remarkably 
similar)  to  the  size  of  the  set  for  any  other  notation.  4  This  suggests  a  commitment  to 
complexity,  at  least  at  the  basic  level  -  the  number  and  arrangement  of  numerals 
and/or  symbols  might  place  a  limit  on  the  surveyability  of  a  representation  (an 
inscription,  for  example),  and  thus  the  size  of  the  totality  of  surveyable  numbers 
would  be  roughly  equivalent  across  notations.  That  is  not  to  say  that  the  same 
numbers  will  be  surveyable  on  any  notation  -  such  a  uniformity  is  lost  given  the 
complexity  criteria  for  surveyability  that  we  are  considering  here  -  but  just  that  there 
are  always  a  (roughly  equivalent)  finite  number  of  surveyable  representations  possible 
within  any  notation.  If,  for  example,  we  were  limited  to  taking  in  only  arrangements 
of  symbols  in  which  there  were  no  more  than  two  symbols,  the  highest  number  we 
could  take  in  in  Arabic  notation  would  be  99.  The  highest  number  we  could  take  in  in 
(purely)  exponential  notation,  on  the  other  hand,  would  be  99.  Although  the  second  of 
these  numbers  has  a  much  greater  magnitude,  still  the  number  of  numbers,  or  the  size 
of  the  set  of  numbers,  that  we  were  capable  of  taking  in  in  each  notation  would  be 
equivalent,  since  we  would  be  limited  to  the  same  combinations  of  symbols. 
ibid. 
4  This  is  not  quite  true,  since  it  will  not  hold  for  very  simple  notations  such  as  stroke  notation,  in  which 
the  set  of  surveyably  representable  numbers  is  presumably  much  smaller  than  in  other  cases.  There 
may,  however,  be  a  natural  explanation  for  this,  as  I  shall  outline  shortly. 
62 One  imme  iate  and  potentially  problematic  observation  regarding  such  a 
claim  is  that  if  we  take  the  numbers  that  are  surveyably  representable  in  any  notation, 
we  are  inevitably  left  with  holes  in  the  number  line.  If,  as  Dummett  suggests,  the 
totality  comprising  the  surveyable  Arabic  numerals  supplemented  by  the  symbols  for 
addition,  multiplication  and  exponentiation  "plainly 
... 
does  not  contain  as  many  as 
10  1010  numbers",  even  though  1010'0  is  a  member  of  such  a  totality,  then  there  are 
clearly  some  'numbers'  which  are  not  surveyable  even  though  their  magnitude  falls 
below  others  which  are.  Moreover,  all  though  some  of  these  may  be  representable  in 
Arabic,  many  of  them,  still  less  than  10  1010 
,  will  be  unsurveyable  in  either  notation. 
Nor  can  this  problem  be  rectified  by  a  'complete  set'  of  advanced  notations,  for  each 
advanced  notation  will  presumably  only  expand  the  range  of  numbers  to  greater 
magnitude,  and  make  more  and  bigger  holes  higher  up  the  traditional  number  line,  not 
less.  And  even  though  it  might  be  true  that  in  principle  notations  may  be  constructed 
to  represent  these  'missing'  numbers  surveyably,  such  a  suggestion  must  be  rejected 
by  a  strict  finitist,  who  is in  the  first  place  restricted  to  in  practice  representation,  and 
in  the  second,  opposed  to  the  idea  that  all  finite  numbers  are  representable,  which 
such  a  solution  would  entail. 
Even  if  we  may  later  offer  considerations  to  accommodate  for  these  missing 
numbers,  it  does  not  look  as  though  we  have  the  resources  for  doing  so  here  -  just 
taking,  as  the  present  proposal  suggests,  complexity  to  be  the  fundamental  criterion 
for  surveyability. 
Moreover,  there  seem  to  be  yet  more  insuperable  problems  for  such  an 
account.  Firstly,  such  a  constraint  would  have  the  effect  of  dividing  mathematics  by 
notation;  the  criteria  are  supposed  to  provide  an  account  of  legitimate  mathematical 
objects  and  practices,  but  on  this  kind  of  account  the  admissible  objects  and  practices 
become  merely  contingent  upon  the  notation  used.  The  position  will  presumably 
entail  statements  like  -  'such-and-such  is  an  admissible  mathematical 
object/statement/practice  (say,  a  number)  in  exponential  notation,  but  not  in  Arabic'. 
Something  like  this  has  been  embraced  by  Van  Dantzig,  who  suggests  that  the  natural 
numbers  which  actually  can  be  constructed  (say,  by  a  series  of  what  he  describes  as 
celementary  mental  acts')  does  not  include  1010'0,  but  that  1010'0  is  nonetheless  a 
natural  number.  What  Van  Dantzig  suggests  is  that  the  meaning  of  the  term  'natural 
number'  has  changed  in  this  case.  Indeed,  he  suggests  that  the  implementation  of  first 
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natural  numbers,  such  that  postulates  involving  any  of  these  operations  will  only 
count  as  (constructible)  proofs  insofar  as  they  apply  to  natural  numbers  in  the  first 
sense.  He  maintains  that  each  interpretation  of  natural  number  has  a  corresponding  set 
-S1  for  natural  numbers  in  the  first  sense,  S2  for  those  involving  addition,  and  so  on, 
so  that  numbers  of  the  form  1010'.  belong  to  S4,  but  not  to  any  'lower'  sets.  His 
conclusion  then  is  that: 
"The  difference  between  finite  and  infinite  numbers  is  not  an  essential,  but  a 
gradual  one.  According  to  the  successive  definition  of  'natural  number'  in  the 
successive  senses,  the  individual  identifiability  and  distinguishability  disappear 
gradually  if  the  numbers  become  larger  and  larger  and  can  be  retained  by  new 
definitions  only  for  a  scarcer  and  scarcer  class  of  numbers.  ,5 
While  Van  Dantzig  is  here  addressing  the  question  of  whether  1010"'  is  afinite 
number,  what  he  says  may  be  equally  well  (if  not  even  more  appropriately,  given  his 
constructivist  qualification)  applied  to  the  case  for  surveyability  -  such  that  a  natural 
extension  of  Van  Dantzig  would  be  to  conclude  instead  that the  difference  between 
surveyable  and  unsurveyable  numbers  is  not  an  essential,  but  a  gradual  one. 
Something  about  this  may  well  seem  appealing,  and  as  I  shall  go  on  to  discuss,  the 
idea  that the  limit  is  absolute  is  one  the  strict  finitist  may  well  wish  to  resist;  but  in  the 
present  case,  the  solution  suggested  by  Van  Dantzig's  analysis  is  to  propose  that 
surveyability  has  different  senses;  numbers  surveyable  in  Arabic  notation  are 
surveyablel,  whereas  those  surveyable  in  (only)  exponential  (or  'higher')  notation,  are 
surveyable4  (following  Van  Dantzig's  identification  of  the  different  sets 
corresponding  to  the  successive  senses).  This  is  certainly  an  ingenious  approach  to  the 
problem,  but  not  one  which  I  think  will  prove  useful  in  the  current  analysis.  For  one, 
it  seems  rather  as  though  the  sense  which  Van  Dantzig  attaches  to  surveyable,  is  the 
original  intended  sense  of  surveyable.  '  Moreover,  it  is  not  clear  that,  for  the  strict 
finitist  who  is  concerned  at  least  with  providing  an  ontological  account,  Van 
Dantzig's  solution  can  meet  the  challenge  of  the  problem  I  have  already  raised.  A 
5  Van  Dantzig,  'Is  10  10"  a  finite  numberT,  p.  276 
6  In  this  sense,  it  seems  to  me,  Van  Dantzig's  analysis  is  not,  after  all,  a  genuine  example  of  the 
'surveyability  as  complexity'  model. 
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practice  in  and  of  itself-  rather  it  will  be  admissible  in  some  senses  and  not  in  others. 
Since  the  strict  finitist  is  looking  for  a  further  move  here,  to  the  extent  that 
surveyability  (and  constructibility  in  this  sense)  will  govern  what  numbers  there  are, 
this  solution,  I  suggest,  looks  an  unpromising  one. 
A  further  problem  for  any  strict  finitary  account  that  takes  complexity  as  its 
requirement  for  surveyability  is  that  such  a  criterion  may  well  admit  individual  cases 
that the  strict  finitist  is  bound  to  reject.  I  have  already  acknowledged  that  on  such  a 
schema,  1010'0  is  admissible,  at  least  in  exponential  notation.  One  might  go  further, 
and  suggest  that  the  strict  finitist,  while  following  such  a  constraint  ought,  to  admit  7E 
as  a  legitimate  (surveyable)  number.  The  symbol  is  comprehensible,  certainly  not  too 
complex,  and  by  most,  at  least,  recognisably  represents  at  least  a  candidate  for 
number-status.  The  problems  of  admissions  of  this  kind  for  strict  finitists  should  be 
obvious;  since  pi  is  an  irrational  number,  in  any  notation  but  this  symbolic  form  its 
construction  is  infinite  in  scope.  One  need  only  consider  the  symbol  for  infinity  to 
register  the  force  of  this  point.  The  symbol  is  a  notation  of  a  kind,  in  either  case,  and 
if  complexity  is  the  requirement  for  surveyability,  numbers  represented  by  symbols 
like  these  look  like  they  should  be  as  admissible  as  the  numbers  represented  by 
numerals  like  1,  or  2.  It  is  of  course  no  defence  to  suggest  that  such  symbols  do  not 
use  'numbers',  or  numerals,  in  representation  -  nor,  presumably,  does  stroke  notation, 
but  it  is  clear  that  it  nonetheless  manages  to  serve  as  a  notation  for  (some)  numbers. 
In  fact  this  problem  looks  like  a  general  one  for  the  surveyability-as- 
complexity  account,  in  a  similar  way  to  the  objection  I  outlined  earlier  regarding  the 
apparent  holes  in  the  number  line  on  such  an  account.  It  looks  as  though  the  constraint 
will  fail  to  adequately  rule  out  any  numbers,  subject  to  some  notation.  To  see  this, 
consider  the  simple  constraint  Dummett  proposes  on  behalf  of  the  strict  finitist  -  that 
of  'numbers  that  it  is  possible  in  practice  to  write  down'.  7  Since  this  now  becomes 
'possible  in  practice  to  write  down  in  some  notation',  it  is  not  clear  that  any  more  is 
ruled  out  than  on  an  intuitionistic  account;  indeed,  to  the  extent  that  it  will  permit 
7  Of  course  this  is  not  the  preferred  constraint  of  the  proponent  of  surveyability,  as  I  have  already 
discussed  -  but  the  simple  example  serves  well  to  demonstrate  the  point;  analogous  demonstrations 
may  be  made  for  more  complex  constraints. 
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mathematics  -  it  may  rule  out  a  whole  lot  less. 
As  a  result,  this  option,  at  least  so-construed,  looks  unpromising  for  the  strict 
finitist  account  of  the  apparent  difficulty  presented  by  alternative  notations.  This 
might  seem  a  natural  conclusion,  in  some  respects  -  after  all,  one  way  to  represent 
this  construal  of  surveyability  is  as  merely  ignoring  Wittgenstein's  'strong' 
surveyability  constraint.  In  the  previous  chapter,  I  drew  out  what  I  called  'intuitive 
intelligibility'  to  be  a  requirement  on  numbers  if  they  are  to  count  as  surveyable, 
following  precisely  from  Wittgenstein's  strong  requirement  upon  proofs  -a  number, 
on  this  kind  of  account,  must  present  itself  to  us  as  a  number,  and  not  merely  as  a 
numeral,  or  arrangement  of  numerals  (supplemented  by  notational  symbols  where 
appropriate).  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  as  is  suggested  by  the  proposal  under 
consideration,  we  merely  take  the  complexity  of  the  representation  as  the  criterion  for 
surveyability,  we  seem  to  be  able  to  do  away  with  Wittgenstein's  strong  requirement 
-  at  least  in  the  sense  of  intuitive  intelligibility  that  I  have  attached.  Such  a  position 
then,  might  want  to  construe  Wittgenstein's  remarks  differently.  One  way  to  do  this 
would  be  to  read  the  strong  requirement,  when  translated  to  numbers,  as  only 
requiring  that  the  representation  of  the  number  must  itself  be  'taken  in'  all  in  one  go  - 
a  notation  which  represents  a  number  with  few  enough  numerals  and  symbols  that 
their  entire  relation  is  understood  'all  at  once',  as  it  were,  will  count  as  sufficient 
notation  to  render  the  number  represented  surveyable.  Something  like  this  might  be 
encouraged  by  the  following  quote,  in  which  Wittgenstein  makes  an  apparent 
commitment  to  the  kind  of  proposal  under  discussion.  He  writes: 
"I  want  to  say:  if  you  have  a  proof-pattern  that  cannot  be  taken  in,  and  by  a  change  in 
notation  you  turn  it  into  one  that  can,  then  you  are  producing  a  proof,  where  there  was 
,,  8 
none  before. 
If,  as  I  have  suggested,  we  are  entitled  to  translate  what  Wittgenstein  says 
about  proofs  to  numbers,  the  natural  suggestion  is  that  if  a  number  is  presented  in  a 
notation  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  unsurveyable  in  that  notation,  it  is  not  to  be  admitted 
as  a  legitimate  object,  but  when  it  is  later  presented  in  a  notation  in  which  it  is 
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66 surveyable,  it  should  be  admitted.  One  is,  in  Wittgenstein's  way  of  putting  it, 
producing  a  number,  where  there  was  none  before. 
This  is,  of  course,  simply  one  way  to  interpret  the  position  advanced  by 
Wittgenstein,  and  even  if  we  were  to  adopt  it,  it  will  not,  I  think,  give  us  sufficient 
motivation  to  accept  the  surveyability-as-complexity  account  in  the  face  of  all  the 
problems  I  have identified.  In  fact  Wittgenstein's  assertion  here  will  not  commit  him, 
as  I  shall  go  on  to  demonstrate,  to  a  notion  of  surveyability  as  complexity,  despite  the 
apparent  similarity.  The  best  interpretation,  both  for  Wittgenstein  and  for  the  strict 
finitist,  turns  precisely  upon  what  is  meant  by  surveyable,  or  'taken  in',  as 
Wittgenstein  writes.  Since  this  is  precisely  what  is  still  at  issue,  I  shall  return  to  this 
point  shortly.  For  now,  let  us  return  to  the  alternative  option  open  to  the  strict  finitist 
when  considering  the  difficulties  of  notation,  that  I  mentioned  at  the  opening  of  this 
chapter. 
Magnitude  over  Complexity 
Another  way  of  dealing  with  the  problem  is  simply  to  deny  that  complexity 
plays  an  important  role  in  our  criteria  for  surveyability.  We  return  here  to  the  criterion 
of  intuitive  intelligibility;  and  insist  that  for  a  number  to  count  as  surveyable,  we  must 
possess  an  intuitive  grasp  of  magnitude,  independent  of  the  notation  used  to  represent 
it.  Thus,  however  I  represent  the  number,  be  it  "9",  "3 
219,64111111  111  ",  etc.,  what  is 
important  is  whether  or  not  I  can  possess  intuitive  grasp  of  the  magnitude,  of  the 
number  9.  The  complexity  of  the  representation  makes  no  difference  to  the  individual 
magnitude  of  the  number  represented,  and  hence,  according  to  this  kind  of  response, 
cannot  determine  whether  or  not  we  may  reach  an  intuitive  grasp  of  that  magnitude. 
There  are  a  number  of  problems  for  such  a  response.  Firstly,  we  ought  to 
remember  that  strict  finitism  is  an  account  of  in  practice  surveyability,  and  hence  the 
means  by  which  we  actually  do  survey  -  including  the  notation  we  use  -  ought  to  be 
important.  When  we  shift  from  using  our  fingers,  or  stroke  notation,  to  counting  in 
Arabic,  there  seems  to  be  a  shift  in  our  practical  capability  to  deal  with  larger  numbers 
intelligibly.  Furthermore,  such  an  account  seems  to  deny  the  common-sense  role  of 
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numbers  accessible,  and  in  precisely  the  sense  of  'accessible'  implied  by  the 
definition  I  have  given  of  'intuitive  grasp  of  magnitude'.  It  seems  as  though  the  only 
finitism  this  kind  of  account  would  suffice  for  would  be  the  overly  restrictive  kind 
(which  in  the  last  chapter  I  called  'fierce  finitism')  that  suggests  an  intuitive  grasp  of 
only  six  or  so  numbers.  In  this  case,  the  intuitive  grasp  in  question  is  one  that  is 
presumably  independent  of  notation,  since  we  appear  to  have  intuitive  access  to  these 
numbers  in  any  notation.  But  it  is  not  clear  that  even  here  the  criterion  is  plausible  - 
might  I  not  construct  a  notation  which  was  so  complex  that  even  the  magnitude  of 
these  simple  numbers  was  not  conveyed?  If  that  were  my  only  notation,  in  what  sense 
would  I  have  an  intuitive  grasp  of  even  these  numbers? 
Complexity,  then,  it  seems  must  play  a  role  in  our  surveying,  and  hence  in  the 
surveyability  of  numbers.  If  it  did  not,  our  ability  to  survey  numbers  ought  to  be 
independent  of  the  notation  used,  and  consideration  of  simple  cases  suggest  that  it  is 
not.  Consider  the  use  of  stroke  notation  alone  -  will  stroke  notation5  not  supplemented 
by  any  further  notation,  adequately  convey magnitude  for  even  relatively  small 
numbers?  Isn't  it  rather  the  case  that,  as  I  intimated  above,  Arabic  notation  simply 
allows  us  to  'grasp'  higher  numbers,  in  the  relevant  sense? 
One  response  might  be  to  suggest  that  familiarity  with  a  notation,  rather  than 
complexity  within  that  notation,  is  important;  and  that  the  more  familiar  we  are  with  a 
notation,  the  better  we  are  able  to  survey,  regardless  of  the  complexity.  For  example, 
few  of  us  are  capable  of  surveying  hexadecimal  numbers  above  sixteen  or  so  -  but  if 
we  (had  been  taught  and)  used  only  hexadecimal  notation  it  might  conceivably  allow 
9 
us  at  least  as  much  grasp  of  magnitudes  as  our  current  decimal  system  does 
. 
There 
seems  something  right  about  such  a  response,  to  the  extent  that  familiarity  seems  to 
play  an  undeniable  role  in  our  ability  to  survey  a  given  notation  -  consider  the  number 
(in  binary)  III  10  110,  the  number  (in  hexadecimal)  E6,  and  the  number  (in  decimal) 
246.  For  most  of  us,  intuitive  intelligibility  follows  only  in  the  decimal  notation;  that 
is  to  say,  a  grasp  of  magnitude  is  only  conveyed  by  the  third  of  the  three  notations. 
The  number  represented  in  each  case,  however,  is  the  same;  but  in  terms  of  the 
9  It  is,  after  all,  entirely  contingent  that  we  use  decimal  notation  in  the  first  place.  (Had  Anne  Boleyn 
invented  counting,  things  might  have  been  very  different). 
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complex. 
But  while  the  point  about  familiarity  is  well  made,  it  is  not  clear  how  this 
would  in  itself  dissuade  us  of  the  idea  that  complexity  is  also  a  relevant  factor  in  our 
ability  to  survey.  In  fact,  precisely  this  kind  of  example,  if  we  consider  stroke  notation 
as  well,  merely  serves  to  reinforce  the  point  about  complexity.  Let  us  try  to 
reconstruct  the  same  number  in  stroke  notation: 
Can  this  representation  convey  a  grasp  of  magnitude?  Hardly  -I  cannot  even 
be  sure  in  this  case  that  I  have  reproduced  it  effectively  -I  trust  that  my  computer's 
copy  and  paste  function  is  adequate,  and  that  my  quick  counting  check  is  correct. 
Moreover,  this  may  give  us  cause  to  doubt  that  familiarity  is  an  adequate  criteria  -I 
am,  in  this  case,  relatively  familiar  with  stroke  notation,  and  yet  the  magnitude  is  not 
conveyed;  I  have  no  intuitive  grasp  of  the  number  represented.  Nor  does  it  look  as 
though  any  amount  of  training  or  habitual  use  will  lead  me  to  recognise  the  number 
represented  here  (represented  in  decimal  by  the  numerals  '246')  when  presented  in 
this  notation.  It  simply  looks  as  though  I  can  reach  an  intuitive  grasp  of  magnitude  in 
one  notation  (in  this  example  in  Arabic),  and  not  in  another  (again,  in  this  example, 
stroke  notation). 
Hence  the  complexity  of  the  notation  seems  to  play  an  undeniable  role  in  our 
ability  to  survey  representations,  and  hence,  to  the  admissibility  of  putative  numbers 
on  a  strict  finitist  account.  We  have  already  seen  the  difficulties  in  adhering  to  the 
principle  that  complexity  of  notation  determines  the  criteria  for  surveyability  -  now, 
here,  it  seems  equally  unpromising  to  deny  that  it  plays  any  role,  and  to  take  intuitive 
grasp  of  magnitude  as  our  criterion  independent  of  the  notation  used.  One  cannot 
divorce  the  notion  of  intuitive  grasp  of  magnitude  from  the  complexity  of  the 
representation,  simply  because  the  representation  is  involved  in  conveying  (perhaps 
even  in  retaining)  the  intuitive  grasp  of  magnitude. 
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were  two  strategies  that  initially  presented  themselves  to  the  strict  finitist  -  under 
closer  scrutiny,  it  seems  neither  option  is  plausible.  Instead,  then,  I  wish  to  advance  a 
third  option  as  the  most  promising  -a  hybrid  of  the  two. 
Complexity  and  Magnitude,  a  combinatorial  approach 
What  I  propose  then,  is  that  our  criteria  for  surveyability  must  contain  both  of 
these  strands  in  order  to  be  coherent.  Specifically,  the  notation  must  convey  an 
intuitive  grasp  of  magnitude.  Hence,  two  things  must  obtain,  in  order  for  a  number  to 
be  surveyable.  First,  it  must  be  possible  (in  practice)  for  the  surveyor  to  possess  an 
intuitive  grasp  of  the  magnitude  of  the  number.  Secondly,  the  notation  used  to 
represent  the  number  must  be  adequate  to  convey  this  grasp  of  magnitude. 
Let  me  (re-)define  the  (strong)  criterion  as  follows:  A  number  is  surveyable  if 
and  only  if  an  intuitive  grasp  of  magnitude  may  be  conveyed  in  some  notation. 
Now,  in  line  with  strict  finitist  ideas,  the  correct  construal  of  'in  some 
notation'  is  presumably  in  some  actual  notation  -  i.  e.  the  magnitude  may  be  conveyed 
in  practice  in  some  notation.  Hence,  where  our  notation(s)  are  sufficient  to  convey  an 
intuitive  grasp  of  magnitude,  then  the  numbers  represented  are  surveyable  -  as  long  as 
we  are  ourselves  capable  of  intuitive  grasp  of  the  magnitude  in  the  first  place. 
Note  then  that  there  are  two  possible  failures  -  failure  of  the  notation,  which 
does  not  necessarily  entail  that  the  number  is  unsurveyable  in  some  notation  (see  for 
example  the  demonstration  above  in  the  case  of  stroke  notation)  and  failure  of  our 
capacity  to  intuitively  grasp  the  magnitude  of  the  number. 
Failure  of  the  notation  occurs  when  the  notation  is  itself  insufficient  to  convey 
numbers  that  are  nonetheless  perfectly  intuitively  intelligible.  For  example,  consider 
the  case  above,  where  the  number  246  is  represented  in  stroke  notation.  The  fact  that 
we  are  unable  to  survey  the  number  here  is  not  because  we  cannot  independently 
grasp  the  magnitude  conveyed  by  the  representation  (after  all,  once  the  number  is 
conveyed  in  Arabic  notation,  we  do  grasp  the  magnitude),  but  rather  that  the 
representation  is  simply  too  complex  to  convey  anything  useful.  Hence,  failure  of  the 
70 notation  does  not  necessarily  entail  that  the  number  is  unsurveyable,  just  unsurveyable 
in  that  notation;  so  that  if  there  exists  another  notation  (in  this  case  Arabic)  in  which 
the  grasp  of  magnitude  is  conveyed,  then  the  number  itself  is  surveyable. 
Failure  of  our  capacity  to  intuitively  grasp  the  magnitude  of  a  number,  on  the 
other  hand,  will  entail  that  the  number  represented,  however  simply,  is  unsurveyable. 
If  the  failure  to  survey  is  because  the  magnitude  exceeds  our  own  finite  human 
capability  to  grasp  magnitudes,  and  not  in  the  notation  used  in  an  attempt  to  convey 
such,  then  no  alteration  (or  indeed  improvement)  of  the  notation  will  allow  us  to  attain 
that  grasp.  The  putative  number  -  that  is  to  say,  the  arrangement  of  numerals  and 
symbols  intended  as  a  candidate  for  numberhood  -  lies  without  our  ability  to  survey, 
regardless  of  notation. 
Note,  however,  that there  is  nothing  here  to  suggest  that  the  set  of  surveyable 
numbers  is  fixed,  as  it  were,  against  the  adoption  of  further  notations  (any  more  than 
it  is  against  improvements  in  our  actual  capacity  to  survey),  once  those  notations  are 
realised.  When  we,  as  mathematicians,  shifted  from  stroke  notation  to  Arabic,  or 
adopted  the  supplementation  of  exponential  notation,  much  larger  numbers  became 
surveyable.  And  in  this  lies  what  I  have  suggested  is  the  best  interpretation  of 
Wittgenstein  on  this  issue.  The  difficulty,  it  will  be  recalled,  lies  in  how  to  interpret 
the  quote  from  Wittgenstein  that  I  outlined  in  a  previous  section: 
"I  want  to  say:  if  you  have  a  proof-pattern  that  cannot  be  taken  in,  and  by  a 
change  in  notation  you  turn  it  into  one  that  can,  then  you  are  producing  a  proof,  where 
there  was  none  before.  " 
Now,  by  simple  substitution,  I  can  illustrate  my  suggested  interpretation  for 
number. 
I  want  to  say:  if  you  have  a  number-patternlo  that  cannot  be  taken  in,  and  by  a 
change  in  notation  you  turn  it  into  one  that  can,  then  you  are  producing  a  number, 
where  there  was  none  before. 
10  Again,  here  'number-pattern'  means  something  like  an  arrangement  of  numerals  and  symbols 
intended  as  a  candidate  for  numberhood. 
71 Which  is  just  to  say,  I  assert,  that  if  we  adopt  a  notation  such  that  we  may 
attain  a  grasp  of  magnitude  where  there  was  not  one  previously,  then  we  produce  (in 
Wittgenstinian  parlance  at  least;  the  strict  finitist  will  presumably  prefer  'construct' 
here)  a  number  where  there  was  not  one  before. 
Of  course,  the  hybrid  model  may  still  seem  to  possess  some  unattractive 
features.  It  looks,  for  example,  as  though  even  on  this  model,  we  are  committed  to  the 
notion,  deemed  objectionable  previously,  that  some  numbers  will  not  be  surveyable  in 
Arabic  notation,  per  se,  but  nonetheless  surveyable  in  some  notation. 
However,  this  is  not  so  great  a  problem  for  the  hybrid  model  as  it  was  for  the 
Surveyability-as-Complexity  model,  since  we  have  here  independent  reasons  for 
limiting  the  extent  of  surveyability,  within  perfectly  finite  boundaries.  On  this  model, 
although  the  answer  to  the  question'is  this  number  surveyable'may  sometimes 
require  further  qualification,  dependent  upon  the  notation  used,  for  the  majority  of 
cases,  the  answer  will  remain  independent  of  notation  -  on  the  one  hand,  in  the 
affirmative,  because  an  intuitive  grasp  of  magnitude  is  conveyed  by  any  and  all 
existing  notations,  and  on  the  other,  in  the  negative,  because  the  grasp  of  magnitude  is 
beyond  our  capacity  as  surveyors. 
In  addition,  the  hybrid  model  for  surveyability  suggested  here  possesses  some 
attractive  features  for  the  strict  finitist.  On  the  one  hand,  by  incorporating  the  third 
surveyability  requirement  outlined  previously,  the  hybrid  model  also  retains  the 
desirable  result  that  certain  notations,  intended  only  to  represent  enonnous  or 
irrational  numbers  and  thus  inadmissible  on  a  strict  finitary  account  (a  paradigm 
example  of  such  a  notation  is  Cantor's  notation  for  transfinite  mathematics),  will 
always  fail  to  represent  a  (surveyable)  number  since  they  must  always  fail  to  convey 
an  intuitive  grasp  of  magnitude.  The  infinite  cardinals,  for  example,  fail  to  convey  any 
intuitive  sense  of  magnitude,  simply  because  their  magnitude  is  only  intended  to  be 
relative  to  one  another  -  no  genuine  sense  of  size  is  conveyed.  With  regard  to  the 
irrationals,  examples  like  71  and  ý2  will  be  inadmissible  as  numbers"  because  no 
11  It  is  not  entirely  clear  what  the  strict  finitist  should  say  about  expressions  like  71  and  42;  one  solution 
might  be  to  suggest  that  they  represent  finite  relations,  rather  than  numbers  themselves.  Certainly, 
when  7r  is used  in  calculation,  a  finite  approximation  is  always  used  and  not  the  irrational  expressed  by 
the  relation  'the  number  of  times  the  diameter  of  a  circle  will  fit  into  its  circumference'. 
72 genuine  magnitude  is  conveyed.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  we  realise  that  7E  lies 
somewhere  between  3  and  4  (or  even  between  3.141  and  3.142)  in  order  to  obtain  a 
grasp  of  its  magnitude,  for  there  are  an  awful  lot  more  numbers  of  which  this  is  also 
true. 
Certainly,  the  strict  finitist  should  wish  to  discount  not  only  transfinite 
numbers,  but  also  irrational  numbers;  and  so  it  is  an  advantage  of  any  account  of 
surveyability  that  gives  us  a  reason  to  do  so. 
Secondly,  as  promised  in  an  earlier  section,  the  model  provides  us  with  the 
proper  resources  to  attempt  an  answer  to  the  question  as  to  whether  10  10'0  is 
surveyable  or  not.  The  answer  may  not  be  simple,  but  it  seems  to  me  to  depend  upon 
whether  intuitive  grasp  of  the  magnitude  is  possible  (in  practice). 
The  notation  is  clearly  sufficiently  simple  in  this  case  that  if  we  are  capable  of 
grasping  the  magnitude,  then  it  will  be  conveyed  by  the  representation.  Now,  recall 
that  intuitive  grasp  of  magnitude  requires  that  when  the  putative  number  is  compared 
with  any  other  surveyable  number,  one  may  identify  (for  example)  the  larger.  The  fact 
that  for  many  of  us,  we  cannot  -  without  calculation  or  the  aid  of  a  computer  -  tell 
which  is  larger  between  the  number-patterns  9  911  and  10  1010 
. 
does  not  rule  out  that 
1010'0  is  surveyable,  as  it  seems  likely  that  99"  is.  My  instinct  is  to  suggest  that  1010'0 
is  unsurveyable  (and  hence,  on  a  strict  finitary  account,  inadmissible  as  a  genuine 
number),  because  we  are  incapable  of  grasping  the  magnitude.  However,  I  would  not 
like  to  rule  out  the  possibility  that  for  some  mathematicians,  the  notation  genuinely 
conveys  an  intuitive  grasp,  and  if  so,  the  number  might  be  admissible  for  them. 
As  a  result,  it  may  still  not  be  easy  to  give  a  decisive  answer  to  the  question, 
since  the  surveyability  of  a  number  is  inextricably  connected  with  the  capabilities  of 
the  surveyor.  In  order  to  answer  questions  about  specific  numbers,  it  seems  as  if  we 
must  give  an  answer  as  to  whether  all  surveyors  can  grasp  a  magnitude  or  not.  But 
clearly,  peoples'  ability  to  survey  varies  -  both  with  the  abilities  of  others,  and  with 
their  own  ability  on  differing  occasions,  and  under  different  circumstances. 
But  now,  rather  than  a  question  of  notation,  the  issue  turns  upon  one  aspect  of 
perhaps  the  central  concern  for  strict  finitism  as  a  whole  -  that  of  vagueness.  It  is  to  a 
proper  discussion  of  vagueness  that  I  shall  turn  in  the  next  few  chapters. 
73 The  Story  sofar 
These  remarks  conclude  the  first  part  of  my  thesis.  I  have  offered  here  an 
account  of  the  commitments  and  claims  of  strict  finitism.  In  summary: 
Strict  Finitism  is  a  foundational  theory  rooted  in  a  branch  of  anti-realism 
known  as  constructivism.  Numbers,  proofs,  and  statements  of  mathematics  are  mind- 
dependent  constructions.  Strict  Finitism  suggests  that  the  mind-dependent  nature  of 
these  constructions  places  a  natural  limit  upon  construction  -  and  a  more  radical  limit 
than  that  proposed  by  the  intuitionists.  The  limit  is  described  in  terms  of  our  ability  to 
'survey';  and  I  have  provided  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  this  concept.  Since  my 
primary  concern  here  is  number,  I  have  asserted  that  Wittgenstein's  three  criteria  for 
the  surveyability  of  a  proof  may  be  usefully  and  relatively  straight-forwardly 
translated  to  apply  to  number.  Of  the  three,  only  the  third  criterion  requires  extensive 
re  -interpretation,  and  I  suggest  the  best  way  to  understand  Wittgenstein's  strong 
criterion  for  surveyability  in  terms  of  number  is  that  a  putative  number  (or  number- 
pattern)  is  surveyable  (and  hence  admissible  as  a  number)  if  and  only  if  its  magnitude 
can  be  intuitively  grasped  by  a  surveyor,  where  intuitive  grasp  of  magnitude  amounts 
to  an  understanding  of  the  exact  magnitude  of  the  number  considered  -a  precise 
identification  of  its  place  on  the  number  line.  Intuitive  grasp  of  the  magnitude  as  a 
part  of  the  requirement  for  surveyability  will  guarantee  that  given  any  two  surveyable 
numbers,  we  may  readily  rank  them  in  order  of  size.  I  have  further  discussed  the 
effect  of  notation  upon  surveyability,  and  modified  the  strong  criterion  as  a  result, 
such  that  a  putative  number  is  surveyable  if  and  only  if  an  intuitive  grasp  of 
magnitude  can  be  conveyed  in  some  notation  to  a  surveyor. 
What  I  intend  to  do  in  the  middle  section  of  the  thesis  is  to  address  some  of  the 
major  objections  to  strict  finitism.  Many  of  these  (although  not  all)  turn  on  the 
commitment  to  a  vague  limit  to  constructibility,  and  I  would  like  to  end  here  with 
precursor  note  to  that  debate.  In  the  discussions  that  follow  I  shall  mostly  consider,  in 
connection  with  the  limit  of  constructibility,  only  the  upper  limit  imposed  upon  the 
size  of  numbers.  This  is  purely  to  make  the  discussion  easier  -  intuitively,  the 
progressive  sequence  of  the  (natural)  numbers  makes  talk  of  upper  limits  readily 
74 comprehensible;  we  are  clear  where  the  limit  of  uni-numeral  (one  digit)  numbers  lies 
on  the  natural  number  scale,  for  example.  However,  it  should  be  understood  that  there 
is  an  accompanying  assumption  for  (strict)  finitist  philosophy  that  the  limit  of 
constructibility  (surveyability,  intelligibility)  will  apply  to  other  features  of 
mathematical  objects  in  general  -  the  size  of  a  plane,  the  'smallness'  of  a  fraction,  the 
complexity  of  a  real  number,  etc.  It  may  be  that  the  precise  entailments  of  each  case 
warrants  further  investigation,  but  for  the  present  thesis,  I  shall  consider  all  such  cases 
uniformly;  as  I  think  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  where  it  is  coherent  to  speak  of  an 
upper  limit  on  the  constructible  size  of  a  natural  number,  it  is  coherent  to  speak  of 
analogous  constructible  limits  on  mathematical  objects  in  general. 
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Let  us  turn  our  attention  now  to  some  of  the  principle  objections  to 
strict  finitism  as  a  foundation  for  mathematics.  Many  of  these  objections  turn  upon  the 
notion  of  surveyability,  as  problematic,  or  even  downright  inconsistent.  The  first  of 
these  objections  that  I  would  like  to  consider  is  regarding  what  Mark  Addis  has 
described  as  the  'psychological  and  epistemological'  issues  at  play  with  the  notion  of 
surveyability.  Addis  has  three  objections  to  the  strict  finitist  program  in  his  article 
'Surveyability  and  the  sorites  paradox',  and  I  shall  mention  the  first  two  in  upcoming 
chapters.  For  now,  I  would  like  to  focus  on  the  third  objection,  which  seems  peculiar 
to  Addis  (in  the  literature  at  least),  but  which  nevertheless  is  exemplary  of  the  kind  of 
misunderstanding  common  to  those  resistant  to  strict  finitism.  In  the  final  section,  of 
his  paper,  Addis  suggests  that  surveyability  raises  a  dilemma  for  the  strict  finitist, 
following  the  question  over  whether  there  is  a  determinate  answer  to  questions  about 
the  unexercised  capacity  for  surveying  in  potential  surveyors.  Addis  writes: 
"The  question  can  then  be  raised  as  to  whether  a  person  can  survey  a  proof  at  a 
certain  time,  even  if  he  is  not  actually  thinking  about  the  proof  at  that  time.  The  strict 
finitist  is  placed  in  a  dilemma  by  this  question.  If  he  claims  that  the  question  has  an 
answer,  then  this  implies  that  there  is  a  fact  of  the  matter  about  whether  the  person 
can  survey  the  proof,  even  though  it  cannot  be  known.  This  view  has  the  undesirable 
consequence  of  entailing  counterfactual  realism  about  human  beings....  If  however 
the  strict  finitist  denies  that  there  is  any  fact  of  the  matter  (independently  of  the 
question  of  whether  it  is  knowable  or  not),  then  he  is  forced  to  conclude  that  it  is  only 
possible  to  assert  that  a  proof  is  or  is  not  surveyable  when  someone  is  actually 
surveying  it.  Hence  the  range  of  applicability  of  the  concept  of  surveyability  is  very 
restricted,  and  knowing  whether  a  proof  is  surveyable  or  not  is  only  possible  at  certain 
times.  "  1 
1  Addis,  p.  163-4 
77 Now,  I  am  not  convinced  that  either  of  the  homs  of  this  purported  dilemma  is 
very  sharp,  or  indeed  that  there  is  really  a  dilemma  here  at  all.  I  shall  examine  each 
hom  in  turn. 
Part  I-  The  First  horn:  Counterfactual  Realism 
The  first  horn  of  Addis'  dilemma  is  as  follows:  According  to  Addis,  the  strict 
finitist  will  run  into  trouble  if  she  asserts  that  the  question  'as  to  whether  a  person  can 
survey  a  proof  at  a  certain  time,  even  if  he  is  not  actually  thinking  about  the  proof  at 
that  time'  admits  of  a  determinate  answer,  because,  Addis  suggests,  this  leads  to  a 
commitment  to  what  he  describes  as  'Counterfactual  Realism'.  Addis  offers,  as  a 
footnote  definition  for  counterfactual  realism,  the  following: 
"Counterfactual  realism  is  the  position  that  there  is  an  actual  fact  about  something 
which  was  an  unrealized  possibility.  "  2 
A  Dummettian  account  of  counterfactual  realism 
Although  Addis  dismisses  counterfactual  realism  as  'undesirable',  his  reasons 
for  doing  so  are  not  altogether  transparent.  Perhaps  Addis'  problems  with 
counterfactual  realism  are  drawn  from  an  analogy  with  Durnmett's  observation  that 
on  a  realist  interpretation,  counterfactuals  about  human  attributes  such  as  bravery,  if 
true,  would  be  true  in  virtue  of  some  'psychic  mechanism'.  Durnmett's  assertion  is 
that  a  counterfactual  involving  a  non-material  conditional  such  as  'If  Jones  had  been 
put  in  danger,  he  would  have  reacted  bravely'  when  in  fact  Jones  is  dead  and  was 
never  put  in  any  danger,  if  true,  could  only  be  true  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  Jones  was 
brave,  despite  Jones  never  having  demonstrated  a  single  brave  act.  3  If  Addis  is 
following  this  thought,  then  the  suggestion  would  be  that  the  counterfactual  'if  A  had 
tried  to  survey  proof  X  even  though  he  did  not  do  so,  then  he  would/would  not  have 
2  Addis,  footnote,  p.  163 
3  Durnmett,  'Realism'  -  Dummett  provides  here  a  comprehensive  discussion  of  the  commitments  of 
realists  and  anti-realists  with  regard  to  counterfactual  statements  of  the  kind  Addis  has  in  mind. 
78 succeeded'  could  be  true  only  in  virtue  of  some  such  mechanism;  and  it  is  clear  that 
Dummett  considers  such  mechanisms  rather  dubious,  particularly  in  the  case  of 
statements  about  character.  Dummett  writes: 
"On  the  realist  view,  statements  about  character  relate  to  something  which  we 
cannot  directly  observe,  but  to  the  state  of  which  we  infer  indirectly  from  a  person's 
behaviour.  The  situation  may  be  such  that,  however  many  facts  we  knew  of  the  kind 
which  we  can  directly  determine,  we  should  not  know  whether  the  statement  'He  was 
brave'  was  true  or  false:  nevertheless  it  would  necessarily  be  either  true  or  false,  since 
the  man's  character  -  conceived  of  as  an  inner  mechanism  which  determines  his 
behaviour  -  must  either  have  included  the  quality  of  bravery  or  have  lacked  it. 
it  is  evident  that  only  a  philosophically  quite  naYve  person  would 
. )4  adopt  a  realist  view  of  statements  about  character'  . 
On  Durnmett's  account  then  5,  psychic  mechanisms  seem  implausible  in  the 
case  of  statements  about  character  -a  person's  bravery  consists  surely  in  the  brave 
acts  they  have  undertaken.  However,  to  return  to  Addis'  claim,  I  believe  that  this 
example  is  disanalogous  to  the  case  of  surveyability.  For  bravery,  if  we  are  to  accept 
Durnmett's  account,  may  only  be  defined  in  terms  of  brave  acts.  But  surveyability 
may  not  only  be  defined  in  terms  of  acts  of  surveying;  rather,  our  ability  as  surveyors 
can  be  described  in  terms  of  an  intellectual  capacity  (even,  allowing  for  a  broadly 
physicalist  interpretation  of  mind,  in  terms  of  certain  physical  characteristics  of  the 
surveyor).  The  counterfactual  will  be  true  or  false  in  virtue  of  the  mental  capabilities 
of  the  subject  (coupled  presumably  with  certain  environmental  factors  that  affect  the 
subject's  powers  of  attention,  reasoning,  etc.  ).  Durnmett  dismisses  the  notion  of  'an 
inner  mechanism  which  determines 
... 
behaviour',  but  presumably  because  such  an 
inner  mechanism  is  neither  observable  nor  measurable.  Bravery  consists  in  brave  acts. 
However,  our  capacity  to  survey,  it  seems  to  me,  consists  not  in  acts  of  surveying  at 
all  -  since  we  are  not  free  to  survey  what  we  choose,  and  reject  the  rest:  while  our 
capacity  for  committing  brave  or  cowardly  acts  is  (at  least  as  ordinarily  conceived) 
within  our  control  -I  may  act  bravely  on  one  occasion  when  the  danger  is  great,  with 
4  Dummett,  'Realism',  pp.  149-50 
5  It  is  not  clear  that  Dummett  is  correct  here  even  to  suggest  that  a  realist  view  of  statements  about 
character  is  indefensible  -a  dispositional  account  of  bravery  would  be  just  such  a  view.  But  for  the 
sake  of  exploring  the  analogy,  I  shall  pass  over  further  remarks  here. 
79 cowardice  on  another  when  it  is  not.  But  my  ability  to  survey  does  not  seem  to  be  a 
matter  of  preference,  determined  simply  by  what  I  have  chosen  to  survey  in  the  past; 
rather,  our  capacity  to  survey  consists  in  observable  and  perhaps  even  measurable 
human  qualities. 
Bravery  is  a  characteristic;  one  which  a  life  may  properly  be  imagined  as 
lacking.  Ability  to  survey  is  not  such  a  thing  -  all  intelligent  life  has  some  capacity  to 
survey;  clearly,  our  ability  to  survey  depends  upon  the  mental  capacity  of  the 
6  individual 
. 
Now,  for  the  analogy  to  proceed,  intelligence  takes  on  the  role  of  an 
unobservable  psychic  mechanism;  and  this  seems  far  less  plausible  than  in  the  case  of 
character  (as  an  inner  mechanism). 
To  put  the  contrast  another  way,  consider  the  following.  If  I  do  not  risk  my  life 
to  save  another  today,  that  does  not  rule  out  the  possibility  of  my  doing  it  tomorrow.  I 
do  not  consider  it  without  my  capacity,  even  if  I  do  not  choose  to  do  so  today.  It 
seems  to  me  as  if  I  have  the  potential  for  bravery,  at  least  until  I  am  no  longer  capable 
of  action.  Perhaps  it  is  plausibly  as  Dummett  suggests,  that  bravery  consists  in  brave 
acts,  and  nothing  more  mysterious.  If  I  choose  to  risk  my  life  to  save  another 
tomorrow,  it  is  a  brave  act;  I  am  therefore  brave.  (Of  course,  if  I  commit  a  good  many 
cowardly  acts  in  life  and  only  a  single  brave  one,  this  may  temper  the  extent  to  which 
I  can  be  considered  brave,  but  for  the  sake  of  argument  we  may  assume  this  is  typical 
behaviour  for  me).  However,  if  I  cannot  survey  the  difference  between  17  to  the 
power  1000  and  2  today,  it  does  not  seem  as  though  I  have  the  potential  to  do  so 
tomorrow.  Hence  my  ability  to  survey  does  not  consist  merely  in  acts  of  surveying.  I 
am  constrained,  by  very  real  (albeit  vague)  limits,  as  to  what  I  may  survey.  By 
comparison,  I  cannot  think  of  a  brave  act  which  I  do  not  have  the  potential  to  choose 
to  commit  tomorrow.  There  is  no  act  beyond  my  capacity  for  braveness,  and  indeed 
'  Indeed,  one  might  be  tempted  to  say  that  our  ability  to  survey  is  straight-forwardly  reducible  to  the 
mental  capacity  of  the  surveyor.  The  reason  I  am  shy  of  doing  so  is  that  assuredly  there  are  factors 
which  will  affect  our  ability  to  survey  that  do  not  alter  our  mental  capabilities,  per  se;  if  a  proof  is  badly 
inscribed,  for  example,  or  if  we  are  affected  by  having  just  performed  a  similar  operation  which 
influences  our  corresponding  ability  -  say,  one  that  leads  us  to  make  a  mistaken  assumption  about  the 
new  proof  that  we  might  not  have  made  if  we  had  approached  this  proof  first.  However,  it  is  clear  that 
the  relationship  between  surveyability  and  mental  ability  is  a  strong  one. 
I  also  acknowledge  that  'mental  capacity'  is  not  a  very  precise  term  -  for  different  acts  of  surveying,  it 
may  be  more  appropriate  to  speak  of  'mathematical  ability',  or  in  other  cases  of  'powers  of  attention'.  I 
do  not  use  the  term  as  definitive,  nor  do  I  intend  to  suggest  that  intellectual  ability  is  directly 
quantifiable  by  reference  to  one  of  these  narrower  definitions;  rather  I  use  it  merely  as  a  'cover-all'  for 
such  terms. 
80 on  Durnmett's  account  this  is  because  bravery  just  consists  in  such  acts.  But  it  seems 
as  if  we  can  postulate  (and  have  here  done  so)  putative  'numbers'  beyond  all  our 
capacity  to  survey.  7 
What  I  take,  then,  to  be  undesirable  about  counterfactual  realism,  is  that  one 
needs  to  postulate  something  (otherwise)  mysterious  in  virtue  of  which 
counterfactuals  may  be  true  or  false.  Dummett  suggests  that  in  the  case  of  statements 
about  character,  this  seems  odd,  since  it  involves  commitment  to  unnecessary  (in 
terms  of  explanatory  role)  and  unobservable  psychic  mechanisms.  Addis  is  perhaps 
suggesting  that  the  same  follows  for  statements  regarding  surveyability;  to  the  extent 
that  the  assertion  that  there  is  something  in  virtue  of  which  counterfactuals  involving 
attempts  to  survey  are  true  or  false  will  lead  to  commitment  to  similarly  unnecessary 
and  unobservable  mechanisms.  I  argue,  however,  that  in  the  case  of  surveyability 
counterfactuals,  the  example  is  disanalogous.  Firstly,  it  seems  as  if  there  is  a  genuine 
difference  between  bravery,  as  a  tendancy,  and  surveyability  as  a  capacity.  The 
tendancy  towards  an  action  is  perhaps  only  demonstrable  by  recourse  to  actions  of  the 
appropriate  kind.  A  capacity  for  action,  on  the  other  hand,  may  be  perfectly 
observable.  I  may  have  the  capacity  for  cross-country  running,  without  displaying  the 
slightest  tendency  towards  it.  If  I  have  never  been  cross-country  running,  my  claims 
to  have  a  tendancy  to  do  so  are  unsubstantiated,  but  my  capacity  to  do  so  need  not  be. 
Indeed,  given  that  I  swim  regularly,  and  have  two  healthy  legs,  no-one  is  likely  to  take 
issue  with  my  capacity  to  do  so.  Similarly,  the  capacity  to  survey  is,  I  say,  perfectly 
demonstrable,  indeed  is  demonstrated  by  all. 
There  is  another  important  distinction  between  the  cases,  which  holds  even  if 
we  were  to  regard  bravery  as  a  capacity,  and  that  is  that  surveyability  is  not  a  simple 
irreducible  capacity,  but  involves  and  is  made  up  of  a  variety  of  other  demonstrable 
(more  general) capacities.  Hence,  although  the  task  does  not  look  promising  for 
bravery  (even  as  a  capacity),  we  may  however  infer  an  individual's  capacity  to  survey 
from  a  host  of  other  abilities. 
7  That  is  to  say  no  more  than  that  we  may  imagine  an  operation,  such  as  the  successor  operation,  or 
some  function  like  the  exponential  function,  taking  us  well  beyond  our  capacity  to  survey.  The  term 
number  applies  in  the  classical  sense,  but  not,  obviously,  in  the  strict  finitary  one. 
81 Alternative  interpretations  of  counterfactual  realism 
However,  perhaps  Dummett's  account  of  counterfactual  truth  is  an  unjust 
analogy.  Perhaps  Addis'  problem  stems  from  a  particular  notion  of  counterfactual 
realism;  one  which,  although  not  fully  defined,  may  nonetheless  cause  trouble  for  the 
strict  finitist.  To  try  to  tease  out  the  suggested  problem,  I  shall  examine  closely  the 
analysis  Addis  offers  us. 
Addis'  explanation  is  in  terms  of  different  kinds  of  counterfactuals,  the  latter 
two  of  which  are  problematic  given  his  account  of  counterfactual  realism.  The  first 
kind  of  counterfactual,  Addis  calls  'Accessible  counterfactuals'.  These  are 
counterfactuals  that  it  is  possible  to  check.  The  second  kind,  Addis  calls  'Inaccessible 
counterfactuals'.  These  are  those  that  cannot  be  checked.  The  last  kind  Addis  neglects 
to  name,  but  in  the  spirit  of  his  analysis  I  shall  call  'Undecided  counterfactuals'.  It  is 
worth  noting  at  this  stage  that  the  analysis  is  decidedly  odd,  since  it  appears  that the 
first  two  kinds  are  not  only  exclusive,  but  exhaustive;  so  it  is  not  clear  how  there  can 
be  a  third  kind.  Addis  does  not  address  the  issue,  instead  offering  examples  of  only 
the  first  two  of  his  suggested  three  kinds,  as  follows: 
"Three  sorts  of  counterfactual  can  be  distinguished: 
1.  Accessible  counterfactuals:  where  it  is  possible  to  check  the  counterfactual.  For 
example,  I  can  work  out  17  -  5.567834  to  six  decimal  places,  even  though  I  have  not 
done  so. 
2.  Inaccessible  counterfactuals:  where  it  is  not  possible  to  check  the  counterfactual. 
For  instance,  consider  the  case  where  I  attempt  to  survey  the  difference  between  17  to 
the  power  1000  and  2. 
3.  [Undecided]  Counterfactuals:  where  it  is  not  known  whether  they  are  accessible  or 
not.  (This  raises  the  problem  of  sorites  paradoxes  about  accessibility).  "  8 
Addis'assertion  is  that,  while  counterfactual  realism  is  non-problematic  in  the 
case  of  accessible  counterfactuals,  i.  e.  those  which  can  be  checked,  it  is  problematic 
Addis,  p.  163 
82 for  those  which  cannot,  or  for  those  where  it  is  not  known  whether  they  can  or  can't 
be  checked. 
"Checking"  as  ýperfbrming  the  antecedent  operation' 
A  lot  turns  on  what  Addis  means  by  'checking'  the  counterfactual.  Let  us  take 
it,  firstly,  that  'checking'  means  testing  in  the  sense  of  simply  carrying  out  the 
operation  contained  in  the  counterfactual,  so  that  we  may  later  determine  whether  or 
not  the  counterfactual  was  true/false/indeterminate.  If  this  is  the  definition,  we  may 
suggest  the  following  surveyability  counterfactuals  (where  k  is  a  surveyable  number, 
2k  is  not,  and  m<k),  as  embodying  the  ideas  Addis  wants  to  put  forward: 
(A')  Accessible:  If  Jones  had  tried  to  survey  a  proof  of  k  steps,  then  he  would  have 
succeeded. 
(I')  Inaccessible:  If  Jones  had  tried  to  survey  a  proof  of  2k  steps,  then  he  would 
have  succeeded. 
(U')  Undecided:  If  Jones  had  tried  to  survey  a  proof  of  k+m  steps  (where  m<k),  then 
he  would  have  succeeded. 
This  analysis  of  'checking'  is  perhaps  suggested  by  Addis'  examples;  for 
accessible  counterfactuals,  he  reports  "I  can  work  out  17  -  5.567834  to  six  decimal 
places,  even  though  I  have  not  done  so.  "  Presumably,  Addis  'can'  in  the  sense  that  he 
understands  the  operation  to  be  a  perfectly  surveyable  one  if  he  were  to  attempt  it 
presently.  Similarly  for  'cannot'  in  the  case  of  inaccessible  counterfactuals  -  if  he 
were  to  attempt  to  survey  the  operation  cited  in  the  counterfactual,  he  understands  the 
operation  to  be  well  beyond  the  bounds  of  his  capabilities.  I  am  not  sure  why,  under 
this  interpretation,  Addis  would  believe  inaccessible  counterfactuals  to  be  problematic 
for  the  strict  finitist.  Surely,  the  finitist  does  not  have  to  be  able  to  attempt  an 
operation  to  assert  that  he  cannot  do  so.  It  is  enough  that  any  later  check  will  fail,  and 
that  we  are  convinced  of  such,  to  assert  that  the  counterfactual  is  inaccessible  -  any 
check  of  the  operation  will  fail,  to  the  extent  that  we  cannot  survey/perform  the 
operation  cited.  If  we  know  that  a  surveyability  counterfactual  of  this  type  is 
83 inaccessible,  then  we  know  that  the  antecedent  operation  is  not  performable,  and 
hence  afortiori  not  surveyable  -  and  so  the  counterfactual  has  a  determinate  truth 
value.  Remember  that  the  suggested  problem  is  that  of  a  conflict  with  counterfactual 
realism  -  the  idea  that  there  is  a  fact  of  the  matter  about  an  unrealised  possibility.  But 
it  seems  as  though  in  this  case,  there  is  a  perfectly  good  fact  of  the  matter  with  respect 
to  the  counterfactual  e.  g.  'If  I  had  tried  to  survey  the  difference  between  17  to  the 
power  1000  and  2,1  could  have  done  so.  '  The  counterfactual  is  just  false  -  and  it  is 
false  in  virtue  of  my  intellectual  limits,  as  described  previously. 
Addis  also  believes  that  there  is  a  problem  regarding  undecided 
counterfactuals  -  but  is  there?  Certainly,  the  idea  that  some  counterfactuals  are  not 
truth  apt  is  incompatible  with  there  being  a  fact  of  the  matter  for  those 
counterfactuals.  But  remember  that  our  current  analysis  is  not  suggesting  that 
undecided  counterfactuals  are  indeten-ninate  at  the  'fact  of  the  matter'  level  -  just  that 
it  is  not  known  whether  we  may  perform  the  antecedent  operation.  This  is  to  say 
nothing  about  the  intrinsic  truth  value  of  such  counterfactuals. 
"Checking"  as  'determining  the  truth  value' 
An  alternative  explanation  of  the  term  'checking'  might  be  in  terms  of  coming 
to  know  the  truth  value.  The  problem  with  counterfactual  realism  is  then  a  suggested 
conflict  between  determinate  truth  values  for  counterfactuals,  and  our  not  being  able  - 
or  not  knowing  whether  we  are  able  -  to  come  to  know  the  truth  values  of  those 
counterfactuals. 
Let  us  begin  with  some  simple  counterfactuals,  in  an  attempt  to  understand 
why  this  might  be  so.  I  suggest  these  three  will  exemplify  this  analysis: 
(A)  Accessible:  If  I  had  dropped  my  pen  a  moment  ago,  it  would  have  hit  the 
floor. 
(1)  Inaccessible:  If  Shakespeare  had  not  died  on  the  23  rd  April  1616,  he  would 
have  died  on  the  30  th  April  1616. 
(U)  Undecided:  If  my  house  had  been  haunted,  then  I  could  have  seen  the  ghost. 
84 We  can  analyse  the  above  counterfactuals  in  the  following  way.  It  is  possible 
for  me  to  come  to  know  the  truth  of  (A),  suggests  Addis;  I  can  come  to  know,  for 
example,  by  dropping  my  pen a  few  times  right  now.  As  long  as  I  have  reproduced  the 
relevant  conditions,  and  by  an  analysis  of  a  sufficiently  similar  open  conditional  ('If  I 
drop  my  pen  now,  it  will  hit  the  floor')  I  can  arrive  at  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  the 
counterfactual  by  adopting  the  determinate  truth  value  of  the  conditional.  However,  I 
cannot  come  to  know  the  truth  (or  falsehood)  of  (1),  because  there  is  no  way  to 
establish  the  truth  (or  falsehood)  of  it.  For  this  to  be  a  problem,  however,  it  needs  to 
be  established  that  there  is  a  problem  with  such  statements  still  having  determinate 
truth  values.  So  in  virtue  of  what  would  (1)  be  true  or  false?  Well,  if  there  were  other 
known  facts,  such  as  knowledge  of  a  murderous  plot,  who  planned  to  murder 
Shakespeare  on  the  3  Oth  if  he  had  not  died  in  the  meantime,  then  the  counterfactual 
might  be  true  in  virtue  of  this  fact.  If  the  plot  was  set  to  kill  Shakespeare  on  the  28  th 
the  counterfactual  might  be  false  in  virtue  of  the  fact.  But  the  problem  comes  when 
there  is  nothing  in  virtue  of  which  the  counterfactual  is  true.  No  plots,  no  terminal 
condition  set  to  erupt  on  the  30  th 
,  no  natural  disaster  at  or  around  Shakespeare's  house 
on  the  3  Oth  April  1616.  Well,  then  it  might  look  as  if  the  counterfactual  was  just  false, 
but  it  is  not  certain.  It  does  not  seem  implausible  that  if  Shakespeare  had  lived  a  little 
longer,  he  would  have  lived  eight  days  longer.  Since  there  are  no  facts  by  which  we 
could  come  to  know  the  truth  of  the  counterfactual  (the  definition  of  an  inaccessible 
counterfactual),  it  is  odd  to  suggest  that  there  are  nevertheless  facts  in  virtue  of  which 
the  counterfactual  is  determinately  true  or  false.  The  problem  can  be  exacerbated  with 
an  examination  of  our  undecided  counterfactual.  I  may  or  may  not  come  to  know  the 
truth  of  (U).  If  I  manage  to  go  somewhere  I  know  is  haunted  and  not  see  the  ghost,  or 
else  if  I  go  somewhere  haunted  (without  necessarily  knowing  it)  and  see  one,  I  may 
come  to  know  that  the  counterfactual  is  true  (or  false).  But  in  virtue  of  what  is  it  true 
or  false?  If  true  or  false,  it  is  so  because  of  certain  properties,  or  lack  thereof,  of  either 
myself,  or  ghosts.  If  I  instead  ask  the  question  'If  my  house  had  been  haunted,  could  I 
have  seen  the  ghostT  would  it  have  a  determinate  answer?  If  not,  then  presumably  on 
the  grounds  that  there  is  no  answer  to  whether  I  can  see  ghosts,  because  their 
properties  are  indeterminate;  in  fact,  either  there  are  ghosts,  in  which  case  the  answer 
would  be  yes  or  no  as  above  (in  virtue  of  the  properties  of  myself/ghosts),  or  there  are 
not  ghosts,  in  which  case  there  would  be  nothing  in  virtue  of  which  an  answer  could 
be  true  or  false. 
85 We  are  here  touching  on  what  Dummett  refers  to  as  'simple  truth'  -  the  idea 
that  a  counterfactual  may  be  true  independently  of  any  other  facts.  Dummett  rejects 
the  idea  that  a  counterfactual  conditional  could  be  simply  true  in  this  way.  But  while 
the  objection  may  cause  problems  for  simple  cases  of  the  kind  described  above, 
surely,  for  surveyability  cases,  there  is  more  to  be  said.  I  have  already  suggested  that 
in  all  cases  of  surveyability  counterfactuals,  there  is  something  in  virtue  of  which  all 
such  counterfactuals  may  be  more  than  simply  true  (or  false);  namely,  the  intellectual 
ability  of  the  surveyors,  coupled  with  local  conditions. 
Furthermore,  it  does  not  seem  as  if  we  are  going  to  find  simple  cases,  for  each 
of  Addis  types  of  counterfactuals,  where  surveyability  is  involved.  Let  us  see  why  this 
is  the  case. 
It  would  be  hard  to  see  how  one  could  come  to  know  the  truth  value  of  even 
accessible  surveyability  counterfactuals  -  such  as  (A)  -  without  attempting  the 
antecedent  operation.  This  will  then  just  lead  us  into  the  same  considerations  that 
followed  the  previous  analysis  of  'checking'.  However,  this  analysis  is  intended  to  be 
purely  in  terms  of  coming  to  know  the  truth  value,  so,  charitably,  perhaps  one  might 
devise  a  method  of  independently  establishing  the  truth  value  of  accessible 
counterfactuals  without  performing  the  antecedent  operation.  But  what  now  of  (Is)? 
Well,  it  looks  as  though  we  can  come  to  know  the  truth  value  of  (Is);  it  is  just  false. 
Nor  is  this  simply  because  I  have  chosen  a  favourable  example  -  in  Addis'  own 
example,  it  looks  like  I  can  come  to  know  the  truth  value  of  the  counterfactual  "If  A 
had  tried  to  survey  the  difference  between  17  to  the  power  1000  and  2,  then  he  would 
have  done  so";  it  is  false.  How  do  I  come  to  know  it?  Because  it  is  clearly  without  the 
demonstrable  boundaries  of  anyone's  intellectual  ability.  Accordingly,  if  we  allow 
that the  (perhaps  repeated)  success  or  failure  of  later  attempts  at  the  antecedent 
operation  for  surveyability  counterfactuals  is  sufficient  grounds  for  arriving  at  the 
truth  value,  (as  is  purportedly  unproblematic  in  the  case  of  accessible 
counterfactuals),  then  it  is  hard  to  distinguish  any  inaccessible  surveyability 
counterfactuals  at  all.  Now,  admittedly,  because  of  the  boundary  cases  where 
sometimes  we  are  successful  in  our  later  attempts  and  sometimes  we  are  not,  this  does 
not  slam  the  door  on  undecided  counterfactuals,  but  it  does  not  seem  as  if  there  is  an 
immediate  conflict  here  with  the  idea  that  despite  the  inconclusive  evidence  of  later 
86 checks,  these  undecided  counterfactuals  just  are  determinately  true  or  false  in  virtue 
of  our  capacities  and  local  factors  at  the  stipulated  time. 
Alternatively,  it  could  be  argued  that  all  counterfactuals  are  of  the  inaccessible 
type9.  Addis'  may  have  intended  to  suggest  that  we  can  check  a  counterfactual  by 
later  attempting  the  antecedent  operation  under  sufficiently  similar  conditions  - 
certainly,  for  surveyability  counterfactuals  at  least,  it  is  hard  to  offer  a  different 
criterion  for  checking  a  counterfactual,  whether  or  not  that  'checking'  is  in  terms  of 
simple  performance  or  of  coming  to  know  the  truth  value,  as  we  have  seen.  But  we 
surely  cannot  replicate  all  the  conditions  to  'test'  for  surveyability  in  this  way  -  if  we 
assert  that  we  do  not  know  whether  someone  is  capable  of  surveying  a  proof  at  one 
particular  time,  presumably  we  mean  to  imply  that  it  is  a  borderline  case  for  them,  and 
if  it  is  a  borderline  case  then  all  sorts  of  local  factors  will  affect  their  ability,  since  the 
ability  to  survey  is  not  a  fixed  limit,  but  a  vague  one;  if  the  person  is  wide-awake, 
healthy,  etc.,  we  might  assume  that  they  are  at  optimum  surveyability,  but  we  cannot 
know  all  the  factors  -  what  if  a  few  brain  cells  have  expired  between  the  time  stated 
in  the  counterfactual,  and  the  time  of  'checking'?  What  if  the  person  surveyed  another 
proof  in-between  times  -  this  might  help,  if  it  was  a  related  proof,  or  hinder,  if  it  has 
taken  their  train  of  thought  away. 
In  this  case,  then,  there  is  no  division  of  surveyability  counterfactuals.  We 
simply  cannot  arrive  at  the  truth  values  for  any  surveyability  counterfactuals,  since  we 
can  never  sufficiently  reproduce  the  conditions  under  which  the  counterfactual  would 
be  verified.  This  is  perhaps  a  wider  point  about  counterfactuals  in  general;  it  does  not 
seem  that  we  could  ever  replicate  the  temporal  condition  for  a  given  counterfactual, 
for  example.  Perhaps  for  certain  types  of  counterfactual  this  would  not  matter. 
Regardless,  the  issue  for  surveyability  is  much  tempered  -  again,  as  above, 
counterfactuals  may  have  determinate  truth  values  despite  our  inability  to  come  to 
know  them.  10 
9  It  also  occurs  to  me  that,  given  the  relatively  loose  nature  of  Addis'  definitions,  one  could  probably 
argue  in  a  similar  fashion  that  all  surveyability  counterfactuals  were  simply  undecided  counterfactuals; 
but  I  shall  not  attempt  that  here. 
10  Even  though,  in  normal  use,  we  might  approximate  to  knowledge  of  them  -I  could  still  reasonably 
assert  that  I  know  I  may  survey  a  proof  of  three  steps,  even  when  I  am  not  attempting  to  do  so  at  that 
time.  The  point  is  simply  that  I  could  not  be  certain;  nonetheless,  it  would  presumably  be  true. 
87 The  solutions  offered  so  far  -  to  the  first  horn  of  Addis  dilemma  -  embrace 
what  Addis  has  called  counterfactual  realism.  It  does  not  seem  as  though  the  trappings 
of  counterfactual  realism,  while  potentially  problematic,  and  'mystical'  for  accounts 
of  character  and  behaviour,  are  immediately  disastrous  for  strict  finitism.  However, 
the  discussion  is  not  entirely  without  objection.  For  some,  intelligence  as  a  ground  for 
surveyability  may  not  be  convincingly  distinct  from  what  Dummett  describes  as  a 
(psychic  mechanism'.  For  others,  it  may  seem  simply  uncomfortable  to  provide  a 
realist  account  of  truth  value  for  surveyability  counterfactuals,  whilst  on  the  whole 
maintaining  an  anti-realist  (in  this  sense  constructivist)  position  with  respect  to  the 
numbers  and  proofs  that  form  the  objects  to  be  surveyed.  One  may  argue,  however,  to 
this  line  of  thought  that  such  an  objection  is  not  much  more  than  a  call  for  general 
continuity  of  approach  -  there  is  after  all  no  inconsistency  here.  The  realism  involved 
regards  human  capacities,  whereas  the  anti-realism  concerns  numbers. 
It  might  also  be  objected  that  such  a  response  rests  upon  an  epistemicist 
description  of  vagueness,  at  least  with  regard  to  the  vagueness  inherent  in 
surveyability.  If  the  strict  finitist's  answer  to  Addis'  question  'as  to  whether  a  person 
can  survey  a  proof  at  a  certain  time,  even  if  he  is  not  actually  thinking  about  the  proof 
at  that time'  is  that  such  questions  admit  of  a  determinate  answer,  then  this  is  perhaps 
tantamount  to  the  epistemicist  claim  that  there  is  a  determinate  answer  in  all  cases, 
though  we  cannot  (always)  know  what  that  answer  is.  I  shall  discuss  the  idea  of 
vagueness  (along  with  the  epistemicist  solution)  in  the  next  chapter,  and  although  I 
shall  conclude  there  that  epistemicism  looks  unpromising  for  the  strict  finitist,  I  shall 
offer  an  account  of  (a  particular  form  of)  strict  finitism  in  chapter  eleven  which  is 
more  in  line  with  the  epistemicist  view  of  vagueness. 
Part  11  -  The  Second  horn:  the  limited  application  of  surveyability 
There  is  perhaps  a  more  general  objection  to  Addis'  dilemma  as  it  stands, 
resulting  from  a  consideration  of  the  second  horn.  At  first  glance,  it  seems  as  though 
Addis  is  right  to  suggest  that  a  commitment  to  there  being  no  determinate  answer  to 
the  question  will  lead  to  a  very  limited  application  of  the  notion  of  surveyability.  But 
this  conclusion  follows  only  if  the  strict  finitist  asserts  that  all  such  questions  must  be 
88 answered  in  the  same  way  -  that  is,  it  can  never  be  the  case  that  there  is  an  answer  to 
the  question  'can  person  A  survey  proof  X  even  though  she  is  not  currently  doing  so?  ' 
Addis'  point  relies  on  the  interpretation  of  the  question  as  'whether  a  person  can 
survey  any  given  proof  at  a  certain  time  if  they  are  not  doing  so',  and  not  upon 
individual  cases.  If  the  response  to  the  individual  cases  ('Can  person  A  survey  a 
particular  proof  I...  ''. 
..  a  particular  proof  2.. 
.'  etc.  )  is  only  sometimes  (or  better, 
occasionally)  that  there  is  no  determinate  answer,  then  the  notion  of  surveyability  is 
not  unduly  han-ned  by  such  an  admission  (provided,  of  course,  that  the  occasions  in 
which  it  is  appropriate  to  assert  that  there  is  no  determinate  answer  to  the  individual 
question  are  relatively  infrequent  when  compared  with  the  occasions  of  questions  to 
which  there  is  a  determinate  answer).  It  seems  to  me  that  the  only  manner  in  which  a 
strict  finitist  is  likely  to  assert  that  there  is  no  answer  to  the  question  is  in  the  case  of 
just  such  individual  examples  -  the  paradigm  vague  examples  -  and  otherwise  to 
assert  that  there  is  a  determinate  answer.  To  make  the  point  as  clearly  as  possible, 
consider  the  following  model.  It  is  plausible  (to  borrow  from  an  upcoming  example) 
to  imagine  a  proof  of  k  steps  such  that  k  steps  is  clearly  surveyable,  but  that  2k  steps 
is  not.  Now,  I  suggest  that  the  question  'Are  all  proofs  surveyable,  even  when 
someone  is  not  attempting  to  surveying  thern?  '  might  be  best  answered  by  something 
like  the  following:  " 
Complexity  of  proof 
2k 
k 
0 
Determinate  answer:  NO 
-------------------------- 
No  detenninate  answer 
-------------------------- 
Determinate  answer:  YES 
Addis'  mistake  is  in  assuming  that the  strict  finitist  must  answer  that  there  is  a 
determinate  answer  for  all  cases,  or  else  that there  is  not  a  determinate  answer  for  all 
II  The  dotted  lines  are  deliberately  not  attached  to  the  axis,  in  an  attempt  to  dileneate  only  a  'vague 
region'  of  cases  for  which  there  will  be  no  determinate  answer.  No  attempt  is  made  at  this  stage  to 
describe  precise  limits  for  this  region;  it  is  sufficient  that  k  lies  clearly  and  determinately  below  it,  and 
2k  similarly  above  it. 
89 cases.  But  why  can  the  strict  finitist  not  answer  that  in  some  cases  there  is  a 
determinate  answer,  in  others  not?  The  answer  to  the  general  question  'as  to  whether  a 
person  can  survey  a  proof  at  a  certain  time,  even  if  he  is  not  actually  thinking  about 
the  proof  at  that  time'  is  just  that  it  depends  upon  the  actual  proof  in  question.  For 
many  proofs,  there  is  a  determinate  answer,  either  Yes  or  No,  presumably 
corresponding  to  Addis'  Accessible  and  Inaccessible  counterfactuals.  For  others,  there 
is  no  determinate  answer,  and  these  proofs  are  the  'vague  cases'. 
We  can  perhaps  demonstrate  the  problem  by  analogy  -  if  I  ask  the  question  as 
to  whether  a  person  can  jump  a  high  jump  bar  even  when  they  are  not  attempting  to 
do  so,  we  cannot  give  one  answer  for  all  cases.  It  depends  upon  the  height  of  the  bar, 
in  a  perfectly  sensible  manner.  Some  heights  are  easily  jumpable,  say  a  foot  from  the 
ground,  in  which  case  the  answer  to  the  question  'can  Jones  jump  this  bar?  '  has  a 
determinate  answer  (yes)  and  some  are  physically  impossible,  so  that  the  question 
also  has  a  determinate  answer.  For  the  heights  in-between,  there  is  no  determinate 
answer  to  the  question,  for  precisely  the  same  reason  that there  is  no  determinate  fact 
of  the  matter  for  the  counterfactual  'if  Jones  had  tried  to  jump  that  bar,  he  would  have 
succeeded'  if  the  counterfactual  refers  to  a  bar  within  Jones'  vague  jumpability 
boundary.  This  does  not  seem  problematic  -  if  it  was  not  the  case,  high  jumping 
would  be  a  very  dull  event  -  on  the  one  hand,  if  jumpability  was  completely 
determinate,  everybody  could  jump  once,  and  the  winner  be  conclusively  declared,  at 
least  until  someone  who  had  never  jumped  before  had  a  go.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
jumpability  was  completely  indeterminate,  then  there  would  be  no  professional  or 
world-class  high  jumpers  -  you  or  I  might  just  as  well  enter  the  Olympics,  since  all 
there  would  be  to  high  jumping  would  be  'just  having  jumped  high'. 
The  dilemma  refuted 
Addis  is  asserting  that  the  question  'Could  a  person  survey  proof  X  when  she 
is  not  actually  attempting  to  do  soT  must  always  have  a  determinate  answer,  or  else 
never  have  a  determinate  answer.  To  answer  that  there  is  a  determinate  answer 
implies  that  she  has  an  independent  (and  determinate)  capacity  for  surveyability, 
90 which  Addis  thinks  undesirable.  To  answer  that  there  is  no  determinate  answer 
implies,  (in  all  cases),  that  there  is  nothing  more  to  being  a  good  surveyor  than 
surveying. 
I  suggest  the  alternative  formulation.  The  question  admits  of  three  possible 
answers,  dependent  upon  the  proofX,  which  is  the  focus  of  the  counterfactual.  The 
answer  Yes  asserts  that  it  is  within  her  capacity  to  do  so.  The  answer  No  asserts  that  it 
is  without  her  capacity  to  do  so.  And  the  answer  that there  is  no  determinate  answer  in 
such  cases  asserts  that  it  is  within  her  vague  limit  to  do  so. 
Nor  is  it  any  objection  to  assert  that  in  answering  'Yes'  or  'No'  to  any  single 
specific  question  will  commit  the  strict  finitist  to  counterfactual  realism  as  Addis  has 
described  -  for  although  this  is  true,  counterfactual  realism  in  this  case  is  assuredly 
unproblematic  for  the  strict  finitist  -  the  position  is  no  longer  that  all  such  questions 
have  a  definitive  answer,  just  that  some  of  them  do  -  counterfactual  realism  in  this 
case  just  boils  down  to  the  assertion  that  counterfactuals  are  sometimes  true.  Surely 
there  is  nothing  objectionable  about  that. 
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Addis'  dilemma,  then,  presents  no  serious  problem  for  strict  finitism.  But  one 
pertinent  feature  of  the  idea  of  surveyability  that  might  have  led  to  Addis'  analysis, 
and  which  is  generally  seen  as  a  large  problem  for  strict  finitism,  is  commitment  to  a 
limit  (or  at  least  some  limitation)  on  the  numbers:  that  is  to  say,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
strict  finitist  is  committed  to  the  assertion  that  the  numbers,  such  as  there  are,  are 
themselves  only  finite  in  number.  What  I  have  been  careful  not  to  suggest  in  the 
discussion  so  far  however,  and  what  the  strict  finitist  is  usually  careful  to  avoid,  is  that 
the  numbers  may  be  bounded  at  afixedpoint.  One  of  the  most  common  (if  not  the 
most  sophisticated)  objections  to  the  claim  that  there  are  only  finitely  many  numbers 
is  simply  to  ask:  what  is  the  biggest  number?  If  the  numbers  are  bounded,  which 
precisely  is  the  last  number  that  lies  beneath  the  boundary?  The  question  is  often 
accompanied  by  another,  intended  to  demonstrate  the  absurdity  of  any  response  to  the 
first  question  without  further  debate:  And  why  can't  I  just  add  one? 
In  this  chapter  I  hope  to  offer  considerations  that  will  ameliorate  these 
problems.  I  shall  introduce  the  sorites  paradox,  and  discuss  the  actually  rather  general 
problem  of  vague  predicates  and  their  corresponding  vague  totalities.  I  shall  begin  to 
look  at  Durnmett's  influential  paper,  'Wang's  Paradox',  which  I  shall  return  to  in 
chapters  seven  and  eight,  and  which  is,  as  we  shall  see,  both  instructive  and 
problematic  for  the  strict  finitist.  I  will  also  look  at  some  of  the  standard  responses  to 
sorites  paradoxes  in  general,  and  offer  a  preliminary  assessment  of  the  effectiveness 
of  such  responses  when  deployed  on  behalf  of  the  strict  finitist.  Following  these 
general  remarks,  I  shall  close  this  chapter  with  an  examination  of  the  rather  more 
specific  idea  that  sorites  paradoxes  need  not  be  problematic  for  the  strict  finitist 
because  the  paradoxes  are  themselves  inadmissible  on  strict  finitary  grounds. 
Vagueness  identified  -  the  Sorites  paradox 
Let  us  begin  with  the  problematic  questions  raised  above.  What  is  the  biggest 
number?  Well,  firstly  let  me  say  that  it  seems  to  me  that  any  form  of  strict  finitism 
92 that  did  hold  that  there  was  a  largest  number,  would  also  hold  that,  contrary  to 
intuition,  one  could  not  simply  add  one  to  it  -  if  you  could,  it  would  not  really  be  the 
largest  possible  number.  Since  reliable  construction  is  necessary,  the  largest  number  is 
by  definition  the  biggest  possible  construction,  and  therefore  there  can  be  no  talk  of 
adding  one  or  anything  else.  Few  finitists  take  this  route,  however,  and  are  unlikely  to 
accept  that  there  is  a  largest  single  number  in  the  first  place.  The  reasons  for  resisting 
such  a  claim  are  numerous,  and  some  are  probably  obvious.  At  the  end  of  chapter 
four,  I  touched  upon  the  concern  that  the  ability  to  survey  differs  between  individuals, 
and  indeed  between  the  same  individual  on  different  occasions.  How  then  might  we 
provide  an  answer  for  all  people,  at  all  times? 
The  disparity  of  ability  in  surveyors  is  a  serious  concern  for  strict  finitism,  but 
is  in  fact  simply  one  aspect  of  a  wider  problem,  which  I  have  already  introduced  as 
the  notion  of  commitment  to  vagueness.  The  commitment  arises  in  that  instead  of 
making  a  claim  that  there  is  a  determinate  greatest  number,  the  strict  finitist  will  more 
standardly  make  the  claim  that  the  largest  number  -  or  more  correctly,  the  upper  limit 
of  surveyable  (and  hence  admissible,  or  actuaO  numbers  -  is  vague:  that  is,  it  lies  in, 
or  better  constitutes,  a  vague  region  of  the  traditionally-conceived  number  line. 
Indeed,  the  disparity  in  the  capacity  of  individuals  to  survey  is  not  the  only 
source  of  indeterminacy  in  strict  finitism.  Even  if  everyone's  ability  to  survey  was 
consistently  equivalent,  over  time  and  individuals,  the  question  above  still  looks 
problematic  -  why  couldn't  they  simply  add  one,  and  come  up  with  a  bigger 
surveyable  number?  The  suggestion  here  is  that  the  act  of  adding  one  to  a  surveyable 
number  cannot  transform  it  into  an  unsurveyable  one;  presumably  supported  largely 
by  the  fact  that  the  act  of  adding  one  is  itself  a  perfectly  surveyable  operation,  and  that 
anyway  we  have  a  common  intuition  that  there  can  be  no  appreciable  difference  in 
surveyability  between  a  number  and  its  successor. 
This  intuition  is,  I  think,  inspired  by  very  similar  cases,  familiar  by  now  in  the 
literature,  of  occurrences  of  vague  predicates  in  ordinary  language.  Is  there  an 
appreciable  difference  in  baldness  between  two  men,  one  of  whom  has  three  hairs  on 
his  head,  while  the  other  has  four?  Or  indeed  between  another  two  men,  one  of  whom 
has  four  thousand  hairs  on  his  head,  while  the  second  has  four-thousand-and-one? 
Predicates  like  'bald',  'small',  'surveyable',  and  even  those  less  obvious  such  as  'red', 
'dark',  and  so  on  are  all  considered  vague  predicates,  and  they  are  all  susceptible  to 
93 what  is  known  as  the  Sorites  paradox.  The  term  comes  from  the  Greek  word  for  heap 
(soros)  -  and  the  original  paradox  runs  like  this: 
If  you  have  a  heap  of  sand,  then  the  removal  of  a  single  grain  is  not  sufficient 
to  change  it  into  something  that  is  not  a  heap.  But,  of  course,  if  you  repeat  the  process 
often  enough,  although  it  must  still  be  true  that  with  no  one  single  grain  removal  do 
you  effect  the  change  from  heap  to  not-a-heap,  eventually  you  are  left  with  no  grains 
of  sand;  which  of  course  is  certainly  (and  pre-theoretically)  not  a  heap. 
Equally,  if  the  removal  of  a  grain  of  a  single  grain  of  sand  cannot  effect  the 
change,  neither  can  the  addition  of  a  grain  to  a  collection  less  than  a  heap;  so  we 
might  write: 
0  grains  of  sand  is  not  a  heap. 
For  all  n,  if  n  grains  of  sand  is  not  a  heap,  then  n+1  grains  is  not  a  heap. 
For  all  n,  n  grains  of  sand  is  not  a  heap. 
We  thus  generate  the  conclusion,  from  the  intuitive  premises,  that  no  matter 
how  many  grains  of  sand  we  add,  we  will  not  make  a  heap,  which  is  contrary  to  the 
obvious  intuition  that  a  great  many  grains  of  sand  will  easily  constitute  a  heap.  One 
can,  of  course,  construct  paradoxes  of  this  type  for  all  such  predicates.  In  the  case  of 
surveyability,  for  example,  the  paradox  runs: 
0  is  surveyable. 
For  all  n,  if  n  is  surveyable,  then  n+I  is  surveyable. 
For  all  n,  n  is  surveyable. 
indicating  that  all  finite  numbers  (and  to  be  sure,  all  finite  numbers  as 
traditionally  -  that  is,  platonistically  -  conceived)  are  surveyable.  Since  this 
conclusion  is  at  odds  with  the  strict  finitist  claim  that  surveyability  is  finitely  upper- 
bounded,  the  paradox  appears  to  generate  an  inconsistency  in  the  heart  of  the  theory. 
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So  far,  then,  we  have  established  two  serious  concerns  for  strict  finitism, 
centring  around  the  problem  of  vagueness.  Firstly  that  our  own  individual  subjectivity 
seems  to  prohibit  the  categorisation  of  a  number  itseýf  as  surveyable  (or  not),  since  it 
is  entirely  possible  that  it  will  be  so  to  one  surveyor  and  yet  not  to  a  second.  Secondly, 
the  fact  that  a  Sorites  paradox  may  be  constructed  for  surveyability  seems  to  entail  a 
contradiction  for  the  strict  finitist. 
The  first  of  these  problems,  that  of  the  differing  capacities  of  individual 
surveyors,  although  it  looks  to  be  a  source  of  vagueness,  is  actually  a  problem  of  a 
different  sort,  so  it  would  be  best  to  sort  out  the  distinction  here  before  I  progress  any 
further.  This  is  really  a  problem  regarding  the  relativity  of  surveyability  to  surveyors. 
If  there  were  a  largest  number,  such  that  there  was  no  separate  commitment  to 
vagueness  at  that  level,  then  the  fact  that  some  people  could  survey  the  largest  number 
and  others  could  not  would  not  be  sufficient  to  introduce  vagueness  where  there  was 
none  before.  Rather,  we  would  surely  say  that  individual's  capacity  to  survey  differed, 
but  in  a  perfectly  determinate  sense.  We  might,  as  a  consequence,  generally  want  to 
resist  statements  like  'n  is  surveyable',  and  insist  that  such  statements  are  properly 
quantified,  such  as  'n  is  surveyable  by  most  people',  or  indeed  'n  is  surveyable  by  x'. 
But  we  are  unlikely  to  insist  that  the  notion  of  different  capacities  of  individuals  adds 
an  extra  level  of  vagueness  when  there  is  vagueness  of  another  sort  present,  and  does 
not  when  there  is  not. 
One  important  question  raised  by  such  a  response  is  that  if  the  strict  finitist 
relativises  the  notion  of  surveyability  in  this  way,  can  he  resist  relativising 
mathematical  truth  in  a  similar  fashion?  Assuredly,  the  prospect  of  relativising 
mathematical  truth  looks  bleak  -  we  surely  want  to  preserve  the  generalisability  of 
mathematical  statements.  I  believe  that the  answer  to  the  question  posed  here  is  that 
the  strict  finitist  can  avoid  a  more  sweeping  relativisation,  simply  by  taking  the 
meaning  of  'n  is  surveyable'  to  be  something  like  'n  is  surveyable  by  a  surveyor  of 
reasonable  competence'.  This  allows  us  to  retain  a  relativised  notion  of  surveyability, 
which  accounts  for  the  differing  capacities  of  individual  surveyors,  whilst  still 
95 advancing  a  universal  function  of  surveyability  that  can  issue  in  generalisable 
mathematical  statements.  ' 
There  is  however  still  a  potential  problem  with  the  reformulation  of  'n  is 
surveyable'  as  'n  is  surveyable  by  a  surveyor  of  reasonable  competence',  in  that  it 
looks  to  entail  that  particularly  gifted  surveyors  are  not  doing  genuine  mathematics. 
That  is,  aside  from  removing  the  problem  of  incompetent  surveyors,  the  reformulation 
looks  to  remove  gifted  surveyors  as  well,  which  is  certainly  an  unwanted 
consequence.  As  a  result  of  this,  it  might  be  more  plausible  to  take  the  meaning  of  'n 
is  surveyable'  to  be  'n  is  surveyable  by  someone',  so  that  at  least  one  surveyor  will 
suffice.  I  shall  return  to  this  idea  seriously  later,  but  for  our  present  purposes  it  will  be 
enough  to  note  that  here  too  there  need  be  no  problem  in  their  being  a  fact  of  the 
matter  about  whether  a  particular  number  is  surveyable  by  someone  -  whether  or  not 
we  can  actually  know  this. 
Hence,  while  I  take  it  that  the  fact  that  the  capacity  to  survey  differs  between 
individuals  might  be  a  problem  of  practical  significance  when  determining  the  limits 
of  surveyability,  it  is  not  however  of  great  theoretical  significance  to  the  proper 
defence  of  the  notion.  2 
What  then  of  the  generation  of  sorites-type  paradoxes  for  surveyability?  This, 
I  think,  is  a  more  serious  problem  for  strict  finitism,  and  indeed  arises  out  of  a  more 
general  commitment  to  vagueness  from  the  strict  finitists.  In  order  to  see  how  we 
might  tackle  the  problem,  let  us  begin  by  examining  some  of  the  standard  ways  to 
approach  the  paradox. 
Michael  Dummett,  in  an  influential  article  entitled  'Wang's  Paradox'  that  I 
shall  refer  to  often  in  this  and  the  following  two  chapters,  outlines  the  difficulties  of 
'  There  is  a  slight  complication  here,  in  that  it  may  be  objected  that  'reasonable  surveyor'  might  itself 
be  a  vague  term.  I  suspect,  however,  that  term  is  indeterminate  only  in  the  sense  that  we  may  not  be 
able  to  know  whether  an  individual  is  a  reasonable  surveyor  or  not;  there  may  be  a  perfectly 
determinate  fact  of  the  matter  (presumably  determined  by  their  comparative  ability  with  every  other 
surveyor). 
2  If  there  is  an  additional  worry  here  about  the  fact  that  we  seem  to  differ  in  our  own  capacity  to  survey 
at  different  times,  as  I  mentioned  in  previous  chapters,  I  trust  that  the  same  reasoning  may  be  applied  in 
this  case  as  well.  The  problem  is  still  one  of  relativity,  but  now  both  to  individuals  and  to  conditions. 
We  would,  then,  take  'n  is  surveyable'  to  mean  'n  is  surveyable  by  an  individual  of  reasonable 
competence  in  ideal  conditions'. 
96 rejecting  the  apparently  compelling  sorites  arguments,  of  the  form  presented  above. 
Dummett  initially  considers  the  predicate  'is  small'  for  numbers,  and  the 
corresponding  paradox  he  attributes  to  Hao  Wang  who  first  presented  the  particular 
example.  The  paradox  is  generated  by  the  following  argument: 
(PI.  )  0  is  small 
(P2)  For  all  n,  if  n  is  small,  then  n+1  is  small: 
1)  Therefore,  every  number  is  small 
Dummett  then  considers  the  alternatives  available  if  one  wishes  to  resist  the 
paradox.  He  writes: 
"Either  premise  2  (the  induction  step)  is  not  true,  or  else  induction  is  not  a 
valid  method  of  argument  in  the  presence  of  vague  predicates.  0 
But,  he  argues,  the  induction  step  (that  is,  premise  2  in  the  above  argument) 
certainly  seems  true.  It  seems  intuitively  absurd  to  suggest  that  the  addition  of  a  single 
unit  can  transform  a  number  from  a  small  number  into  one  that  is  not  -  in  just  the 
same  way  as  it  would  seem  absurd  to  suggest  that  one  hair  might  make  the  difference 
between  bald  and  not  bald,  as  above.  Dummett  considers  the  possibility  that the  rule 
of  universal  generalisation  fails  in  the  presence  of  vague  predicates:  in  that  we  might 
not  be  straightforwardly  entitled  to  pass  from  the  truth,  for  some  arbitrary  value  a,  of 
A(a)  (where  A(a)  is  equivalent  to  the  premise  'if  a  is  small,  then  a+1  is  small'  in  this 
case,  and  to  the  relevant  premise  in  analogous  sorites  constructions  for  any  vague 
predicate),  to  that  of  Vn  A(n).  (Which  in  the  current  case  amounts  to  'For  every  n,  if  n 
is  small,  n+1  is  small').  I  will  look  at  this  translation  more  seriously  in  a  later  chapter, 
but  Dummett  goes  on  to  note  that: 
"even  if  we  suppose  this,  we  should  still  be  able  to  derive  [by  iteration  of  a 
finite  number  of  instances,  say],  for  each  particular  value  of  n,  the  conclusion  [that]  n 
is  small,  even  though  we  could  not  establish  the  single  proposition'For  every  n,  n  is 
3  Durnmett,  'Wang's  Paradox',  p.  304 
97 small'.  And  this  does  not  remove  the  paradox,  since  for  each  suitable  interpretation  of 
1small'we  can  easily  name  a  specific  value  of  n  for  which  the  proposition'n  is  small' 
is  plainly  false.  " 
Dummett's  point  here  is  then  that  in  fact,  we  do  not  need  to  rely  upon  the  rule 
of  universal  generalisation  in  order  to  generate  the  paradox.  Even  if  we  suppose  that 
induction  is  not  a  valid  method  of  argument  in  the  presence  of  vague  predicates,  we 
can  still  derive  the  conclusion  'n,,  is  small'  from  the  induction  basis  '0  is  small',  and  a 
finite  number  of  instances  of  the  induction  step,  by  means  of  a  series  of  applications 
of  modus  ponens.  ('If  0  is  small,  I  is  small',  'If  I  is  small,  2  is  small'.  .  .) 
Each 
application  for  a  particular  value  of  n  (even  for  very  large  n),  as  long  as  each 
induction  step  in  the  iteration  is  valid,  will  demonstrate  that  n  is  small.  That  is,  by 
following  the  sequence: 
0  is  small. 
If  0  is  small,  then  I  is  small. 
1  is  small. 
If  I  is  small,  then  2  is  small. 
2  is  small. 
If  2  is  small,  then  3  is  small. 
etc. 
until  we  reach  the  step  involving  our  desired  value  of  n,  we  also  generate  the 
conclusion  that,  for  our  desired  value  of  n,  n  is  small.  Obviously,  if  we  choose  a 
number  such  that  intuitively  obviously  n  is  not  small,  we  arrive  at  a  contradiction  in 
the  same  way  as  with  the  original  paradox  as  stated  above. 
Standard  responses  to  the  paradox  -  epistemicism 
Various  accounts  of  vagueness  standardly  attack  the  induction  step  as  a 
reliable  premise  in  arguments  of  this  kind.  Epistemicists,  for  example,  take  the  line 
4jbid. 
98 that  Dummett  simply  dismisses  (as  I  described  above)  -  to  the  extent  that  the  addition 
of  a  single  unit  can  transform  a  number  from  a  small  number  into  one  that  is  not;  in 
short,  epistemicists  maintain  that  there  is  a  precise  cut  off  point  for  vague  predicates, 
despite  our  inability  to  know  where  that  point  lies.  Vagueness  is  then  simply  an 
epistemic  problem,  about  how  we  come  to  know  precisely  what  is  governed  by  a 
predicate  and  what  is  not.  An  epistemicist  then  will  assert  that  it  is  simply  false  that 
IVn  (n  is  small  ->  n+1  is  small) 
precisely  because  (n  is  small  ->  n+1  is  small)  does  not  hold  for  arbitrary  n.  In 
Dummett's  example  of  iterated  steps,  one  of  the  instances  of  the  conditional  is  simply 
false,  even  if  we  cannot  decide  which  it  is.  Indeed,  the  epistemicist  will  reject  (P2)  of 
the  original  argument,  the  induction  step,  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  just  the  case  that, 
for  example,  the  addition  of  a  single  unit  will,  for  one  particular  number,  transform 
that  number  from  a  small  number  into  one  that  is  not.  Equally,  two  men  who  have  an 
indiscriminable  difference  in  the  number  of  hairs  upon  their  head  may  well 
nonetheless  differ  in  respect  of  whether  they  are  bald  or  not,  although  we  may  not  be 
at  liberty  to  say  which  two  men.  Generally,  the  epistemicist  rejects  the  induction  step, 
and  asserts  instead  (for  any  vague  predicate  S): 
-V(X)  (  S(X)->S(X')  )  (where  x'  is  the  successor  of  x) 
Indeed,  the  episternicist  is  committed  to  the  classical  equivalence  of  the 
negation  of  the  induction  step  that  this  entails: 
3  (X)  (  S(X)  &  -S(X')  ) 
For  some,  epistemicism  is  a  simple  and  elegant  way  to  address  the  problems  of 
vagueness.  It  preserves  classical  logic,  and  reduces  the  problem  to  one  of  human 
fallibility.  Mark  Sainsbury  and  Timothy  Williamson,  for  example,  arguing  broadly  in 
favour  of  epistemicism,  conclude: 
99 "we  are  not  aware  of  any  decisive  refutation  of  [the  episternic  view],  and  it 
would  provide  a  breathtakingly  simple  solution  to  sorites  paradoxes.  ,5 
One  problem  for  epistemicism  is  of  course  the  persistent  intuition  that  it  seems 
simply  absurd  to  suggest  that,  say,  one  man  may  be  bald  while  his  neighbour,  who  has 
just  one  more  hair  on  his  head,  may  not  be.  The  epistemicist  rejoinder  is  simply  that  it 
seems  absurd  because  our  use  of  the  predicate  is  inconsistent  -  sometimes  we  use  it 
correctly,  and  sometimes  we  don't,  because  we  lack  the  precise  faculty  for  detecting 
the  correct  application  of  the  predicate.  6  Certainly,  the  mere  objection  that  it  seems 
intuitively  unappealing  is  not  enough  to  cause  serious  worry  for  the  epistemicist 
position,  but  it  is  one  which  dissuades  many  from  adopting  the  position.  As  far  as 
strict  finitism  is  concerned,  it  seems  the  principle  problem  for  adopting  an 
epistemicist  position  with  respect  to  vagueness  is  that  of  providing  grounds  on  which 
there  will  be  a  determinate  largest  number,  even  if  the  need  to  provide  an  actual 
number  is  alleviated  by  the  unknowability  of  such  a  number.  In  fact  I  think  there  is  a 
way  to  define  the  largest  number,  which  is  not  simply  arbitrary,  and  which  is  in  line 
with  the  suggestion  I  outline  above  regarding  the  understanding  of  'n  is  surveyable'  as 
'n  is  surveyable  by  at  least  one  surveyor'.  I  shall  return  to  the  idea  in  earnest  in 
chapter  eleven,  when  I  shall  consider  how  a  strict  finitism  of  broadly  epistemicist-type 
might  be  advanced.  For  now,  let  us  continue  with  our  examination  of  standard 
methods  of  tackling  the  problem  of  Sorites  paradoxes. 
Standard  responses  to  the  paradox  -  degrees  of  truth 
An  alternative  solution  to  the  paradox  is  offered  by  the  degree  theory  of  truth. 
Degree  theory  suggests  that  statements  may  possess  differing  degrees  of  truth.  It  may, 
for  example,  be  truer  to  say  that  my  elbow  is  close,  than  to  say  that  the  street  outside 
5  Sainsbury  &  Williamson,  "Sorites",  in  Wright  &  Hale  Eds.  Companion  to  the  Philosophy  of 
Language,  p.  481 
'I  do  not  mean  to  imply  here  that  the  epistemicist  necessarily  thinks  that,  with  improved  faculties,  we 
could  determine  the  cut-off  point;  some  epistemicists  (Williamson,  for  example)  hold  that  the  cut-off 
point  is  in  principle  unknowable.  My  point  is  simply  that  the  epistemicists  claim  that  we  do  not,  and 
perhaps  cannot,  know  when  the  predicate  is  being  applied  correctly,  except  in  the  obvious  cases. 
100 is  close,  although  they  are  both  close  to  some  degree.  Hence,  it  may  be  truer  to  say 
that  some  number  x  is  surveyable,  than  to  say  that  2x  is  surveyable. 
Moreover,  on  this  account,  the  logical  connectives  may  preserve  differing 
degrees  of  truth.  7  In  particular,  a  conditional  will  only  be  entirely  true  (that  is,  possess 
degree  of  truth  1)  if  the  consequent  possesses  a  degree  of  truth  at  least  that  of  the 
antecedent. 
As  a  result,  the  induction  step  in  the  Sorites  arguments  need  not  be  entirely 
true.  If  it  is  truer  to  suggest  that  a  man  with  n  hairs  on  his  head  is  bald  than  to  say  it  of 
a  man  with  n+1  hairs  on  his  head,  (for  some  particular  n)  -  even  though,  undoubtedly 
they  will  differ  by  only  a  tiny  degree  of  truth  -  then  the  conditional  ceases  to  be 
entirely  true.  Indeed,  degree  theory  stipulates  that  a  conditional  has  the  following 
degree  of  truth: 
[p->q]  =  1,  if  [q]  >  [p],  =I-(  [p]  -  [q]  )  otherwise 
(where  degree  of  truth  I  represents  entire  truth,  and  0  represents  entire  falsity). 
Hence,  if  the  degree  of  truth  of  the  consequent  is  (even  marginally)  less  than 
the  degree  of  truth  of  the  antecedent,  the  conditional  will  fall  short  of  a  degree  of  truth 
1.  As  a  result,  the  conditional 
S 
will  fall  short  of  entire  truth,  as  long  as  it  is  (even  marginally)  less  true  to  say 
that the  successor  of  a  number  x  is  small  than  to  say  that  a  number  x  is  small.  Thus 
(P2)  of  the  original  sorites  argument  need  not  be  entirely  true. 
Indeed,  the  argument  has  more  problems  under  a  degree  theoretic  account  of 
truth.  Standardly,  on  a  degree  theoretic  account,  valid  arguments  must  preserve 
degrees  of  truth.  As  Sainsbury  and  Williamson  outline: 
7  For  a  more  comprehensive  account  of  degree  theory  see  for  example  Forbes,  'Thisness  and 
Vagueness',  or  Goguen,  'The  Logic  of  inexact  Concepts'. 
101 cca  valid  argument  is  one  such  that  every  model  assigns  a  degree  of  truth  to  the 
conclusion  no  lower  than  that  assigned  to  the  lowest  value  premise.  " 
Well,  now  the  iterated  steps  form  of  the  argument  looks  to  be  in  trouble  too, 
because  under  such  an  interpretation,  modus  ponens  is  no  longer  valid.  Again, 
Sainsbury  and  Williamson  provide  a  useful  demonstration  of  the  point: 
"For  suppose  that  [p]  =  0.9,  and  [q]  =  0.8.  Then  [p-+q]  =  0.9.  So  an  argument 
of  the  form: 
p,  p->q  .  -.  q 
has  a  lowest-valued  premise  of  0.9,  and  a  conclusion  valued  0.8.,,  8 
So  what  are  the  prospects  of  a  degree  theoretic  account  of  vagueness  for  the 
strict  finitist?  Well,  there  is  at  least  one  good  pragmatic  reason  for  the  strict  finitist  to 
resist  a  degree  theoretic  treatment  as  proposed  along  the  lines  presented  here.  To  see 
this,  we  need  to  consider  degree  theory  in  a  slightly  wider  context.  Rosanna  Keefe  and 
Peter  Smith9  describe  degree  theory  as  a  many-valued  theory,  grouping  it  with  other 
theories  that  introduce  one  or  more  new  truth-values  and  develop  a  multi-valued  logic 
to  deal  with  the  problem  of  vagueness.  They  continue: 
"Many-valued  theories  usually  take  one  of  two  options.  Either  they  assign  all 
borderline  predications  the  same  intermediate  value,  to  be  interpreted  as 
"indeterminate"  or  "indefinite":  this  yields  a  three-valued  logic.  Or  they  adopt  an 
infinite-valued  logic,  with  the  set  of  values  typically  represented  by  the  real  numbers 
in  the  closed  interval  [0,1  ],  where  0  corresponds  to  complete  falsity  and  I  to  complete 
truth;  these  values  are  naturally  interpreted  as  degrees  of  truth".  10 
Since  the  latter  option  describes  degree  theory,  it  should  not  be  hard  to  see 
why  a  strict  finitist  might  find  it  problematic  to  rely  upon  such  an  interpretation; 
simply  because  of  the  commitment  to  an  infinite  domain.  Clearly,  not  all  real  numbers 
are  going  to  be  admissible  on  a  strict  finitary  account,  and  so  it  seems  obvious  that  to 
8  Sainsbury  and  Williamson,  'Sorites',  p.  476 
9  In  the  introduction  to  Vagueness:  a  reader,  Keefe  and  Smith  1999. 
'0  Keefe  and  Smith,  Vagueness:  a  reader,  p.  36. 
102 rely  upon  a  solution  to  vagueness  that  requires,  for  some  predicates  at  least,  the  closed 
interval  of  real  numbers  between  0  and  1  will  be  immediately  inconsistent  for  the 
strict  finitist. 
This  does  however  raise  the  question  as  to  whether  a  multi-valued  theory 
which  takes  what  Keefe  and  Smith  describe  above  as  the  first  option,  that  of  a  three- 
valued  logic,  "  may  be  usefully  employed  by  the  strict  finitist.  Moreover,  there  is  a 
third  option,  although  as  Keefe  and  Smith  suggest,  it  is  not  a  common  one.  There 
remains  the  possibility  of  a  finite  multi-valued  logic,  and  the  corresponding  question 
as  to  whether  a  logic  with  many  more  than  three  values,  but  nonetheless  'finitely- 
grained',  can  be  adopted  by  strict  finitism.  I  shall  simply  defer  these  questions  for  the 
time  being.  Proper  answers  require  thorough  discussion,  (and  I  shall  offer  such  in 
chapter  nine),  but  it  seems  first  important  to  establish  that  strict  finitism  is  worthy  of 
attention  in  this  way;  there  still  remain  suggested  problems  for  strict  finitism  which 
threaten  to  render  it  independently  inconsistent,  and  obviate  the  need  for  such  deeper 
analysis. 
Further  attempts  to  avoid  the  contradiction 
Although  Dummett  doesn't  discuss  either  epistemicism  or  multi-valued 
theories  like  degree  theory  in  the  current  context,  he  does  suggest  that  attempts  to 
reject  classical  assumptions  within  the  restricted  context  of  vague  predicates  seem  to 
oppose  the  accepted  meanings  of  the  terms  involved.  He  argues  that  we  can  either 
deny  that  the  rule  of  universal  instantiation  is  valid  in  the  presence  of  vague  predicates 
(insisting  that  we  cannot,  for  each  particular  m,  derive  'If  m  is  small,  then  m+  1  is 
small'from  'For  every  n,  if  n  is  small,  then  n+1  is  small')  -  but  this  seems  to  reject  the 
meaning  of  the  word  'every';  or  else  we  can  regard  modus  ponens  as  invalid  in  the 
context  (so  that  we  cannot,  at  least  for  some  values  of  m,  derive  'm+  I  is  small'  from 
the  premises'if  m  is  small,  then  m+1  is  small'and'm  is  small')  -  but  this  seems  to 
reject  the  meaning  of  the  word  'if. 
The  only  alternative  then,  continues  Dummett,  is  to  deny  that  an  argument, 
each  step  of  which  is  valid,  is  necessarily  itself  valid  in  the  presence  of  vague 
11  or  indeed  an  n-valued  logic  for  some  quite  large  n. 
103 predicates.  Dummett  suggests  that  this  will  fare  no  better  than  the  options  just 
mentioned,  since: 
"[t]his  measure  seems,  however,  in  turn,  to  undermine  the  whole  notion  of 
proof  (=  chain  of  valid  arguments),  and,  indeed,  to  violate  the  concept  of  valid 
argument  itself,  and  hence  to  be  no  more  open  to  us  than  any  of  the  other  possibilities 
we  have  so  far  canvassed.  ),  j  12 
Nonetheless,  as  Dummett  acknowledges,  the  strict  finitist  may  be  tempted  to 
advance  just  such  a  strategy  to  deal  with  the  apparent  contradiction.  Remember  that 
from  the  strict  finitist's  point  of  view: 
"a  proof  is  valid  just  in  case  it  can  in  practice  be  recognised  by  us  as  valid; 
and,  when  it  exceeds  a  certain  length  and  complexity,  that  capacity  fails.  "  13 
It  seems  plausible,  therefore,  that  the  strict  finitist  might  simply  wish  to  reject 
the  claim  that  the  conclusion  1no  is  small'may  be  derived  from  a  series  of  no 
applications  of  modus  ponens  -  the  series  might  just  be  too  long  to  effect.  Thus  the 
proof  of  the  sorites  which  takes  the  'longhand'  form  indicated  by  Dummett  will  just 
be  unsurveyable  itseýf,  and  hence  the  paradox,  at  least  with  respect  to  surveyability 
predicates,  is  avoided.  I  shall  look  at  this  suggestion  in  the  remainder  of  this  chapter, 
for  it  has  been  seriously  considered  by  various  commentators.  If  it  were  a  successful 
strategy,  it  might  perhaps  allow  us  to  circumvent  many  of  the  worries  regarding  a 
vague  limit  to  surveyability,  both  for  lengths  of  proofs  and  for  size  of  numbers.  That 
is  to  say  that  with  such  a  strategy,  it  might  be  entirely  plausible  for  the  strict  finitist  to 
hold  as  suggested  above  that  the  rule  of  universal  generalisation  fails,  whilst  resisting 
the  move  to  proof  constructions  of  the  type  '0  is  surveyable,  if  0  is  surveyable  then  I 
is  surveyable,  1  is  surveyable,  etc.  '.  For  proofs  of  this  type  will  never  demonstrate  a 
paradox  of  the  sorites  type  to  the  strict  finitist,  since  the  proof  itself  will  be 
unsurveyable.  However,  it  should  perhaps  also  be  noted  that  even  if  such  a  response 
were  coherent,  it  does  not  seem  to  be  a  response  that  will  help  with  all  Sorites 
paradoxes  -  take  Wang's  paradox,  for  example:  it  might  be  objected  that  the  strategy 
12  Durnmett,  'Wang's  Paradox'  p.  306. 
104 will  not  work  here  since  it  is  possible  to  construct  the  paradox  within  acceptable  limits 
of  number  for  the  strict  finitist.  The  limit  of  'small'  is  presumably  lower  than  that  of 
'  surveyable',  and  hence  a  proof  of  the  paradox  for  small  might  well  be  achievable  in  a 
perfectly  surveyable  number  of  steps.  (Given  that  we  may  be  allowed  a  relatively 
sharpened'  application  of  small,  it  ought  to  be  possible  with  relatively  few  steps). 
14  Durnmett  himself  makes  a  plausible  case  of  this  kind 
But  this  objection  might  not  worry  the  strict  finitist  too  much;  the  solution  of 
sorites  paradoxes  in  general  is  not  necessarily  on  the  agenda.  If  an  answer  could  be 
given  to  the  suggested  paradox  for  surveyability  in  these  terms,  much  of  the  problem 
for  the  strict  finitist  is  ameliorated. 
The  unsurveyability  objection  and  Wright's  surveyable  proof 
A  much  more  serious  concern  for  the  strict  finitist  who  wishes  to  claim  that 
sorites  proofs  are  unsurveyable  in  this  way  is  raised  by  Crispin  Wright.  Wright 
suggests  that  even  though  the  strict  finitist  may  be  entitled  to  maintain  that  proofs  of 
the  kind  suggested  by  Dummett  are  unsurveyable,  still  an  argument  may  be 
constructed,  that  is  itself  perfectly  surveyable,  to  demonstrate  a  sorites  paradox  for  the 
strict  finitist. 
To  see  how,  consider  the  original  objection,  which  runs  something  like  this:  if 
we  construct  a  (long-hand)  proof15  of  the  kind  Dummett  has  in  mind  to  demonstrate  a 
sorites  paradox  for  surveyability,  it  looks  something  like  this: 
13 
Ibid. 
14  Ibid.  Dummett's  analysis  is  in  terms  of  apodictic  and  small  numbers,  where  a  number  n  Is  apodictIc 
if  it  is  possible  for  a  surveyable  proof  to  contain  as  many  as  n  steps.  But  his  conclusion  amounts  to  that 
which  I  have  outlined  here. 
15  That  is,  one  which  does  not  rely  upon  the  rule  of  universal  generalisation 
105 A  proof  of  length  1  step  is  surveyable. 
If  a  proof  of  length  1  step  is  surveyable,  then  a  proof  of  length  2  steps  is  surveyable. 
A  proof  of  length  2  steps  is  surveyable. 
and  so  on,  until  we  reach  some  point  at  which: 
A  proof  of  length  n  steps  is  surveyable. 
(where  n  represents  a  length  of  proof  which  is  ex  hypothesi  unsurveyable) 
But,  the  strict  finitist  replies,  this  proof  is  itself  of  at  least  n  steps  in  length  16 
, 
and  hence  is  itseýf  unsurveyable.  Hence,  the  strict  finitist  is  not  bound  to  accept  it  as  a 
proof  of  anything. 
Wright's  suggestion,  however,  is  that  an  argument  can  be  constructed  on 
similar  lines,  (so  as  not  to  rely  upon  the  rule  of  universal  generalisation),  but  which  is 
of  a  perfectly  surveyable  length.  Wright's  argument  is  as  follows: 
"It  is  plausible  to  suppose  that  there  is  some  particular  number  k  such  that  k 
successive  pairwise  steps  of  universal  instantiation  and  Modus  Ponens  constitute  a 
surveyable  proof  structure  while  2k  such  steps  do  not.  A  number  m  is  small  just  in 
case  m+k  such  pairwise  steps  constitute  a  surveyable  proof  structure.  Then  0  is  small; 
and  it  is  plausible  to  suppose  that  if  n  is  small,  so  is  its  successor;  ( 
... 
).  Thus  by  k 
pairwise  steps  of  universal  instantiation  and  Modus  Ponens  we  can  prove  that  k+k=2k 
is  small,  contTary  to  hypothesis.  "  17 
The  extent  of  the  proof,  and  Addis'  contradiction 
There  is  however  a  conftising  strand  to  the  argument  as  presented  above,  and  it 
has  unfortunately  been  misinterpreted  (at  least  once)  as  establishing  more  than  it  does. 
"  Indeed,  as  I  present  it,  it  is  2n  steps  in  length.  Wright,  as  we  shall  see,  presents  his  analysis  in  terms 
of  lengths  of  pairwise  steps  of  universal  instantiation  and  Modus  Ponens,  and  runs  the  same  argument. 
If  I  were  to  represent  the  current  argument  in  the  same  terms,  we  should  have  a  proof  of  length  n 
steps. 
r ri  i  t,  "Strict  Finitism",  in  e.  g.  Infinity,  ed.  Moore,  p.  257.  Addis  (as  I  shall  discuss  in  the  next 
section)  also  reproduces  Wright's  argument;  I,  like  he,  have  for  brevity's  sake,  omitted  Wright's 
qualification  of  the  plausibility  of  the  suggestion  that  if  n  is  small,  so  is its  successor. 
106 One  must  be  careful  to  draw  only  the  conclusion  that  Wright  intends  from  the 
argument  -  which  is  simply  that  it  is  not  open  to  the  strict  finitist  to  claim  that  any 
proof  of  the  sorites  paradox  for  the  predicate  'surveyable'  will  itself  be  unsurveyable. 
What  the  argument  does  not  show  is  that  there  is  a  further  contradiction  in  arguments 
of  this  type  that  will  cause  special  problems  for  the  strict  finitist.  However,  the 
presence  of  an  error  in  Wright's  description  (not  present  in  his  conclusion)  has  led  at 
least  one  commentator  to  assume  the  latter.  Mark Addis,  in  attempting  to  find  fault 
with  the  strict  finitist's  construal  of  surveyability,  exemplifies  the  assumption. 
Following  an  account  of  Wright's  argument,  he  writes  in  conclusion: 
46  when  any  two  surveyable  proof  structures  are  added  together  they  produce 
another  surveyable  proof  structure  to  the  assumption  that  certain  proof  structures, 
such  as  of  length  2k,  are  unsurveyable.  "  18 
Addis'  point  here  is  not  made  clearer  by  the  fact  that  there  appears  to  be  a 
word  omitted  from  the  sentence.  I  take  it  that  something  like  the  word  'contrary'  has 
been  missed  out  of  the  second  line,  so  that  the  quote  reads  that  a  surveyable  proof 
structure  is  produced,  contrary  to  the  assumption  that  a  proof  of  that  length  is 
unsurveyable. 
There  is  a  more  serious  point  here,  however,  and  that  is  that  the  conclusion  is 
plainly  not  what  Wright's  argument  is  intended  to  show  at  all.  Wright's  intention  was 
to  demonstrate  that  the  strict  finitist  could  not  avoid  the  problem  of  the  Sorites  by 
simple  appeal  to  the  principle  of  surveyability;  in  other  words,  by  asserting  that  any 
demonstration  of  a  sorites  paradox  about  surveyability  would  be  a  proof  structure  that 
was  itself  unsurveyable.  What  Wright's  argument  does  demonstrate,  in  place  of 
Addis'  somewhat  mistaken  conclusion,  is  that  one  can  describe  the  sorites  Paradox 
inherent  in  surveyability  in  a  single  proof  ofperfectly  surveyable  length. 
So  it  is  important  to  recognise  that the  argument  does  not  show  that  we  can  get 
from  'l  is  surveyable'  to  '2k  is  surveyable'  using  a  surveyable  proof,  for  it  is  clear 
that  we  cannot;  that  is  the  motivation  behind  the  original  claim  Wright  offers  on 
"  Addis,  p.  16  1. 
107 behalf  of  the  strict  finitist  -  the  strategy  under  investigation  relies  upon  it.  Instead,  the 
proof  offered  is  one  oQust  k  steps,  which  nevertheless  demonstrates  the  presence  of  a 
sorites  paradox  for  surveyability.  The  argument,  far  from  "adding  together  two 
surveyable  proof  structures",  uses  just  one  surveyable  proof  structure  to  demonstrate 
the  conclusion.  It  proceeds  like  this:  (each  line  is  a  "pairwise  step"  of  modus  ponens 
and  universal  instantiation,  as  referred  to  by  Wright): 
1)  If  k  proof  steps  are  surveyable,  then  k+1  proof  steps  are  surveyable  (UI);  k  proof 
steps  are  surveyable  (the  initial  premise  of  the  argument) 
2)  If  k+1  proof  steps  are  surveyable,  then  k+2  proof  steps  are  surveyable  (Ul);  k+1 
proof  steps  are  surveyable  (from  1  above) 
k)  If  k+(k-1)  proof  steps  are  surveyable,  then  2k  proof  steps  are  surveyable;  k+(k-1) 
proof  steps  are  surveyable. 
Step  k  generates  the  conclusion  that  2k  steps  are  surveyable,  which  is  contrary  to 
the  original  hypothesis. 
Now,  as  I  have  suggested,  Addis  is  not  entirely  to  blame  for  the  mistaken 
conclusion  -  there  is  in  fact  a  corresponding  error  in  Wright's  argument  as  presented 
above.  It  is  clear  from  the  rest  of  Wright's  presentation  that  the  error  is  an  oversight  in 
the  simplification  of  the  argument  -  and  indeed  Wright  is  careful  to  outline  precisely 
the  correct  conclusion  elsewhere.  But  when  he  writes  "we  can  prove  that  k+k=2k  is 
smair,  it  seems  as  though  the  argument  requires  two  surveyable  proof  structures  to 
demonstrate  the  conclusion.  But  what  has  in  fact  been  demonstrated  by  Wright's 
argument  is  just  that  proofs  of  2k  steps  are  surveyable;  and  importantly,  this  has  been 
demonstrated  by  a  proof  that  is  only  k  steps  long.  Wright's  argument  summary  should 
end  with:  'Thus  by  k  pairwise  steps  of  universal  instantiation  and  Modus  Ponens  we 
can  [surveyably]  prove  that  a  proof  of  length  2k  is  surveyable'. 
As  I  have  already  described,  the  resultant  conclusion  is  just  that  the  strict  finitist 
may  not  cry  that  sorites  paradoxes  are  simply  not  a  problem  for  surveyability,  or  at 
108 least  not  on  the  grounds  that  there  are  no  demonstrably  acceptable  proofs  of  such 
paradoxes  within  the  finitist's  paradigm.  However,  as  Wright  also  observes,  this  is  not 
immediately  to  reject  the  Strict  Finitist's  program  -  otherwise  the  presence  of  proofs 
of  sorites  paradoxes  in  general  language  (such  as  the  proof  that  all  men  are  bald) 
would  call  for  the  rejection  of  natural  language.  This  is  an  important  point,  and  one  I 
think  worth  stressing.  Whatever  the  prospects  are  for  obtaining  a  solution  to  the 
problem  of  vagueness  for  surveyability  (and  I  shall  investigate  such  at  length  in  the 
chapters  to  follow),  the  mere  fact  that  strict  finitism  is  committed  to  vagueness  in 
some  way  should  not  prompt  us  to  reject  the  theory.  As  Wright  suggests: 
"it  is  open  to  the  strict  finitist  to  wonder  why  the  involvement  of  his  philosophy 
with  such  expressions  any  more  calls  its  viability  into  question  than  its  involvement 
with  certain  other  such  expressions  calls  into  question  the  viability  of  art  criticism.  "  19 
There  is  perhaps  a  further  thought  here,  worthy  of  mention  before  I  proceed  any 
further  into  a  study  of  vagueness  and  surveyability.  This  is  that the  presence  of  sorites 
paradoxes  in  the  strict  finitist  discussion  of  number  and  proofs  may  be  more 
problematic  than  the  presence  of  such  in  natural  language  because  the  strict  finitist  is 
attempting  to  mark  a  definitive  boundary  or  limit,  whereas  in  language  no  such  limit 
is  necessarily  required.  But  I  am  not  sure  that this  is  a  convincing  thought  when 
properly  examined;  we  may  recognise  that  in  ordinary  language-use  we  do  indeed 
impose  limits  based  on  sorites-susceptible  predicates. 
If,  for  example,  I  own  a  nightclub,  and  I  instruct  my  door  staff  not  to  admit  bald 
people,  it  is  not  the  case  that  bouncers  will  admit  some  people  who  are  definitely  not 
bald,  reject  some  people  who  are  definitely  bald,  and  in  some  way  half-admit  the  rest. 
Rather,  the  bouncers  will  simply  stipulate  for  every  given  case  (based  perhaps,  in 
vague  cases,  on  mutual  agreement)  whether  the  individual  is  to  be  admitted  or  not. 
The  predicate  will  function  as  a  precise  limit  in  terms  of  admission  or  non-admission, 
just  as  if  I  had  asked  the  door  staff  to  admit  women  and  not  men  -  that  is,  some 
people  will  not  be  admitted,  others  will.  Hence  the  strict  finitist  limit  may  be  roughly 
described  as  something  akin  to  this  -  admit  a  proof  (or  a  number)  if  it  is  surveyable, 
don't  if  it  is  not. 
19  Wright,  'Strict  Finitism',  p.  253 
109 Alternatively,  perhaps  the  suggested  problem  is  an  ontological  one.  In  making  a 
claim  about  numbers,  the  strict  finitist  seems  to  be  making  a  claim  about  what  there 
is;  vagueness  in  such  a  case  seems  inherently  more  problematic  than  in  the  case  of 
mere  categorisation,  as  in  the  case  of  bald  or  not-bald  men.  But  to  raise  this  kind  of 
objection  is  to  quite  wrongly  employ  a  platonistic  reading  of  the  strict  finitist  claim 
about  number.  The  strict  finitist  is  not  offering  an  account  of  what  there  is, 
objectively,  in  the  world;  it  is  important  to  remember  that  the  claim  is  a  constructivist 
one.  Presumably,  there  are  many  plausible  constructions  (or  plausible  putative 
constructions)  in  the  mind  -  what  the  strict  finitist  is  attempting  is  precisely  a 
categorisation  of  those  constructions  which  are  to  count  as  numbers,  or  as 
mathematical  proof.  The  rough  guide  for  admittance  given  in  the  preceding  paragraph 
with  respect  to  'proof/number-status'  rather  than  nightclub  entry  -  i.  e.  admit  a  proof 
(or  a  number)  if  it  is  surveyable,  don't  if  it  is  not  -  is  not  a  claim  about  numbers  in  the 
world;  on  any  anti-realist  account,  there  is  no  such  thing.  Numbers  exist  only  to  the 
extent  that  they  are  (or  perhaps  can  be,  in  some  sense)  constructed  in  the  mind.  Now, 
if  constructibility  is  to  be  construed  in  terms  of  surveyability,  that  is,  if  a  number  or 
proof  must  be  surveyable  in  order  for  us  to  be  certain  that  it  has  been  correctly 
constructed,  then  our  varying  capacities  as  surveyors  just  will  give  rise  to  vagueness 
concerning  the  limits  of  construction.  But  there  can  be  no  independent  ontological 
problem  here  -  for  the  constructivist,  numbers  possess  no  ontology  beyond  that  of 
their  being  valid  constructions  in  the  mind. 
110 CHAPTER  VIL  SORITES  AND  SURVEYABILITY 
In  the  previous  chapter,  we  saw  that  it  is  not  open  to  the  strict  finitist  to  merely 
reject  the  sorites  paradox  on  the  ground  that  any  proof  of  the  paradox  will  be 
unsurveyable.  It  seems  then  as  though  we  must  take  the  problem  -  and  Dummett's 
corresponding  claims  of  inconsistency  -  seriously;  at  least,  inasmuch  as  the  problem 
threatens  the  theory  as  a  whole:  for  I  have  also  acknowledged,  at  the  end  of  the  last 
chapter,  Wright's  observation  that  it  is  not  immediately  apparent  that  sorites- 
susceptibility  will  be  grounds  for  rejecting  a  theory,  since  many  ordinary  activities 
involve  the  use  of  predicates  which  are  themselves  sorites-susceptible.  However,  there 
are  two  avenues  of  inquiry  that  immediately  present  themselves  following  on  from 
this  thought,  with  perhaps  obvious  justification:  firstly,  if  we  cannot  simply  reject  the 
claim  that  surveyability  is  sorites-susceptible,  we  must  look  at  the  purported 
entailments  of  inconsistency  which  Dummett  (and  others)  offer  us;  and  secondly,  we 
may  try  to  give  a  convincing  account  of  vagueness  at  least  with  respect  to 
surveyability,  in  the  hope  that  we  may  ameliorate  the  concerns  of  those  less  willing  to 
consider  strict  finitism  on  'equal-footing',  as  it  were,  with  practices  like  everyday 
colour-ascription.  Broadly  speaking,  the  first  of  these  will  form  the  basis  for  this 
chapter  and  the  next,  while  the  second  task  will  be  properly  addressed  in  chapters  nine 
and  ten. 
In  this  chapteT,  then,  we  return  to  Dummett's  analysis,  in  an  attempt  to  deal 
with  his  charge  of  inconsistency.  Dummett's  charge  rests  on  an  analogy  with  the  case 
of  colour-ascription,  and  I  shall  both  fully  outline  the  analogy  and  reject  it  in  what 
follows;  in  the  second  half  of  the  chapter  I  offer  two  principal  ways  in  which  the 
analogy  fails. 
Dummett  on  strictfinitary  totalities 
Let  us  return,  then,  to  Dummett's  analysis.  Durnmett  is  explicit  in  his  account 
of  vagueness  that  it  will  entail  serious  consequences  for  strict  finitism.  His  article 
'Wang's  Paradox'  is  intended,  in  part,  to  demonstrate  that  strict  finitism  is  an 
untenable  position  in  the  philosophy  of  mathematics.  Dummett  suggests  that  the 
ill notion  of  a  weakly  finite  but  weakly  infinite  totality,  such  as  he  insists  a  strict  finitist 
must  be  committed  to,  is  ultimately  inconsistent.  We  shall  see  precisely  what 
Dummett  intends  by  this  notion,  and  examine  his  reasons  for  claiming  inconsistency.  I 
shall  suggest  that  Dummett's  remarks,  although  worth  serious  consideration  for  the 
strict  finitist,  do  not  in  fact  entail  the  repudiation  of  strict  finitist  mathematics  as 
Dummett  expects. 
I  should  also  like  to  note  at  this  point  that  although  Dummett's  claim  that  the 
strict  finitist  is  committed  to  weakly  finite  but  weakly  infinite  totalities  is  plausible,  it 
is  open  to  question,  and  I  shall  question  it  in  a  later  chapter.  For  now,  I  shall  grant  the 
claim  for  the  sake  of  argument,  and  consider  its  alleged  consequences  for  strict 
finitism. 
Let  me  begin  by  carefully  outlining  Dummett's  approach.  He  opens  the  article 
with  a  briefly  explanation  of  strict  finitism,  in  which  he  suggests  that  strict  finitism  is 
usually  couched  in  terms  of  feasible  operations.  That  is,  strict  finitism  is  committed  to 
the  idea  that,  as  Durnmett  describes: 
'by  "natural  number"  must  be  understood  a  number  which  we  are  in  practice 
capable  of  representing.  '  I 
This  is  of  course  simply  the  weakest  of  the  surveyability  requirements  that  I 
have  already  identified,  but  Dummett  identifies  the  strict  finitist  constraint  only  in  this 
weak  sense.  He  also  explains  that the  natural  numbers,  under  a  strict  finitist 
interpretation,  are  not  closed  under  simple  arithmetical  operators  such  as 
exponentiation. 
'The  totality  of  natural  numbers  which  we  are  capable  in  practice  of 
representing  by  an  Arabic  numeral  [for  example  2]  is  evidently  not  closed  under 
exponenfiation;  '  3 
'  Durnmett,  'Wang's  Paradox',  p.  100 
2  Dummett  discusses  his  reasons  for  taking  the  Arabic  numerals  as  a  paradigm  case  in  some  detail.  I 
have  discussed  the  problem  of  differing  notation  at  length  myself,  and  will  not  rehearse  the  discussion 
here.  For  the  purposes  of  the  present  discussion,  let  us  simply  assume  that  what  may  be  said  about  the 
numbers  we  are  capable  of  representing  in  Arabic  numerals  may  presumably  be  said  about  any  other 
totality  we  may  wish  to  formulate  strict  finitistically. 
3  Durnmett,  'Wang's  Paradox',  p.  10  1 
112 The  strict  finitist  is  therefore  at  least  committed  to  totalities  that  are,  for 
example,  not  closed  under  exponentiation  (or,  for  that  matter,  under  the  successor 
operation;  more  on  this  later).  As  Dummett  suggests: 
'Strict  finitism  is  coherent  only  if  the  notion  of  totalities  of  this  sort  is  itself 
coherent  4 
There  is  nothing  particularly  controversial  in  the  discussion  so  far  -  but 
Dummett  makes  an  additional  assumption  about  the  kind  of  totalities  to  which  the 
strict  finitist  must  be  committed;  an  assumption  which  seems  at  least  prima  facie 
plausible.  He  suggests  that  totalities  of  this  sort  are  similar  to  totalities  such  as  'the 
-)5  number  of  heartbeats  in  my  childhood 
He  describes  this  kind  of  totality  as  weakly-finite  but  weakly-infinite,  as 
follows: 
'Let  us  characterise  a  totality  as  "weakly  infinite"  if  there  exists  a  well- 
ordering  of  it  with  no  last  member.  And  let  us  characterise  as  "weakly  finite"  a 
totality,  such  that,  for  some  finite  ordinal  n,  there  exists  a  well-ordering  of  it  with  no 
nth  member. 
,6 
Totalities  such  as  'the  numbers  we  are  capable  of  representing  by  an  Arabic 
numeral'  are  of  this  kind,  argues  Dummett,  because  they  are  firstly  bounded  above 
(weakly  finite),  to  the  extent  that  I  can  supply  a  number  such  that  my  corresponding 
heartbeat  did  not  occur  in  my  childhood,  and  similarly  one  can  supply  a  putative 
'number'  (e.  g.  1010)  which  is  not  in  the  totality  of  numbers  we  are  capable  of 
representing  by  an  Arabic  numeral;  and  secondly,  they  have  no  last  member  (are 
weakly  infinite)  since  for  every  heartbeat  that  occurred  in  my  childhood,  I  was  still  in 
my  childhood  when  the  next  one  occurred, and  similarly,  if  I  can  write  down  a 
number  in  Arabic  notation  I  will  always  be  able  to  write  down  its  successor. 
4 
ibid. 
5  Attributing  the  example  to  Yesinin-Volpin,  who,  as  a  strict  finitist,  apparently  shares  Durnmett's 
conclusion  that  strict  finitism  must  be  committed  to  this  particular  kind  of  totality. 
'  Dummett,  'Wang's  Paradox',  p.  109 
113 The  supposition  that  this  last  point  is  correct  is  what  I  describe  above  as  a 
plausible  assumption,  and  I  shall  discuss  it  further  elsewhere.  Again,  for  the  purposes 
of  the  present  analysis  let  us  assume  that  the  totalities  proposed  by  the  strict  finitist 
are  indeed  weakly  finite  and  weakly  infinite  totalities,  in  accordance  with  Dummett's 
definitions,  and  examine  the  argument  by  which  he  hopes  to  establish  grounds  for  the 
repudiation  of  strict  finitism. 
Dummett  -s  treatment  of  the  paradox 
Dummett  begins  his  attack  on  strict  finitism  with  a  consideration  of  the 
predicates  used  by  the  strict  finitist,  intending  to  show  that the  predicates  used  are 
vague  ones,  subject  to  the  same  considerations  as  vague  predicates  in  ordinary 
language.  He  suggests  that  the  inherent  inconsistency  within  strict  finitist  totalities  is 
observable  in  the  kind  of  Sorites  paradoxes  constructible  for  vague  predicates.  His 
example  is  Wang's  paradox,  which,  we  may  recall,  runs  as  follows: 
'0  is  small; 
For  all  n,  if  n  is  small,  n+1  is  small: 
Therefore  all  numbers  are  small.  7 
Now,  it  is  clear  that  strict  finitism  will  not  couch  the  totality  of  natural 
numbers  in  terms  of  numbers  that  are  'small';  but  it  is  also  clear  from  Durnmett's 
remarks  that  he  intends  the  paradox  as  a  quite  general  one,  and  would  presumably 
endorse  the  following  reformulation: 
It  is  possible  in  practice  to  write  down  the  Arabic  numeral  for  0; 
For  all  n,  if  it  is  possible  in  practice  to  write  down  the  Arabic  numeral  for  n,  then  it  is 
possible  in  practice  to  write  down  the  Arabic  numeral  for  n+l: 
Therefore,  it  is  possible  in  practice  to  write  down  the  Arabic  numeral  for  every 
number. 
7  Durnmett,  'Wang's  Paradox',  p.  10  1 
114 It  appears  that  Dummett  believes  these  paradoxes  to  be  equivalent  -  and 
certainly,  there  is  nothing  particularly  implausible  about  the  premises  or  conclusion  of 
the  reformulation,  just  as  with  the  given  example.  Moreover,  Dummett  argues  that 
vagueness  will  be  a  problem  for  all  totalities  of  this  kind;  he  later  concludes,  for 
example: 
'The 
...  totalities  which  must  underlie  any  strict  finitist  reconstruction  of 
mathematics  must  be  taken  as  seriously  as  the  vague  predicates  of  which  they  are 
defined  to  be  the  extensions.  '  8 
Vagueness,  Dummett  acknowledges,  is  a  quite  general  problem,  not  one 
especially  attributed  to  strict  finitist  mathematics.  In  fact,  as  Dummett  admits,  even 
straight-forward  acceptance  of  his  argument  will  lead  not  only  to  the  rejection  of  strict 
finitism,  but  also  to  the  rejection  of  phenomenal  properties  (due  to  the  inherent 
inconsistency  of  observational  predicates  that  admit  of  vague  application). 
This  last  point  is  an  important  one,  and  not  simply  a  'side-effect'  of 
Dummett's  analysis.  Indeed,  his  primary  conclusion  might  have  been  the  rejection  of 
phenomenal  properties,  rather  than  strict  finitism,  as  he  develops  his  argument  not 
with  respect  to  the  predicate  'possible  in  practice  to  represent  by  an  Arabic  numeral' 
or  even  'is  a  heartbeat  in  my  childhood',  but  rather  for  the  predicate  'red',  or  'is  red'. 
What  we  shall  see  is  that the  straightforward  analogy  intended  here  will  in  fact  simply 
fail  for  strict  finitist  predicates,  and  I  shall  describe  the  important  differences  between 
the  two  cases  in  detail.  However,  I  shall  also  go  on  to  consider  the  idea  that  Dummett 
may  be  making  a  slightly  different  claim,  to  the  effect  that  all  vague  predicates  are 
infected  by  an  inconsistency  that  is  similar  in  kind,  and  that  the  example  of  colour 
predicates  is  simply  illustrative  of  the  kind  of  inconsistency,  rather  than  being 
intended  as  an  immediately  analogous  case.  Let  us  begin  with  Dummett's  rejection  of 
observational  predicates  such  as  'red'. 
Taking  red  as  a  paradigm  example  of  a  vague  predicate,  Dummett  develops 
the  conclusion  that  the  use  of  observational  predicates,  where  the  source  of  vagueness 
is  the  non-transitivity  of  non-discriminable  difference,  is  intrinsically  inconsistent. 
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115 Dummett  rejects  observational  predicates  such  as  'red'  in  two  steps.  Firstly,  he 
demonstrates  that  the  source  of  vagueness  for  such  predicates  lies  in  the  non- 
transitivity  of  non-discriminable  difference.  That  is  to  say,  predicates  such  as  'red'  are 
not  "independently  adjudicable";  something  is  red  because  we  assign  the  property  of 
C  redness'  to  it,  and  that  assignment  is  necessarily  vague  because  for  subtle enough 
changes  of  shade  we  cannot  tell  the  difference  between  a  shade  and  its  immediate 
neighbour.  We  can  look  at  two  different  shades,  one  very  close  to  another,  and  we 
may  not  tell  the  difference  merely  by  looking.  This  non-discriminable  difference  is 
non-transitive  because  we  may  say  there  is  no  difference  between  shade  01  and  shade 
02,  nor  between  02  and  03,  and  yet  apparently  hold  quite  consistently  that  there  is  a 
difference  between  shade  01  and  shade  03.  However,  (and  this  leads  neatly  to 
Dummett's  second  step),  'red'  is  just  such  a  predicate,  whose  application  is 
detennined  precisely  by  looking.  As  Dummett  outlines,  in  the  case  of  vague 
predicates  such  as  'red',  I  am  bound  by  the  principle  that  if  shade  n  is  red  (looks  red 
to  me)  then  shade  n+l,  which  I  cannot  discern  any  difference  in,  is  also  red  (also 
looks  red  to  me).  But  because  non-discriminable  difference  is  non-transitive,  this 
principle  will  fail  to  consistently  govern  the  use  of  'red'  -I  can  be  forced  to  assert 
contrary  statements,  to  the  effect  that  a  particular  shade  is  both  red  and  not  red.  I  must 
admit  that  if  shade  01  looks  red,  then  shade  02  looks  red,  and  equally  if  shade  02 
looks  red  then  shade  03  looks  red,  and  so  on.  Ultimately,  I  must  conclude  (even  for 
shade  03  in  my  above  simplified  example)  that  something  which  is  (otherwise 
obviously)  not  red  is  red,  given,  say,  a  sufficiently  long  series  of  shades  from  red  to 
blue,  each  one  of  which  is  non-discriminable  from  its  neighbours.  According  to 
Dummett  it  follows  that: 
'the  use  of  any  predicate  which  is  taken  as  being  governed  by  such  a  principle 
is  potentially  inconsistent:  the  inconsistency  fails  to  come  to  light  only  because  the 
principle  is  never  sufficiently  pressed.  Thus 
...  the  use  of  vague  predicates  -  at  least 
when  the  source  of  the  vagueness  is  the  non-transitivity  of  a  relation  of  non- 
discriminable  difference  -  is  intrinsically  incoherent.  '9 
ibid. 
116 I  would  just  like  to  point  out  that  Dummett's  position  on  observational 
predicates  is  controversial  -  the  suggestion  is  that the  use  of  colour  predicates  (for 
example)  is  governed  entirely  by  this  'observational'  principle  that  Dummett  has  laid 
out.  As  we  shall  see,  it  is  not  clear  that the  use  of  all  vague  predicates  needs  to  be 
governed  by  such  'observational'  principles  -  but  moreover,  it  may  be  that  we  do  not 
need  to  accept  that  even  colour  predicates  are  governed  in  this  way;  a  straight 
epistemicist  response,  for  example,  would  demand  that  the  correct  use  of  the 
predicate  was  governed  by  properties  (presumably)  of  objects.  Dummett's 
conclusions  regarding  the  inconsistency  of  such  predicates  relies  upon  the  fact,  at 
least  for  colour  predicates,  that to  be  a  certain  colour  is  just  to  look  a  certain  colour.  It 
seems  to  me  that  a  more  general  defence  (of  the  kind  of  phenomenal  properties  that 
Dummett  is  admittedly  forced  to  reject)  might  start  with  some  response  of  this  kind; 
however,  there  are  a  number  of  considerations  in  favour  of  strict  finitism  that  will 
eclipse  such  issues,  and  I  need  not  attempt  the  more  general  (and  assuredly  hazardous) 
defence  here.  I  want  to  move  swiftly  onto  Dummett's  remarks  about  strict  finitism. 
On  the  strength  of  his  remarks  regarding  observational  predicates,  where  the  source  of 
the  vagueness  is  the  non-transitivity  of  non-discriminable  difference,  Dummett 
believes  he  is  in  a  position  to  reject  strict  finitism. 
Dummett  summarises  his  conclusions  in  the  following  way. 
'(1)  Where  non-discriminable  difference  is  non-transitive,  observational  predicates 
are  necessarily  vague. 
(2)  Moreover,  in  this  case,  the  use  of  such  predicates  is  intrinsically  incoherent. 
(3)  Wang's  paradox  merely  reflects  this  inconsistency 
... 
(4)  The  weakly  infinite  [no  last  member]  totalities  which  must  underlie  any  strict 
finitist  reconstruction  of  mathematics  must  be  taken  as  seriously  as  the  vague 
predicates  of  which  they  are  defined  to  be  extensions  ...  on  the  strength  of  conclusion 
2,  weakly  infinite  totalities  may  likewise  be  rejected  as  spurious;  this  of  course  entails 
the  repudiation  of  strict  finitism'.  10 
It  is  clear  from  this  that  Dummett  intends  us  to  understand  an  immediate 
connection  between  the  kind  of  examples  he  has  been  discussing,  and  the  predicates 
10  Dummett,  'Wang's  Paradox',  p.  115 
117 used  in  strict  finitist  analysis.  But  I  am  not  convinced  that  such  an  immediate 
connection  exists.  I  think  that  it  is  essential  to  Dummett's  conclusions  that  he  has 
been  discussing  observational  predicates,  where  the  source  of  vagueness  is  the  non- 
transitivity  of  non-discriminable  difference.  I  maintain  that  it  is  possible  to  reject  the 
assumption  that  predicates  of  the  kind  'possible  to  write  down  in  practice'  are  of  the 
same  species;  in  fact,  I  suggest  that  they  are  neither  observational  predicates,  nor  is 
the  root  of  their  vagueness  the  non-transitivity  of  non-discriminable  difference.  I  shall 
outline  this  precisely  below.  However,  perhaps  more  seriously  for  Dummett,  I  believe 
that  any  proposed  analogy  of  the  argument  will  fail  to  achieve  the  'repudiation  of 
strict  finitism',  because  of  the  fact  that  Dummett's  argument  involves  a  subtle 
equivocation,  as  I  shall  also  aim  to  show  in  the  next  chapter. 
Rejecting  the  analogy 
Firstly,  then,  I  want  to  consider  the  rejection  of  strict  finitary  predicates  in  line 
with  Dummett's  rejection  of  observational  predicates  like  'red'.  As  I  have  already 
remarked,  it  is  not  clear  that the  step  is  an  automatic  one;  for  two  reasons.  I  shall 
discuss  them  in  turn. 
a)  Strictfinitary  predicates  need  not  be  observational  predicates 
Dummett's  argument,  at  face  value  at  least,  relies  upon  the  fact  that the  vague 
predicates  in  question  are  observational  ones.  The  use  of  such  predicates  runs  into 
inconsistency,  according  to  Durnmett,  because  it  is  possible  to  derive  contrary 
statements,  e.  g.  x  is  red  and  x  is  not  red.  But  it  only  leads  to  inconsistency  in  the  case 
of  red  because  we  are  bound  to  accept  the  premises  that,  on  the  one  hand,  something 
which  looks  definitely  blue  (i.  e.  is  not  red)  to  us  is  blue  (and  not  red),  and  on  the  other 
hand,  as  Durnmett's  principle  describes,  that  if  we  cannot  tell  the  difference  between  a 
shade  which  is  red  and  another,  we  must  agree  that the  second  shade  is  also  red. 
However,  although  we  may  accept  the  first  premise  without  concern,  we  will  only 
accept  the  second  premise  so  long  as  'being  red'  and  'looking  red'  are  synonymous. 
Consider  the  following  simplification: 
118 (1)  Shade  01  is  (clearly  looks)  red. 
(2)  Shade  05  is  (clearly  looks)  blue. 
(3)  We  (being  in  this  case  very  poor  colour  discriminators)  cannot  tell  the 
difference  between  any  two  shades  next  to  one  another  in  the  sequence  (that  is  we 
cannot  tell  the  difference  between  01  &  02,  or  02  &  03,  or  03  &  04,  or  04  &  05). 
(4)  If  one  shade  is  indistinguishable  in  colour  from  another  shade,  the  shades 
must  be  the  same  colour. 
(5)  Therefore,  according  to  (3),  01  is  the  same  colour  as  02,02  is  the  same 
colour  as  03,03  is  the  same  colour  as  04,  and  04  is  the  same  colour  as  05. 
(6)  Hence,  01  is  the  same  colour  as  05,  contrary  to  premises  (1)  and  (2). 
Now,  the  problem  comes  with  (4)  -  this  assumes  that  there  is  nothing  more  to 
something  being  a  certain  colour  than  it  looking  a  certain  colour.  Certainly  it  may  be 
plausible  enough,  in  the  case  of  colour,  that  the  use  of  the  predicate,  as  Dummett  says, 
is  governed  by  this  principle.  As  I  have  said,  the  arguments  for  colour  predicates  are 
somewhat  moot  -I  have  no  easy  answer  here.  But  the  distinction  I  wish  to  draw  is 
important  to  the  strict  finitist's  case.  Let  us  consider  another  predicate,  say  'is  one 
metre  long'  and  see  if  the  same  argument  will  lead  us  immediately  into  inconsistency. 
In  this  case,  it  seems  not.  We  do  not,  even  intuitively  for  such  predicates,  wish 
to  maintain  clause  (4)  above.  The  argument  becomes: 
(I  a)  Stick  01  is  one  hundred  centimetres  long. 
(2a)  Stick  05  is  one  hundred  and  one  centimetres  long. 
(3a)  We  cannot  tell  the  difference  between  the  lengths  of  any  two  sticks  next 
to  one  another  in  the  sequence  (that  is  we  cannot  tell  the  difference  between  01  and 
02,  or  02  and  03,  or  03  and  04,  or  04  and  05). 
(4a)  If  one  stick  is  indistinguishable  in  length  from  another  stick,  both  sticks 
must  be  the  same  length. 
(5a)  Therefore,  according  to  (3),  01  is  the  same  length  as  02,02  is  the  same 
length  as  03,03  is  the  same  length  as  04,  and  04  is  the  same  length  as  05. 
(6a)  Hence,  01  is  the  same  length  as  05,  contrary  to  premises  (1)  and  (2). 
119 Now  (4a)  looks  plainly  false.  Note  that  in  this  case,  we  do  not  need  more  than 
2  sticks  for  the  example.  The  fact  that  we  cannot  distinguish  between  the  length  of 
stick  01  and  stick  02  does  not  force  us  even  to  conclude  that these  two  sticks  are  the 
same  length  -  in  fact,  given  the  experiment,  we  would  happily  conclude  exactly  the 
opposite,  despite  the  evidence  of  our  senses.  What  is  importantly  different  in  the  case 
of  colour  (and  what  Dummett  more  generally  refers  to  as  observationao  predicates  is 
that the  evidence  of  our  senses  is  supposed  to  count  in  the  relevant  way  -  it  is 
supposed  to  govern  what  is,  and  is  not,  red. 
In  the  case  of  non-observational  predicates,  it  does  not  appear  as  if 
inconsistency  follows. 
Now,  admittedly,  predicates  such  as  'is  one  metre  long'  are  not  vague.  They 
have  a  perfectly  determinate  application.  Nonetheless,  is  it  impossible  that  vague 
predicates  could  be  non-observational  (in  this  sense)  and  still  vague?  Predicates  such 
as  'is  (or  was)  a  heartbeat  in  my  childhood'  have  vague  application,  but  it  does  not 
follow  that  the  predicate  is  an  observational  one.  The  application  of  the  predicate  is 
not  defined  by  the  principle  that  if  I  say  one  heartbeat  occurred  in  my  childhood,  and  I 
cannot  see  any  difference  between  that  and  the  next,  then  the  next  occurred  also  in  my 
childhood.  But  the  correct  (and  assuredly  vague)  application  of  the  predicate  is 
detennined  by  the  (intrinsically  vague)  length  of  my  childhood,  something  for  which  I 
can  claim  very  little  responsibility. 
We  could  of  course  run  a  similar  argument  for  'seems  like  a  heartbeat  in  my 
childhood',  or  'looks  one  metre  long',  which  then  would  be  observational  predicates, 
and  run  into  inconsistency  in  the  way  Dummett  proposes;  but  this  says  nothing  about 
the  predicate  'was  a  heartbeat  in  my  childhood'  or  'is  one  metre  long'.  Dummett's 
conclusions  about  the  predicate  'is  red'  stem  from  his  assumption  that  'is  red'  is 
synonymous  with  'looks  red'. 
Again,  I  shall  not  debate  that  issue  here.  The  important  question  is  whether  the 
predicates  that  strict  finitism  is  committed  to  are  observational  predicates  (in  the  same 
way  as  Dummett  proposes  'is  red'  is),  or  predicates  of  a  non-observational  kind,  such 
as  'is  one  metre  long'. 
120 My  contention,  of  course,  is  that  they  are  the  latter.  We  must  be  careftil  not  to 
assume  that  predicates  like  'possible  in  practice  to  represent  by  an  Arabic  numeral' 
are  synonymous  with  predicates  like  'seems  possible  in  practice  to  represent  by  an 
Arabic  numeral'.  "  Of  course,  we  are  talking  theoretically  about  such  matters,  (since 
the  proposed  breakdown  of  possibility  is  not  accessible  in  the  way  that  the  transition 
between  red  and,  say,  orange  is,  since  we  can  have  no  examples  of  impossible 
representations),  but  it  seems  as  though  external  factors  will  play  a  very  crucial  role  in 
the  determination  of  applicability;  understood  simply  (perhaps  most  simply)  as  a 
physical  task,  for  example,  we  will  actually  run  out  of  room  (or  time)  in  which  to 
inscribe  suitably  large  numbers.  Again,  the  limit  might  not  be  precisely  determinate 
(i.  e.  is  vague),  but  nevertheless,  it  seems  inevitable  that  it  will  come. 
If  this  is  accepted,  we  can  see  immediately  that  the  proposed  reformulation  of 
Wang's  paradox  from  using  the  predicate  'small'  to  using  the  predicate  'possible  in 
practice  to  represent  by  an  Arabic  numeral'  is  not  as  simple  as  it  may  first  appear. 
Arguably,  'Small'  may  be  an  observational  predicate  in  the  relevant  sense  -  but  only 
if  the  application  of  'small'  is  governed  by  what  seems  small  to  us,  rather  than 
asserting  something  which  is  genuinely  true  of,  say,  a  number.  There  is  some  support 
for  this  suggestion,  since  'small'  seems  context-dependent,  such  that  thirty-five  grains 
of  sand  will  seem  a  small  amount,  but  a  class  of  thirty-five  students  will  not  seem 
small.  Nonetheless,  it  seems  to  me  as  if,  at  least  with  respect  to  numbers,  (as  in  the 
context  of  Wang's  paradox),  some  numbers  are  genuinely  small,  and  do  not  merely 
seem  small  in  certain  contexts.  So  perhaps  one  might  make  a  similar  case  that  'small' 
is  not  an  observational  predicate.  However,  for  my  present  purposes,  it  is  enough  to 
note  that  (even)  if  'small'  can  be  counted  an  observational  predicate,  then  Dummett's 
suggestion  that  another  interpretation  of  'n  is  small'  is  'it  is  possible  in  practice  to 
write  down  the  Arabic  numeral  for  n'  is  just  incorrect;  as  in  this  case  the  former 
would  be  an  observational  predicate,  but  the  latter  is  not. 
it  There  is  a  side  issue  here  about  'surveyability'.  Mark  Addis  (in  his  paper  'Surveyability  and  the 
Sorites  paradox')  makes  the  valid  point  that  we  must  be  careful  not  to  ascribe  'surveyability'  as  a 
property  of  numbers  (or  proofs,  etc.  ).  But  just  because  surveyability  depends  upon  us  in  an  important 
way,  it  does  not  follow  that  we  are  wholly  responsible  for  adjudicating  what  is surveyable  and  what  is 
not.  Indeed,  in  the  case  of  surveyability,  it  seems  as  though  the  concept  rests  upon  the  fact  that  we  are 
not  -  surveyability  is  intended  to  convey  a  limit  to  human  capacity.  If  it  were  determinable  by  the 
surveyor,  it  would  be  a  redundant  term. 
121 Dummett  is  not  entirely  unaware  of  the  distinction  between  predicates  which 
involve  observational  vagueness,  and  those  that  do  not.  He  suggests  that: 
we  are  to  have  terms  whose  application  is  to  be  determined  by  mere 
observation,  these  terms  must  necessarily  be  vague.  '  12 
But  his  mistake  is  to  assume  that  all  non-observational  predicates  which  give  rise 
to  vagueness  do  so  in  virtue  of  translation  into  an  observational  predicate  of  the  kind 
'looks 
..  .'  or  'seems. 
.  .'  or  some  such.  Dummett  attributes  vagueness  to 
observational  predicates,  where  the  source  of  the  vagueness  is  the  non-transitivity  of 
non-discriminable  difference.  He  allows  that  there  will  be  examples  where  the  non- 
transitivity  of  non-discriminable  difference  seems  to  offer  a  paradox,  but  on  closer 
inspection,  (as  with  his  example  of  the  clock  hand)  the  predicate  actually  determines  a 
perfectly  determinate  totality,  one  that  is  not  vague.  That  is,  Dummett  agrees  that 
there  are  'cases  of  non-discriminable  difference  which  give  rise  to  vague  predicates 
[and]  ones  which  do  not.  '  13  What  he  does  not  countenance  is  that there  could  be  non- 
observational  predicates  which  are  vague,  but  where  the  source  of  vagueness 
(importantly)  may  not  lie  in  the  non-transitivity  of  non-discriminable  difference. 
b)  It  is  not  clear  that  the  source  of  vagueness,  for  strictfinitary  predicates,  is  the 
non-transitivity  of  non-discriminable  difference. 
Since  we  can  no  longer  assume  that  strict  finitary  predicates  are  observational,  it 
no  longer  follows  that  the  source  of  vagueness  lies  in  the  non-transitivity  of  non- 
discriminable  difference  for  such  predicates.  If  there  are  non-observational  vague 
predicates,  as  will  be  the  strict  finitist  contention  in  reaction  to  Durnmett  here,  then 
their  application  is  no  longer  governed  by  the  observational  principle  -  hence  the 
vagueness  need  not  rest  in  our  inability  to  recognize  observational  differences. 
Let  us  again  reconstruct  the  argument  for  the  predicate  'is  possible  in  practice 
to  represent  by  an  Arabic  numeral'.  The  argument,  designed  to  show  inconsistency, 
would  run: 
12  Durnmett,  'Wang's  Paradox',  p.  112 
Durnmett,  'Wang's  Paradox',  p.  114 
122 (I  b)  Number  01  is  inscribable,  in  practice,  in  Arabic  notation. 
(2b)  Number  05  is  not  inscribable,  in  practice,  in  Arabic  notation. 
(3b)  We  cannot  tell  the  difference  between  the  'inscribability'  of  any  two 
numbers  next  to  one  another  in  the  sequence  (that  is  we  cannot  tell  the  difference 
between  01  and  02,  or  02  and  03,  or  03  and  04,  or  04  and  05  in  terms  of 
inscribability). 
(4b)  If  one  number  is  indistinguishable  in  inscribability  from  another  number, 
both  numbers  must  be  equally  inscribable. 
(5b)  Therefore,  according  to  (3),  01  is  as  inscribable  as  02,02  is  as  inscribable 
as  03,03  is  as  inscribable  as  04,  and  04  is  as  inscribable  as  05. 
(6b)  Hence,  01  is  as  inscribable  as  05,  which  is  contrary  to  premises  (1)  and 
(2). 
We  are  of  course  firstly  at  liberty  to  maintain  that  4b)  is  false,  if,  as  suggested 
above,  inscribability  does  not  depend  upon  our  ability  to  recognize  it.  However,  it  also 
seems  we  could  make  a  different  objection  here  as  well,  to  the  effect  that  there  just  is 
a  discernable  difference  between  any  two  (different)  numbers,  regardless  of  the 
increment  between  them.  Consider  the  argument  above  for  the  predicate  'is 
inscribable  in  stroke  notation',  for  the  domain  of  the  positive  integers.  Now  we  might 
insist  that  for  any  two  numbers,  even  if  we  take  '1'  and  '2'  (or  '1'  and  '11'),  there  is 
clearly  a  difference  in  inscribability.  The  above  argument  will  not  proceed,  because 
we  will  not  agree  with  stage  3b)  for  any  two  numbers  (as  long  as  they  differ  in  size). 
In  fact  there  is  an  apparent  complication  with  'inscribable  in  Arabic  notation',  since 
Arabic  notation  works  in  base  10,  an  'artificial'  counting  system.  The  suggestion  here 
may  be  easier  to  grasp  for  a  predicate  like  'inscribable  in  stroke  notation'.  But  the 
force  of  the  argument  is  perhaps  excellently  illustrated  by  Arabic  notation  -  although, 
in  one  sense,  we  are  bound  to  say  that  there  is  no  difference  in  'inscribability'  (in 
terms  of  time,  effort,  length,  etc.  )  between  the  number  '2'  and  '3',  we  are  hardly 
likely  to  say  the  same  for  '9'  and  10,.  14 
14  Note  here  it  still  seems  implausible  that  there  will  be  a  sharp  cut-off  (say,  for  example,  beyond  a 
certain  'numeral  -length')  to  the  inscribability  of  numbers;  because  the  limit  is  vague. 
123 It  must  be  acknowledged  that  this  response  will  not  suffice  without 
modification  for  'inscribable  in  Arabic  notation'  -  as  suggested  above,  base  10 
complicates  matters  when  considering  the  equi-scribability  of  numbers.  It  looks  as 
though  we  might  make  such  an  argument  for  stroke  notation,  since  clearly  it  will  take 
us  longer  to  inscribe  larger  numbers.  However,  it  does  not  seem  obvious  that  it  will 
take  us  longer  to  inscribe  the  numeral  '8'  than  '1',  for  example,  so  we  need  to  have  a 
broader  understanding  of  the  kind  of  predicate  advanced  by  strict  finitism.  What  does 
'possible  in  practice  to  represent  by  an  Arabic  numeral'  require,  at  numbers  above  the 
obvious?  One  possibility  is  the  notion  of  surveyability.  A  numeral,  in  order  to  be  a 
meaningful  representation,  must  presumably  be  recognizable  as  such  -  and  this  is 
where  the  notion  of  surveyability  usually  comes  into  play.  If  we  cannot  recognize 
whether  a  number  has  actually  been  represented  or  not,  we  have  no  guarantee  that  the 
number  is  in  fact  representable. 
Now,  surveyability  has  neither  the  obviously  favourable  properties  of  stroke 
notation,  (in  that  it  seems  obvious  to  us  that  higher  numbers  will  always  take  'longer' 
-  i.  e.  there  is  no  non-discriminable  difference),  nor  the  immediate  worries  of  Arabic 
notation  (in  that  it  seems  clear  that  some  numbers  are  prima  facie  as  'inscribable  as 
others  of  the  same  order  of  magnitude).  So  what  are  we  to  say  about  the  predicate 
'surveyable'?  Firstly,  we  might  simply  insist  that  the  argument  here  is  true  for 
surveyability,  just  as  for  inscribability  in  stroke  notation.  The  fact  that  we  are  able  to 
survey  both  the  number  '1'  and  the  number  '45'  does  not  mean  we  are  incapable  of 
recognizing  a  difference  in  the  attention  required  to  do  so  -  why  may  not  the  same  be 
true  of  the  numbers  '5'  and  W,  for  example?  The  suggestion  here  is  that  we  can 
always  recognize  a  difference  in  surveyability  between  any  two  numbers,  even  when 
those  two  numbers  are  next  to  one  another  in  the  sequence.  15  If  this  suggestion  is  the 
correct  one,  there  will  be  no  cases  of  non-discriminable  difference  for  surveyability  - 
each  number  will  be  discriminably  more  or  less  surveyable  than  any  other. 
15  Of  course,  this  will  not  be  the  case  if  surveyability  is  defined  in  'black  and  white'  terms  -  to  the 
effect  that  there  is  only  ever  a  difference  in  surveyability  between  two  numbers  if  one  number  is 
surveyable  and  the  other  is  not.  But  as  with  all  of  the  predicates  we  are  considering,  this  would  be  too 
narrow  a  definition  of  the  predicate  to  be  of  use  to  the  strict  finitist,  or  anybody  else.  Surely,  we  can 
sometimes  struggle  with  (for  example)  a  proof,  spending  hours  studying  it  before  we  finally  understand 
(and  have  thus  surveyed)  it;  such  cases,  contrasted  with  the  simplest  of  proofs  that  seem  all  but  obvious 
to  us  on  inspection,  are  taken  to  establish  that  there  just  is  a  difference  in  surveyability  between  some 
cases  of  nonetheless  'surveyable'  (as  opposed  to  'not-surveyable')  examples. 
124 However,  one  might  argue  that  there  is  nothing  to  substantiate  this  claim,  and 
that  actually  there  is  a  counter-intuition,  for  cases  like  'a  number  and  its  immediate 
successor'),  where  it  seems  perfectly  plausible  to  maintain  that  the  two  seem  equi- 
surveyable;  that  is,  there  is  a  non-discriminable  difference  between  them.  But  then  the 
force  of  our  earlier  argument  regarding  observational  and  non-observational 
predicates  may  be  felt  again  -  it  does  not  seem,  in  the  case  of  surveyable,  that  it  need 
matter  what  our  discriminative  capabilities  are:  whatever  our  intuition,  it  may 
perfectly  well  still  be  more  difficultfor  us  to  survey,  say,  the  number  '2'  than  the 
number'l'. 
The  vagueness  in  all  of  the  cases  we  are  advancing  on  behalf  of  the  strict 
finitist,  (be  it  'surveyable',  'possible  in  practice  to  represent  by  an  Arabic  numeral', 
'inscribable  in  stroke  notation',  etc.  ),  does  not  lie  in  the  non-transitivity  of  non- 
discriminable  difference  -  instead,  what  is  vague  is  the  limit  to  our  capacities. 
As  a  result  then,  my  interim  conclusion  is  that  Durnmett's  assumed  parallel 
between  the  cases  of  observational  predicates  such  as  red,  and  the  predicates  endorsed 
by  strict  finitism,  fails  on  two  counts.  Dummett  rejects  strict  finitism  on  the  strength 
of  his  first  two  conclusions,  which  read  (as  above): 
'(1)  Where  non-discriminable  difference  is  non-transitive,  observational  predicates 
are  necessarily  vague. 
(2)  Moreover,  in  this  case,  the  use  of  such  predicates  is  intrinsically  incoherent.  ' 
Strict  finitist  predicates  do  not  count  as  'such  predicates'  because  they  are 
neither  observational,  nor  is  the  source  of  their  vagueness  the  non-transitivity  of  non- 
discriminable  difference. 
125 The  Charge  of  inconsistency 
However,  as  I  suggested  earlier,  there  may  be  another  way  to  interpret 
Dummett's  remarks.  Dummett's  discussion  is  nonetheless  intended  to  cover  all  cases 
of  vague  predicates,  and  perhaps  he  does  not  need  to  argue  that  strict  finitary 
predicates  are  inconsistent  because  of  his  argument  against  phenomenal,  observational 
predicates,  but  rather  that  they  are  merely  inconsistent  in  a  similar  way.  I  have 
suggested  that  any  analogous  claims  will  also  fail  due  to  an  essential  equivocation  in 
Dummett's  discussion  of  weakly  finite  and  weakly  infinite  totalities.  I  would  like  now 
to  explore  this  further,  and  hope  to  substantiate  the  claim. 
Let  us  recall  Durnmett's  earlier  conclusion  that  'the  use  of  any  predicate  which 
is  taken  as  being  governed  by  such  a  principle  is  potentially  inconsistent'.  It  would  be 
useful  to  establish,  for  the  case  of  strict  finitism,  answers  to  the  following  questions: 
just  what  is  the  principle  that  is  supposed  to  govern  predicates  such  as  'surveyable', 
'inscribable',  or  perhaps  'representable  in  Arabic  notation',  and  is  it  indeed 
potentially  inconsistent? 
However,  it  is  not  clear  how  we  should  proceed  in  finding  such  a  principle  to 
assess.  We  have  already  seen  that  a  direct  'translation'  of  the  principle  -  to  the  effect 
that  e.  g.  a  similar  principle  for  'inscribable  in  stroke  notation'  becomes  'if  I  cannot 
discern  any  difference  between  the  inscribability  of  a  and  the  inscribability  of  b,  and  I 
have  characterised  a  as  inscribable,  then  I  am  bound  to  accept  a  characterisation  of  b 
as  inscribable'  -  will  fail  to  demonstrate  inconsistency  because  it  simply  does  not 
appear  as  if  the  use  of  the  predicate  is  governed  by  this  principle.  Dummett's  test  of 
inconsistency  will  not  work  for  strict  finitary  predicates,  if  they  are  not  wholly 
observational;  since,  again,  his  argument  against  colour  predicates  depends  upon  the 
synonymity  of  e.  g.  'red'  and  'looks  red'. 
Dummett  certainly  provides  us  with  no  equivalent  principle.  But  what  is  clear 
is  that  Durnmett  believes  there  to  be  an  intrinsic  inconsistency  in  all  totalities  of  the 
weakly  finite  and  weakly  infinite  kind  -  of  which  presumably,  now,  observational 
predicates  are  simply  a  special  case.  Therefore,  I  shall  turn  my  attention  next  to  a 
general  discussion  of  weakly  finite  and  weakly  infinite  totalities,  in  which  I  hope  to 
argue  against  the  claims  that  commitment  to  such  totalities  will  lead  to  inconsistency. 
126 CHAPTER  VIII:  WEAKLY  FINITE  AND  WEAKLY  INFINITE  TOTALITIES 
Durnmett  objects  principally  to  all  totalities  that  are  weakly  finite  and  weakly 
infinite  in  kind,  because,  he  maintains,  commitment  to  one  aspect  will  lead  to 
inconsistency  when  combined  with  the  other.  In  short,  Dummett  maintains  that  no 
totalities  may  be  consistently  both  weakly  finite  and  weakly  infinite.  I  argue,  on  the 
other  hand,  that  the  strict  finitist  is  at  liberty  to  ascribe  to  the  existence  of  such 
totalities,  since  no  such  inconsistency  is  apparent.  As  I  shall  attempt  to  show  in  what 
follows,  Dummett  is  guilty  of  not  taking  the  strict  finitist  commitment  seriously 
enough  in  his  analysis.  In  fact,  Dummett  isn't  the  only  commentator  to  suggest  that 
weakly  finite  and  weakly  infinite  totalities  are  inconsistent;  a  related,  more  obvious 
error  is  to  be  found  in  "Surveyability  and  the  sorites  paradox"  by  Mark  Addis,  who 
attempts  a  similar  rejection.  Although  Addis'  objection  is  different  from  Dummett's 
and  more  easily  answered,  the  two  objections  are  broadly  similar  in  character. 
Exposing  the  error  underlying  Addis'  objection  may  help  to  illuminate  the  subtler 
flaw  in  Dummett's.  Essentially,  both  make  the  mistake  of  reading  weakly  infinite  and 
weakly  finite  as  too  harsh  a  requirement  -  but  where  Dummett  ultimately  (and 
incorrectly)  reduces  weakly  finite  to  mean  simply  'finite',  Addis  collapses  weakly 
infinite  to  just  'infinite'. 
In  this  chapter  I  shall  offer  an  account  of  both  objections,  and  also  my 
rejection  of  each  of  them.  As  a  result,  I  hope  to  show  that  commitment  to  weakly 
infinite  and  weakly  finite  totalities  amounts  to  nothing  more  problematic  than  a 
general  commitment  to  vagueness  on  behalf  of  strict  finitism,  and  certainly  not  to 
some  internal  inconsistency  hrising  from  combining  the  two  defined  properties  of 
such  sets.  I  shall  begin  with  an  outline  of  Addis'  equivocation  first  then,  in  the  hope 
that  it  will  make  the  related  mistake  in  Dummett  more  apparent. 
Weakly  Finite,  and  Weakly  Infinite 
Before  I  begin,  however,  it  would  first  be  prudent  to  establish  precisely  what  is 
meant  by  the  terms  involved  in  the  concept,  actually  identified  by  Dummett  himself, 
127 of  'weakly  finite  and  weakly  infinite  totalities'.  Firstly,  perhaps  obviously,  a  totality 
can  be  thought  much  like  a  set  -  as  the  extension  of  a  predicate,  for  example  (as  in  the 
kind  of  examples  I  shall  consider).  There  is  an  important  reason  why  the  strict  finitist 
will  prefer  the  terni  'totality';  the  notion  of  a  completed  set  is  one  in  common  usage  - 
the  strict  finitist  will  want  to  resist  commitment  to  completed  (infinite)  sets,  and  the 
term  'totality'  has  no  such  connotation.  I  shall  therefore  often  prefer  the  word 
'totality',  on  the  understanding  that  whatever  applies  to  totalities  applies  to  sets,  but 
not  necessarily  vice  versa.  Totalities  may  be  determinate  or  indeterminate,  and  at  least 
finite.  "Is  a  postgraduate  in  Glasgow's  philosophy  department'  'is  a  predicate  which 
specifies  a  determinate  totality,  and  one  which,  as  I  understand  it,  is  ordinarily  finite  - 
that  is  to  say,  the  predicate  has  only  finitely  many  instances,  and  hence  the  totality  has 
only  finitely  many  members.  Much  more  contentiously,  the  classical  (Platonist)  view 
of  the  numbers  suggests  an  infinite  totality  (indeed  a  completed  set)  -  one  with 
infinitely  many  members.  However,  for  the  strict  finitist,  who  will  not  countenance 
talk  of  infinite  numbers,  there  will  obviously  not  be  infinite  totalities  in  this  sense.  A 
strict  finitist  may  well  admit  totalities  that  are  weakly  infinite,  however;  in  precisely 
the  vague  cases  under  discussion. 
Recall  Dummett's  definition  of  "weakly  infinite  and  weakly  finite  totalities". 
To  be  clear,  that  is  totalities  that  are  both  weakly  infinite,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
weakly  finite.  His  definitions  read  as  follows: 
"Let  us  characterise  a  totality  as  'weakly  infinite'  if  there  exists  a  well- 
ordering  of  it  with  no  last  member.  And  let  us  characterise  as  'weakly  finite'  a  totality 
such  that,  for  some  finite  ordinal  n,  there  exists  a  well  ordering  of  it  with  no  nth 
member.  "  I 
The  idea  is  that  such  a  totality  may  be  'open-ended',  in  the  sense  that  there  is 
no  last  member,  and  yet  'bounded-above',  such  that there  is  a  point  which  it  certainly 
does  not  reach.  As  I  have  already  indicated,  it  is  the  contention  then  of  both  Dummett 
and  Addis  that  a  totality  that  is both  weakly  finite  and  weakly  infinite  (and  hence  the 
strict  finitary  totalities  among  them)  cannot  really  be  coherent.  Both  suggest  (Addis 
1  Durnmett,  'Wang's  Paradox',  p.  312 
128 explicitly,  Dummett  implicitly)  that  the  notion  of  weakly  finite  cannot  be  held 
simultaneously  with  the  notion  of  weakly  infinite.  As  I  have  suggested,  the  principle 
aim  of  this  chapter  will  be  to  establish  that  certainly  Addis'  conclusion,  but  also,  I 
maintain,  Dummett's,  rests  upon  a  mistaken  interpretation  of  these  notions,  and  a 
simple  fallacy  of  equivocation.  I  shall  begin  with  Addis. 
A 
.7  .1  aais'charge  ofInconsistency 
Addis  opens  his  argument  with  what  he  describes  as  the  Wittgenstinian 
distinction  between  'intensional'  and  'extensional'  specification,  although  this  is 
evidently  an  inaccurate  attribution,  as  the  idea  is  already  found  in  Russell's  Principles 
ofMathematics  (1903).  The  distinction  itself  requires  a  little  additional  definition 
before  we  proceed.  In  Addis'  words: 
"An  'intensional  specification  of  a  set'  is  one  in  which  a  rule  is  given  for 
generating  the  set,  or  some  general  characteristic  for  set  membership.  An  'extensional 
specification'  is  one  that  consists  in  giving  a  list  of  its  members.  "  2 
The  reservation  I  have  expressed  towards  talking  about  sets  and  not  totalities 
need  not  affect  the  discussion  here,  I  think  -I  take  it  that  the  strict  finitist  will  accept 
everything  that  Addis  says  about  (and  is  able  to  establish  with  regard  to)  sets  in  the 
present  discussion  as  holding  for  totalities  as  well. 
Addis  argues  that  since  we  can  give  only  intensional  definitions  of  infinite 
sets,  a  weakly  infinite  set  must  therefore  be  specified  intensionally.  Addis  also  seems 
to  suggest  that  in  general,  a  finite  set  may  not  be  specified  simply  intensionally: 
"A  finite  set  ...  can  be  listed  and  it  is  insignificant  that  the  list  is  not,  or  could 
not  be  governed  by  any  specific  rules.  "  3 
2  Addis,  'Surveyability  and  the  sorites  paradox'  p.  159 
3  ibid. 
129 To  be  fair  to  Addis,  he  does  acknowledge  that  we  can  sometimes  give 
intensional  specifications  of  finite  sets,  but  believes  this  is  only  possible  when,  as  he 
describes,  the  intensional  specification  is  equivalent  to  the  extensional  specification: 
"In  the  case  of  finite  sets,  there  will  sometimes  be  a  rule  or  condition  for  set 
membership  that  can  be  specified  extensionally,  that  is,  by  giving  a  list  of  members 
and  the  intensional  specification  of  the  set  is  equivalent  to  the  extensional 
specification".  4 
Weakly  finite  sets  must  therefore,  as  I  understand  Addis  to  be  asserting,  only 
be  specified  wholly  extensionally.  He  further  claims: 
"The  totality  can  be  described  either  in  terms  of  its  finite  or  its  infinite  aspects, 
and  Wittgenstein's  contention  is  that  both  notions  cannot  be  held  at  once.  "  5 
Addis'  argument  is  then  essentially  a  development  of  what  he  takes  to  be  an 
objection  of  Wittgenstein's  against  the  coherence  of  intensional  and  extensional  sets. 
Addis'  contention  is  that  weakly  infinite  sets  (or  totalities)  must  be  specified 
intensionally,  and  weakly  finite  ones  must  be  specified  extensionally.  From  this, 
Addis  arrives  at  the  conclusion  that  since  we  cannot  specify  a  totality  both 
intensionally  and  extensionally  at  the  same  time  (or  in  the  same  'understanding'  -I 
take  this  to  be  the  meaning  of  Addis'  'at  once'),  the  notion  of  a  weakly  finite  but 
weakly  infinite  totality  is  incoherent. 
There  are  one  or  two  objections  to  be  made  about  Addis'  general  reasoning 
here,  before  the  simple  equivocation  is  exposed.  It  certainly  seems  obvious  that  we 
can  give  intensional  specifications  for  finite  sets.  As  I  describe,  Addis  allows  for  this, 
but  only  when  the  intensional  specification  is  equivalent  to  the  extensional.  But  it  is 
not  at  all  clear  firstly  that  the  intensional  specification  of  the  members  of  a  (straight- 
forwardly)  finite  set,  when  available,  is  ever  equivalent  to  the  extensional 
specification.  It  is  not  obvious  what  Addis  intends  to  imply  here  -  from  what  follows 
4  Addis,  p.  159 
5  ibid. 
130 in  his  discussion,  a  plausible  interpretation  of  this  would  be  to  suggest  that  in  the  case 
of  finite  sets,  the  intensional  specification  is  'reducible  to',  or  'actually  is'  the 
extensional.  But  what  conceivable  cases  are  there  in  which  the  intensional 
specification  of  a  finite  set  is  reducible  to  the  extensional?  Perhaps  we  might  allow 
that  if  the  rule  for  set  membership  (and  hence  the  intensional  specification)  was  as 
simple  as  'must  be  one  of  the  numbers  1,2,  or  3',  then  it  can  be  said  to  include  the 
extensional  specification  11,2,3  1;  but  very  rarely,  even  in  extremely  ordinary  finite 
cases,  will  the  intensional  specification  look  like  this.  My  earlier  example  of  'must  be 
a  postgraduate  at  Glasgow  University'  does  not  contain  any  extensional  specification, 
and  indeed  the  intensional  specification  may  be  understood  without  any  grasp  of  the 
extensional  specification. 
Of  course,  the  extensional  and  intensional  specifications  of  a  finite  set  will 
pick  out  the  same  members,  but  Addis  cannot  simply  require  that  the  specifications 
are  co-extensional  in  order  for  them  to  be  equivalent  in  his  sense  -  since  if  this  is  not 
the  case,  the  specifications  are  just  not  of  the  same  set  in  the  first  place. 
Furthermore,  it  just  seems  obvious  that  finite  sets  in  general  may  be  specified 
intensionally,  wholly  independently  of  the  possible  extensional  specification.  Addis' 
own  example,  of  the  prime  numbers  less  than  eighty,  may  be  intensionally  specified  in 
terms  of  a  rule  (or  perhaps  combination  of  rules  -'is  less  than  eighty'  and  'is  a  prime 
number',  for  example)  for  set  membership,  without  our  having  grasped  any 
extensional  specification.  Without  writing  them  down,  and/or  working  them  out,  I 
have  no  direct  connection  with  the  extensional  specification  of  the  set,  although  I 
understand  well  what  is  to  count  as  a  member  of  the  setfrom  the  intensional 
specification. 
Perhaps  Addis'  intention  is  to  suggest  rather  that  finite  sets  may  always  be 
specified  extensionally,  if  occasionally  intensionally,  and  infinite  sets  may  always  be 
specified  intensionally,  and  (presumably)  never  extensionally.  A  more  natural 
demarcation  on  such  an  interpretation  would  then  be  to  suggest  that  finite  sets  may  be 
specified  extensionally,  and  infinite  sets  may  not,  and  that  this  is  the  defining 
difference.  He  does  make  a  broad  statement  in  this  direction: 
131 "There  is  no  extensional  correlate  in  infinite  sets  and  this  is  the  crucial  contrast  with 
finite  sets.  "  6 
However,  it  seems  as  though  Addis,  in  his  discussion  of  Wittgenstein's 
distinction,  is  asserting  something  further  -  not  that  simply  the  extensional 
specification  'belongs'  in  this  way  to  finite  sets,  but  that  intensional  specification 
belongs,  in  a  corresponding  sense,  to  infinite  sets.  As  long  as  finite  sets  may  be 
specified  intensionally,  as  surely  they  may,  this  belonging  does  not  seem  equivalent 
(since  in  the  finite  case  it  is  exclusive,  but  not  in  the  infinite).  Indeed,  for  Addis' 
argument  to  progress,  he  must  require  this  stronger  demarcation  -  his  argument  rests 
upon  the  idea  that  since  we  cannot  hold  an  intensional  and  extensional  specification  of 
a  totality  simultaneously,  (as  Wittgenstein  describes),  and  that  since  a  finite  totality 
must  be  specified  extensionally  and  an  infinite  totality  intensionally,  we  may  conclude 
that  the  notion  of  a  (weakly)  finite  but  (weakly)  infinite  totality  is  incoherent. 
Obviously,  if  Addis  allows  that  finite  sets  may  be  specified  intensionally,  then  the 
conclusion  does  not  follow  -  we  may  give  a  purely  intensional  specification  of  a 
(weakly)  finite  and  (weakly)  infinite  totality. 
What  Addis  has  not  shown  is  that  finite  sets  must  be  specified  extensionally. 
To  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  the  specifications  conflict,  he  must  show  not  only,  as  I 
believe  he  does,  that  there  can  be  no  extensional  specification  for  an  infinite  set,  but 
also,  as  he  does  not,  that  specification  of  a  finite  set  necessarily  involves  extensional 
specification. 
One  final  possible  reading  of  Addis  might  suggest  the  following  interpretation. 
Perhaps  Addis'  point  is  that  finite  sets  possess  the  property  of  (or  always  have  the 
capacity  for)  being  extensionally  specified,  whereas  infinite  sets  do  not  possess  that 
property  (or  have  the  capacity). 
This  suggestion  is  also  supported  by  the  claim,  quoted  above,  that  "[t]here  is 
no  extensional  correlate  in  infinite  sets  and  this  is  the  crucial  contrast  with  finite  sets.  " 
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the  same  quality,  a  (weakly)  infinite  and  (weakly)  finite  totality  is  incoherent. 
But  here,  Durnmett's  definition  of  weakly  finite  becomes  very  important.  For 
while  it  seems  intuitively  plausible  that  (strongly,  or  ordinary)  finite  sets  always  admit 
of  extensional  specification,  it  does  not  seem  a  requirement  of  the  definition  "a 
totality  such  that,  for  some  finite  ordinal  n,  there  exists  a  well  ordering  of  it  with  no 
nth  member"  that  it  be  always  possible  to  provide  extensional  specification  for  such  a 
totality.  Indeed,  to  insist  that  it  does  is  precisely  to  ignore  the  kind  of  paradigm 
examples  that  gave  rise  to  the  definition  in  the  first  place;  for  example,  Addis  also 
refers  to  the  totality  of  heartbeats  in  one's  childhood.  Is  it  even  intuitive  now  that  such 
a  totality,  while  surely  weakly  finite,  admits  of  extensional  specification?  Surely  not. 
The  essential  mistake,  then,  that  Addis  makes  in  drawing  his  conclusion  is  that 
the  terms  'finite'  and  'weakly  finite'  are  interchangeable.  If  his  argument  is  intended 
to  prove  that  infinite  sets  cannot  be  finite  sets,  it  seems  trivial  -  such  a  distinction  we 
might  think  merely  implicit  in  the  definitions  of  finite  and  infinite.  But  it  appears  -  in 
order  for  his  conclusion  to  follow  -  that  he  has  simply  failed  to  notice  the 
discrepancies  between  simply  finite  and  weakly  finite  sets.  Assuredly,  all  (well- 
ordered)  finite  sets  will  be  weakly  finite.  However,  it  is  something  else  entirely  to 
assert  that  all  weakly  finite  sets  will  be  finite  in  the  normal  sense;  if  this  was  also  the 
case,  what  use  could  Durnmett's  definition  serve?  A  set  is  (simply)  finite  if  its 
members  can  be  correlated  I  -I  with  the  natural  (finite)  numbers  up  to  n  for  some  n. 
And  this  will  entail  that  the  set  is  weakly  finite  also.  But  the  converse  does  not  hold  - 
being  weakly  finite  does  not  entail  being  finite.  Moreover,  it  seems  as  though  the 
paradigm  cases  of  weakly  finite  but  weakly  infinite  totalities  are  precisely  the  kind  of 
cases  that  are  not  finite  in  the  usual  sense,  and  certainly  do  not  admit  of  extensional 
specification  (the  number  of  heartbeats  in  my  childhood,  for  example).  But  without 
the  important  assumption  that  weakly  finite  sets  are  also  finite  in  a  more  general 
sense,  Addis'  argument  fails  to  proceed.  Addis'  conclusion  begins  as  follows: 
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consistently  this  means  that  a  set  cannot  be  both  finite  and  infinite.  " 
Now,  as  I  have  said,  this  interim  conclusion  might  be  considered  trivial.  I  have 
expressed  some  concern  already  about  the  stark  polarity  Addis  attributes  to 
intensional  and  extensional  specifications  regarding  infinite  and  finite  sets 
respectively,  but  even  if  we  grant  this,  the  conclusion  is  nothing  more  than  that  'a  set 
cannot  be  both  finite  and  infinite'.  But  we  might  think  this  is  a  definitive  property  of 
finite  and  infinite  sets,  at  least  from  the  kind  of  definition  proposed  by  Dedekind  that 
a  set  is  infinite  if  and  only  if  it  can  be  mapped  in  one  to  one  correspondence  with  a 
proper  subset  of  itself,  and  finite  otherwise.  However,  Addis  continues: 
"Since  the  intensional  and  extensional  specifications  of  the  totality  conflict,  the 
argument  shows  that  it  is  impossible  to  describe  coherently  a  weakly  finite,  but 
weakly  infinite,  totality.  "  8 
Here  the  equivocation  is  exposed.  The  intensional  and  extensional 
specifications  of  afinite  but  infinite  totality  conflict,  but  that  says  nothing  about 
weakly  finite  but  weakly  infinite  totalities  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  all  weakly  finite 
totalities  must  be  finite  totalities  in  the  general  sense  (and  similarly  for  weakly  infinite 
and  'genuinely'  infinite  totalities).  And  this  Addis  has  certainly  not  shown  -  nor  does 
the  task  look  like  a  promising  one. 
Dummett'S  charge  ofInconsistency 
I  shall  turn  my  attention  next  to  Dummett's  discussion  of  strict  finitism,  from 
which  we  may  draw  his  reasons  for  believing  that  there  is  a  general  inconsistency  in 
the  kind  of  totalities  we  are  discussing.  It  is  my  aim  to  show  that  Dummett  is  guilty  of 
an  essentially  similar  equivocation  to  Addis,  despite  the  fact  that  Dummett  has 
undoubtedly  provided  us  with  useful  definitions  of  'weakly  infinite'  and  'weakly 
7  Addis,  p.  160 
8  ibid. 
134 finite'.  There  is  a  sense  here  in  which  Dummett  appears  to  overlook  the  importance  of 
his  own  definition. 
Firstly,  Dummett  suggests,  as  I  have  said,  that  strict  finitism  must  be 
committed  to  weakly  infinite  and  weakly  finite  totalities,  because  it  is  committed  to 
the  idea  that: 
Ca  vague  expression  may  have  a  completely  specific,  albeit  vague,  sense;  and 
therefore  there  will  be  a  single  specific  totality  which  is  the  extension  of  a  vague 
predicate.  '  9 
Certainly  strict  finitism  as  traditionally  advanced  will  not  balk  at  such  a 
suggestion.  However,  Dummett,  like  Addis,  suggests  that  there  is  a  tension  between 
these  two  properties  -  'weakly  infinite'  and  'weakly  finite'  -  because,  as  he  appears  to 
assume,  'weakly  infinite'  is  equivalent  to  'closed  under  the  successor  operation'.  On 
the  face  of  it,  this  looks  to  be  a  different  objection.  Let  us  see  how  Dummett  discovers 
the  tension. 
Dummett  asserts  that  it  is  a  necessary  feature  of  weakly  infinite  totalities  that 
they  should  not  have  a  determinate  number  of  members.  His  argument  here  is 
convincing,  and  indeed  the  assertion  seems  undeniable.  It  is  precisely  this  element  of 
the  kind  of  totalities  (and  corresponding  predicates)  that  provide  us  with  our 
interesting  examples.  But  this,  he  continues, 
'should  lead  us  to  doubt  whether  saying  that  a  totality  is  closed  under  a 
successor-operation  is  really consistent  with  saying  that  it  is  weakly  finite  [i.  e.  that  it 
has  an  upper  bound]'.  10 
Dummett  has  previously  however  made  no  mention  of  a  totality  that  is  closed 
under  the  successor  operation,  and  since  the  suggested  conflict  is  between  weakly 
itifinite  and  weakly  finite,  we  must  assume  that  he  simply  presupposes  at  this  point 
Dummett,  p.  313 
Dummett,  p.  318 
135 that  a  weakly  infinite  totality  necessarily  is  closed  under  the  successor  operation.  He 
immediately  precedes  the  last  quote  with: 
'the  definition  of  "weakly  infinite  totality"  specified  that  such  a  totality  should 
not  have  a  last  member:  whereas,  if  a  totality  has  exactly  n  members,  then  its  nth 
member  is  the  last.  '  II 
Durnmett's  controversial  move  then  is  to  reason  from  this  plausible  statement 
to  the  conclusion  that  a  totality  which  is  not  closed  under  the  successor  operation  must 
have  a  last  member.  Presumably  the  thought  behind  the  assumption  is  that  if  a 
sequence  of  numbers  is  not  closed  under  the  successor  operation,  there  must  come  a 
point  at  which  you  cannot  add  one  to  n;  and  in  that  case,  of  course,  n  is  the  last 
member.  So  unless  the  totality  is  closed  under  the  successor  operation,  it  must  have  a 
last  member.  A  weakly  finite  totality,  by  definition,  is  not  closed  under  the  successor 
operation,  and  hence,  by  the  above  assumption,  it  must  have  a  last  member.  But  a 
weakly  infinite  totality  is  such,  as  we  remember,  that  there  exists  a  well-ordering  of  it 
with  no  last  member  (and  hence  it  must  be  closed  under  the  successor  operation).  The 
two  definitions  are  in  conflict. 
This  then,  I  take  it,  is  Durnmett's  attempt  to  establish  inconsistency  for  weakly 
infinite  and  weakly  finite  totalities.  A  weakly  finite  totality  is  bounded-above,  but  a 
totality  which  is  bounded-above  is  not  closed  under  the  successor  operation.  A  totality 
cannot  therefore  be  both  weakly  finite  and  weakly  infinite,  since  to  be  weakly  infinite 
is  to  be  closed  under  the  successor  operation. 
However,  I  wish  to  argue  that  it  is  simply  not  the  case  that  'weakly  infinite'  is 
equivalent  to  'closed  under  the  successor  operation'.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  precisely 
because  it  is  not  equivalent  that  such  totalities  are  characterised  as  weakly  infinite,  for 
surely  only  'ordinary'  infinite  sets  will  be  closed  under  the  successor  operation.  12 
Dummett,  in  a  similar  manner  to  Addis  with  respect  to  'finite',  has  failed  to  properly 
distinguish  between  'infinite'  and  'weakly  infinite'. 
11  ibid. 
12  Indeed,  the  point  is  stronger  still  -  for  under  a  strict  finitist  banner,  the  term  'closed  under  the 
successor  operation'  will  apply  to  no  totalities. 
136 Durnmett's  argument  is,  however,  at  least  intuitively  convincing,  and  so  is 
worthy  of  further  discussion.  His  mistake  is,  I  believe,  in  assuming  that  there  are  only 
two  options  -  either  a  totality  is  closed  under  the  successor  operation,  in  that  for  every 
n,  if  n  is  a  member  then  n+1  is  a  member,  or  there  is  a  single  determinate  last  member 
such  that  its  successor  is  not  a  member  of  the  totality.  In  short,  the  assertion  is  that  if  a 
totality  is  not  closed  under  the  successor  operation,  then  it  must  have  exactly  n 
members.  Because,  assuredly,  a  totality  that  is  closed  under  the  successor  operation 
(i.  e.  a  'strongly'),  or  ordinary,  infinite  totality)  has  no  last  member,  Dummett  assumes 
that  it  is  therefore  also  true  that  a  totality  with  no  last  member  must  be  closed  under 
the  successor  operation.  But  for  precisely  the  vague  totalities  that  we  are  interested  in, 
this  need  not  be  the  case.  The  sense  in  which  such  totalities  have  no  last  member  is 
not  in  this  strongly  infinite  sense,  but  rather  in  an  (appropriately)  weaker  sense  -  they 
have  no  last  member  because  there  is  no  precise  last  member;  and  not  because  their 
membership  is  infinite  in  number.  The  members  of  such  totalities  may  be  (rather 
imprecisely)  imagined  as  'fading  out);  for  this  is  exactly  the  notion  of  vagueness  at 
play  here.  There  is  no  candidate  for  last  membership  because  the  totality  has  no  sharp 
end.  13 
Let  me  offer  an  example  before  I  move  on  to  a  discussion  of  the  correct  strict 
finitary  formulation  of  'no  last  member'.  If  we  take  an  ordinary  view  of  colour,  it 
seems  to  us  as  though  there  must  be  definite  cut  off  points  between  colours,  unless  we 
are  to  fall  into  the  kind  of  inconsistency  proposed  by  Dummett  for  such  cases  (recall 
the  discussion  of  the  previous  two  chapters).  Indeed,  given  an  epistemicist  reading  of 
vagueness,  there  is  philosophical  justification  behind  the  idea  that  there  are  sharp  cut- 
off  points  between  colours,  although  we  are  unable  to  recognise  them.  Hence,  if  we 
take  the  'vague  region'  between  blue  and  green,  we  might  be  tempted  to  say  that  a 
shade  must  be  either  blue  or  green,  and  not  both.  Blue  and  green  are  just  such  colours, 
however,  that  give  rise  to  an  interesting  situation  at  the  boundary  -  we  have  a  third 
identifiable  colour,  Turquoise,  which  it  seems  to  us,  at  least  on  an  inforinal  reading,  to 
be  both  (and  perhaps  neither)  blue  and  green.  In  fact,  I  can  give  no  better  definition  of 
"  One  possible  source  of  confusion  regarding  the  problem  is  the  equivocation  for  many  philosophers 
and  mathematicians  between  'totality'  and  'set';  but  presumably,  Dummett  has  (rightly)  avoided  the 
term  'set'  because  it  is  not  possible  to  conceive  of  such  totalities  as  sets,  for  the  very  reason  that  sets 
have  sharp  barriers  to  membership.  This  should  come  as  no  great  surprise  -  the  finitist  (even  in  a  loose 
sense,  e.  g.  intuitionists)  will  reject  much  of  the  talk  of  set  theory  anyway. 
137 turquoise  than  that.  Now,  the  episternicist  (and  indeed  the  informal  view)  may  wish 
to  hold  that  there  is  simply  a  further  cut  off  between  blue  and  turquoise,  and  likewise 
between  turquoise  and  green.  However,  to  the  extent  at  least  in  which  turquoise  is 
both  blue  and  green,  it  does  not  seem  determinate  which  shades  properly  belong  to  the 
totality  'blue',  and  which  properly  belong  to  the  totality  'green'.  It  is  clear  that  Blue  is 
not  Green,  and  so  the  totality  of,  say,  blue  shades  clearly  does  not  contain  some  green 
shades.  But  it  does  seem  to  contain  some  (or  even  all)  of  the  turquoise  shades.  The 
turquoise  shades  are  however  only  vaguely  members  of  the  totality  of  blue  shades  - 
they  are  neither  exactly  in  nor  exactly  out. 
The  precise  entailments  of  the  required  semantics  for  such  vague  regions  I 
shall  explore  in  due  course;  but  for  now  let  us  be  explicit  about  the  rejection  of 
Durnmett's  reasoning  as  I  have  begun  to  present  it  here. 
The  strict  finitist  is  committed  to  the  claim  that there  is  no  last  member,  to  the 
extent: 
--,  3X  (S(X)  A  --,  S(X')) 
(where  x'  is  the  successor  to  x  in  a  well-ordering  of  the  totality  of  objects  to 
which  the  vague  predicate  S  applies) 
but  will  resist  the  classical  equivalence  Dummett  assumes,  to  the  extent: 
Vx  (S(X)  ->  S(X')) 
The  classical  equivalence  proceeds  as  follows: 
--,  3X  (S(X)  A  --iS(X')) 
VX 
-, 
(S(X)  A  --iS(X')) 
vx  (S(X) 
-+ 
S(X')) 
But  the  derivation  here  relies  upon  the  law  of  excluded  middle,  and  the  strict  finitist,  I 
suggest,  will  want  to  employ  only  constructively  acceptable  logical  principles. 
138 Remember  that,  in  the  current  context,  Durnmett's  charge  of  inconsistency  rests  upon 
the  claim  that  either  there  is  a  last  member,  or  the  totality  is  closed  under  the 
successor  operation.  What  the  strict  finitist  will  reject  then  is  not  the  quantifier  shift 
(the  first  step  in  the  above  derivation),  but  the  translation  of  the  con  unction  into  the 
conditional.  The  quantifier  shift  is  constructively  acceptable,  since  if  it  is  true  that 
there  is  nothing  in  the  domain  to  which  the  assertion  applies,  then  it  will  be  true  of  all 
the  things  in  the  domain  that  the  assertion  does  not  apply.  What  the  strict  finitist  will 
resist  is  the  classically  acceptable  translation  of- 
-, 
(S(X)  A  --, 
S(X')) 
into 
(S(x)  ->  S(x')) 
The  reason  for  rejecting  the  translation  is  precisely  the  objection  made  to 
Durnmett's  understanding  of  'no  last  member'.  The  fact  that  there  is  no  determinate 
last  member  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  totality  is  infinite  in 
scope.  The  fact  that  I  cannot  (presumably  in  principle  cannot)  specify  a  determinate 
last  member  of  the  heartbeats  in  my  childhood,  does  not  stop  me  from  asserting  that 
the  totality  'runs  out'  somewhere  in  my  teens.  Now,  it  is  true  that  classical  logic  is 
inadequate  to  deal  with  such  an  intuition,  and  classically,  of  course,  the  conjunction 
and  conditional  offered  just  above  are  equivalent.  Clearly,  in  order  to  properly  explore 
the  suggestion,  we  need  to  offer  an  alternative  logic.  There  are  various  approaches  to 
this,  which  I  shall  explore  fully  in  the  next  chapter,  but  one  possible  solution,  that  I 
raise  here  just  to  illustrate  the  kind  of  response  I  think  is  correct  to  Durnmett's 
challenge  but  that  I  shall  go  on  to  discuss  in  considerable  detail  in  chapter  ten,  is  to 
move  to  a  three-valued  logic:  a  logic  which  uses  three  truth  values  -  True,  False,  and 
Indefinite.  The  reason  for  introducing  a  third  value  is,  I  suspect,  intuitive  in  this  case: 
let  us  postulate  that  there  are  members  of  the  sequence  which  are  indeterminately  part 
of  the  (vague)  totality,  and  that this  is  the  source  of  vagueness.  That  is  to  say,  if  we  are 
considering  any  vague  predicate,  the  predicate  will  be  True  of  some  objects  in  the 
domain,  and  False  of  others;  but  there  will  be  a  third  category  of  objects  for  which  the 
(vague)  predication  is  Indefinite.  In  this,  I  suggest,  lies  the  strict  finitary  interpretation 
of  'no  last  member'  -  it  is  not  that  there  is  no  last  member  because  the  members  of  the 
139 totality  are  inexhaustible,  but  rather  because  there  is  no  one  determinate  last  member, 
and  instead  a  'vague  range'. 
The  response  to  Durnmett's  charge  of  inconsistency  for  weakly  finite  and 
weakly  infinite  totalities,  then,  is  that  'closed  under  the  successor  operation'  is  not  the 
correct  interpretation  of  'weakly  infinite'.  In  fact,  it  is  a  property  (only)  of  strongly 
(that  is,  ordinary)  infinite  totalities,  and  hence  the  identification  with  weakly  infinite 
totalities  is  mistaken,  unless  'weakly  infinite  totalities'  are  reducible  to  'infinite 
totalities'.  If  this  is  the  case,  the  analysis  is  pointless,  as  it  is  clear  that  a  totality  cannot 
be  both  weakly  finite  and  infinite.  But  presumably,  Dummett's  characterisation  of 
'weakly  infinite'  is  intended  to  cover  a  class  of  cases,  among  which  we  may  count  the 
totalities  which  give  rise  to  strict  finitary  predicates,  which  differ  from  the  ordinary 
cases  in  a  significant  respect.  Ultimately,  however,  Durnmett's  analysis  fails  to 
respect  this  difference,  and  as  a  result  is  guilty  of  a  similar  (if  subtler)  equivocation  to 
that  of  Mark  Addis  in  his  discussion  of  weakly  infinite  and  weakly  finite  totalities. 
Dummett  rejects  strict  finitism  on  the  grounds  that  the  predicates  it  endorses 
are  inconsistent  in  application,  but  his  establishment  of  inconsistency  for  these 
predicates  relies  upon  an  equivocation  between  'weakly  infinite'  and  'infinite'  14 
which  the  strict  finitist  can  (and  will)  reject. 
The  Story  sofar 
These  remarks  conclude  the  second  part  of  this  thesis.  In  the  final  part,  I  shall 
attempt  to  give  a  rigorous  definition  of  the  kind  of  semantics  required  by  the  rejection 
suggested  here,  and  to  test  such  a  solution  in  a  wider  context.  I  shall  also  move  on  to 
look  at  alternative  formulations  for  strict  finitism,  following  my  earlier  remark  that  it 
is  not  obvious  that  a  strict  finitist  must  be  committed  to  the  notion  of  weakly  finite 
and  weakly  infinite  totalities  in  the  first  place. 
14  Or,  at  least,  between  'weakly  infinite'  and  'closed  under  the  successor  operation';  but  since  the  latter 
is  a  property  only  of  infinite  totalities,  the  equivocation  amounts  to  the  same. 
140 In  part  two,  we  have  identified  vagueness  as  the  principle  obstacle  for  strict 
finitism  as  a  foundational  theory  for  mathematics,  but  I  have  also  rejected  a  number  of 
problems  that  have  been  suggested  along  these  lines.  While  vagueness  still  remains  a 
potentially  troublesome  issue,  the  problems  I  have  discussed  here  do  not  seem  as 
immediately  fatal  to  the  theory  as  the  objectors  intended.  Firstly,  there  is  no  special 
problem  over  what  Addis'  referred  to  as  the  'psychological  and  epistemological' 
elements  of  Surveyability  -  the  complication  that  surveyability  is  determined  not  only 
by  the  objects  to  be  surveyed  but  also  by  the  abilities  of  surveyors  has  been  shown 
only  to  be  an  additional  source  of  vagueness,  rather  than  a  contradiction  in  itself. 
Moreover,  we  have  seen  that  the  charges  of  inconsistency  based  on  a  commitment  to 
Weakly  Finite  and  Weakly  Infinite  totalities  may  be  rejected,  and  that  there  need  be 
no  inherent  inconsistency  in  the  strict  finitist  recognising  the  Sorites  paradox.  Perhaps 
the  most  crucial  observation  here  is  that  endorsed  by  Wright's  analysis:  that  the 
presence  of  vagueness  in  the  strict  finitist  theory  is  insufficient  to  reject  the  theory  in 
itself  -  otherwise  the  presence  of  vague  predicates  in  natural  language  might  call  for  a 
similar  rejection. 
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As  we  have  seen,  Dummett's  attempt  to  establish  the  inconsistency  of  weakly 
finite  and  weakly  infinite  totalities  rests  upon  the  assumption  that  the  strict  finitist,  and 
indeed  perhaps  anyone  attempting  to  provide  a  coherent  answer  to  the  sorites  paradox, 
must  rely  upon  classical  logic  in  order  to  derive  a  solution.  As  Dummett  suggests,  such  a 
solution  does  not  look  promising,  as  any  formulation  of  the  totalities  he  discusses  within 
a  classical  framework  apparently  entails  a  contradiction,  since  as  we  have  seen,  the 
weakly  infinite  requirement: 
(1)  -3x(S(X)  A  -S(X')) 
entails  (classically): 
(2)  Vx  (S(x)  ->  S(x')) 
which  is  straightforwardly  inconsistent  with  the  weaklyfinite  requirement  when 
used  as  a  premise  in  a  Sorites  type  argument. 
But,  as  I  have  already  suggested,  it  is  not  clear  that  a  strict  finitist  (nor,  again, 
anyone  attempting  to  find  a  viable  solution  to  Sorites  paradoxes)  is  bound  to  use  classical 
logic.  One  of  the  apparent  advantages  of  the  epistemic  response  to  vagueness  is  that  it 
requires  no  revision  of  the  logic,  but  it  is  nonetheless  only  one  competing  theory  in  many. 
It  should  also  perhaps  be  of  little  surprise  that  classical  logic  is  insufficient  to  support  the 
strict  finitary  case  -  intuitionism,  after  all,  requires  an  extensive  revision  of  the  logic,  and 
strict  finitism  is,  in  some  sense  at  least,  more  demanding  than  intuitionism. 
The  focus  of  this  chapter  will  therefore  be  an  examination  of  alternative  logics  for 
the  strict  finitist.  I  begin  with  a  look  at  intuitionistic  logic,  but  will  quickly  describe  the 
need  to  move  to  a  three-valued  logic,  which  I  shall  also  present.  I  argue  that  a  three- 
143 valued  logic  is  sufficient  to  reject  Dummett's  charge  of  inconsistency,  and  outline  the 
rejection  here  also.  I  shall  finish  the  chapter  with  an  acknowledgement  that  three-valued 
logic  suffers  from  a  problem  known  as  'higher-order  vagueness',  and  prepare  the  ground 
for  a  proper  assessment  of  the  issue  in  the  next  chapter. 
Weaklyfinite  and  weakly  infinite  totalities  and  Intuitionistic  logic 
Following  the  observation  that  some  revision  to  the  logic  is required  in  order  to 
avoid  Dummett's  troubling  conclusion  regarding  the  consistency  of  weakly  finite  and 
weakly  infinite  totalities  as  he  defines  them,  a  natural  step  would  be  to  consider  whether 
intuitionistic  logic,  as  an  existing  system,  will  be  sufficient  to  defend  such  totalities 
against  the  criticisms  levelled  by  Dummett.  Although  I  have  already  hinted  at  the  need  for 
(at  least)  a  trivalent  logic,  we  might  be  spared  such  enquiry  if  the  existing  intuitionistic 
programme  proved  robust  enough  for  the  purpose.  Let  us  then  initially  take  a  more 
cautious  step  forward,  and  examine  the  case  for  an  intuitionistic  solution,  without  resort 
to  a  three-  (or  indeed  many-)  valued  logic. 
At  first  glance,  intuitionistic  logic  seems  well  equipped  to  resist  Durnmett's 
classical  contradiction  -  since  under  intuitionistic  logic  we  are  not  entitled  to  pass  from 
the  truth  of  (1)  above,  to  the  second  claim  (2).  Let  us  recall  the  classical  derivation  of  the 
equivalence,  as  I  outlined  it  in  a  previous  chapter: 
--13X  (S(X)  A  -S(X')) 
VX  -(S(X)  A  -S(X')) 
Vx  (S(X)  ->  S(X')) 
Now,  I  suggested  in  Chapter  Eight  that  the  strict  finitist  will  object  to  the  move 
from  the  negated  conjunction  to  the  conditional,  and  not  to  the  quantifier  shift.  This 
stands  well  in  line  with  the  intuitionistic  logic.  Under  such  logic,  the  quantifier  shift  is 
144 ýU  is  allowable%  so  insofar  as  the  first  step  of  the  derivation  is  concerned,  intuitionistic  logic 
in  accord  with  classical  logic.  Where  intuitionistic  logic  will  diverge  is  at  precisely  the 
point  where  I  suggested  the  strict  finitist  should  object  to  the  classical  logic,  over  the  shift 
from  the  negated  conjunction  to  the  conditional.  This  equivalence  is  not  provable 
intuitionistically;  and  thus  intuitionistic  logic  provides  us  with  a  way  of  resisting 
Dummett's  argument  for  inconsistency,  at  least  as  it  is  presented.  Since  we  cannot  pass 
from  (1)  to  (2)  above  without  recourse  to  the  principle  of  bivalence,  we  are  not  entitled  to 
the  conclusion,  and  hence  do  not  in  this  way  derive  a  simple  contradiction  from  the 
definitions  of  'weakly  finite'  and  'weakly  infinite'. 
However,  although  Dummett  himself  makes  no  case  against  an  intuitionistic 
response  to  the  problem,  there  is  a  way  to  reformulate  the  problem  in  a  way  that  is 
2 
consistent  with  intuitionistic  logic,  such  that  it  remains  problematic  for  any  such  account  . 
The  reformulation  relies  upon  a  form  of  the  Intuitionistic  Least  Number  Principle. 
The  classical  version  of  the  Least  Number  Principle  amounts  to  the  following  stipulation: 
if  the  number  I  has  a  certain  property  A  and  a  larger  number  n  does  not,  then  there  must 
be  a  least  number  among  the  set  of  numbers  between  1  and  n  which  does  not  possess  the 
property  A.  Or: 
A(l) 
3n  -A(n) 
3x  (A(x)A-A(x')) 
1  Although  one  must  be  careftil  with  quantifiers  under  intuitionistic  logic,  since  the  construction  of  a  proof 
to  the  effect  of  establishing  the  translation  is  only  available  in  some  cases,  and  not  in  others.  The  move  from 
-3x  A(x)  to  Vx  -A(x)  is  allowed,  but  the  move  from  -3x  -A(x)  to  Vx  A(x)  fails.  This  is  not  because  the 
quantifier  shift  from  -3x  to  Vx  -  fails  (the  shift  from  -3x  -A(x)  to  Vx  --A(x)  is  acceptable)  but  rather 
because  double  negation  elimination  is  required  to  take  us  from  Vx  -A(x)  (the  proper  intuitionistic 
equivalent  in  this  case),  to  Vx  A(x). 
21  am  grateful  to  Dr  Patrick  Greenough  (Univ.  of  St.  Andrews)  for  the  observation,  and  indeed  the  structure 
of  the  argument  that  follows,  to  the  extent  that  intuitionistic  logic  is  not  sufficient  to  dispel  the  objection. 
145 This  follows  of  course  from  the  idea  that  either  A(n)  or  -A(n)  must  hold  for  every 
n:  because  there  is  at  least  one  number  in  the  set  which  does  possess  the  property,  and  at 
least  one  which  does  not,  all  the  others  must  fall  into  one  or  other  category.  Hence,  there 
must  be  a  least  number  among  those  which  fall  into  the  category  of  not  possessing  the 
property.  As  such,  the  classical  least  number  principle  (CLNP)  therefore  rests  upon  the 
law  of  excluded  middle,  and  so  it  is  invalid  under  intuitionistic  logic.  However,  there  is 
an  intuitionistic  version  of  the  least  number  principle,  which  does  not  rely  upon  the  law  of 
excluded  middle.  It  makes  a  weaker  claim  than  the  CLNP,  but  it  is  nonetheless 
problematic  for  the  case  currently  under  consideration.  We  may express  the  Intuitionistic 
least  number  principle  (ILNP)  as  follows: 
A(l) 
3n  -A(n) 
--i--,  3x  (A(x)A-A(x')) 
So,  the  ILNP  asserts  instead  that  if  the  number  1  has  a  certain  property  A  and  a 
larger  number  n  does  not,  then  it  is  notfalse  that  there  is  a  least  number  among  the  set  of 
numbers  between  I  and  n  which  does  not  possess  the  property  A.  (Since  the  argument 
that  follows  will  return  to  the  notion  of  surveyability,  I  shall  from  here  on  re-substitute  for 
the  general  property  'A(x)'  the  predication  'is  Surveyable',  'S(x)'): 
SM 
3n  -S(n) 
--1-3X  (S(X)  A  -S(X'))  (4)  (IILNP) 
The  principle  is  problematic  for  our  account  of  Surveyability  in  the  following 
way.  The  first  premise  we  may  of  course  assume,  and  is  not  at  all  in  dispute  -  i.  e.  that  one 
is  a  member  of  the  totality  (of  surveyable  numbers);  and  the  second  premise  is  simply 
equivalent  to  the  previously  accepted  definition  for  weakly  finite  -  that  is,  that  the  totality 
is  bounded  above,  such  that  one  can  specify  a  number(-candidate)  which  is  not  a  member 
146 of  the  totality.  And  so  it  seems  as  if  we  are  intuitionistically  entitled  to  draw  the 
conclusion  (4).  Now,  although  the  conclusion  (4)  won't  collapse  into  the  classical 
equivalent: 
3x  (S(x)A-S(x'))  (CLNP) 
it  is  nonetheless  (intuitionistically)  still  in  contradiction  with  the  strict  finitary 
definition  of  weakly  infinite  (that  of  'no  last  member')  provided  in  the  last  chapter.  This 
was  of  course: 
-3X  (S(X)  A  -S(X')) 
So  it  seems  that,  while  intuitionistic  logic  is  able  to  resist  the  classical  charge  that 
Dummett  poses,  it  is  itself  insufficient  to  provide  a  natural  solution  to  the  general 
problem  -  which  is  that  the  definitions  of  'weakly  infinite'  and  'weakly  finite'  seem 
incompatible  and  are  logically  contradictory.  We  must  therefore  return  instead  to  a 
discussion  I  began  briefly  at  the  close  of  the  last  chapter,  and  investigate  the  potential  of 
multi-valued  logic  systems. 
The  many-valued  approach 
I  have  already  mentioned  more  than  one  multi-valued  logic,  and  I  should  perhaps 
offer  a  brief  account  of  the  distinctions  between  models.  I  outlined  in  Chapter  Six  the 
'degree  theory  of  truth'  approach  to  vagueness,  and  noted  there  the  commitment  therein 
to  a  multi-valued  logic.  In  fact,  I  also  suggested  that  a  degree  theoretic  account  looked 
unpromising  for  a  strict  finitist,  not  least  because  it  is  committed  to  a  very  fine-gained 
notion  of  'degee',  and  an  (at  least  potentially)  infinite  number  of  values.  In  the  last 
chapter,  I  began  to  sketch  a  different  multi-valued  approach,  using  only  the  (three)  values 
True,  False,  and  Indefinite.  So  how  many  values  is  enough? 
147 The  question  is  actually  rather  a  tricky  one,  and  save  for  rejecting  the  answer 
'infinitely  many',  I  shall  defer  answering  the  question  for  the  present,  and  return  to  it 
shortly.  What  is  apparent,  however,  is  that  further  to  a  rejection  of  infinitely-valued 
logics,  the  strict  finitist  must,  I  think,  and  for  obviously  similar  reasons,  be  careful  also 
not  to  appeal  to  unsurveyably-many-valued  logics.  To  avoid  unnecessary  complication 
then,  it  seems  prima  facie  preferable  to  have  as  few  as  possible,  and  indeed  a  specifiable 
amount.  Hence,  for  much  of  what  follows  here,  I  shall  be  investigating  the  potential  of  a 
trivalent  (three-valued)  logic,  but  I  will  also  give  some  attention  to  the  possibility  of  a 
'surveyably-finite'-valued  logic. 
A  Three-valued  approach 
A  trivalent  logic,  then,  introduces  a  third  truth-value.  The  truth  functionality  of  the 
classical  operators  (and  corresponding  truth-tables)  must  be  revised  to  accommodate  this 
third  value.  The  idea  of  a  trivalent  logic  is  not  particularly  new  3_  and  the  by-now 
standard  term  for  the  third  value  in  the  literature  is  'Indefinite'.  Any  proposition  will  take 
one  of  three  truth-values:  true,  false,  or  indefinite.  So  what  are  the  candidates  for 
statements  with  indefinite  truth-value?  Presumably  the  paradigm  vague  cases  we  are 
interested  in.  Take  for  example  the  predicate  'is  tall'.  Now  it  certainly  looks  true  to  say  of 
some  people,  say,  those  over  six  feet,  that  they  are  tall.  Equally,  there  are  certainly  people 
of  whom  it  would  be  false  to  say  that  they  are  tall  -  say,  those  who  are  less  than  five  feet 
in  height.  But  now,  it  may  well  be  that  it  is  simply  inappropriate  to  assert,  of  many  of  the 
remaining  people,  that  they  are  tall,  or  that  they  are  not  tall.  In  such  cases,  it  may  well  be 
neither  true  nor  false  to  say  that  someone  of,  say,  5  feet  10  inches  is  tall.  Indeed,  it  may 
look  as  though  it  is  as  true  to  say  that  they  are  tall,  as  to  say  that  they  are  not  tall.  This 
may  give  us  a  useful  model  with  which  to  define  the  negation  operator. 
3  Kleene  presents  a  comprehensive,  if  technically  concentrated  overview  in  his  1952  book  Introduction  to 
Metamathematics  (c.  f.  pp.  332-40).  The  truth  tables  presented  here  are  essentially  the  same  as  those  he 
presents 
148 Let  us  take  this  as  a  definition  of  the  truth  value  of  the  negation  operator  in 
trivalent  logic:  the  negation  of  any  statement  is  false  if  the  original  statement  was  trueý 
true  if  it  was  false,  and  indefinite  if  it  was  indefinite.  Notice  that  the  classical  results  are 
preserved  for  cases  involving  only  true  or  false  statements,  but  where  indefinite 
statements  are  involved,  we  may  have  further  statements  with  indefinite  truth-values.  This 
is  represented  below: 
p  --Ip 
Thus  the  classical  truth  values  are  preserved  for  the  values  true  and  false,  but 
indefinite  statements  introduce  a  new  level  of  complexity  into  the  logic.  Notice  also  that 
the  negation  of  an  indefinite  statement  is itself  indefinite.  This  follows  from  the  example  I 
provided  above  -  if  there  are  some  people  of  whom  it  is indefinite  to  say  that  they  are  tall, 
it  may  well  be  (and  seems  likely  that  it  is)  just  as  indefinite  to  say  that  they  are  not  tall. 
The  same  adjustment  of  truth  values  for  statements  involving  indefinite 
components  holds  for  all  of  the  classical  connectives.  Consider  the  case  of  conjunction; 
intuitively,  if  I  say  of  two  people  that  they  are  tall,  i.  e.  I  assert  that  A  is  tallAB  is  tall, 
then  it  will  clearly  be  false  if  one  of  them  is  obviously  not  tall,  and  true  if  both  of  them 
are  obviously  tall,  but  if  one  or  both  of  them  lies  within  the  indefinite  range  and  neither  is 
false,  it  seems  as  though  the  truth  value  of  the  conjunction  will  be  similarly  indefinite.  So, 
a  conjunction  will  be  true  when  both  its  conjuncts  are  true,  false  when  either  is  false,  and 
indefinite  otherwise: 
PAQ 
Q 
I 
T  T  I  F 
P  I  I  I  F 
F  F  F  F 
149 Similarly  for  disjunction:  a  disjunction  will  be  true  when  either  of  its  disjuncts  is 
true,  false  if  they  are  both  false,  and  indefinite  otherwise: 
PVQ 
Q 
T.  I  F 
T  T 
I 
F 
And  finally,  a  conditional  will  be  false  when  the  antecedent  is  true  and  the 
consequent  false,  true  when  both  antecedent  and  consequent  are  true  or  when  the 
antecedent  is  false,  and  indefinite  otherwise. 
T 
I 
F 
The  assignments  of  the  values  here  might  look  a  little  odd  at  points,  so  let  me  take 
a  moment  to  justify  them  4.  Firstly,  consider  the  case  when  the  antecedent  is  false  and  the 
consequent  is  indefinite.  The  classical  parallel  suggests  that  if  the  antecedent  is  false,  the 
conditional  is  (vacuously)  true  whatever  the  truth  value  of  the  consequent.  This  seems 
intuitive,  in  fact:  since  the  ordinary  (classical)  case  for  the  (vacuous)  truth  of  any 
conditional  when  the  antecedent  is  false  rests  upon  the  idea  that,  for  example,  if  the  sea  is 
dry  then  [anything],  because  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  sea  is  not  dry.  If  the  ordinary 
explanation  of  the  truth  conditions  is  accurate,  then  it  looks  equally  plausible  whatever 
the  actual  truth  value  of  the  consequent,  be  it  true,  false  or  indefinite. 
4 
This  assignment  of  truth  values  also  matches  the  table  you  get  if  you  simply  define  the  conditional  P--4Q 
as  -(PA-Q). 
150 But  now  consider  the  value  assigned  when  the  antecedent  is  indefinite,  and  the 
consequent  true.  Perhaps  we  should  not  be  surprised  by  an  assignment  of  values  under 
which  the  conditional  comes  out  true  whenever  the  consequent  is  true,  following  the 
remarks  above  and  a  similar  analogy  with  the  classical  case  -  after  all,  on  a  classical 
account,  the  conditional  comes  out  true  whenever  the  consequent  is  true;  but  the  model  is 
perhaps  not  so  immediately  intuitive  in  this  case.  It  maybe  objected  that  all  we  can  assert 
in  this  case  is  that  classically,  whenever  the  consequent  is  true,  a  conditional  comes  out 
true  whether  the  antecedent  is  true  or  false,  which  is  not  to  say  it  comes  out  true  whatever 
the  value  of  the  antecedent.  Clearly,  the  conditional  can't  be  false,  but  this  doesn't 
amount  to  the  assertion  that  it  must  be  true  given  a  trivalent  semantics.  The  issue  here 
centres  around  the  precise  definition  of  Indefinite,  on  these  semantics.  Indeed,  under 
different  interpretations,  the  worry  expressed  here  will  spread  to  other  values  of  the  truth 
table.  I  will  discuss  this  issue  in  more  detail  shortly,  but  let  us  take  it  for  now,  for  the 
purpose  of  these  truth  tables,  that  the  indefinite  value  means  something  like  'might  come 
out  true  or  false'  -  in  which  case  the  assigm-nent  of  'true'  to  the  case  where  the  antecedent 
is  indefinite  and  the  consequent  true  seems  correct,  since  whether  the  indefinite 
antecedent  turns  out  true  or  false,  the  conditional  will  remain  true.  Moreover,  the 
assignment  of  truth  values  for  the  conditional  as  presented  here  have  the  advantageous 
feature  that  the  resulting  truth  table  matches  that  of  -P  v  Q,  so  that  we  preserve  the 
equivalence.  Though  not  in  itself  a  motivating  factor,  the  result  is  reassuring. 
Lastly,  with  regard  to  the  assigni-nent  of  truth  values  to  the  conditional  I  have 
presented,  it  is  sometimes  thought  that  trivalent  logic  is  unattractive  because  it  gives  a 
truth  value  for  A-*A  of  indefinite  when  A  is  itself  indefinite,  whereas  this  ought  to  come 
out  always  true  (and  indeed  is  obviously  a  classical  tautology).  But  presumably  it  ought  to 
come  out  always  true  (classically  speaking)  only  because  it  can  never  be  false  -  since  if  it 
is  false  then  it  implies  a  contradiction.  But  the  idea  that  it  is  never  false  is  certainly 
endorsed  by  the  trivalent  semantics.  Admittedly,  it  is  not  a  genuine  tautology,  and  indeed 
there  may  well  be  no  genuine  tautologies  in  a  three  valued  logic.  But  the  fact  that  the 
conditional  does  not  always  come  out  true  does  not  have  the  same  consequence  as  it  does 
151 in  a  bivalent  semantics  -  what  remains  of  importantance  is  that  the  conditional  does  not 
come  outfalse,  since  that  (and  only  that)  would  imply  a  contradiction.  When  A  is  true  or 
false,  the  conditional  is  true,  and  when  A  is  indefinite,  the  conditional  is  indefinite;  hence, 
the  conditional  is  never  false.  In  fact,  Michael  Tye  endorses  precisely  this  response  to  the 
objection  in  'Vague  Objects'  (p.  545),  suggesting  that  cases  like  the  conditional  A->A 
will  be  what  he  describes  as  'quasi-tautologies'  in  a  three  valued  semantics.  (A  quasi- 
tautolgy  is  defined  by  exactly  the  characteristics  offered  here:  while  a  quasi-tautology 
cannot  be  false,  it  may  be  true  or  indefinite).  5 
Three  values  vs.  Dummett 
So,  given  the  trivalent  semantics  outlined  above,  we  are  now  in  a  position  to 
effectively  tackle  the  general  problem,  alluded  to  by  Dummett. 
To  see  precisely  how,  imagine  a  series  of  heartbeats,  ranging  from  birth  into 
adulthood,  and  let  us  assume  an  arbitrary  point  p,  such  that  it  is  true  that  all  heartbeats,  up 
to  and  including  p,  are  heartbeats  in  my  childhood.  Now,  let  us  take  a  second  arbitrary 
point  r,  such  that  it  is  false  for  r  and  all  subsequent  heartbeats  that  they  are  heartbeats  in 
my  childhood.  Between  p  and  r  is  a  range  of  heartbeats  for  which  we  are  unsure  -  the 
vague  region  in  question.  Now,  let  us  say  that  it  is  indeterminate  whether  or not  these 
heartbeats  are  heartbeats  in  my  childhood  or not.  (For  the  purpose  of  the  following 
demonstration,  let  us  also  set  an  arbitrary  point  somewhere  within  that  region:  heartbeat 
q). 
For  the  present  case,  I  am  considering  only  the  simplest  example.  Of  course,  it  is 
unlikely  to  be  the  case  that  we  wish  to  define  the  truth  value  assignment  as  sharply  as  this, 
5  Tye  also  presents  (in  the  same  article)  a  similar  account  of  the  conjunction  AA-A,  which  also  comes  out 
indefinite  when  A  is  indefinite,  contrary  to  the  (classical)  intuition  that  this  should  always  come  out  false,  as 
a  contradiction.  Following  the  same  thought,  Tye  suggests  that  such  cases  are  'quasi-contradictions',  in  that 
while  they  cannot  be  true,  they  may  perfectly  consistently  be  false  or  indefinite. 
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and  r  are  such  that  it  implies  that  the  division  between  True  and  Indefinite  (and  indeed 
False  and  Indefinite)  is  not.  I  shall  discuss  the  attendant  difficulties  at  a  later  stage,  but  for 
now  let  us  consider  the  example  where  p  and  r  are  sharp  points,  so  that  we  may  gradually 
introduce  the  role  of  the  indefinite  truth  value.  The  idea  being  presented  at  this  stage  is 
only  how  that  role  will  differ  from  the  traditional  conception  of  bivalent  accounts,  and  so 
the  simple  case  will  be  sufficient  for  the  explanation  at  this  stage. 
Using  such  an  example  then,  we  may  give  independent  sense  to  the  strict  finitist 
claim  that  there  is  no  last  member,  while  resisting  the  classical  equivalence  of  closure 
under  the  successor  operation  -  which  was  the  suggested  solution  to  the  dilemma  that  I 
tentatively  offered  in  Chapter  Eight  -  and  at  the  same  time  offer  a  robust  alternative  to 
Dummett's  derivation  of  inconsistency  from  the  definitions  of  weakly  finite  and  weakly 
infinite. 
Firstly,  let  us  consider  the  claim  that  there  is  a  last  member  on  this  model  -  that  is, 
let  us  try  and  satisfy:  3x  (S(x)A  --, 
S(x')) 
where  the  domain  is  the  heartbeats  in  an  adult  lifetime,  and  S  corresponds  to  the 
predicate  'is  a  heartbeat  in  childhood'.  Now,  the  existential  quantifier  will  be  true  just  in 
case  there  is  at  least  one  instance  where  the  conjunction  is  true,  false  where  there  are  no 
instances  of  the  conjunction  which  are  true  or  indefinite,  and  indefinite  otherwise.  Let  us 
consider  all  heartbeats  in  the  sequence. 
Before  p,  --,  S(x')  is  False,  making  (S(x)A--,  S(x'))  False 
At  p,  S(x)  is  True,  but  ---,  S(x')  is  Indefinite  making  (S(x)  A--,  S(x'))  Indefinite 
At  q,  both  S(x)  and  --,  S(x')  are  Indefinite  making  (S(x)  A  --,  S(x'))  Indefinite 
At  r,  --,  S(x')  is  True,  but  S(x)  is  Indefinite,  making  (S(x)  A  -IS(x'))  Indefinite 
After  r,  S(x)  is  False,  making  (S(x)  A  --,  S(x'))  False 
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or  rather,  we  are  not  committed  to  the  claim  that  there  is  no  last  member.  6 
However,  for  closure  under  the  successor  operation,  we  need  the  universally 
quanti  ied  conditional  to  hold.  But  now  it  seems  as  though  we  have  reason  to  resist  the 
conditional,  for  all  x.  The  universal  quantifer  will  be  true  just  in  case  all  instances  of  (in 
this  case)  the  conditional  are  true,  false  just  in  case  there  is  at  least  one  instance  of  the 
conditional  which  is  false,  and  indefinite  otherwise.  Again,  let  us  consider  all  the 
heartbeats  in  the  sequence. 
Before  p,  the  conditional  will  hold;  that  is,  S(x)  is  True  and  S(x')  is  True,  making 
(S(x)  ->  S(x'))  True. 
Equally,  after  r,  S(x)  and  S(x')  are  both  False,  making  (S(x)  ->  S(x'))  True. 
However,  at  q  (at  least),  S(x)  and  S(x')  are  both  Indefinite,  making  (S(x)->  S(x')) 
Indefinite. 
Hence,  we  can  not  conclude  that  it  is  true  that: 
Vx  (S(X)  -> 
since  the  universally  quantified  conditional  here  comes  out  indefinite.  The  sorites 
is  not  sound,  but  there  is  no  rule  of  inference  which  fails.  Consider  the  paradox: 
S(1) 
Vx  (S(X)  -*  S(X')) 
Vx  S(X) 
6  There  is  an  important  distinction  to  make  here,  in  that,  given  a  three-valued  logic,  refusing  to  endorse  or 
accept  the  truth  of  a  statement  does  not  amount  to  an  assertion  that  the  statement  isfalse  -  simply  that  it  is 
not  true.  The  principle  of  bivalence  will  obviously  not  apply  in  a  trivalent  system.  Hence  it  is  not  that  we 
may  here  conclude  that  statement  is  false,  since  we  have  shown  it  to  be  indefinite.  It  is  perhaps  more  correct 
to  speak  of  a  rejection  of  the  (truth  of  the)  statement,  as  opposed  to  a  denial  (an  assertion  that  the  statement 
is  false). 
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conclusion  cannot  be  true. 
By  now  it  should  be  obvious  how  I  intend  to  translate  this  to  the  case  of 
surveyability.  A  trivalent  approach  will  assert  that,  concerning  the  borderline  vague 
members  of  the  totality  of  surveyable  numbers,  it  is  indefinite  whether  each  borderline 
member  is  surveyable  or  not.  There  will  be  numbers  which  are  clearly  surveyable,  (proto- 
)numbers,  or  'number-pattems',  which  are  clearly  unsurveyable,  and  then  there  will  be  a 
vague  region  of  numbers  7  which  are  neither  clearly  surveyable  nor  clearly  not.  But 
although  we  are  entitled  to  the  assertion  of  weakly  infinite  for  a  totality  such  as  'the 
surveyable  numbers',  since  there  will  be  no  number  such  that  it  is  True  that  it  is 
surveyable,  and  yet  False  of  its  successor  that  it  is  surveyable,  we  are  not  entitled  to  assert 
that  the  totality  is  closed  under  the  successor  operation,  since  the  definition  of  closed 
under  the  successor  operation  relies  upon  an  interpretation  of  --,  3x  (S(x)A  --,  S(x'))  where 
-S(a)  implies  'it  is  false  that'  S(a),  and  not  merely  'it  is  not  true  that'  S(a),  and  is  instead 
(on  the  current  model)  either  false  or  indefinite.  Hence  Dummett's  charge  of 
inconsistency  fails  under  a  trivalent  approach. 
Problemsfor  trivalent  logics  -  the  preservation  ofMonotonicity 
I  would  like  to  end  the  chapter  on  such  a  successful  note,  but  it  is  only  fair  to 
acknowledge  that  the  three-valued  approach  is  not  without  difficulties;  the  first  of  these  is 
a  problem  regarding  the  assignment  of  truth  values  for  the  conditional  as  I  have  presented 
it  here.  I  offered  some  justification  above  for  assigning  the  truth  values  in  this  way 
(following  Kleene),  but  it  should  be  noted  that  such  an  assignment  will  nonetheless 
produce  some  rather  odd  and  undesirable  results.  One  of  the  most  problematic  is  that  the 
truth  table  for  the  conditional  does  not  preserve  monotonicity.  That  is  to  say,  the 
conditional:  'For  all  x,  if  x'  is  small  and  x  is  smaller  than  x'  then  x  is  small',  will  have 
'  Perhaps  'potential'  numbers  would  be  (heuristically)  better  here,  if  rather  'loosely-speaking'. 
155 indeterminate  instances,  simply  because  Y  is  small'  will  have  indeterminate  instances  - 
hence  the  conditional  itself  must  be  indeterminate.  But  this  is  extremely  counter-intuitive 
-  the  conditional  just  ought  to  be  true. 
There  is  no  obvious  way  to  resolve  this  issue,  and  although  I  shall  devote  the  next 
chapter  to  a  discussion  of  some  further  problems  for  trivalent  logic,  and  a  look  at  some  of 
the  other  odd  results,  it  is  principally  because  of  results  of  this  kind  that  I  shall  ultimately 
prefer,  in  the  final  chapter,  a  formulation  of  strict  finitism.  which  is  not  committed  to  more 
than  a  bivalent  logic. 
Problemsfor  trivalent  logics  -  Higher  order  vagueness 
There  is  a  further  problem  for  trivalent  logics  in  general,  (however  the  conditional 
is  expressed),  and  it  is  to  finding  a  way  out  of  this  difficulty  that  the  next  chapter  will  be 
devoted.  For  now,  let  me  outline  the  general  problem,  and  identify  its  strongest  objection. 
Let  us  begin  with  taking  the  results  above  and  applying  them  to  a  wider  context 
once  again.  Now,  in  addition  to  a  pleasing  response  to  the  worries  expressed  by  Durnmett 
for  the  strict  finitist,  three-valued  logic  provides  us  with  a  fresh  way  to  tackle  the  more 
general  problem  of  sorites  paradoxes.  Using  a  trivalent  semantics,  a  purported  paradox  of 
the  form: 
I  is  surveyable 
For  all  n,  if  n  is  surveyable,  then  n+1  is  surveyable 
All  numbers  are  surveyable 
is  no  longer  paradoxical,  since  a  denial  of  the  second  premise  no  longer  entails 
3X  (S(X)  A  -S(X')) 
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'is  Surveyable'  is  true  for  x  and  yet  false  for  the  successor  of  x;  instead,  there  are  some 
values  of  x  for  which  S(x)  is  true,  then  some  values  for  which  S(x)  is  indefinite,  and  then 
further  values  for  which  S(x)  is  false. 
Prima  facie,  this  is  a  neat  response,  but  there  is  certainly  something  suspicious 
about  the  solution.  The  problem,  by  now  well-identified,  is  that  of  higher  order 
vagueness.  The  idea  behind  the  higher  order  vagueness  objection  is  simply  to  observe  that 
even  if  one  can  no  longer  assert  that  the  existence  of  an  upper  bound  entails  that  there 
comes  a  point  along  a  well-ordering  of  the  totality  such  that  it  is  true  that  S(x)  and  false 
that  S(x'),  one  may  insist  instead  that  there  must  come  a  point  where  it  is  true  that  S(x), 
and  indefinite  that  S(x').  So  unless  the  proponent  of  three-valued  logic  is  willing  to 
commit  to  the  idea  that  there  exists  an  x  such  that  S(x)  is  true,  but  S(x')  is  indefinite,  then 
the  vagueness  is  simply  moved  one  step  back  (or  higher),  and  the  difficulty  is  not  truly 
averted.  To  express  this  idea  formally,  we  need  a  further  truth  functional  operator  for 
indefinite;  define  V  as  'it  is  indefinite  that',  such  that  VS(x)  stands  for  'it  is  indefinite  that 
x  is  surveyable'.  And  to  make  the  point  explicit,  let  us  write,  for  S(x)  (where  S(x)  is  true, 
and  not  indefinite  8) 
, 
Def  S(x).  Now,  the  'higher-order'  sorites  runs  like  this: 
DefS(l) 
Vx  Def  S(x)  ->  Def.  S(x') 
Vx  Def  S(x) 
Now  a  denial  of  the  second  premise  entails 
EN  (DefS(X)  A  VS(X')) 
which  amounts  to  the  assertion  that  there  is  a  sharp  boundary  between  true  cases 
and  indefinite  ones.  (Analogously,  for  example,  between  men  who  are  definitely  bald  and 
'  Strictly  speaking,  neither  indefinite  norfalse,  of  course  -a  similar  introduction  can  be  made  for  Def.  -S(x) 
where  S(x)  is  false  and  not  indefinite  (or  true). 
157 men  who  are  indefinitely  bald).  And  this  may  look  as  unpromising  as  the  original  bivalent 
claim  did,  to  the  extent  that  there  is  a  sharp  boundary  between  true  cases  and  false  ones. 
However,  I  qualify  this  statement  by  saying  it  'may  look'  so,  because  although  I 
think  this  is  in  fact  the  correct  response  here,  I  wish  to  register  a  slight  misgiving,  which  I 
shall  return  to  later,  and  it  is  this:  it  does  not  seem  to  me  precisely  as  implausible  in  the 
trivalent  case  as  in  the  bivalent  one  that  there  may  be  a  sharp  cut-off  point.  It  may  at  any 
rate  be  easier  to  sort  a  group  of  men  into  three  groups  containing  those  that  are  bald, 
those  that  are  not,  and  those  that  are  neither  bald  nor  not  bald,  than  to  sort  the  same  group 
of  men  into  two  groups,  containing  those  that  are  bald  in  one  and  those  that  are  not  in 
another.  This  suggests  that  the  concept  is  not  as  unintuitive  as  in  the  bivalent  case. 
Although  as  I  have  said  I  think  that  in  the  trivalent  case  the  idea  of  sharp  boundaries  is 
still  implausible,  since  it  is  easy  to  think  of  examples  where  it  would  not  seem 
appropriate,  I  will  offer  further  considerations  shortly  that  might  make  this  observation 
poignant. 
One  way  to  attempt  to  meet  the  challenge  head  on  would  be  to  introduce  a  further 
truth  value,  something  like  indefinitely-indefinite,  to  define  a  vague  region  between  those 
values  for  which  S(x)  is  definitely  true,  and  those  for  which  S(x)  is  indefinite  (and 
between  indefinite  and  false)  ;  but  it  should  be  fairly  clear  that  this  will  simply  push  the 
problem  back  another  step  -  that  is,  take  it  to  a  higher  order  again.  Then,  of  course,  we 
have  to  introduce  another  truth  value,  indefinitely-indefinitely-indefinite,  and  so  on, 
moving  away  from  trivalent  semantics  into  four-,  five-,  six-valued  logics  and  beyond. 
Each  step  is  unlikely  to  resolve  the  problem,  unless  we  abandon  a  finitely-valued  theory, 
and  return  to  the  idea  of  the  degree  of  truth  theorists,  who  help  themselves  to  a 
(potentially)  infinite  number  of  truth  values.  But  even  in  this  case  the  problem  of  higher 
order  vagueness  is  not  resolved  -  infinitely-valued  degree  theories  still  have  a  sharp 
three-fold  classification  between  truth  to  degree  1,  truth  to  degree  0,  and  the  remaining 
degrees  of  truth,  such  that  we  can  ask  which  is  the  last  member  of  the  totality 
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advantage  over  finitely  valued  ones  with  respect  to  higher  order  vagueness. 
I  don't  want  to  say  too  much  more  about  the  possibility  of  finitely-valued  logics  in 
this  regard  -  as  it  seems  as  though  they  will  always  be  burdened  in  this  way  with  the 
problems  of  higher  order  vagueness  -  except  to  reiterate  the  point  I  made  above:  with 
each  broadening  of  the  indefinite  operators,  the  claim  that  there  might  be  sharp  cut-off 
points  between  truth-values  is,  I  suggest,  more  and  more  plausible.  Indeed,  for  any 
sharpening9  of  a  particular  predicate,  it  certainly  looks  as  though  we  will  find  a  finite- 
range  suitable  for  precise  delineation;  if  asked  to  sort  eight  men  into  at  most  eight  groups 
of  baldness,  the  first  containing  definitely  bald,  and  the  last  containing  definitely  not  bald, 
we  will  not  find  it  particularly  taxing.  As  long  as  the  values  are  sufficiently  fine-grained 
for  the  relevant  sharpening,  there  will  be  no  need  to  introduce  further  values  in  the 
particular  case;  and  any  entailment  of  the  existence  of  sharp  boundaries  will  be 
unproblematic  in  this  way.  More  on  this  later;  but  for  now  there  is  a  more  pressing 
problem  -  for  there  is  an  apparently  easy  reforinulation  of  the  problem  which  will  still 
cause  problems,  no  matter  how  many  truth  values  we  retreat  to.  (Indeed,  the  problem,  as 
reformulated,  remains,  as  far  as  I  am  aware,  a  problem  for  the  degree  theory  of  truth  also). 
The  problem  is  essentially  this  -  regardless  of  the  number  of  (indefinitely-, 
indefinitely-indefinitely-,  etc.  )  indefinite  values,  we  may  still  always  ask  for  the  sharp 
boundary  where  S(x)  stops  being  definitely  true  -  and  force  an  entailment  of 
3x(Def,  S(x)A-Def,  S(x'))  following  any  attempted  rejection  of  the  second  premise  in  the 
sorites  argument.  Regardless  of  the  'fine-grainedness'  of  our  multi-valued  logic,  such  a 
stipulation  will  always  look  arbitrary:  that  a  man  with  n  hairs  is  definitely  bald,  and  yet  a 
man  with  n+1  hairs  is  not  definitely  bald,  remains  as  improbable  as  in  the  very  first  case 
considered.  Moreover,  given  more  complicated  cases  of  vagueness,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
predicate  'is  surveyable',  due  to  our  inconstant  ability  as  surveyors  it  follows  that  any 
such  stipulation  will  (sometimes)  be  inaccurate. 
9A  sharpening  of  the  predicate  is  essentially  an  application  in  use;  hence,  an  application  of  'small'  when 
applied  to  the  size  of  stars  will  clearly  include  many  more  potential  quantities  than  when  it  is  applied  to 
balls. 
159 By  way  of  offering  further  considerations  to  mitigate  this  problem,  but  also 
because  a  proper  account  is  by  now  overdue,  I  shall  open  the  next  chapter  with  a  brief 
discussion  of  the  precise  meaning  of  the  truth  value  'Indefinite',  before  I  attempt  to 
provide  any  positive  solution  on  behalf  of  a  trivalent  semantics  to  the  issue  just  raised. 
160 CHAPTER  X:  HIGHER-ORDER  VAGUENESS 
Since  three-valued  logic  offers  us  a  profitable  response  to  Dummett's  charge  of 
inconsistency,  it  is  worth  trying  to  defend  it  against  the  main  criticism  levelled  against  it, 
which  is  that  it  is  susceptible  to  higher-order  vagueness.  Michael  Tye  offers  a  solution  to 
the  problem,  which  I  shall  outline  and  adapt  in  this  chapter  to  offer  a  plausible  defence  of 
a  three-valued  logic  for  strict  finitism.  Without  necessarily  adopting  Tye's  model  with 
respect  to  vague  objects  in  the  world,  I  hold  nonetheless  that  the  theory,  when  applied  to 
the  vagueness  arising  in  the  strict  finitary  formulation,  will  offer  an  intuitive  pleasing 
method  of  rejecting  Dummett's  charge  without  entailing  further  problems  of  a  'higher- 
order'  kind.  I  shall  conclude  this  chapter  with  the  consideration  of  a  third  alternative  logic 
for  the  strict  finitist,  (one  which  will  presumably  be  particular  to  the  strict  finitist),  that  of 
surveyablyfinitely-valued  logic. 
As  promised,  however,  and  before  we  progress  any  further  with  the  discussion  of 
multi-valued  logics  in  any  sense,  I  shall  begin  with  a  discussion  of  the  truth  value 
'Indefinite'. 
The  truth  value  'Indefinite' 
One  way  to  try  to  address  the  problem  raised  at  the  end  of  the  previous  section 
might  be  to  provide  a  more  rigorous  analysis  of  what  is  meant  by  the  term  'indefinite'. 
For  example,  one  may  raise  the  objection  that  there  must  be  a  sharp  boundary  between 
Definitely  True  and  -Definitely  True  only  if  it  is  clear  that  Indefinite  must  always  entail 
-Definitely  True. 
On  the  face  of  it,  this  may  seem  an  obviously  valid  entailment.  Indeed,  various 
interpretations  of  Indefinite  support  such  an  entaihnent.  The  'standard"  interpretation  is 
1  If  indeed  there  is  a  standard  interpretation;  although  three-valued  logic  is  not  the  most  popular  of  theories, 
there  have  been  various  models  of  trivalent  logics,  with  corresponding  variations  to  the  truth  tables  and  to 
the  definition  of  Indefinite  -  and  by  'standard'  I  mean  to  imply  only  the  more  common  interpretation. 
160 that  Indefinite  is  neither  True  nor  False.  Michael  Tye,  whose  truth  tables  I  have  replicated 
here,  and  whose  analysis  of  vagueness  fonns  the  basis  for  what  follows  in  this  chapter, 
defines  Indefinite  much  in  this  way.  He  writes: 
"The  third  value  here  is,  strictly  speaking,  not  a  truth-value  at  all  but  rather  a 
truth-value  gap.  In  my  view  there  are  gaps  due  to  failure  of  reference  or presupposition 
and  gaps  due  to  vagueness".  2 
He  footnotes  this  rather  brief  explanation  as  follows: 
"Where  a  gap  is  due  to  vagueness,  I  maintain  that  something  is  said  which  is 
neither  true  nor  false.  I  deny  however  that  anything  is  said  in  the  case  where  a  gap  is  due 
to  failure  of  reference.  I  am  inclined  to  extend  the  latter  view  to  gaps  due  to  failure  of 
presupposition".  3 
Hence,  when  it  is  asserted  of  a  borderline  member  that  it  is  a  member  of  the 
(vague)  totality,  the  truth  of  the  assertion  is indefinite  in  the  sense  that  it  is  neither  true 
nor  false.  It  counts  (for  Tye  at  least)  as  a  legitimate  assertion  -  that  is,  one  in  which 
something  is  asserted  -  but  it  takes  neither  truth  value. 
Such  a  definition  will  of  course  invite  precisely  the  kind  of  response  outlined  in 
the  previous  section,  but  can  alternatives  fare  any  better? 
One  possibility  is  to  suggest  that  the  value  indefinite  means  both  True  and  False. 
Something  like  this  has  been  offered  by  Van  Bendegem,  for  example,  who  (following 
Priest),  describes  an  assignment  of  the  third  value  to  the  set  IT,  F),  or  {O,  II  contrasting 
this  with  the  usual  assignment  of  value  Y2  to  the  Indefinite,  if  T  is  1,  and  F  is  0.  If 
indefinite  is  regarded  in  this  way,  the  problem  raised  above  looks  initially  less 
threatening,  since  there  will  be  no  point  between  true  members  and  borderline  members 
2  Tye,  'Vague  Objects',  p.  544 
3  ibid  (footnote  in  original) 
161 where  assertions  indicating  their  membership  of  the  set  are  no  longer  true;  but  the 
proposed  solution  here  looks  a  little  shaky.  There  will  come  a  point,  of  course,  at  which 
statements  are  no  longer  True  -  but  in  this  case,  it  will  be  at  the  boundary  between 
Indefinite  and  False,  and  not  at  the  boundary  between  True  and  Indefinite  as  before.  We 
might  certainly  expect  it  to  be  not  true  of  non-members  (that  is  to  say,  candidates  of 
which  assertions  of  membership  are  false)  that  they  are  members  of  the  totality;  but  the 
sharp  boundary  implied  by  the  observation  looks  equally  as  problematic  as  the  first 
higher-order  vagueness  problem  outlined  above.  The  point  is  made  explicit  by  the 
corresponding  observation  that  there  ought  to  come  a  point,  on  such  an  account,  at  the 
original  boundary  between  True  and  Indefinite  where  assertions  cease  to  be  not-False; 
that  is,  there  is  an  implied  sharp  limit  on  True  assertions  that  are  simply  True  and  not 
False  as  well. 
Perhaps  the  next  plausible  position  is  to  consider  the  Indefinite  value  as  taking 
either  4  the  value  True  or  False,  but  not  determinately  one  or  the  other.  In  this  way,  one 
might  attempt  to  simply  side-step  the  challenge  posed  by  the  kind  of  objections  we  are 
here  considering;  one  might  say  that  there  is  no  sharp  boundary  between  the  Definite 
members  and  the  borderline  members,  simply  because  the  borderline  members  might  still 
possess  the  value  Definitely  True,  (or  simply  'True'),  although  they  might  not,  and  hence 
they  are  Indefinite. 
We  must  be  careful  with  such  a  response,  however  -  it  is  not  enough  to  hold  that 
the  borderline  cases  take  one  of  the  bivalent  truth  values  but  we  don't  know  which,  so  we 
call  them  Indefinite;  this  looks  tantamount  to  an  Epistemicist  response,  and  we  have 
already  rejected  that  as  unpromising  for  our  account.  We  don't  want  there  to  be  a  'fact  of 
the  matter'  about  numbers,  per  se;  at  least  with  respect  to  whether  or  not  they  are 
surveyable,  since  we  have  already  acknowledged  that  capacity  to  survey  varies  by 
instantiation. 
41  am  considering  here  the  suggestion  that  Indefinite  means  True  or  False  in  an  exclusive  sense.  I  think 
there  is  a  corresponding  question  about  a  stipulation  of  Indefinite  as  True  v  False  in  the  inclusive  sense; 
this  seems  (in  a  similar  way)  to  avoid  the  problem  of  higher  order  vagueness,  since  there  is  no  point  at 
which  to  ask  when  the  assertions  of  membership  are  no  longer  True;  but  in  the  end,  it  is  still  the  case  that  a 
case  satisfying  this  condition  will  possess  one  of  the  following  truth  values:  True,  False  -  whether  or  not  it 
possesses  the  other. 
162 But  if  we  do  not  mean  that  we  just  do  not  know  which  truth  value  borderline  cases 
take,  in  what  sense  can  we  mean  that  Indefinite  means  either  True  or  False?  One  way  of 
thinking  about  this  kind  of  idea  might  be  to  try  to  draw  an  analogy  with  a  similar  case  in 
physics.  Modem  quantum  physics  teaches  a  great  deal  of  counter-intuitive  'facts'  about 
the  world.  Among  them,  it  tells  of  how  there  is  a  peculiar  property  of  electrons,  such  that, 
according  to  Heisenberg's  uncertainty  principle,  you  can  measure  either  the  position  or 
the  velocity  of  an  electron,  but  you  may  never  attain  both.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  the 
act  of  measuring  'forces'  the  electron  into  a  'new'  state,  a  state  such  that  it  possesses  the 
measured  property.  Now,  let  us  imagine  we  are  interested  in  measuring  one  or  the  other. 
Call  the  state  in  which  the  electron  is  at  the  point  of  measurement  of  position  P,  and  the 
state  in  which  it  is  at  if  instead  we  measured  velocity  V.  Now,  prior  to  any  measurement, 
what  are  we  to  say  of  the  state  of  the  electron?  As  I  understand  it,  the  electron  can't  be  in 
state  P,  or  in  state  V,  but  nor  can  it  be  correct  to  say  that  it  is  in  state  P  AND  V-  since  the 
act  of  measurement  will  alter  the  state  such  that  it  is  P  OR  V  but  not  both.  Furthermore,  it 
can  be  no  more  correct  to  say  that  the  electron  is  in  neither  state  P  NOR  V  (that  is,  in 
state  P  or  V  or  neither),  since  if  that  were  the  case  then  the  act  of  measuring  will  tell  you 
nothing  about  the  electron  you  were  trying  to  measure.  Instead,  then,  the  electron  is in  an 
Indefinite  state  prior  to  measurement.  Nor  is  this  simply  an  epistemically  indefinite  state, 
as  I  discussed  in  the  previous  paragraph.  The  act  of  measurement  is  such  that  it  brings 
about  a  physical  state,  but  nonetheless  a  state  that  pertains  to  that  electron. 
Perhaps  then,  this  is  a  useful  way  to  think  about  Indefinite  as  a  truth-value.  It  is 
not  a  demonstrable  truth-value  in  reference  to  the  truth  values  True  or  False,  but  is  a 
value  in  its  own  right.  It  is  in  some  sense  correct  to  say  that  if  a  proposition  is  indefinite  it 
is  neither  true  nor  false,  but  only  in  some  sense;  that  sense  being  that  it  does  not  possess 
the  truth  value  True,  nor  False,  but  instead  Indefinite  -  but  what  this  is  not  to  say  is  that 
there  is  an  absence  of  truth  or  falsehood,  since  it  is  precisely  that  their  presence  cannot  be 
confirmed  or  denied  that  leads  to  the  proposition  having  the  truth-value  Indefinite  in  the 
first  place.  Just  as  it  is  wrong  to  assert  either  that  an  electron  is  in  a  particular  state  prior 
to  measurement  or  (at  the  same  time)  that  it  is  not  in  such  a  state,  so  it  may  be  wrong  to 
163 assume  that  because  Indefinite  is  distinct  from  the  values  True  or  False  it  is itself  entirely 
neither. 
However,  this  is  not  to  do  so  much,  at  this  stage,  as  provide  a  particularly  useful 
account  of  the  value  Indefinite;  and  perhaps  all  it  can  really  suggest  is  what  it  is  not. 
Indeed,  the  quantum  case  just  begs  the  question  regarding  the  third  value,  because  we 
have  no  useful  model  of  indeterminacy  in  that  case  either.  Aside  from  illuminating  the 
problem,  it  does  not  seem  as  if  the  analogy  can  provide  any  clear  definition  of  what  it  is 
for  Indefinite  to  mean  either  True  or  False,  since  the  quantum  case  seems  to  cry  out  for 
adequate  definition  in  exactly  the  same  way. 
The  conclusion  here  then  is  that  in  general,  the  standard  interpretation  of 
Indefinite,  such  that  a  statement  which  is  Indefinite  is  then  neither  True  nor  False,  looks 
as  at  least  as  promising  as  the  alternatives.  It  is  extremely  difficult  to  avoid  the  issues  of 
higher  order  vagueness,  and  as  such  it  is  perhaps  better  to  formulate  a  strategy  to  meet 
them  head  on.  It  is  to  such  a  solution  that  I  shall  turn  my  attention  in  the  next  section. 
Tye  vs.  higher  order  vagueness 
Michael  Tye  offers  a  solution  to  sorites  problems  using  a  version  of  three-valued 
logic,  as  I  outlined  above.  What  is  importantly  distinct  about  Tye's  account  however,  and 
a  feature  that  I  believe  will  enable  us  to  provide  a  useful  response  to  the  problem  we  are 
left  with  (that  of  the  precise  termination  of  DefS),  is  that  Tye  maintains  that  as  well  as 
there  being  three  classifications  for  candidates  for  membership  of  a  vague  totality, 
corresponding  to  whether  the  relevant  predicate  is  true,  false,  or  indefinite  when  applied 
to  that  member  it  is  furthermore  indefinite  whether  there  are  any  'remaining'  members  of 
the  (or  any)  given  vague  totality  that  "are  neither  members,  borderline  members,  nor  non- 
members".  5  The  theory  is  hard  to  conceptualise,  so  let  me  begin  with  Tye's  own  example: 
5  Tye,  'Vague  Objects',  p.  536 
164 "Consider  Mount  Everest.  It  seems  obvious  that  there  is  no  line  which  sharply 
divides  the  matter  composing  Everest  from  the  matter  outside  it.  Everest's  boundaries  are 
fuzzy  [vague].  Some  molecules  are  inside  Everest  and  some  molecules  outside.  But  some 
have  an  indefinite  status:  there  is  no  objective  determinate  fact  of  the  matter  about 
whether  they  are  inside  or  outside.  -)96 
So  far,  the  example  is  sufficiently  similar  to  those  I  have  already  provided  -  it  is 
true  of  those  molecules  that  are  inside  that  they  are  part  of  Everest,  false  of  those  that  lie 
outside,  and  indefinite  of  those  which  are  borderline  cases.  But  Tye  continues: 
"Are  there  any  remaining  molecules?  To  suppose  that  it  is  true  that  this  is  the  case 
is  to  postulate  more  categories  of  molecules  than  are  demanded  by  our  ordinary,  everyday 
conception  of  Everest  and  hence  to  involve  ourselves  in  gratuitous  metaphysical 
complications.  It  is  also  to  create  the  need  to  face  a  potentially  endless  series  of  such 
questions  one  after  the  other  as  new  categories  of  molecules  are  admitted.  On  the  other 
hand,  to  suppose  that  it  is  false  that  there  are  any  remaining  molecules  is  to  admit  that 
every  molecule  fits  cleanly  into  one  of  the  three  categories  so  that  there  are  sharp 
partitions  between  the  molecules  inside  Everest,  the  molecules  on  the  border,  so  to  speak, 
and  the  molecules  outside.  And  intuitively,  pretheoretically,  it  is  not  true  that  there  are 
any  sharp  partitions  here.  What,  I  think,  we  should  say,  then,  is  that  it  is  objectively 
indeterminate  as  to  whether  there  are  any  remaining  molecules.  ,7 
I  should  perhaps  be  careful  to  point  out  that  Tye  is  advancing  a  more  general 
thesis  than  I  am  at  this  point;  to  the  extent  that  there  are,  or  could  be,  vague  concrete 
objects,  such  as  mountains.  Since,  as  far  as  I  can  see,  the  debate  over  whether  there  are  or 
can  be  vague  concrete  objects  -  that  is  objects  which  themselves  are  vague  independent 
6  Tye,  'Vague  Objects',  p.  535 
7  ibid. 
165 of  our  ability  to  categorise  them  -  is  very  much  unresolved,  8  and  given  that  my  concern 
here  is  primarily  with  mathematical  objects  (and  moreover  with  a  determinedly  anti- 
realist,  that  is,  constructivist,  account  of  mathematical  objects),  I  shall  abstain  from 
commitment  regarding  the  generality  of  Tye's  claims,  and  restrict  my  application  of 
Tye's  solution  solely  to  the  case  of  vagueness  regarding  (mind-dependent)  abstract 
objects,  as  in  the  considered  case  of  the  totality  of  surveyable  numbers. 
Tye's  suggestion,  then,  is  that  in  addition  to  there  being  an  indetenninacy  at  the 
level  of  membership  (for  parts  of  a  vague  object,  for  vague  sets/totalities  and  so  on)  to  the 
extent  that  while  some  candidates  are  genuine  members  and  some  are  not  it  is 
indetenninate  whether  a  further  class  of  candidates  are  genuinely  members  or  not,  it  is 
further  indeterminate  whether  or  not  there  are  any  remaining  candidates  not  covered  by 
these  three  classes. 
Roughly,  Tye's  model  is  something  like  this: 
Indefinite 
Def.  S  (i.  e.  not  Def  S,  not  Def  -S) 
---------------------------  I------I  --------------------------- 
Indefinite  Indefinite 
(no  fact  of  the  matter)  (no  fact  of  the  matter) 
whether  this  region  whether  this  region 
is  empty  or  not  is  empty  or  not 
Def  -S. 
Moving  away  from  the  concept  of  concrete  objects,  Tye  describes  the  application 
to  sets  in  general: 
8  Although  the  focus  of  criticisms  of  Tye's  position  has  been  concerning  his  assertion  that  there  are  vague 
concrete  objects;  that  there  is  'real-world'  vagueness.  There  is  no  need  to  make  such  a  commitment  in  order 
to  utilise  the  principle  he  advances  in  the  way  that  I  shall  do  here. 
166 "A  set  S  [is]  vague,  if,  and  only  if,  (a)  it  has  borderline  members  and  (b)  there  is 
no  determinate  fact  of  the  matter  about  whether  there  are  objects  that  are  neither 
members,  borderline  members,  nor  non-members.  "9 
The  extension  to  the  case  of  (surveyable)  numbers  is  then  apparent.  It  is  true  of 
some  number-patterns  that  they  are  surveyable  (and  hence,  to  be  precise,  on  a  strict 
finitist  account  that  they  are  numbers),  false  of  others,  and  indefinite  (in  the  sense  of 
indefinite  as  a  distinct  truth  value)  of  some  other,  borderline  cases,  that  they  are 
surveyable  (that  they  are  admissible  numbers).  Furthermore,  it  is  indefinite  whether  or 
not  there  are  further  'classes'  of  number-pattern  -  whether  there  are  number  candidates 
not  captured  by  the  three  categories. 
It  may  perhaps  seem  counter-intuitive  to  consider  even  the  possibility  of  further 
number  candidates  in  this  case;  particularly  to  someone  who  is  resistant  to  admitting  a 
borderline  class  in  the  first  place.  Obviously,  I  suggest  that  we  have  good  reason  to 
expect  borderline  cases  with  respect  to  Surveyability,  since  any  attempt  to  describe  it  as  a 
precise  predicate  seem  doomed  to  failure.  But  in  terms  of  intuitive  justification  for  the 
possibility  of  further  candidates,  (over  and  above  that  implied  by  the  problems  of  higher- 
order  vagueness),  I  offer  similar  considerations  as  Tye  does  with  respect  to  Everest. 
Firstly,  to  suppose  that  there  are  further  'classes',  borderline-borderline  members  and  so 
on,  is  to  postulate  more  categories  than  our  analysis  has  so  far  suggested.  But  secondly,  to 
suggest  that  there  are  not  entails  that  there  is  a  sharp  cut-off  between  numbers  which 
everyone  can  (always)  survey,  and  those  candidates  which  not  everyone  can  (reliably) 
survey.  And,  of  course,  that  there  is  a  corresponding  sharp  boundary  between  those 
number  candidates  which  some  people  can  (sometimes)  survey,  and  those  which  no-one 
can  (ever)  survey.  And  here  too,  as  in  Tye's  case,  such  boundaries  seem  simply 
implausible  in  this  case.  10  In  fact,  if  they  did  seem  plausible,  we  might  with  some 
justification  simply  choose  one  or  other  boundary  as  a  limit  for  suirveyability  -  hard 
surveyability,  on  the  one  hand,  which  stops  just  as  soon  as  anyone  cannot  (always)  survey 
9  Tye,  'Vague  Objects',  p.  536 
10  No  less  implausible,  I  think,  than  the  original  idea  that  there  might  be  sharp  cut-off  points  between  what 
is  true  and  what  is  false,  on  such  an  account  -  it  is  just  that  we  do  not  need,  in  this  case,  to  actively 
postulate  any  further  categories  (and  corresponding  truth  values)  than  the  three  we  now  have. 
167 a  given  candidate;  or  soft  surveyability  on  the  other,  where  the  precise  limit  is  determined 
at  the  point  at  which  even  the  very  best  surveyor  (under  optimum  conditions)  can  no 
longer  survey.  If  we  were  entitled  to  such  boundaries,  the  problem  of  the  sorites  paradox 
disappears  -  we  have  something  like  an  epistemic  solution.  But,  (pretheoretic  ally 
perhaps),  neither  the  assertion  that  there  are  further  classes  of  number  candidates  beyond 
surveyable,  indefinitely  surveyable,  and  not  surveyable,  nor  the  assertion  that  there  are 
not  seem  plausible.  The  extension  of  each  class  just  looks  to  be  itself  indefinite.  Hence 
we  have  good,  intuitive  reasons  for  taking  Tye's  suggestion  seriously  in  the  case  of 
Surveyability. 
Tye's  case  offers  us  a  fresh  approach  to  problems  of  a  sontes  kind,  and  moreover, 
as  I  have  already  intimated,  it  provides  the  tools  with  which  to  deconstruct  the  problem  of 
higher-order  vagueness  that  we  were  left  with  earlier  in  this  Chapter.  Tye  himself 
considers  the  application  of  his  idea  to  the  case  of  sorites  paradoxes.  For  any  sorites 
paradox  (of  the  general  fon-n:  )'  1 
S(1)  (1) 
Vx  (S(X)  ->  S(X+I)) 
Vx  S(X) 
he  maintains: 
"that  (2)  is  either  false  or  indefinite  and  not  that  it  is  false  as  the  classical 
reasoning  supposes.  Secondly,  (2)  is,  in  fact,  indefinite  in  truth-value.  "  12 
The  problem,  according  to  Tye,  that  we  have  been  facing  all  along  rests  upon  the 
idea  that  denying  the  truth  of  the  second  premise  in  the  sorites  argument  is  taken  to  be  an 
assertion  that  the  premise  isfalse.  But  this  need  not  be  the  case  -  in  a  three  valued  logic, 
11  Tye's  actual  example  is  that  of  bald  men:  his  premise  (1)  is  that  a  man  with  zero  hairs  on  his  head  is  bald; 
I  use  here  my  own  formulation  of  the  general  paradox  from  a  previous  chapter  in  order  to  try  to  retain 
uniformity. 
12  Tye,  'Vague  Objects',  pp.  547-8 
168 a  denial  of  the  truth  of  a  statement  is  not  an  assertion  of  falsehood;  rather  the  assertion 
that  it  has  a  truth-value  other  than  True;  that  it  is  either  false  or  indefinite.  This  is  an 
important  step,  as  we  shall  see  below,  but  is  already  enough  to  mitigate  many  of  the 
problems  we  have  so  far  encountered. 
Moreover,  as  should  be  plain  by  now,  it  is  Tye's  contention  that  a  universal 
quantification  of  the  second  premise  of  the  sorites  paradox  will  be  indefinite.  Since  there 
are  no  assignments  under  which  (2)  is  false  (because  of  the  implausibility  of  any  sharp 
boundaries  for  vague  predicates),  yet  there  are  assigm-nents  under  which  both  the 
antecedent  and  the  consequent  are  false,  the  second  premise  understood  as  a  universally 
quantified  statement  will  itself  be  indefinite.  That  is,  Tye  maintains  that: 
Vx  (  S(x)  ->  S(x+l)  )  (2*) 
is  indefinite. 
Tye's  next  move  is  to  suggest  that  if  (2*)  is  indefinite,  then  statements  of  the 
fonn: 
-3X  (S(X)  A  -S(X')) 
must  be  indefinite  also,  since  (4)  is  equivalent  to  (2*).  Then,  of  course,  if  (4)  is 
indefinite,  the  negation  of  (4)  must  also  be  indefinite,  and  so  it  has  not  been  shown  that 
there  is  (for  example)  an  n  such  that  it  is  surveyable  and  its  successor  is  not. 
We  must  be  a  little  careful  here,  however,  given  what  I  have  already  said 
regarding  the  equivalence  of  the  conditional  and  the  conjunction  in  these  expressions. 
They  are  only  equivalent  if  the  (or  at  least  the  second)  negation  operator  is  interpreted  in 
the  proper  way  -  not  as  an  assertion  of  falsehood,  but  as  a  denial  of  truth.  The  point  here 
is  perhaps  more  clearly  made  with  reference  to  the  boundary  between  'true'  cases  and 
borderline  ones.  Applying  the  same  analysis,  it  should  be  clearer  that 
169 3x  (S(X)  /\  VS(X'))  (5) 
is  indefinite.  Since  the  'first-order'  sorites  has  already  been  resolved  simply  by 
the  introduction  of  a  third  truth-value,  I  will  not  embark  upon  a  further  critique  of  Tye's 
extrapolation  -  it  is  sufficient  for  my  purposes  that  what  he  says  (or  perhaps  should  have 
said)  applies  straightforwardly  to  (5),  if  not,  without  the  correct  interpretation,  to  (4). 
Now  we  can  return  to  the  problem  I  set  out  to  solve  here.  Recall  that  my  earlier 
discussion  of  the  challenge  of  higher-order  vagueness  culminated  with  an  identification 
of  a  general,  and  at  that  point,  seemingly  insuperable  problem;  that  of  the  boundary 
where  S(x)  stops  being  definitely  true.  It  seemed  as  though,  whatever  the  prospect  for 
many-valued  theories,  we  might  conceivably  always  ask  at  what  point  'full'  or  definite 
truth  stops,  and  the  first  (no  matter  how  finely-grained)  non-true  value  starts.  But  now, 
we  have  a  model  with  which  to  offer  a  solution  to  this  problem.  We  have  already  seen 
that  (5)  is  indefinite.  But  since  (5)  is  indefinite,  it  follows  that: 
3x(Def  S(x)A-Def  S(x'))  (6) 
will  be  indefinite  also.  And  so  the  paradox  here  is  averted  also.  Conceptually,  this 
final  point  is  harder  to  grasp,  so  let  me  try  to  elaborate  a  little.  The  idea  is  essentially  that 
the  point  at  which  the  numbers  stop  being  definitely  surveyable  is  itself  not  precise  -  but 
6not  precise'  in  the  sense  that  it  is  indefinite  whether  it  is  precise  or  not.  Because  it  is 
indefinite  whether  there  are  members  of  the  set  between  those  which  are  DefS  and  those 
which  are  VS  (which  are  indeed  -DefS),  the  extension  of  DefS,  in  the  case  of  vague 
predicates,  must  be  itself  indefinite.  It  no  longer  seems  good  sense  to  ask  whether  there  is 
a  sharp  boundary  between  definitely  surveyable  numbers  and  'indefinitely-definite' 
surveyable  numbers;  to  do  so  is  precisely  to  ignore  the  meaning  of  indefinite. 
Tye's  solution  to  the  general  problem  presented  by  higher  order  vagueness  is  thus 
to  embrace  the  rejection  of  the  second  premise  of  sorites-type  arguments,  but  to  maintain 
170 that  this  will  not,  as  is  usually  objected,  lead  to  a  further,  higher  order  sorites  centred 
around  the  boundary  between  True  and  Indefinite.  Although  this  border  is  assuredly 
vague,  it  is  not  vague  in  some  'higher-order'  sense;  instead,  the  presence  of  further 
members,  such  that  would  be  admitted  by  moving  to  four-  or  five-  values  and  beyond,  is 
itseýf  indefinite,  in  the  first  order  sense.  13 
One  might  perhaps  wonder,  at  this  stage,  why  Tye  admits  the  presence  of  any 
borderline  cases  at  all  -  he  might  have  offered  instead  an  account  which  suggested  that  it 
was  indefinite  whether  there  were  any  borderline  members  at  all,  between  those  members 
which  are  definitely  extensions  of  a  given  predicate,  and  those  which  are  not.  But,  recall, 
his  initial  criterion  requires  of  a  vague  set  that  it  has  borderline  members.  Presumably,  the 
reason  here  is  that  it  is  just  intuitive,  at  this  stage,  that  vague  sets  do  have  borderline 
members;  it  does  not  seem  intuitively  plausible  to  suggest  that  it  is  indefinite  whether  the 
set  of  surveyable  numbers  has  any  borderline  members;  for  example,  clearly,  there  are 
cases  of  men  with  some  hair  where  we  are  uncertain  as  to  the  correct  classification  of 
their  baldness  or  lack  of  it,  and  hence  the  set  contains  borderline  members.  Secondly, 
since  a  trivalent  logic  will  be  necessary  anyway,  to  make  the  claim  that  it  is  indefinite 
whether  there  are  further  members,  the  logic  already  supports  the  inclusion  of  'first- 
order'  indefinite  members. 
What  is  perhaps  most  attractive  about  Tye's  account  is  that  it  incorporates  the 
property  of  vagueness  into  the  account  of  vagueness.  Many  of  the  theories  of  vagueness 
attempt  to  solve  the  problem  by  providing  a  precise  description  of  the  notion  -  that  is, 
they  offer  a  reductive  account  of  vagueness  which  is  itseýf  determinate.  Even  in  many 
trivalent  solutions,  the  meta-language  attempts  to  be  precise,  in  that  sentences  in  the 
meta-language  are  expected  to  have  only  bivalent  truth  values.  It  is  true  that  there  are 
three  candidates  for  truth  function,  andfalse  that  there  are  any  more  than  this.  Tye's 
approach,  on  the  other  hand,  preserves  the  vagueness  in  the  meta-language.  Perhaps,  for 
some,  this  won't  look  like  much  of  a  solution  at  all.  Perhaps  Tye  seems  to  have  pushed 
13  Tye  acknowledges  that  some  objectors  may  here  wish  to  suggest  vicious  circularity,  but  his  response  is 
succinct  and  convincing  on  this  point.  He  has  three  reasons  for  denying  this  claim;  for  a  full  explanation  see 
Tye,  'Vague  objects',  pp.  545-6 
171 the  problem  back,  and  is  now  guilty  of  a  different  kind  of  higher-order  vagueness.  But  I 
think  rather  that  we  should  expect  the  vagueness  to  infect  the  meta-level;  if  it  does  not, 
we  seem  to  lose  the  original  concept.  It  is,  I  suggest,  an  implausible  task  to  precisify  the 
extension  of  vague  operators,  since  to  do  so  is  tantamount  to  insisting  that  they  are  not 
really  vague  at  all  -  or  only  vague  in  a  weak,  misunderstood  sense.  Surely  vagueness  is 
stronger  than  that.  Once  we  admit  that  vagueness  can  be  (in  any  sense)  sharply 
delineated,  we  lose  the  original  intent,  and  moreover  will  leave  ourselves  open  to 
precisely  the  kind  of  problems  posed  by  higher-order  vagueness  and  the  like. 
Surveyably-finite-valued  logic  as  a  solution  to  Higher  Order  Vagueness? 
I  believe  that  the  analysis  above  is  the  best  solution  to  the  problem  of  higher-order 
vagueness,  and  I  offer  it  as  a  solution  on  behalf  of  the  strict  finitist  attempting  to  advance 
a  constructivist  foundation  for  mathematics  which  retains  commitment  to  what  Dummett 
has  identified  as  weakly  finite  and  weakly  infinite  totalities.  Tye  has,  at  any  rate, 
illuminated  a  methodological  error  in  the  analysis  of  many  of  those  who  reject  the  three- 
valued  approach  to  vagueness,  in  that  a  denial  of  the  second  premise  in  sorites  arguments 
is  not  equivalent  to  an  assertion  that  the  premise  isfalse.  This  alone  should  give  us  cause 
to  consider  the  validity  of  such  rejections,  even  if  it  proves  to  be  the  case  that  Tye's 
solution  cannot  have  quite  the  range  of  application  he  desires  it  to  (to  the  extent  that  he 
wants  to  establish  a  corresponding  vagueness  about  concrete  objects),  and  even  if  it  were 
not  the  case  (although  I  suggest  it  is)  that  the  analysis  as  presented  proves  sufficient  to 
provide  a  robust  account  for  the  vagueness  inherent  in  the  case  of  predication  involving 
(mind-dependent)  abstract  objects,  such  as  in  the  example  of  Surveyability. 
However,  as  I  have  also  suggested  before,  I  am  not  convinced  that  this  is  the  only 
solution  for  strict  finitism,  and  that  the  theory  must  stand  or  fall  with  the  solution 
presented  here.  In  the  next  chapter,  I  shall  begin  to  look  at  alternative  formulations, 
which  do  not  accept  the  purported  commitment  to  weakly  finite  and  weakly  infinite 
172 totalities  in  the  first  instance.  Dummett  seems  to  simply  assume  that  the  commitment  is 
necessary,  and  there  is,  I  maintain,  a  good  deal  more  to  be  said  here. 
Before  I  proceed  to  this  discussion,  I  wish  to  conclude  this  chapter  with  an 
examination  of  what  I  referred  to  at  the  opening  of  the  previous  chapter  as  'surveyably- 
finite-valued  logic',  and  raise  one  or  two  further  issues  there.  I  consider  this  as  an 
alternative  solution  to  that  offered  above  in  light  of  Tye's  work,  and  one  which  is 
certainly  still  in  line  with  the  commitment  to  weakly  finite  and  weakly  infinite  totalities; 
although  it  is,  I  believe,  ultimately  unpromising.  Nonetheless,  it  seems  a  natural  extension 
of  the  earlier  ideas  I  have  presented,  and  so  I  offer  it  partly  for  the  sake  of  completeness. 
The  conjecture  of  a  surveyable-finite-valued  logic  follows  on  from  consideration 
of  infinite-valued  logics;  for  example,  the  logic  proposed  by  degree  theory.  As  I  have 
said,  infinitely-valued  theories  are  obviously  not  available  on  any  kind  of  strict  finitist 
approach.  And  the  major  problem  for  finitely-valued  theories  14,  like  many  three-valued 
theories,  is  that  of  higher-order  vagueness;  no  matter  how  many  values  we  retreat  to,  we 
always  meet  the  objection  that  there  might  then  be  sharp  boundaries  between  members  of 
a  given  totality  when  divided  into  groups  possessing  these  distinct  values. 
However,  there  is  a  further  thought  here,  and  that  is  simply  that  for  all  practical 
applications,  we  will  always  only  need  a  finitely-grained  theory.  That  is  to  say,  in  the 
example  mentioned  previously,  if  we  consider  a  set  of  eight  men,  we  will  only  ever  (at 
most)  require  eight  truth  values  to  properly  ascribe  any  (vague)  predicates  to  them.  The 
problem  of  which  of  them  are  bald  is  no  problem  if  we  can  have  (at  most)  eight  'degrees' 
of  baldness  into  which  to  categorise  them,  such  that  it  is  100%  True  of  this  one,  say,  90% 
of  this  one,  65%  true  of  this,  and  so  on.  Moreover,  for  any  finite  set,  we  will  only  ever 
need  a  finite  number  of  truth-values.  For  any  given  case,  the  practical  assignment  of  truth 
values  will  only  ever  require  a  finite  number  of  values.  The  problem  of  sharp  boundaries 
need  not  arise  -  there  are  (unproblematic)  sharp  boundaries,  provided  that  we  have  the 
requisite  number  of  values  to  distinguish  between  different  cases.  Now  clearly,  eight  is 
14  Though  not  necessarily  exclusively  -  as  I  have  previously  remarked,  the  most  forceful  of  the  higher- 
order  objections  looks  to  be  a  problem  for  infinitely-valued  theories  too. 
173 not  sufficient  for  all  cases,  so  we  might  need  a  good  deal  more  for  a  general  theory  of  this 
kind.  Indeed,  generalising  for  all  cases,  it  might  look  as  if  we  need  to  move  towards  at 
least  a  potentially  infinite  number  -  at  least,  it  must  be  large  enough  to  distinguish 
between  cases  in  the  largest  possible  set  with  the  largest  possible  variety.  And  even  if  we 
need  not  necessarily  accept  infinite  sets  at  this  point,  a  number  of  this  magnitude  is 
clearly  well  without  the  bounds  of  surveyability  -  and  hence  should  be  rejected  by  the 
Strict  Finitist,  it  seems. 
But  now  let  us  consider  the  case  of  Surveyability  only.  It  is,  I  expect,  plausible  to 
suggest  that  1  is  100%  surveyable  (so  possesses  the  first  truth  value,  say  T  1)  and  some 
number-pattern  (2k,  in  earlier  examples)  is  0%  surveyable  (and  so  possesses  the  last  truth 
value,  say  FO).  Now,  for  all  numbers  in-between,  they  will  possess  a  degree  of  truth  with 
respect  to  surveyability  of  equal  to  or  between  T,  and  Fo.  The  precise  extension  of  each 
truth  value,  whether  by  complexity,  or  individually  with  respect  to  each  number  will 
depend  upon  the  successful  application  of  criteria  already  much  discussed,  but  it  should 
be  reasonably  clear  that  we  will  never  require  more  truth-values  than  there  are  positive 
integers.  15  And  so,  with  respect  to  numbers,  as  a  Strict  Finitist  will  define  them,  we  will 
only  ever  need  a  finite  number  of  truth  values  to  correctly  assign  the  Surveyability 
predicate  to  them.  Moreover,  since  it  will  never  be  false  of  this  number  (the  number  of 
truth  values)  that  it  is  surveyable,  it  follows  that  only  a  surveyably-  finite  number  of 
values  will  be  required.  So  it  seems  as  though  we  may  operate  with  a  surveyably-finite- 
valued  logic  which  will  nonetheless  be  able  to  correctly  assign  the  truth  of  the  predicate 
'is  surveyable'  to  every  object  in  the  domain. 
As  I  said,  this  seems  in  some  ways  a  natural  extension  to  the  previous  discussion 
about  many-valued  theories.  However,  I  have  also  described  it  as  an  unpromising 
solution,  one  of  the  principle  reasons  being  that  it  doesn't  seem  easily  generalisable  as  a 
solution  to  vagueness.  Perhaps,  insofar  as  it  refers  to  numbers  (and  numbers  as  mind- 
15  This  may,  in  fact,  only  be  entirely  clear  if  we  are  considering  the  totality  of  positive  integers.  But  as  I 
explained  in  a  previous  chapter,  I  think  similar  considerations  may  be  applied  to  various  other  totalities, 
such  as  the  reals;  I  find  it  reasonable  that  the  number  0.2  will  be  just  as  surveyable  as  some  integer, 
although  the  precise  value  will  depend  upon  which  integer,  given  both  notation  and  ease  of  intuitive  grasp, 
is  roughly  equivalent. 
174 dependent  constructions  at  that),  there  is  some  potential  application  here,  but  one  might 
think  that  any  proposed  solution  to  the  problems  of  vagueness  should  be  capable  of  wider 
application,  and  not  advanced  simply  on  a  needs-related,  individual  case  basis.  There  is 
also  perhaps  a  more  specific  objection  here  too  -  the  thought  may  be  that  if  there  can  be 
vague  objects,  for  example,  like  mountains,  whose  properties  do  not  depend  upon  us  in 
any  relevant  sense,  then  a  surveyably-finite-valued  logic  will  be  inapplicable,  since  the 
variation  required  in  the  'degrees'  of  truth  would  depend  upon  the  actual  amount  of 
variation  in  objects  (in  the  case  of  the  mountain,  something  like  the  variation  in  relative 
proximity  of  molecules),  and  not  on  our  intellectual  limits. 
Well,  to  both  the  general  and  specific  objections,  I  should  firstly  like  to  observe 
that  I  do  not  think  that  a  surveyably-finite-valued  solution  is  restricted  solely  to  the  case 
of  surveyability;  and  while  I  shall  devote  no  more  time  to  its  development  here,  I  suggest 
that  it  seems  plausible  that  it  would  equally  well  deal  with  vagueness  of  any  kind  that  in 
some  sense  depended  on,  or  arose  from  interaction  with,  us.  And  furthermore,  the  idea 
that  vagueness  might,  as  a  whole,  require  more  than  one  solution  is  not  altogether 
unpalatable.  More  than  one  commentator  in  the  literature  has  drawn  a  distinction  between 
different  kinds  of  vagueness  -  Dummett  himself  makes  a  distinction  between  what  he 
describes  as  'observational'  predicates,  including  among  them  those  vague  predicates 
whose  vagueness  has  its  source  in  the  non-transitivity  of  non-discriminable  difference, 
and  those  predicates  where  we  might  think  the  source  of  vagueness  were  simply  an 
under-determination  of  (something  like)  semantic  convention.  So,  if  such  distinctions  are 
genuine,  need  we  expect  there  to  be  a  general  solution?  It  may  well  be  the  case  that  if 
there  is  more  than  one  source  of  vagueness,  there  may  be  more  than  one  problem  here. 
As  a  result,  as  long  as  a  surveyably-finitely-valued  logic  were  locally  generalisable,  that 
is  to  say  that  it  could  be  applied  to  any  vague  predicates  that  were  relevantly  similar  (in 
kind,  or  rather  such  that  the  sources  of  vagueness  in  each  case  were  of  a  sufficiently 
similar  kind),  then  I  do  not  see  why  one  should  necessarily  expect  it  to  be  generalisable  in 
any  wider  sense. 
175 Of  course,  this  is  not  to  detennine  the  precise  scope  of  application  of  the  solution, 
and  it  may  turn  out  that  the  scope  is  too  narrow  to  be  of  genuine  use.  It  will  not  be 
ordinarily  applicable  to  colour  predicates,  for  example,  unless  they  are  as  Dummett 
describes,  entirely  governed  by  what  looks  a  certain  colour  to  us.  If  this  is  the  case  then, 
again,  our  ability  to  recognise  different  colours  will  be  important,  and  we  will  not  need 
any  more  truth  values  than  the  'grainedness'  of  our  perception  warrants.  But  even  if 
Dummett  is  right  about  colour  predicates  in  this  way,  it  still  looks  entirely  contingent  that 
the  number  of  colours  that  we  are  capable  of  discriminating  is  itself  surveyable 
(assuming,  in  fact,  that  it  is).  Moreover,  I  have  taken  pains  elsewhere  to  suggest  that 
surveyability  is  not  of  the  kind  of  vagueness  that  Dummett  describes  as  Observational  in 
this  sense,  so  even  if  the  application  were  to  be  (contingently)  applicable  in  the  case  of 
observational  predicates,  it  is  unlikely  to  be  because  they  share  a  'type'  with  the  predicate 
'is  surveyable'. 
Since  I  can  provide  no  clear  solution  to  the  objections  outlined,  I  do  not  propose 
to  take  the  idea  of  surveyably-finite-valued  logic  seriously  as  a  solution  to  vagueness, 
even  in  the  restricted  case.  There  does  however  remain  something  intuitive  about  the  idea 
that  the  more  truth  values  we  have  access  to,  the  less  unappealing  the  notion  of  sharp 
boundaries  becomes,  when  presented  with  any  practical  assignment  of  truth.  And  the 
thought  that  for  our  understanding  of  truth,  at  least,  a  surveyable  number  will  suffice  for 
any  given  assignment  in  this  way,  also  remains  intuitively  plausible'  6. 
16  In  addition,  the  surveyably  finite-valued  approach  relates  quiet  closely  to  the  broadly  episten-&1st 
approach  to  finitism  that  I  shall  outline  in  the  next  chapter.  So  we  shall  return  to  something  Ue  it  shortly. 
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Finally,  I  wish  to  suggest  and  examine  some  further  possibilities  for  the  strict 
finitist,  following  on  from  a  much  earlier  observation  that  the  commitment  to  weakly 
finite  and  weakly  infinite  totalities  has  been  simply  assumed  by  some  commentators, 
and  it  does  not  seem  to  me  to  be  a  necessary  feature  of  strict  finitary  theories.  I  hope  I 
have  shown  that  commitment  to  such  totalities  is  not,  in  fact,  inconsistent  for  the  strict 
finitist,  and  I  have  offered  an  account  of  vagueness  for  surveyability,  following  the 
work  of  Michael  Tye,  that  attempts  to  avoid  the  problems  raised  by  Dummett  and 
others.  To  the  extent  that  such  a  solution  may  continue  to  be  supported,  I  suggest  that 
strict  finitism,  even  one  committed  to  totalities  of  the  kind  proposed,  remains  a  viable 
theory  for  the  foundation  of  mathematics.  However,  a  number  of  considerations  have 
led  me  to  question  whether,  in  fact,  the  strict  finitist  should  admit  that  the  totality  of 
(surveyable)  numbers  is  both  weakly  finite  and  weakly  infinite  as  Dummett  defines 
them;  and  I  will  outline  these  considerations,  and  the  corresponding  alternative 
formulations,  in  what  follows  here. 
It  is  perhaps  worth  taking  a  moment  here  to  explain  the  structure  of  this 
debate,  and  its  relation  to  what  has  been  discussed  in  previous  chapters.  I  see  the 
question  of  whether  a  strict  finitist  needs  to  be  committed  to  these  totalities  in  the  first 
place  as  essentially  distinct  from  the  issue  of  whether  or  not  the  contradiction 
suggested  by  Dummett  can  be  countered.  That  is  to  say,  although  I  have  offered  a 
rejection  of  the  purported  inconsistency,  I  suggest  that  the  strict  finitist  has  the  option 
of  not  needing  to  do  so,  if  she  rejects  instead  the  idea  that  the  totalities  to  which  she  is 
committed  need  be  both  (or  indeed  either)  in  the  first  place.  Now,  assuredly,  there 
remains  a  problem  for  totalities  like  'the  number  of  heartbeats  in  my  childhood',  and 
if  the  strict  finitist  accepts  the  definitions  for  'weakly  infinite'  and  'weakly  finite'  she 
must  surely  agree  that  such  a  totality  seems  to  be  both,  and  hence  problematic;  but 
this  looks  like  a  perfectly  general  problem,  and  a  problem  indeed  for  Durnmett. 
Presumably  Dummett  must  agree  that  such  a  totality  is  both  weakly  finite  and  weakly 
infinite  -  and  yet  it  seems  odd  to  doubt  as  a  consequence  that  there  is  a  genuinely 
plausible  totality  of  heartbeats  in  my  childhood.  The  problem  of  the  apparently 
contrasting  definitions  need  not  necessarily  be  addressed  by  the  strict  finitist,  then; 
since,  as  I  shall  show  in  this  chapter,  she  is  entitled  to  accept  only  one  (or  indeed 
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she  is  committed. 
Let  us  begin  with  an  examination  of  the  first  of  these  possibilities:  an 
acceptance  of  the  weakly  finite  definition,  and  a  rejection  of  the  weakly  infinite. 
Rejecting  the  'weaklyfinite' 
L:  7 
The  strict  finitist  has  (at  least)  two  options  in  rejecting  the  definition  of  the 
totality  as  given;  firstly,  we  may  reject  the  claim  that  the  totality  in  question  is  weakly 
infinite.  That  is  to  say,  we  might  try  to  give  an  account  in  which  there  is  a  last 
member,  even  if  we  cannot  give  the  precise  last  member.  This  may  sound  like  a 
broadly  epistemicist  response;  and  I  have  so  far  rejected  epistemic  accounts  of 
vagueness  for  surveyability,  partly  because  it  does  not  seem  plausible  that there  will 
be  a  'fact  of  the  matter',  at  the  world-level,  as  it  were,  regarding  mind-dependent 
constructs,  and  secondly,  because  it  does  not  seem  plausible  that  this  fact  of  the  matter 
obtains  independently  of  the  differing  capacities  of  individual  surveyors.  However,  I 
will  go  on  to  consider  a  special  case,  later  in  the  chapter,  which  I  believe  may  provide 
a  plausible  route  to  this  sort  of  solution,  while  avoiding  the  apparent  conflict  with  a 
more  traditional  epistemicist  account. 
The  second  option,  and  the  one  I  shall  begin  with,  is  that  the  strict  finitist 
might  deny  that  the  totality  of  (surveyable)  numbers  is  weaklyfinite  (that  is,  we  may 
deny  that  the  totality  is  upper-bound  -  deny  that  we  can  genuinely  give  an  example  of 
a  number  which  is  not  in  the  totality).  The  suggestion  that  we  cannot  stipulate  a 
number  such  that  it  is  not  in  the  totality  is  actually  intuitively  plausible  in  the  strict 
finitist  case,  especially  considering  the  constructivist  root  of  strict  finitism:  it  is  not  as 
if  we  can  provide  an  example  of  an  unsurveyable  number,  strictly  speaking.  Note  that 
this  is  a  significant  difference  between  the  case  of  surveyability  and  various  other 
cases  of  vagueness  -  while  we  are  clearly  able  to  provide  examples  of  non-bald  men, 
say,  the  strict  finitist  will  not  be  willing  to  admit  that  there  genuinely  are  examples  of 
non-surveyable  numbers.  As  I  have  earlier  described,  the  strict  finitist  should, 
properly  speaking,  resist  the  classical  use  of  'number',  since  to  count  as  an  admissible 
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speak  instead  of  proto-numbers  (or  number-patterns,  or  some  such)  as  contrasted  with 
genuine  numbers  -  the  latter  of  which  will  of  course  only  ever  be  surveyable. 
We  are  still  left  with  a  traditional  problem,  in  this  case  that  of  identifying  the 
last  number.  But  remember,  under  this  option,  the  strict  finitist  remains  happy  with 
the  definition  of  the  totality  as  being  weakly  infinite,  and  so  no  definite  last  member 
should  be  expected.  The  totality  is  not  infinite  in  the  traditional  sense,  of  course  -  it  is 
still  not  closed  under  the  successor  operation,  for  example.  The  claim  that  the  totality 
is  not  bounded-above  is  not  tantamount  to  admitting  that  it  is  (strongly)  infinite  -just 
because  there  is  no  boundary  it  does  not  follow  that  the  totality  extends  indefinitely. 
Conceptually,  the  distinction  here  is  rather  like  that  between  the  potential  infinite  and 
the  actual  infinite. 
Let  us  look  at  the  suggestion  a  little  more  closely.  In  rejecting  only  the  weakly 
finite  part  of  the  definition,  the  strict  finitist  retains  the  idea  that the  totality  is  indeed 
weakly  infinite,  and  that  it  will  therefore  be  the  case  that  there  is  no  number  that  is 
surveyable  but  such  its  successor  is  not.  Fonnally,  where  S(x)  applies  the  predicate  'is 
surveyable'  to  x,  and  x'  is  again  the  successor  of  x: 
-3X  (S(X)  A  -S(X'))  (1) 
But  at  the  same  time,  the  strict  finitist  in  this  case  is  rejecting  that the  totality 
is  weakly  finite,  such  that  it  is  not  the  case  that  there  is  an  example  beyond  the  upper 
boundary: 
-3x  -S(X) 
The  strict  finitist  will  now  make  one  of  two  claims.  Firstly,  he  may  say  that 
there  is  no  number  such  that  it  is  not  surveyable,  because  all  numbers,  (as  properly 
understood),  are  surveyable  -  by  definition.  That  is,  from  (2),  we  can  straight- 
forwardly  (and  using  only  classical  logic)  derive: 
Vx  S(X)  (3) 
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strict  finitist.  If  the  domain  is  surveyable  numbers  (since  numbers  are  surveyable  by 
definition  on  this  response),  then  it  is  simply  tautological  to  say  of  them  that  they  are 
all  surveyable.  But  this  is  perhaps  to  be  expected  on  such  an  account,  since  what  we 
are  essentially  suggesting  is  that  the  totality  of  possible  numbers  is  that  of  surveyable 
numbers.  It  is  precisely  a  rejection  of  the  platonist  conception  of  the  number  line 
which  motivates  this  position  in  the  first  place. 
The  alternative  response  at  this  point  might  be  to  resist  the  strong  claim  that  all 
numbers  are  surveyable,  and  instead  stick  with  (2),  and  make  a  weaker  (more 
agnostic)  claim,  in  line  with  intuitionistic  ideas  about  mathematics,  that  there  is  no 
number  which  lacks  the  property  of  being  surveyable.  Notice  that  in  intuitionistic 
logic,  (2)  does  not  entail  (3),  so,  as  long  as  commitment  to  (at  least)  intuitionistic  logic 
is  acknowledged,  the  strict  finitist  is  entitled  to  the  latter  claim  without  admitting  the 
former. 
It  is  not  clear  that  this  second  response  is  particularly  advantageous  over  the 
first,  however;  even  in  (2)  the  strict  finitist  would  have  to  agree  that  the  range  of  the 
quantifier  includes  only  surveyable  objects,  and  so  if  there  is  a  genuine  problem  with 
the  stronger  assertion  (3)  there  is  an  equal  problem  for  this  account.  The  strict  finitist 
is  entitled  to  assert  (3)  here  because  if  it  is  false  that  something  is  surveyable,  it  is  also 
false  that  it  is  a  number.  So  S(x)  cannot  be  false  for  anything  in  the  domain. 
Additionally,  the  strict  finitist  might  have  a  good  independent  reason  for 
rejecting  the  definition  of  weakly  finite  as  provided  by  Dummett.  Dummett's 
definition  is  essentially  that  a  totality  is  weakly  finite  if  and  only  if  there  exists  a  finite 
ordinal  n  such  that  there  is  a  well-ordering  of  the  totality  with  no  nth  member.  But 
now  consider  the  finite  ordinals  themselves.  Presumably  Dummett's  strict  finitist 
should  think  this  is  a  weakly  finite  totality  -  but  that  requires  a  well  ordering  of  it  with 
no  nth  member  for  somefinite  ordinal  n.  And  this  looks  to  entail  an  immediate 
contradiction. 
The  rejection  of  the  'weakly  finite'  is  then  I  suggest  also  a  promising 
alternative  for  the  strict  finitist.  I  shall  now  move  on  to  a  discussion  of  the  rejection  of 
the  'weakly  infinite'  restriction;  the  strict  finitist  is,  as  I  have  suggested,  able  to  reject 
180 either  or  both  of  these  restrictions,  and  the  theory  I  shall  ultimately  offer  in  this 
chapter  relies  on  neither  definition,  as  we  shall  see,  but  arises  out  of  considerations 
relating  to  the  rejection  of  the  weakly  infinite  restriction.  It  is,  I  think,  entirely 
compatible  with  the  weakly  finite  restriction,  although,  especially  following  the 
remarks  above,  it  is  not  obvious  why  anyone  should  wish  it  to  be  so  at  this  stage. 
Rejecting  the  'weakly  infinite' 
The  rejection  of  the  weakly  infinite  constraint  may  seem  like  an  odd  route  for 
the  strict  finitist.  Certainly,  the  claim  that there  is  no  last  member  is  the  focus  of  many 
problems  for  strict  finitism,  especially  when  coupled  with  the  suggestion  that  this 
nonetheless  does  not  entail  that  the  members  continue  on  ad  infinitum,  as  it  were.  And 
the  stipulation  of  an  actual  last  member  might  suggest  that  commitment  to  vagueness 
need  not  after  all  be  necessary  for  strict  finitism.  But  any  such  stipulation  looks 
implausible,  along  lines  I  have  already  much  discussed.  Various  important  questions 
must  be  answered.  Broadly,  the  most  significant  ones  are  as  follows: 
i)  If  there  is  a  last  number,  what  is  it? 
ii)  Why  can't  we  just  add  one  to  it? 
iii)  And  doesn't  it  have  to  be  the  same  for  all  people? 
In  an  earlier  chapter,  I  commented  that  the  second  of  these  three  questions 
might  be  met  be  a  strict  finitist  who  was  tempted  to  stipulate  a  last  (largest)  number; 
the  strict  finitist,  I  remarked,  might  simply  insist  that  if  it  is  the  last  number  it  is 
precisely  so  because  you  cannot  add  to  it.  Various  philosophers  and  mathematicians 
have  already  begun  to  develop  an  arithmetic  along  these  lines  -  Yesinin-Volpin  for 
example.  But  it  still  seems  to  me  that  the  problem  raised  by  the  third  question  looks 
insuperable  for  any  account  that  stipulates  of  numbers  that  they  are  or  are  not 
surveyable.  People  have  differing  abilities  to  survey;  the  need  to  generalise  does  not 
take  adequate  account  of  the  relativity  of  the  'human  factor'  in  such  accounts. 
Moreover,  when  it  comes  to  answering  the  first  question,  most  commentators  are 
silent.  This  is  perhaps  to  be  expected,  since  the  construction  of  such  a  number  is 
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actually  achieve.  So  what  are  we  to  say?  That  there  is  a  largest  number,  but  we  don't 
(perhaps  can't)  know  what  it  is? 
This  is  of  course  the  response  suggested  by  the  epistemicist  account  of 
vagueness,  but  I  have  also  previously  remarked  that  this  looks  perhaps  especially 
unpromising  for  an  account  of  surveyability,  largely  because  any  such  account  must 
surely  answer  yes  to  question  three  above,  when  such  an  answer  just  looks  wrong  in 
the  face  of  what  actually  goes  on  when  surveying  numbers.  But  perhaps  the  questions 
are  separable,  as  I  have  separated  them  in  this  list;  and  one  might  reasonably  ask 
whether  the  epistemicist  response  is  sufficient  if  a  convincing  solution  to  the  problem 
of  multiple  surveyors  might  be  found. 
I  hope  to  provide  answers  to  all  these  questions  in  what  follows;  and  not  least, 
to  provide  an  account  of  a  form  of  strict  finitism  that  I  believe  will  enable  us  to  deny 
that  strict  finitism  is  committed  to  weakly  infinite  totalities  in  the  first  place  -  indeed, 
they  may  simply  require  only  a  strongly  (ordinarily)  finite  one  -  while  providing  us 
with  satisfactory  answers  to  the  problems  raised  in  questions  i)-iii)  above.  Before  I 
begin,  let  me  be  certain  I  have  been  clear  about  the  motivation:  we  reject  the  idea  that 
strict  finitistic  totalities  are  weakly  infinite,  and  so  we  reject  the  claim  that,  for  the 
totality  of  surveyable  numbers: 
-3x  (S(x)A  -S(x')). 
More  specifically,  we  are  here  considering  the  plausibility  of  a  strict  finitism 
that  is  committed  to  the  positive  claim  that  there  is  a  largest  surveyable  number: 
(  3X  S(X)  )A(  -3y  (Y>X)  ) 
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Firstly,  let  me  outline  precisely  what  I  intend  when  I  suggest  that  we  may 
stipulate,  with  such  a  theory,  that  there  is  a  last  number.  Admittedly,  my  aim  here  is  to 
explore  an  alternative  formulation,  which  is  intended  to  overcome  the  related  worries 
of  a  'vague  limit'  to  the  admissible  numbers,  by  a  stipulation,  in  a  sense,  of  a  precise 
limit.  I  do  not,  however,  wish  to  make  that  stipulation  arbitrarily  -  nor  do  I  anticipate 
the  uncovering  of  a  particular  number  x,  such  that  no  greater  number  is  surveyable.  It 
seems  to  me  that  such  alternatives  are  unpromising.  Following  the  first  option,  it 
seems  that  any  arbitrary  stipulation  simply  will  not  do,  for  the  perfectly  plausible 
reason  that  even  if  I  were  to  uncover  a  number  such  that  at  that  precise  moment  I  was 
incapable  of  understanding  (that  is,  of  surveying)  another  -  slightly  greater  -  one,  there 
is  no  reason  why  I  may  not  do  so  at  another  time,  nor  indeed  would  it  prevent 
someone  with  a  better  capacity  for  surveying  doing  precisely  that.  Moreover,  while  a 
completely  arbitrary  stipulation  may  trivially  solve  the  problem  of  vagueness  -  if  I 
were  to  suggest,  for  example,  that  there  are  precisely  10  10  surveyable  numbers  and  no 
more  -I  have  no  better  reason  for  choosing  one  particular  number  over  another; 
indeed  no  reason  to  choose  any  one  at  all. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  project  of  uncovering  a  number  such  that  no  greater 
number  is  surveyable,  just  as  a  matter  of  fact,  seems  equally  doomed  to  failure  -  why 
should  there  be  such  a  number?  Indeed,  if  we  are  serious  about  surveyability,  it  must 
be  admitted  that  one's  ability  to  survey  varies,  and  the  ability  varies  between 
individuals.  Unless  the  number  lies  considerably  above  my  own  ability  to  survey,  to 
allow  for  better  minds,  present  or  future,  then  it  seems  ridiculously  counter-intuitive 
to  suggest  that  there  might  be  a  matter  of  fact  about  numbers  such  that  even  with  the 
apparent  mental  capacity  to  construct  and  survey  numbers  above  a  certain  point,  we 
would  not  be  able  to  do  so.  And  if  the  limit  were  considerably  above  my  (or  anyone 
else's)  ability  to  survey,  it  is  unclear  how  we  would  go  about  identifying  it;  moreover, 
the  stipulation,  construed  in  this  way,  seems  to  possess  a  most  peculiar  quality  -  the 
proposal  entails  that  there  is  a  number,  above  which  I  cannot  survey,  which  itself  lies 
well  above  my  capacity  to  survey. 
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since  I  have  already  said  that  neither  of  these  options  amounts  to  what  I  wish  to 
propose  here.  Instead,  I  want  to  extend  the  constructivist  line  of  the  strict  finitist  in  a 
natural,  if  perhaps  unusual  direction.  One  motivation  behind  the  strict  finitist  claim,  as 
I  have  previously  described,  is  that  the  intuitionists  do  not  go  far  enough  -  in  short, 
they  are  wrong  to  stop  at  in  principle  possibility  (for  the  construction  of  numbers), 
and  instead  should  desire  in  practice  possibility.  Now,  I  suggest,  there  is  a  further  line 
of  thought  that  suggests  that  even  this  is  not  rigorous  enough,  on  a  constructivist 
account;  and  that  what  we  should  be  concerned  with  is  in  practice  actuality.  The 
central  thought  is  then  something  like  this:  the  genuine  numbers  are  only  those  mental 
constructions  that  have  been  (surveyably)  constructed'.  At  any  given  time  t,  the 
totality  of  numbers  comprises  precisely  those  numbers  that  have  been  surveyably 
constructed  up  to  time  t.  Similarly,  the  largest  number  at  time  t  is  always  precisely  the 
largest  number  that  has  been  surveyably  constructed  by  time  t.  Note  that  the 
requirement  is  not  that  the  number  is  present  in  a  mind  at  the  time  -  one  does  not  have 
to  actually  be  surveying  a  number  for  it  to  count;  such  a  requirement  would 
hopelessly  narrow  the  surveyability  constraint.  Rather,  numbers  are  mental 
constructions,  and  as  such  do  not  exist  until  they  have  been  constructed. 
This  may  seem  counter-intuitive  for  a  number  of  reasons,  but  let  me  deal  with 
the  first  and  most  obvious  objection  straight  away.  Initially,  it  seems  wildly 
implausible  to  suggest  that  even  the  numbers  3  and  22,  for  example,  were  not  to  count 
as  legitimate  numbers  prior  to  their  construction  in  a  mind.  But  let  us  consider  the 
following  analogy.  Suppose  I  wish  to  construct  a  new  alphabet.  Perhaps  I  have  a  new 
language  in  mind,  or  else  I  am  trying  to  catalogue  one  which  has  so  far  only  had  a 
spoken  component,  and  I  do  not  wish  to  use  an  existing  language  in  case  I  mis- 
represent  the  spoken  language  as  a  result.  Now,  let  us  say  that  I  construct  fifteen 
letters  in  this  alphabet,  no  more  and  no  less.  Now  it  is  correct  to  say  that  my  alphabet 
has  fifteen  letters  in  it,  and  it  is  absurd  to  suggest  that  it  has  infinitely  many  (or  indeed 
any  higher  number  of)  letters  in  it,  but  that  only  fifteen  have  been  identified.  Nor  does 
this  preclude  me  from  adding  to  the  alphabet  at  a  later  stage  -  after  cataloguing  the 
II  constructions.  I  include  the  prefix  here  Not  that  I  wish  to  imply  that  there  can  be  unsurveyable  mental  I 
rather  to  remind  the  reader  that  the  constructivism  under  consideration  is  defined  by  surveyable 
operations. 
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the  subtleties  of  the  spoken  language  properly,  so  I  add  five  more  letters  to 
compensate  for  the  deficit.  Now  surely  it  is  correct  to  say  that  there  are  twenty  letters 
in  the  alphabet,  but  not  that  there  always  were.  There  is  an  obvious  objection,  of 
course,  that  numbers  are  not  like  letters,  and  that  alphabets  are  designed  with  a  certain 
number  of  letters,  even  if  that  number  may  be  expanded;  whereas  numbers  are 
representative  of  a  formal  system,  with  rules  governing  their  continued  creation, 
according  to  a  fixed  framework.  Well,  the  first  response  to  such  an  objection  is  simply 
a  note  of  caution:  we  must  be  careful  not  to  think  about  numbers  in  the  familiar 
platonistic  framework  -  remember  that  the  claim  of  the  constructivist  is  that  numbers 
are  mind-dependent  constructions;  our  framework  is  not  as  fixed  as  all  that.  But  this 
note  aside,  we  may  press  the  analogy  further  to  respond  to  such  a  challenge.  Let  us 
say  that  I  tire  of  my  task  of  cataloguing  the  language,  or  else  that  it  is  so  vast  in 
linguistic  variety  and  vocabulary  that  I  cannot  possibly  hope  to  catalogue  it  in  the 
course  of  my  lifetime,  and so  instead  I  leave  instructions  for  anyone  who  wishes  to 
carry  on.  I  want  to  preserve  the  original  intent,  that  is  the  faithful  representation  in  a 
dedicated  and  corresponding  alphabet,  so  among  my  instructions  I  include  certain 
rules  for  the  creation  of  further  letters  of  the  alphabet,  such  that  my  rules  constrain 
how  the  letters  may  be  formed,  but  do  not  constrain  how  many  are  constructed;  I  may 
say  that  they  must  all  contain  a  certain  number  of  strokes,  for  example,  or  else  that  the 
shapes  that  appear  in  them  appear  in  certain  complicated  and  recurring  patterns.  And 
my  rules  are  so  specific  that  those  who  pick  up  my  endeavours  have  no  choice  but  to 
create  letters  of  exact  shape  in  a  certain  order  when  they  find  a  need  for  them,  even 
though  I  have  not  done  so,  for  I  do  not  know  how  many  will  be  needed,  and  of  course 
I  do  not  wish  the  alphabet  to  have  redundant  letters.  Now,  even  though  there  are  rules 
for  the  addition  of  letters,  is  it  now  true  to  say  that  the  alphabet  has  a  limitless  number 
of  letters  in  it?  No  -  it  has  precisely  the  number  required;  precisely  the  letters  that 
have  been  constructed  as  needed.  If  I  do  nothing  more  than  I  have  already  done  except 
to  make  explicit  my  rules  for  continuing,  then  the  alphabet  has  twenty  letters  in  it.  If, 
later,  someone  finds  a  need  for  two  more,  and  constructs  them  in  accordance  with  my 
rules,  there  are  twenty-two  letters  in  the  alphabet. 
This  example  may  seem  fanciful,  but  a  little  reflection  reveals  that  it  is  not  so 
outlandish  a  suggestion.  Japanese,  for  example,  has  three  alphabets,  one  of  which  is  a 
pictorial  alphabet,  which  continues  to  expand,  as  new  letters  are  required  for 
185 previously  non-existent  words  (such  as  those  corresponding  to  new  inventions  or 
advances  and  discoveries  in  one  of  many  diverse  fields).  Presumably  there  are  some 
rules  for  the  creation  of  new  letters  in  such  an  alphabet  -  they  must  not  be  identical 
with  pre-existing  letters,  and  they  must  bear  some  similarity  to  letters  for  similar 
words,  etc. 
Let  me  take  care  to  identify  the  intended  analogy  here.  The  suggestion  is  not,  of 
course,  that  numbers  are  simply  an  alphabet,  but  rather  that,  as  in  the  example  of  the 
new  alphabet  above,  they  are  mental  constructions  that  must  be  constructed  in  order  to 
exist.  Indeed  this  seems  to  me  to  be  an  intuitive  requirement  of  the  constructivist 
account  -  it  seems  a  little  peculiar,  as  an  ontology,  to  allow  things  that  are  only 
potentially  so,  to  be  so. 
There  is  one  other  pertinent  analogy  to  be  drawn  from  the  example  at  this 
point.  It  may  be  objected  that  numbers  are  different  in  this  sense  -  that  we  may  ask,  of 
a  string  of  numerals,  whether  it  marks  a  surveyable  number;  and  we  may  do  so  prior 
to  any  attempt  to  'mentally  construct',  or  survey  the  inscription.  But  this  is  surely  true 
also  in  the  case  of  letters  for  the  expandable  alphabet  -I  may  make  a  few  random 
marks  on  a  piece  of  paper  and  ask  if  it  marks a  letter  that  is  in  the  completed  alphabet. 
On  the  one  hand,  of  course,  there  is  no  way  to  answer  the  question  unless  the  letter  (or 
number)  is  constructed,  (in  the  relevant  sense)  2,  or  at  least  unless  an  attempt  is  made. 
Moreover,  such  a  question  presupposes  a  determinate  set  of  constructions  (letters  or 
numbers),  taken,  as  it  were,  over  all  time.  But  precisely  the  distinguishing  feature  of 
such  an  account  is  that  the  size  of  the  set  can  only  be  judged  at  a  given  time,  and  is 
determined  even  then  by  contingent  events. 
To  recap,  the  claim  of  fanatical  finitism  is  this:  the  numbers  (and  statements, 
and  proofs)  that  we  should  legitimately  accept  as  mathematical  entities  are  only  those 
which  have  been  surveyably  constructed.  The  totality  of  (legitimate)  numbers  is 
always  determinate,  that  is,  it  has  a  precise  membership,  but  the  size  of  that  totality 
2  We  must  be  careful  here  to  avoid  a  further  complication  regarding  the  notion  of  'surveyability';  it  is 
no  complaint  to  object  that  surveyability  does  not  arise  in  the  example  of  the  alphabet.  Certainly,  in  this 
case,  there  is  no  issue  of  surveyabilit  y,  at  least  not  one  that  is  relevant  to  the  example.  The  analogy  is 
drawn  instead  between  'required  by  the  language'  for  the  letters  and  'surveyable'  in  the  case  of 
numbers. 
The  language  exists,  and  is  not  infinite  in  scope;  hence  the  scope  of  the  alphabet  is  limited. 
186 vanes  wit  time,  such  that  the  members  of  the  totality  at  time  t  comprise  precisely 
those  numbers  which  have  been  surveyably  constructed  by  time  t.  The  largest  number 
at  time  t  is  simply  the  largest  number  to  have  been  surveyably  constructed  by  time  t. 
So  how  does  fanatical  finitism  offer  answers  to  the  three  broad  questions  I 
asked  at  the  outset  of  this  section?  Firstly,  to  the  question  'What  is  the  largest 
numberT,  fanatical  finitism  will  I  suspect  provide  a  standardly  episternicist  response; 
we  do  not  know  what  the  largest  number  is,  since  there  is  no  (practical)  way  to 
canvass  the  largest  number  that  has  been  surveyed.  3  Nonetheless,  there  will  be  a  fact 
of  the  matter. 
To  the  second  question,  the  familiar  objection  to  strict  finitism,  which  runs 
,4  'Why  can't  we  simply  add  one  to  the  largest  number?  ,  we  are  in  a  position  to  give  a 
fresh  answer,  which  seems  to  have  at  least  intuitive  merit  -  the  answer  is  of  course, 
you  can,  although  you  haven't.  One  can  (or  rather,  may  well  be  able  to  -  at  the  upper 
bound  of  practical  possibility,  this  is  still  a  contingent  matter)  add  one  to  the  largest 
number,  but  only  at  time  t',  at  which  time  the  totality  will  include  the  new  number, 
and  the  newer  number  will  itself  be  the  largest  number. 
Thirdly,  with  respect  to  the  final  question,  which  raises  the  concern  that 
different  people  have  differing  abilities  to  survey,  we  may  answer  that  the  limit  is 
indeed  the  same  for  all,  since  what  matters  on  this  account  is  the  optimum  actual 
ability  to  survey.  Notice  that  this  observation  allows  us  to  provide  a  broadly 
epistemicist  response  to  question  i),  without  encountering  the  problematic  idea  that 
different  abilities  will  render  it  redundant. 
Problemsfor  Fanatical  Finitism 
I  can  already  foresee  a  number  of  potential  objections  to  fanatical  finitism,  so 
let  me  now  say  what  I  can  in  order  to  ameliorate  the  problems  that  might  arise  as 
much  as  possible. 
3  There  is  nothing  to  say  that  this  is  in  principle  impossible,  however;  presumably,  there  could  be  a  way 
to  do  so. 
4  of  course,  the  objection  is  misconceived  when  raised  against  strict  finitism,  but  that  does  not  prevent 
its  common  employment  as  we  have  seen  trict  ini  I  -  the  difference  is  that  the  s'  fi  itist  will  in  response 
retreat  to  the  still  controversial  refuge  of  a  vague  totality,  whereas  the  fanatical  finitist  does  not  have  to. 
187 The  first  of  these  arises  from  an  apparent  tension  between  the  notion  of 
surveyability,  to  which  fanatical  finitism  is  still  firmly  committed,  and  the  apparent 
rejection  of  vague  totalities.  To  begin  with,  fanatical  finitism  must  be  committed  to 
the  surveyability  criteria  -  it  is  not  enough  to  say  that  they  have  simply  been 
constructed;  this  leaves  open  the  logical  possibility  that  God,  or  some  superior  form  of 
life,  might  have  already  constructed  them.  So  it  must  be  committed  to  the  idea  that 
numbers  must  be  surveyably  constructed  in  order  to  count  as  admissible.  But,  as  we 
have  seen,  the  notion  of  surveyability  seems  intractably  vague,  whereas  the 
motivation  behind  fanatical  finitism  is  to  avoid  the  problems  of  vagueness  in  the  first 
place.  So  how  can  it  do  so,  while  retaining  the  surveyability  criteria? 
The  answer  lies  in  distinguishing  between  sources  of  vagueness.  I  have  already 
acknowledged  that  on  a  traditional  account,  there  are  two  sources  of  vagueness  -  one 
arising  from  the  apparent  fact  that  adding  one  to  a  number  cannot  affect  the  transition 
from  surveyable  to  non-surveyable,  (a  vagueness  which  fanatical  finitism  is 
attempting  to  eradicate)  and  the  other  arising  from  the  varying  capacity  of  human 
beings  as  surveyors  (which  it  may  perfectly  well  allow  for).  The  important  feature  of 
fanatical  finitism  in  this  instance  is  that  it  establishes  a  precise  limit  on  the  admissible 
numbers  at  any  given  time  -a  determinate  size  for  the  totality  of  numbers.  The 
vagueness  inherent  in  surveyability  in  the  sense  implied  by  the  objection  here  only 
arises  if  we  ask  'can  so-and-so  survey  number  such-and-such?  ',  where  the  answer 
might  well  be  indeterminate  -  the  number  might  lie  in  a  vague  range  for  the  surveyor. 
But  the  totality  of  numbers  is  not  vague,  and  nor  is  the  fact  about  any  given  number  as 
to  whether  it  is  admissible  or  not  -  both  will  depend  purely  on  a  contingent  but 
perfectly  determinate  state-of-affairs.  Hence  the  totality  of  numbers  that  have  been 
surveyed  will  not  be  vague. 
Secondly,  it  might  be  objected  that  the  theory  is  inflexible  with  regards  to 
future  practice.  There  are  two  ways  that  I  can  see  a  potential  objector  might  formulate 
this  worry.  On  the  one  hand,  they  might  object  that  the  size  of  the  totality  of  numbers 
is  inconstant  -  the  totality  may  well  be  much  bigger  at  future  times.  Moreover,  the 
largest  number  today  need  not  be  the  largest  number  tomorrow.  This  way  of  forming 
the  objection  is  not  a  serious  cause  for  concern,  since  it  doesn't  really  amount  to  an 
objection  at  all,  other  than  at  an  instinctive  level;  the  fanatical  finitist  may  simply 
188 agree  that  this  is  a  feature  of  fanatical  finitism  -  the  largest  number  does  vary  over 
time.  But  note  that  this  is  perfectly  reasonable  within  a  constructivist  framework: 
indeed,  we  might  expect  such  a  relationship.  The  set  of  numbers  at  time  t  will  depend 
upon  what  has  been  (relevantly)  surveyably  constructed  by  time  t. 
Alternatively,  the  objection  might  be  put  in  terms  of  truth;  statements  which 
are  true  or  false  at  time  t  will  not  necessarily  remain  so  at  some  future  time  -  and 
usually,  we  want  mathematics  to  be  immune  to  such  revision.  Otherwise,  the  laws  of 
mathematics  may  become  temporally-dependent:  any  statement  about,  say,  all  the 
numbers  may  not  be  true  when  larger  numbers  have  been  added.  But  isn't  this  in  fact 
to  be  expected  also,  on  a  constructivist  account?  The  fact  that  it  is  not  what  we  usually 
expect  of  mathematical  truths  is  no  objection  in  itself,  and  it  seems  that  mathematical 
theories  or  statements  are  held  to  be  true,  and  then  revised  in  light  of  further  work 
(and  in  this  sense,  construction).  Mathematics  makes  fresh  discoveries  in  ways  not 
entirely  distinct  from  those  in  the  empirical  sciences.  Nor  is  it  the  case  that  all 
mathematical  laws  are  subject  to  revision  in  this  sense:  since  some  of  the  laws  govern 
what  may  be  constructed,  it  seems  that  these  laws  at  least  will  be  immutable,  similarly 
for  any  laws  derived  from  them.  For  any  further  statements,  if  they  are  provable  at 
time  t,  they  will  be  true  at  time  t,  but  not  necessarily  true  at  some  later  time,  if  for 
example  a  counter-example  is  constructed.  This  may  seem  a  bitter  pill  to  swallow, 
perhaps  -  since  it  allows  that  some  statements  will  be  true,  and  then  cease  to  be  true. 
When  scientific  discoveries  are  made,  the  earlier  claims  are  (and  always  were)  false. 
But  to  the  extent  that  the  new  scientific  postulates  are  considered  to  be  true  (and 
indeed  that  anything  we  discover  may  be  true),  this  does  not  seem  too  far  removed 
from  the  practice  suggested  by  fanatical  finitism. 
Furthermore,  the  idea  that  the  'expandable'  totality  of  numbers  may  have 
consequences  for  the  truth  of  statements  about  numbers  is  not  a  worry  peculiar  to 
fanatical  finitism.  Strict  finitism  in  general,  even  one  asserting  a  vague  totality  of 
numbers,  should  be  reluctant  to  deny  that  the  totality  can  grow  in  size  as  our  ability  to 
survey  grows  (both  in  terms  of  intellectual  ability  to  achieve  intuitive  grasp  of  a 
number  and  our  continuing  development  and  understanding  of  new  notations). 
I  suppose  that  one  might  also  raise  a  problem  here  about  guaranteeing  that  we 
are  all  thinking  about  the  same  mind-dependent  abstract  objects-  Assuredly,  this  is  a 
problem 
for  anti-realist  theories  in  general,  and  so  is  hardly  worthy  of  special 
189 attention  here,  except  that  particular  to  fanatical  finitism  seems  to  be  the  possibility 
that  a  number  exists  even  though  one  cannot  personally  survey  it.  Do  numbers  then 
exist  for  all  once  someone  has  constructed  them?  This  seems  very  odd  if  one  is 
intrinsically  unable  to  construct  a  number  oneself,  particularly  as  the  number  is  mind- 
dependent  in  the  first  place.  There  is  also  a  sense  in  which  this  sort  of  assertion  seems 
to  grant  the  construction  mind-independence.  We  may  of  course  always  say  of  a 
particular  string  or  arrangement  of  numerals  (or  whatever  is  notationally  relevant)  that 
it  marks  a  genuine  number  because  someone  has  constructed  it  (as  long  as  it  is  true 
that  someone  has,  of  course  -I  do  not  mean  here  that  mere  inscription  of  an 
arrangement  of  numerals  will  suffice),  but  this  does  not  seem  to  properly  address  the 
difficulty. 
What  I  think  is  the  correct  response  here  is  to  recall  that  there  are  still  rules 
governing  the  construction  of  numbers.  Individually,  we  use  the  same  shared  rules  to 
construct  numbers  as  mind-dependent  entities,  and  hence  if  we  try  to  reproduce  a 
number  constructed  by  another,  the  rules  should  ensure  that  we  are  all  referring  to  the 
same  constructions.  The  number  is  not  independent  of  the  mind  in  which  it  is 
constructed,  but  simply  once  it  has  been  constructed  its  actual constructibility  is 
guaranteed.  Other  people  are  ftee  to  construct  the  same  number,  or  even  'new' 
numbers, as  long  as  the  construction  is  consistent  with  the  rules;  as  long  as  we  are 
attentive,  we  will  be  constructing  the  same  numbers. 
Finally,  a  major  objection,  I  suspect,  will  be  concerning  the  possibility  of 
4  gaps'  in  the  number  line.  Since  there  is  nothing  in  the  notion  of  surveyability  that 
requires,  for  a  number  to  be  surveyably  constructed,  that  all  the  numbers  below  it  are 
surveyably  constructed,  it  remains  both  possible  and  likely  that  some  'numbers' 
remain  actually  unconstructed  even  though  there  are  larger  numbers  still  which  have 
actually  been  constructed.  However,  it  is  not  immediately  obvious  why  such  gaps  will 
be  problematic;  the  objection  that  something  is  missing  from  the  classical  picture  is 
not  enough  to  cause  a  problem,  since  that  will  be  true  of  any  finitist  account.  Unless  a 
demonstrable  issue  arises,  the  fanatical  finitist  may  simply  acquiesce  that  there  are 
indeed  'gaps'  below  the  largest  number. 
5 
5  After  all,  there  are  only  'gaps'  by  comparison  with  the  traditional  (classical  platonist)  number  line. 
And  it  is  not  clear  that  even  this  is  a  useful  comparison  for  the  finitist. 
190 Tentatively,  then,  I  conclude  this  section  with  the  claim  that  fanatical  finitism 
is  an  interesting  and  promising  alternative  for  the  strict  finitist.  A  good  deal  more 
development  and  analysis  is  required  before  the  theory  may  be  considered  robust,  but 
at  least  in  light  of  the  early  (and  perhaps  only  the  obvious)  objections,  I  hope  to  have 
established  its  potential.  If  indeed  it  can  be  supported  and  defended  against  further 
criticism,  it  would  offer  an  elegant  solution  to  the  problems  of  vagueness  for  the  strict 
finitist. 
The  role  ofFanatical  Finitism 
Fanatical  Finitism,  then,  is  interesting  for  a  number  of  reasons.  Firstly,  if  it  can 
be  shown  to  be  robust,  it  provides  a  neat  answer  to  the  challenge  that  (strict)  finitism  6 
is  committed  to  vague  totalities,  and  hence  incoherent;  and  one  that  avoids 
commitment  to  vague  totalities  altogether.  Moreover,  if  its  coherence  can  be 
established,  then  to  the  extent  that  the  strict  finitist  is  entitled  to  claim  that 
commitment  to  constructivism  should  not  stop  at  intuitionism  and  should  proceed  to 
strict  finitism,  so  too,  it  seems,  is  the  fanatical  finitist  entitled  to  claim  that  that 
commitment  to  constructivism.  should  lead  inexorably  to  fanatical  finitism. 
On  the  other  hand,  Fanatical  Finitism  is  interesting  because,  if  it  can  be  shown 
to  be  incoherent,  the  consequences  for  constructivism  in  general  are  potentially 
serious.  Crispin  Wright,  in  his  article  entitled  'Strict  Finitism',  suggests  that  there  is  a 
generally  accepted  Modus  Tollens  in  criticisms  of  the  constructivist  (and  finitist) 
tradition,  to  the  extent: 
66  arguments  essentially  analogous  to  those  which  the  Mathematical 
Intuitionists 
...  use  to  support  their  revisions  of  classical  logic  and  mathematics  lead 
to  a  yet  more  radical  strictfinitist  outlook;  this  outlook,  however,  is  incapable  of 
issuing  in  a  coherent  philosophy  of  mathematics;  therefore  there  must  be  something 
6  Fanatical  Finitism  is  intended  as  a  (still  more  vigorous)  form  of  strict  finitism,  and  I  shall  take  it  that 
many  of  the  definitions  established  by  strict  finitism  may  be  employed  by  the  fanatical  finitist  also  - 
both  are  interested  in  the  notion  of  surveyability,  and  both  will  employ  it  to  repudiate  an  infinite  totality 
of  numbers. 
191 amiss  with  the  arguments  which  lead  to  it,  and  by  analogy,  with  the  original 
99  7  intuitionistic  arguments  also  . 
In  essence,  then,  Wright's  proposed  Modus  Tollens  is  this: 
(1)  If  the  arguments  for  Intuitionism  are  compelling,  then  essentially  similar 
arguments  for  Strict  Finitism  are  compelling. 
(2)  Strict  Finitism  is  incoherent. 
(3)  As  such,  the  arguments  for  Strict  Finitism  cannot  be  compelling. 
(4)  Therefore,  the  arguments  for  Intuitionism  cannot  be  compelling. 
Wright  also  suggests  that  the  intuitionist's  response  is  usually  to  try  to  reject 
the  major  (the  conditional)  premise  in  the  argument,  but  convincingly  demonstrates 
that  the  major  premise  is  sound.  Instead,  he  claims  that  the  strict  finitist  is  entitled  to 
reject  the  minor  premise  8,  and  hence  neither  strict  finitism  nor  intuitionism  is 
defeated.  But  as  Wright  further  implies,  strict  finitism  is  of  great  interest  not  only  for 
its  own  sake,  but  also  for  this  inextricable  connection  with  intuitionism. 
Similarly,  then,  I  suggest  that,  even  if  incoherent,  Fanatical  finitism  may  still 
be  of  interest  in  its  relation  to  other  constructivist  formulations.  I  suggest  there  is  a 
similar  link  between  strict  and  fanatical  finitism,  such  that  if  fanatical  finitism,  is 
demonstrably  incoherent,  we  have  a  further  Modus  Tollens,  to  the  extent: 
(1  *)  If  the  arguments  for  Fanatical  Finitism  are  compelling,  then  essentially 
similar  arguments  for  Strict  Finitism  are  compelling. 
(2*)  Fanatical  Finitism  is  incoherent. 
(3  *)  As  such,  the  arguments  for  Fanatical  Finitism  cannot  be  compelling. 
(4*)  Therefore,  the  arguments  for  Strict  Finitism  cannot  be  compelling. 
7  Wright,  'Strict  Finitism',  pp.  203-4 
81  shall  not  recall  here  Wright's  defence  of  the  major  premise,  as,  although  I  find  it  convincing,  its 
success  or  failure  will  not  affect  what  is  to  follow  over  much  -  and  It  is  sufficiently  removed  from  the 
present  debate  to  be  an  unnecessary  digression  within  this  study.  With  regard  to  the  minor  premise,  as 
we  have  seen  elsewhere,  Wright's  defence  of  Strict  finitism  allows  that  the  strict  finitist  must  be 
committed  to  vague  totalities,  but  suggests  that  such  a  commitment  does  not  entail  incoherence  nor  call 
for  the  rejection  of  the  thesis  any  more  than  the  presence  of  vague  predi 
for  the  rejection  of  the  language. 
icates  in  natural  language  call 
192 Of  course,  the  Modus  Tollens  proposed  by  Wright  is  still  in  force,  and  so  the 
incoherence  of  arguments  for  Fanatical  Finitism  would  ultimately  entail  the 
incoherence  of  arguments  for  Intuitionism. 
I  have  so  far  presented  Fanatical  Finitism  as  coherently  as  possible,  and  so  my 
principal  aim  here  is,  I  trust,  apparent:  to  deny  the  truth  of  the  minor  premise  in  the 
second  Modus  Tollens,  just  as  Wright  does  on  behalf  of  strict  finitism  in  the  first,  as 
he  presents  it.  Although  I  do  not  wish  to  attempt  to  properly  establish  here  the  truth  of 
the  major  premise  9-  since  the  primary  concern  of  this  research  is  regarding  the 
coherence  of  (various  forms  of)  strict  finitism  -I  would  however  like  to  close  with  a 
few  remarks  in  this  direction. 
Let  me  then  explain  why  it  is  that  I  maintain  that  someone  committed  to  the 
idea  of  constructivism  should  find  it  hard  to  resist  continuing  further  down  the  road, 
and,  just  as  it  is  claimed  that  strict  finitism  is  the  'natural  outcome'  of  intuitionist 
reasoning'O,  so  it  may  prove  that  fanatical  finitism  is  the  natural  outcome  of  strict 
finitary  -  indeed  general  constructivist  -  reasoning.  Consider  the  constructivist 
constraint.  It  is  natural,  I  suppose,  on  an  anti-realist  account  to  take  it  that  meaning  is 
conferred,  and  not  intrinsic;  that  is  to  say,  in  order  for  a  proposition  to  be  meaningful 
it  must  be  meaningful  to  us. 
Intuitionism,  we  may  recall,  places  a  limit  based  on  what  it  is  in  principle 
possible  for  us  to  construct;  and  the  stnct  finitist  places  a  yet  stricter  limit  based  on 
what  it  is  in  practice  possible  to  construct.  But  constructions  must  surely  be 
understood  as  mind-dependent  abstract  objects,  and  hence  the  real  requirement  here  is 
that  for  a  number,  proof,  or  mathematical  statement  to  have  meaning,  it  must  be 
constructible  in  the  mind.  The  intuitionist  is  criticised  for  not  taking  this  criterion 
seriously  enough  -  for  a  proposition  involving  or  asserting  a  mathematical  object, 
proof,  or  statement  to  have  meaningful  content  it  must  have  meaning  to  us;  and  the 
notion  of  in  principle  possibility  does  not  guarantee  this  properly.  The  proposition 
need  not  have  meaning  to  us,  just  to  something  (even  very  remotely)  like  us,  whose 
9  This  is  of  course  a  crucial  question  with  respect  to  constructivism  in  general,  and  one  that  I  suggest  is 
worth  pursuing;  just  not  one  that  is  strictly  relevant  to  the  topic  in  hand. 
"  Wright  has  made  such  a  claim,  in  fact:  "strict  finitism  remains  the  natural  outcome  of  the  anti-realism 
which  Dummett  has  propounded  by  way  of  support  for  the  Intuitionist  philosophy  of  mathematics", 
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193 only  real  semblance  to  us  is  that  it  must  be  in  some  way  constrained  to  act  in  time, 
and  space  (although  not  necessarily  our  time  and  space;  its  space-time  may  well  be 
limitless,  even  if  ours  isn't).  In  any  event,  the  meaning  of  statements  which  are  not 
within  our  in-practice  capabilities  to  properly  construct  will  not  be  accessible  to  us, 
and  indeed  will  only  be  accessible  to  some  equally  in  principle  possible  beings. 
Hence  the  strict  finitist  asserts  that  we  must  be  concerned  with  in  practice 
possibility.  But  what  is  it  for  a  mental  construction  to  be  in  practice  possible?  If  the 
objection  is  that  mere  in  principle  possibility  is  not  sufficient  to  guarantee  meaning  to 
potential  constructions,  then  why  should  the  objector  stop  at  the  distinction  between 
'in  principle'  and  'in  practice"?  Why  not  object  to  the  modal  qualification  as  well? 
The  thought  here  is  this  -  what  is  it  for  an  (in  practice)  possible  construction  to  have 
meaning,  unless  the  construction  is  actual  as  well?  Can  a  potential  construction  really 
be  said  to  have  meaning,  independent  of  its  actual  construction? 
There  are  perhaps  two  issues  here,  which  first  became  apparent  in  my  earlier 
discussion  about  anti-realism  in  ontology  vs.  anti-realism  in  truth  value.  One  might  be 
tempted  to  separate  issues  of  ontology  from  issues  of  meaning,  or  truth.  If  our 
constructivism  is  of  the  former  kind,  which  is  to  say  that  the  only  numbers  (for 
example)  that  exist  are  those  which  we  can  construct,  then  an  interpretation  of  'can 
construct'  here  that  suggests  there  might  be  numbers  that  exist  but  which  we  have  not 
constructed  seems  absurd;  any  suggestion  that the  'can'  is  potential  rather  than  actual 
-  indeed,  that  it  means  'could'  rather  than  'have'  -  seems  to  undermine  the  whole 
basis  for  the  ontology. 
Indeed,  it  seems  to  me  that  fanatical  finitism  is  the  intuitive  option  following 
constructivist  thinking  -  there  is  after  all  something  rather  odd  about  admitting 
potential  constructions"  into  an  anti-realist,  constructivist  ontology.  Numbers  simply 
are  mind-dependent  constructions.  Why  should  we  be  obliged  to  admit  any  potential 
numbers  that  are  not  (yet)  constructed? 
On  the  other  hand,  one  might  try  to  take  the  anti-realist  in  truth-value  route, 
and  attempt  to  avoid  this  troubling  conclusion.  Instead,  we  might  try  to  assert  that 
numbers  (proofs,  statements)  are  guaranteed  meaning  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  we 
11  4potential'  in  either  sense  here;  potential  as  in  'in  principle',  or  potential  as  in  'possible  but  not 
actual'. 
194 could  construct  them.  A  statement  is  guaranteed  a  truth-value  as  long  as  it  is 
effectively  decidable. 
But  here,  the  strict  finitist  complaint  against  intuitionism  looks  less  well- 
founded  in  the  first  place.  if  we  are  allowed  potentiality  in  the  weaker  sense  of 
'possible  but  not  actual',  then  why  not  in  the  stronger  sense  of  'in  principle'?  We  no 
longer  seem  to  have  quite  the  same  grounds  for  making  the  practice/principle 
distinction  in  the  first  place.  Moreover,  we  saw  in  chapter  two  that  it  is  implausible  to 
suppose  that  truth-value  and  ontology  come  apart  in  this  way  for  the  constructivist. 
It  is  my  conjecture,  therefore,  that  the  first  of  these  suggestions  is  the  only 
feasible  route  for  the  finitist,  and  one  that  appears  to  lead  even  further  down  the 
constructivist  path  towards  fanatical  finitism.  It  becomes  incumbent  on  the 
'traditional'  strict  finitist,  and  moreover  on  the  intuitionist,  to  identify  a  point  at  which 
the  progressively  harsher  constructivist  requirements  may  be  sensibly  halted;  or  else 
their  future  looks  as  bright  or  dark  as  the  future  of  fanatical  finitism  itself. 
195 CONCLUSION 
At  the  outset  of  this  research,  my  aim  was  to  provide  a  robust  defence,  and 
proper  account  of  the  theory  of  strict  finitism.  I  have  divided  the  final  content  of  my 
thesis  into  three  parts,  to  reflect  the  differing  orientation  of  each.  In  part  one,  chapters 
one  through  four,  I  offered  an  account  of  the  theory  of  strict  finitism.  Drawing  upon 
the  existing  literature,  in  the  first  chapter  I  distinguished  between  strict  finitism  and  a 
more  liberal  finitism,  called  'classical'  finitism  by  Tiles,  which  embraces  certainly  the 
mathematical  intuitionists'  school  of  thought.  The  distinction  is  important,  since  the 
only  qualification  for  entry  into  the  broad  school  of  'finitism',  is  I  assert,  a  rejection 
of  the  traditionally  (platonistically)  conceived  infinite  -  that  is,  the  actual  infinite. 
Strict  finitism  then  goes  further  than  the  intuitionists  in  rejecting  potential  infinity 
also. 
I  went  on  to  establish  the  theory  of  strict  finitism  as  a  thoroughgoing  anti- 
realist  constructivism;  an  anti-realism  with  respect  to  both  the  objects  of  mathematics, 
and  the  truth  values  of  mathematical  statements.  Furthermore,  I  made  the  claim  in 
chapter  two  that  it  is  impossible  for  a  strict  finitist  (along  constructivist  grounds  at 
least)  to  be  an  anti-realist  with  respect  to  either  ontology  or  truth  values,  whilst 
holding  a  realist  position  with  regard  to  the  other.  Indeed,  I  remain  sceptical  of  any 
attempt  to  do  so.  In  chapter  two  I  also  introduced  the  notion  of  surveyability,  and 
distinguished  between  the  'weak'  and  'strong'  strict  finitist  claims.  The  weak  claim 
need  not  be  revisionary,  since  it  is  a  claim  only  about  what  we  can  deal  with,  and  not 
about  what  numbers  there  are;  as  such,  I  suggest,  a  strict  finitist  as  I  have 
characterised  him  will  be  interested  only  in  the  strong  claim,  which  carries  with  it  an 
ontological  commitment.  The  weak  claim  approaches  that  advanced  by  Wittgenstein, 
who  is  sometimes  considered  a  strict  finitist  for  this  reason;  in  my  view,  although 
Wittgenstein's  characterisation  of  the  notion  of  surveyability  is  strict  finitist  in 
outlook  (and  indeed  instructive),  his  refusal  to  carry  this  idea  through  to  the 
ontological  level  means  that  he  should  not  be  properly  characterised  as  a  strict  finitist 
in  the  full  sense. 
In  chapter  three,  I  took  Wittgenstein's  criteria  for  the  surveyability  of  proofs, 
and  showed  how  they  could  be  usefully  adapted  to  provide  an  account  of 
surveyability  for  numbers.  In  broad  terms,  the  only  numbers  (as  traditionally 
196 understood)  that  are  admissible  on  a  strict  finitist's  view  are  those  which  are 
surveyable,  which  is  to  say  i)  that  they  are  reproducible,  in  the  sense  that  they  May  be 
written  down,  ii)  that  they  are  checkable,  in  that  one  may  perform  a  check  that  each 
inscription  in  the  representation  is  correctly  reproduced  (that  one  has  written  a  6,  and 
not  an  E,  for  example)  and  iii)  that  they  are  intuitively  graspable,  in  that  their 
magnitude  may  (in  actuality,  and  not  potentiality)  be  grasped  and  understood  by  the 
human  mind.  In  an  attempt  to  further  define  this  notion  of  intuitively  graspable,  I 
suggest  that  one  has  an  intuitive  grasp  of  magnitude  of  a  particular  number  if,  when 
presented  with  any  other  surveyable  number,  one  can  readily  rank  the  pair  in  order  of 
size. 
To  conclude  the  first  part,  in  chapter  four,  I  looked  at  the  problem  of  differing 
notation  and  its  effect  on  the  surveyability  of  numbers.  I  dismissed  the  idea  that 
notation  is  unimportant  in  demarcating  the  numbers  which  are  surveyable  from 
traditionally  accepted  'numbers'  which  are  not,  but  I  was  equally  unconvinced  by  the 
notion  that  notation  (or  perhaps  more  correctly,  the  complexity  of  a  representation) 
should  be  sufficient  grounds  for  such  demarcation.  Instead,  I  suggested  a  hybrid 
model,  in  which  complexity  and  magnitude  take  equal  weighting;  with  the  net  effect 
that  the  three  stage  criteria  outlined  above  be  amended  such  that  the  third  criterion 
reads:  iii)  that  an  intuitive  grasp  of  magnitude  can  be  conveyed  in  some  notation  to 
the  surveyor. 
From  these  four  chapters,  I  contend  that  the  model  of  strict  finitism  I  offer  is 
the  best  model  to  represent  the  theory  in  terms  of  the  way  it  has  been  presented  or 
hinted  at  in  the  literature  to  date.  The  question  of  notation  is  not  one  that  has  been 
seriously  addressed,  and  the  role  of  numbers,  rather  than  proofs  or  statements  of 
mathematical  truths,  has  received  comparatively  little  attention  in  the  existing  work 
on  surveyability;  I  hope  that  the  first  part  of  this  research  goes  someway  towards 
repairing  these  deficits. 
In  the  second  part  of  this  thesis  I  considered  the  principal  objections  raised  by 
contemporary  philosophers  against  the  theory  of  strict  finitism.  The  most  serious  of 
these  is  a  charge  of  inconsistency  levelled  at  the  theory  by  Michael  Dummett, 
although  I  also  considered  three  separate  charges  of  inconsistency  raised  by  Mark 
Addis.  Perhaps  the  most  obscure  of  these  is  what  I  described  in  chapter  five  as  the 
surveyability  dilemma,  and  I  present  there  a  thorough  analysis,  and  broad  rejection,  of 
197 the  alleged  dilemma  facing  the  strict  finitist,  as  it  is  proposed  by  Addis.  Addis 
contends  that  the  dilemma  arises  when  the  strict  finitist  attempts  to  answer  the 
question  'Can  surveyor  X  survey  a  proof  (or  number)  even  if  he  is  not  actually 
surveying  it  at  that  timeT.  If  the  strict  finitist  admits  there  is  a  determinate  answer, 
Addis  claims  he  is  committed  to  counterfactual  realism,  whereas  if  he  argues  that 
there  is  no  determinate  answer,  Addis  claims  that  the  'range  of  applicability  of  the 
concept  of  surveyability'  is  too  restricted  to  be  of  any  use.  I  argued  that  counterfactual 
realism  is  not  the  problem  for  strict  finitism  that  Addis  thinks  it  is,  and  furthermore 
that  the  strict  finitist  is  at  liberty  to  answer  that  there  is  no  determinate  answer  only  in 
some  cases,  dependent  on  the  particular  proof  (or  number)  concerned. 
The  remaining  objections  to  strict  finitism  that  I  considered  in  part  two  centre 
around  the  observation  that  strict  finitism  is  committed  to  vague  totalities,  and  in 
chapter  six  I  gave  a  general  introduction  to  the  problem,  containing  a  first  look  at  the 
Durnmettian  analysis  of  the  sorites  problem,  as  well  as  some  preliminary  remarks  on 
two  standard  ways  of  dealing  with  vagueness:  episternicism  and  the  degree  theory  of 
truth.  I  also  considered  the  idea  that  the  strict  finitist  may  be  able  to  reject  sorites 
paradoxes  on  the  ground  that  they  themselves  are  not  surveyable,  but  found  Crispin 
Wright's  argument  against  this  possibility  convincing.  I  also  made  an  important  point 
regarding  Wright's  conclusion,  however  -a  point  missed  by  Addis  in  his 
consideration  of  the  argument.  Addis  claims  that  Wright's  argument  is  proof  of  a 
further  inconsistency  for  the  strict  finitist;  Wright  in  fact  concludes  no  such  thing.  I 
warned  against  the  mistake  made  by  Addis,  and  endorse  Wright's  assertion  that 
vagueness  is  only  a  problem  for  strict  finitism  inasmuch  as  it  is  a  problem  for  ordinary 
language,  which  also  employs  vague  predicates. 
In  chapter  seven,  I  continued  with  a  discussion  of  Durnmett's  analysis,  and 
reject  the  claim  that  strict  finitism  is  intrinsically  incoherent  in  an  analogous  way  to 
the  way  in  which  Durnmett  claims  to  have  established  incoherence  in  the  case  of 
colour  predicates.  I  reject  the  analogy  on  two  counts  -  firstly,  that  strict  finitary 
predicates  need  not  be  'observational'  predicates  in  Durnmett's  sense,  and  secondly 
that  the  source  of  vagueness  in  strict  finitary  predicates  is  not  the  non-transitivity  of 
non-discriminable  difference.  However,  I  also  acknowledged  that  Durnmett  might 
intend  his  case  to  be  more  general  than  his  analogy  implies,  and  so  in  chapter  eight  I 
moved  on  to  a  consideration  of  weakly  finite  and  weakly  infinite  totalities. 
198 In  that  chapter  we  saw  that  not  only  Dummett,  but  Addis  also,  claim  that 
weakly  finite  and  weakly  infinite  totalities  are  intrinsically  inconsistent.  Allowing  for 
the  sake  of  argument  that  the  strict  finitist  needs  to  be  committed  to  such  totalities  as 
Dummett  defines  them,  I  rejected  both  charges  of  incoherence.  Addis's  mistake 
involves  a  quite  crude  confusion  of  the  notion  of  weakly  finite  sets  with  that  of  finite 
sets.  Dummett's  mistake  is  subtler,  and  his  charge  of  inconsistency  certainly  more 
challenging  to  the  strict  finitist,  but  ultimately  I  suggested  that  he  fails  to  respect  his 
own  definition  of  weakly  infinite,  when  he  assumes  that  a  totality  must  either  have  a 
last  member,  or  be  closed  under  the  successor  operation. 
Dummett's  point  is  nonetheless  compelling  given  the  framework  of  the 
prevailing  bivalent  logic,  and  I  argued  that  this  might  give  us  good  reason  to  abandon 
the  logic,  rather  than  the  strict  finitist  position.  After  all,  as  Dummett  himself  admits, 
the  contradiction  is  equally  problematic  for  such  established  practices  as  colour- 
ascription.  As  a  result,  my  task  in  the  final  section  was  to  explore  alternatives  for  the 
strict  finitist  program,  largely  in  response  to  the  challenge  presented  by  Dummett.  The 
task  I  undertook  in  part  three  was  two-fold;  firstly,  to  examine  alternative  logics  for 
their  capacity  to  deal  with  the  problem,  and  secondly,  to  look  at  alternatives  to 
accepting  Dummett's  definition  of  the  kind  of  totalities  that  strict  finitism  needs  to  be 
committed  to.  The  first  of  these  aims  was  accomplished  in  chapters  nine  and  ten. 
In  chapter  nine,  I  consider  intuitionist  logic  as  an  alternative,  but  conclude 
there  that  it  is  insufficient  to  meet  the  challenge;  Dummett's  point  can  simply  be 
reconstructed  in  purely  intuitionistic  terms  to  present  a  problem  of  equal  magnitude 
for  the  strict  finitist.  Consequently,  I  explored  a  version  of  trivalent  logic  as  a  further 
alternative,  and  assert  that  the  introduction  of  a  third  truth-value,  'Indefinite',  will 
allow  us  to  avoid  the  ruinous  conclusion  that  Dummett  reaches  regarding  totalities 
that  are  weakly  finite  and  weakly  infinite  in  kind. 
The  principal  objection  to  adopting  a  trivalent  semantics  as  a  solution  to  the 
problem  of  vagueness,  despite  its  promise  when  dealing  with  cases  like  Durnmett's, 
remains  the  problem  of  higher-order  vagueness.  I  acknowledge  this  at  the  end  of 
chapter  nine,,  and  so  chapter  ten  is  devoted  to  addressing  the  problem.  I  suggested 
there  that  Michael  Tye  has  an  attractive  method  for  dealing  with  higher-order 
vagueness,  and  one  which  looks  to  render  the  objection  impotent.  If  this  is  the  case, 
there  remains  no  real  barrier  to  the  strict  finitist  who  wants  to  proceed  with 
199 Dummett's  definition  of  weakly  finite  and  weakly  infinite  totalities,  while  at  the  same 
time  deflecting  the  charge  of  inconsistency. 
I  concluded  chapter  ten  with  a  brief  look  at  the  ultimately  unpromising 
alternative  of  a  surveyably-finitely-valued  logic,  before  turning  my  attention  in  the 
final  chapter  to  more  general  alternatives  for  the  strict  finitist  program. 
In  chapter  eleven,  then,  I  considered  the  twin  definitions  Dummett  offers  of 
'weakly  finite'  and  'weakly  infinite',  and  made  the  assertion  that the  strict  finitist  is 
entitled  to  reject  one  or  both  of  the  definitions.  With  respect  to  the  'weakly  finite',  I 
argued  that  the  strict  finitist  does  not  need  to  acknowledge  that  there  are  cases,  for 
any  of  the  totalities  to  which  she  is  committed,  of  genuine  candidates  for  membership 
which  are  clearly  not  members  of  the  totality.  In  the  case  of  numbers,  for  example,  the 
strict  finitist  need  not  admit  that  there  are  'numbers'  (even  proto-numbers,  or 
'putative'  numbers)  which  are  not  surveyable  -  hence  the  description  of  the  totality  of 
numbers  as  being  bounded-above  is  incorrect  for  the  strict  finitist. 
Furthermore,  I  outlined  a  particular  development  of  the  strict  finitist's  claim 
which  is  entirely  consistent  with  a  rejection  of  the  definition  that  Durnmett  provides 
of  'weakly  infinite'.  Fanatical  Finitism,  as  I  referred  to  it,  suggests  that  what  is  of 
paramount  importance  to  establishing  what  numbers  there  are  is  the  numbers  which 
actually  have  been  constructed.  To  that  extent,  the  totality  of  numbers  is  not  without  a 
last  member  -  since  there  will  be  a  determinate  last  member  at  any  given  time  -  and 
so  is  not  weakly  infinite.  I  consider  some  preliminary  objections,  but  can  find  no 
reason  why  fanatical  finitism  should  be  dismissed  as  a  serious  (and  broadly  strict 
finitary)  theory. 
The  options  for  the  strict  finitist,  and  the  potential  for  further  research,  look 
very  promising  as  a  result.  I  hope  to  have  provided  good  reasons  to  be  suspicious  of 
the  various  rejections  of  strict  finitism  in  the  existing  literature,  and  further  reasons 
still  to  consider  the  theory  alive  and  well  as  a  foundation  for  mathematics.  There  are 
several  projects  that  present  themselves  as  themes  for  further  research.  The  first  of 
these  is  a  proper  development  of  a  strict  finitary  arithmetic  in  line  with  the  three- 
valued  semantic  supported  in  chapters  nine  and  ten.  Then  there  are  the  perhaps 
distinct  tasks  of  developing  on  the  one  hand  a  strict  finitism  that  is  reluctant  to 
acknowledge  that  it  is bounded-above,  and  suggests  that  the  domain  of  discourse  for 
numbers  is  the  domain  of  discourse  for  surveyable  numbers,  and  on  the  other  hand  a 
200 strict  finitism  of  the  kind  I  have  described  as  fanatical  finitism.  This  last  task  is,  as  I 
have  suggested,  an  important  one,  and  not  just  for  the  strict  finitist  alone.  For  if  a  full 
defence  of  the  position  proves  impossible,  the  ramifications  for  constructivism  as  a 
whole  are  potentially  serious. 
In  addition,  in  the  context  of  a  wider  research  into  the  prospects  of  a  grand 
rejection  of  the  infinite  that  I  mentioned  in  the  introduction  to  this  work,  I  conclude 
that  strict  finitism  is  a  promising  finite  alternative  to  acknowledging  the  abstract 
infinite  in  mathematics.  And  if  the  scientific  theories  regarding  the  finiteness  of  the 
universe  (some  of  which  are  still  admittedly  in  their  infancy)  are  vindicated,  to  the 
extent  that there  are  no  genuine  instantiations  of  the  infinite  apart  from  the  abstract 
existence  attributed  to  it  in  pure  mathematics,  what  real  remaining  justification  can  we 
have  -  given  that  there  exists  a  consistent,  (if  revisionary),  finite  alternative  foundation 
for  mathematics  -  for  retaining  it? 
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